

THE
WORKS OF PLATO,

VIZ.

HIS FIFTY-FIVE DIALOGUES, AND TWELVE EPISTLES,

IN FIVE VOLUMES
VOL. V.

AMS PRESS
NEW YORK

THE
WORKS OF PLATO,

VIZ.

HIS FIFTY-FIVE DIALOGUES, AND TWELVE EPISTLES,

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK;

NINE OF THE DIALOGUES BY THE LATE FLOYER SYDENHAM,

AND THE REMAINDER

BY THOMAS TAYLOR:

WITH

OCCASIONAL ANNOTATIONS ON THE NINE DIALOGUES TRANSLATED BY SYDENHAM,

AND

COPIOUS NOTES,

BY THE LATTER TRANSLATOR;

IN WHICH IS GIVEN

THE SUBSTANCE OF NEARLY ALL THE EXISTING GREEK MS. COMMENTARIES ON
THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO,

AND A CONSIDERABLE PORTION OF SUCH AS ARE ALREADY PUBLISHED.

IN FIVE VOLUMES.

VOL. V.

ΤΟΤΟΝ ΘΙΑΣΟΦΙΑΣ ΤΥΠΟΝ ΦΑΙΝΕΝ ΑΝ ΕΠΙ ΕΙΣ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥΣ ΕΛΘΕΙΝ ΕΠ' ΕΥΕΡΓΕΣΙΑΙ
ΥΔΗΝ ΤΗΑΙ ΨΥΧΗΝ, ΑΝΤΙ ΤΩΝ ΑΓΑΑΜΑΤΩΝ, ΑΝΤΙ ΤΩΝ ΙΕΡΩΝ, ΑΝΤΙ ΤΗΣ ΟΛΗΣ ΑΓΙΣΤΕΙΑΣ ΑΤΤΗΣ, ΚΑΙ ΙΣΤΗΡΙΑΣ
ΑΡΧΗΓΩΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΓΕ ΝΥΝ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙΣ, ΚΑΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΕΙΛΑΤΟΙΣ ΓΕΝΗΤΟΜΕΝΟΙΣ.

PROCL. MS. COMMENT. IN PARMENIDEM.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR THOMAS TAYLOR,

BY R. WILKS, CHANCERY-LANE;

AND SOLD BY E. JEFFERY, AND R. H. EVANS, PALL-MALL.

1804.

THE EUTHYPHRO:

A

DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

SANCTITY.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE EUTHYPHRO.

THE whole of the Euthyphro of Plato, says Ficinus, is employed in confutation; whence some Platonists have called this dialogue, as well as the Euthydemus and Greater Hippias, *elenctic*. However, as he justly observes, while Socrates confutes the false opinions which Euthyphro entertained of holiness, he presents certain vestiges of the truth to its investigators. We may collect therefore from this dialogue and the Gorgias that holiness according to Plato is that part of justice which attributes to Divinity that which is his own. But as man is a composite being, and the different parts of his composition were produced, according to the Platonic theology, from different divinities, perfect piety will consist in consecrating to each deity that part of us which he immediately gave. This definition being premised, what Plato says here and elsewhere respecting holiness will be apparent. Hence, when it is said that holiness is that which is beloved by Divinity it is true; but it is beloved by Divinity because it is holiness, and is not holiness because it is beloved by him. Likewise because it is beloved by him it may be beloved, but is not beloved because it may be beloved: for the holy is not in every respect the same with that which may be beloved; since neither does the essence of holiness consist in being the object of love, but rather in retribution and devotion.

Again, when it is said that holiness is that which is ministrant to the operations of Divinity, this also is truly said: for it is ministrant to the conversion to Divinity of that which we receive from him. And the work of Divinity

is to produce, convert, purify, illuminate, and perfect. Hence it is beautifully observed by Porphyry, "that being conjoined and assimilated to the highest God, we should offer the elevation of ourselves to him as a sacred sacrifice; for thus we shall celebrate him and procure our own salvation." He adds, "In the soul's contemplation therefore of this Divinity, unattended by the passions, the sacrifice to him receives its completion; but his progeny, the intelligible gods, are to be celebrated vocally by hymns¹." Lastly, when it is said that holiness is the science of requesting and giving to the gods, this likewise is true, though it is not a perfect definition of sanctity. For he who properly prays to Divinity, will request him to impart that by which he may be enabled to offer himself to him in the most acceptable manner.

¹ For the sake of the Platonic reader I will give the whole of this very beautiful passage. *Θυσιμεν τοιουν και ημεις αλλα θυσιμεν, ως προσκει, διαφορους τας θυσιας, ως αν διαφοροις δυναμεισι προσ-αγομεντες. Θωμ μεν τω επι πασι, ως τις ανηρ σοφος εφη, μηδεν των αισθητων, μητε θυμιωντες, μητε επονομαζοντες ουδεν γαρ εστιν ενυλον ο μη τω αυλω ευθυσ εστιν ακαθαρτον. Διο ουδε λογος τουτω ο κατα φωνην, οικειος, ουδ' ο ενδον, εταν παθει ψυχης η μεμολυσμενος δια δε σιγης καθαρας και των περι αυτου καθαρων εννοιων θρησκευομεν αυτον. Δει αρα συναφθεντας, και ομοιωθεντας αυτη, την αυτων αναγωγην θυσιαν ιεραν προσαγαγειν τω θεω, την αυτην δε και υμνον ουσαν και ημων σωτηριαν. εν απαθει αρα της ψυχης τουδε του θεου θεωρια, η θυσια αυτη τελειται. Τοις δε αυτου εγγονοις, ιουτοις δε θεοις, νη και την εκ του λογου υμνιδιαν προσθετιον. Απαρχης γαρ εκαστω αν δεδωκεν η θυσια, και δι αν ημων τρεφει, και εις το ειναι συνεχει εις την θυσιαν. Ως ουν γεωργος δραγματων απαρχεται και των ακροδρυων, ουτως ημεις απαρχομεθα αυτοις, ενοιων των περι αυτων κελων, ευχαριστουτες αν ημων δεδωκασι την θεωριαν, και οτι ημας δια της αυτων θεας αληθινως τρεφουσι, συνοντες και Φαινομενοι και τη ημετερα σωτηρια επιλαμβοντες. Porphy. de Abstinencia, lib. ii. p. 165, 4to. 1767: i. e. "Let us also sacrifice, but let us sacrifice in such a manner as is proper, offering different sacrifices to different powers. To that God, indeed, who is above all things, as a certain wise man says, neither fumigating nor consecrating any thing sensible. For there is nothing material, which, to an immaterial nature, is not immediately impure. Hence neither is external language adapted to him, nor that which is internal when it is defiled by any passion of the soul; but we should adore him in pure silence, and with pure conceptions concerning him. It is necessary, therefore, that, being conjoined and assimilated to him, we should offer the elevation of ourselves to Divinity as a sacred sacrifice; for thus we shall both celebrate him and procure our own salvation. In the soul's contemplation, therefore, of this Divinity, unattended by the passions, the sacrifice to him receives its completion; but his progeny, the intelligible gods, are to be celebrated vocally by hymns. For to each of the gods the first fruits are to be sacrificed of what he imparts to us, and through which he nourishes and preserves us. As, therefore, the husbandman offers his first fruits from handfuls of fruits and acorns, so also we should sacrifice from beautiful conceptions concerning the gods, giving thanks for those things of which they have imparted to us the contemplation, and that, through the vision of themselves, they truly nourish us, associating with and appearing to us, and shining upon us for our salvation."*

THE EUTHYPHRO.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE,

EUTHYPHRO, SOCRATES.

EUTHYPHRO.

WHAT novel circumstance has happened, Socrates, that you, leaving the discussions in the Lyceum, are now waiting about the porch¹ of the king? For you have not an action with the king, as I have.

Soc. The Athenians, Euthyphro, do not call it an action, but an accusation.

EUTH. What do you say? Some one, as it seems, has accused you. For I should not think that you would accuse another.

Soc. I should not, indeed.

EUTH. Has, then, another accused you?

Soc. Certainly.

EUTH. Who is he?

Soc. I do not, Euthyphro, perfectly know the man: for he appears to me to be young, and of no note. But they call him, I think, Melitus; and he is of the town Pittheus: if you have in your recollection one Melitus, a Pitthean, who has long hair, a thin beard, and an aquiline nose.

EUTH. I do not recollect him, Socrates. But what is his accusation of you?

Soc. What is it? Not an ignoble one, as it appears to me. For it is no

¹ The king's porch was a place on the right side of the Ceramicus, where the second of the nine archons, who was called the king, presided for the space of a year. See Pausanias in Attic. lib. i. p. 5, and Meursius in Attic. Lect. lib. vi. c. 27.

despicable thing, for one who is a young man, to be knowing in a circumstance of such a magnitude. For he knows, as he says, how the youth are corrupted, and who they are that corrupt them. And he appears to be a certain wise man; and seeing my ignorance, and considering me as one who corrupts his equals in age, to have accused me to the city, as to a mother. In consequence of this, he only of the citizens seems to me to have begun rightly. For it is right to pay attention to youth, in the first place, that they may become the most excellent characters: just as it is reasonable that a good husbandman should first take care of the young plants, and after this of the others. Thus also Melitus perhaps will first cut us up who corrupt the blossoms of youth, as he says, and afterwards he will certainly pay attention to those of a more advanced age, and thus will be the cause of the most numerous and the greatest goods to the city. This is what may be expected to happen from one who makes such a beginning.

EUTH. I should wish it were so, Socrates; but I tremble, lest the contrary should happen. For, in reality, he appears to me, by trying to injure you, to begin to hurt the city from the Vestal hearth¹ itself. But tell me by what part of your conduct it is that he says you corrupt the youth?

SOC. The things of which he accuses me, O wonderful man, must be considered, when they are heard, as absurd. For he says that I am a maker of gods; and, as if I introduced new and did not believe in the ancient gods, has brought this accusation against me.

EUTH. I understand you, Socrates; it is because you say that a dæmoniacal² power is every where present with you. This accusation, therefore, is brought against you as one that introduces novelties in divine affairs; and as well knowing that the multitude are always disposed to receive such kind of calumnies. For indeed they ridicule me as one insane, when I say any thing in a public assembly concerning the gods, and predict to them future events; though I do not predict to them any thing which is not true. At the same time, however, they envy all such as we are. But indeed it is

¹ The hearth, among the Greeks, contained the household gods, of whom Vesta was the chief. Hence *to begin* from the Vestal hearth was a proverbial expression, when they spoke of beginning with what is most excellent and sacred.

² This perfectly accords with what we have cited from Xenophon, in the Introduction to the Apology of Socrates.

not fit to pay any attention to them; but we should still go on in our own way.

Soc. But, dear Euthyphro, to be ridiculed is perhaps a trifling thing. For the Athenians, as it appears to me, are not very much concerned whether or not a man is skilful in any thing, so long as he is not a teacher of his wisdom; but they are indignant with him whom they think makes others to be such, whether this is from envy, as you say, or from some other cause.

EUTH. With respect to this circumstance, therefore, how they may be affected towards me I am not very desirous to try.

Soc. For perhaps you exhibit yourself but rarely, and are not willing to teach your wisdom; but I fear lest, through philanthropy, I should appear to disclose, with too much freedom, to every man whatever I possess, not only without taking a reward, but even willingly adding one, if any person is willing to hear me. As I therefore just now said, if they were only to ridicule me, as you say they do you, there would be nothing unpleasant in passing the time in a court of justice, jesting and laughing; but if they are in earnest, how this affair may terminate is immanifest, except to you diviners.

EUTH. Perhaps, however, Socrates, the affair will be nothing; but you will plead your cause successfully, and I also think that I shall mine.

Soc. But what is the cause, Euthyphro, which you have to plead? Are you defendant or plaintiff?

EUTH. I am plaintiff.

Soc. Whom do you prosecute?

EUTH. One whom, by prosecuting, I appear to be insane.

Soc. What, then, do you pursue one that flies?

EUTH. He is very far from flying; for he is very much advanced in years.

Soc. Who is he?

EUTH. My father.

Soc. Your father? O best of men!

EUTH. He is, indeed.

Soc. But what is the crime, and of what do you accuse him?

EUTH. Of murder, Socrates.

Soc.

Soc. O Hercules ! The multitude, Euthyphro, will be ignorant how this can ever be right. For I do not think it is the province of any casual person to make such an accusation with rectitude, but of one who has made a very great proficiency in wisdom.

EUTH. Very great indeed, by Jupiter, Socrates.

Soc. Is it any one of your relations who has been killed by your father ? Though it certainly must be so ; for you would not prosecute your father for the murder of a stranger.

EUTH. It is ridiculous, Socrates, if you think it makes any difference whether he who is slain is a stranger or a relation, and are not persuaded that this alone ought to be attended to, whether he who committed the murder did it justly or not ; and, if justly, that he should be dismissed ; but, if unjustly, that he should be prosecuted, even though he should be your domestic, and partake of your table. For you become equally defiled with him, if you knowingly associate with such a one, and do not expiate both yourself and him, by bringing him to justice. But to apprize you of the fact : The deceased was one of our farmers, who rented a piece of land of us when we dwelt at Naxos. This man, having one day drank too much wine, was so transported with rage against one of our slaves, that he killed him. My father, therefore, ordered him to be cast into a pit, with his hands and feet bound, and immediately sent hither, to consult one of the interpreters of sacred concerns what he should do with him ; and in the mean time neglected this prisoner, and left him without sustenance as an assassin, whose life was of no consequence ; so that he died. For hunger, cold, and the weight of chains killed him, before the person my father had sent returned. Hence my father and the rest of my relations are indignant with me, because I, for the sake of a homicide, accuse my father of murder, which, as they say, he has not committed ; and if he had, since he who is dead was a homicide, they think I ought not to be concerned for the fate of such a man. For they say it is impious for a son to prosecute his father for murder ; so little do they know the manner in which a divine nature is affected about piety and impiety.

Soc. But, by Jupiter, Euthyphro, do you think you possess such an accurate knowledge about divine affairs, and how things holy and impious are circumstanced,

circumstanced, that these things having taken place as you say, you are not afraid, left in prosecuting your father you should commit an impious action?

EUTH. My profession, Socrates, would be of no advantage to me, nor would Euthyphro surpass in any respect other men, unless he accurately knew all such particulars.

SOC. O wonderful Euthyphro, it will therefore be a most excellent thing for me to become your disciple, and before the determination of my process to let Melitus know that I have hitherto considered the knowledge of divine concerns as a thing of the greatest consequence; and that now, since he says I am guilty of acting in a rash manner, and introducing novelties concerning divine natures, I am become your disciple. If, therefore, I shall say, you acknowledge, O Melitus, that Euthyphro is wise and thinks rightly in such affairs, think and judge also the same of me; but if you do not entertain this opinion, call him, my preceptor, to account before you call me, as one who corrupts elderly men, viz. me and his father; me by instructing, but him by reproving and punishing. And if he is not persuaded by me, but still continues his prosecution, or accuses me instead of you, it will be necessary to say the very same things on the trial, to which I shall have previously called his attention.

EUTH. It will so, by Jupiter, Socrates; and if he attempts to accuse me, I shall find, as I think, his weak side, and he will be called to account in a court of justice long before me.

SOC. And I, O my dear associate, knowing these things, desire to become your disciple, as I am persuaded that no one, and not even Melitus himself, dares to look you in the face, though he so accurately, inartificially, and easily sees through me, that he has accused me of impiety.—Now therefore, by Jupiter, tell me that which you now strenuously contend you clearly know, viz. what kind of thing you assert holiness to be, and also unholiness, both respecting murder and other things? Or is not holiness the same with itself in every action? And again, is not unholiness, which is perfectly contrary to holiness itself, similar to itself? And does not every thing which it will be unholy to do, possess one certain idea according to unholiness?

EUTH. Certainly, Socrates.

SOC. Tell me, then, what you say holiness, and also what unholiness is?

EUTH. I say, therefore, that holiness is that which I now do, viz. to prosecute him who acts unjustly either with respect to murder or sacrilege, or any thing else of a similar nature; whether the offending person be a father or mother, or any other whatever; and that not to prosecute such a one is impious. For see, Socrates, what a great proof I will give you in law that it is so, and which I have also mentioned to others, viz. that it is right not to spare an impious man, whoever he may be. For men are firmly persuaded that Jupiter is the best and most just of gods, and yet they acknowledge that he put his father in chains, because he unjustly swallowed his children; and again, that Saturn castrated¹ his father, through other things of a similar nature: but they are indignant with me, because I prosecute my father who has acted unjustly; and thus these men assert things contrary to each other in what they say concerning the gods and concerning me.

SOC. Is this the thing then, Euthyphro, on account of which I am brought to the bar, because when any one asserts things of this kind concerning the gods, I admit them with pain; and through which, as it seems, some one calls me an offender? Now, therefore, if these things thus appear also to you who are well acquainted with such particulars, it is necessary, as it seems, that we also should admit them. For what else can we say, who acknowledge that we know nothing about such things? But tell me, by Jupiter, who presides over friendship; do you think that these things thus happened in reality?

¹ For the signification of bonds and castrations, when applied to divine natures, see p. 141 of the Introduction to the Second Book of the Republic. I shall only observe here with Proclus, that Plato was of opinion that all such narrations as these will be condemned by the multitude and the stupid through ignorance of their arcane meaning, but that they will indicate certain wonderful conjectures to the wise. Hence, though he does not admit this mode of mythologizing, yet, as is evident from what he says in the *Timæus*, he thinks we ought to be persuaded by those antients who were the offspring of the gods, and to investigate their occult conceptions. Hence too, though he rejects the Saturnian bonds, and the castrations of Heaven, when discoursing with Euthyphro and the auditors of his Republic, yet in his *Cratylus*, when he investigates names philosophically, he admits other secondary bonds about the mighty Saturn and Pluto. Plato, therefore, by no means ridicules the religion of his country in what he here says, as some moderns have pretended he does; but he admits such relations as these with pain, because he well knew that they would only be impiously perverted by, and were far beyond the comprehension of, the vulgar.

EUTH. Yes, and things still more wonderful than these, Socrates, of which the multitude are ignorant.

SOC. Do you therefore think that the gods *in reality* wage war with each other, and that there are among them dire enmities and battles, and many other such like particulars as are related by the poets, with the representation of which by good painters our temples are decorated; and in the great Panathenææ a veil¹ full of such like variegated ornaments is carried into the Acropolis. Must we say, O Euthyphro, that these things are true?

EUTH. Not these only, O Socrates; but, as I just now said, I can relate to you many other things concerning divine affairs if you are willing, which when you hear I well know that you will be astonished.

SOC. I should not wonder; but you may relate these things to me hereafter, when you are at leisure. Now, however, endeavour to tell me more clearly that which I just now asked. For you have not yet, my friend, sufficiently answered my question what holiness is, but you have only told me that this which you are now doing is holy, viz. to prosecute your father for murder.

EUTH. And I spoke the truth, Socrates.

SOC. Perhaps so. But, O Euthyphro, do you not also say that many other things are holy?

EUTH. I do.

SOC. Recollect, therefore, that I did not request you to teach me one or two from among many holy things, but what that form itself is by which all holy things are holy. For you have said that things unholy are unholy by one idea; and also that things holy are holy by another. Or do you not remember?

EUTH. I do.

SOC. Teach me, therefore, what this very idea is, that looking to it, and using it as a paradigm, I may say that whatever thing of this kind you or any other does is holy, and that whatever is not of this kind is unholy.

EUTH. But if you wish it, Socrates, I will also tell you this.

SOC. I do wish it.

¹ For the explanation of this veil, see the Additional Notes on the Republic, vol. i. p. 520.

EUTH. That, therefore, which is dear to the gods is holy, but that which is not dear to them is unholy.

SOC. You have now answered, O Euthyphro, most beautifully, and in such a manner as I wished you to answer. Whether truly or not however, this I do not yet know. But you will doubtless in addition to this teach me that what you say is true.

EUTH. Certainly.

SOC. Come then, let us consider what we say. That which is dear to divinity, and the man who is dear to divinity, are holy; but that which is odious to divinity, and the man who is odious to divinity, are unholy. But the holy is not the same with the unholy, but is most contrary to it. Is it not so?

EUTH. It certainly is so.

SOC. And these things appear to have been well said.

EUTH. I think so, Socrates.

SOC. But has it not, O Euthyphro, also been said that there is sedition among the gods, and that they oppose and are enemies to each other?

EUTH. It has been said.

SOC. But let us thus consider, excellent man, about what particulars discord produces enmity and wrath. If, therefore, I and you differed in opinion concerning numbers, which of them were more in quantity, would this difference make us enemies, and should we be enraged with each other? Or, betaking ourselves to computation about things of this kind, should we not be quickly liberated from this dissension?

EUTH. Entirely so.

SOC. Hence also, if we differed concerning the greater and the lesser, should we not, by applying ourselves to measuring, soon bring our disagreement to an end?

EUTH. We should.

SOC. And, as I think, by betaking ourselves to weighing, we should be able to judge concerning the heavier and the lighter.

EUTH. Undoubtedly.

SOC. About what then disagreeing, and not being able to recur to a certain criterion, should we become enemies to, and be enraged with, each other?

other? Perhaps you cannot readily inform me; but consider whether they are such as these, viz. the just and the unjust, the beautiful and the base, good and evil. Are not these the things about which disagreeing, and not being able to arrive at a certain judgment of them, we become enemies to each other, when we do so become, you and I, and all other men?

EUTH. This, Socrates, is indeed the dissension, and it is about these things.

SOC. But what? Do not the gods, O Euthyphro, if they disagree in any respect, disagree on account of these very things?

EUTH. By an abundant necessity.

SOC. Different gods, therefore, O generous Euthyphro, according to your assertion, think different things to be just, beautiful, base, good and evil. For they never would oppose each other unless they disagreed about these things. Or would they?

EUTH. You speak rightly.

SOC. Do they not severally, therefore, love those things which they think to be beautiful, good and just, but hate the contraries of these?

EUTH. Entirely so.

SOC. But with respect to these very things, some of the gods, as you say, think them to be just, and others unjust; about which also being dubious, they oppose and wage war with each other. Is it not so?

EUTH. It is.

SOC. The same things therefore, as it seems, are hated and loved by the gods; and the things odious to and dear to the gods will be the very same.

EUTH. So it appears.

SOC. Hence also the same things will be holy and unholy, O Euthyphro, from this reasoning.

EUTH. It seems so.

SOC. You have not therefore, O wonderful man, answered my question. For I did not ask you this, to whom the same thing is both holy and unholy: but, as it seems, that which is dear is also odious to divinity. So that, Euthyphro, there is nothing wonderful if in this which you are now doing, viz. punishing your father, you should do that which is pleasing to Jupiter, but odious to Saturn and Heaven; and which is pleasing to Vulcan, but odious to Juno: and if any other of the gods differs from another about

this

this very circumstance, you should in like manner do that which is approved by the one and hated by the other.

EUTH. But I think, Socrates, that no one of the gods will differ from another in this affair, and assert that it is not proper for him to suffer punishment who has unjustly slain any one.

SOC. But what? Have you ever heard any man doubting, O Euthyphro, whether he who has unjustly slain another, or has done any thing else unjustly, ought to be punished?

EUTH. They never cease doubting about these things, both elsewhere and in courts of justice. For those that act unjustly in a very great degree, say and do every thing in order to escape punishment.

SOC. Do they also, O Euthyphro, confess that they have acted unjustly? And confessing this, do they at the same time say, that they ought not to be punished.

EUTH. They by no means say this.

SOC. They do not, therefore, say and do every thing. For I think they dare not say, nor even doubt this, that if they act unjustly punishment must be inflicted on them: but, as it appears to me, they deny that they have acted unjustly. Do they not?

EUTH. You speak the truth.

SOC. They are not, therefore, dubious about this, whether he who acts unjustly ought to be punished; but they perhaps doubt who he is that acts unjustly, and by what action, and when, his conduct may be considered as unjust.

EUTH. True.

SOC. Will not, therefore, the very same things happen to the gods if they oppose each other concerning things just and unjust, according to your assertion; and will not some of them say, that they act unjustly by each other, and others again deny this? Since, O wonderful man, no one, either of gods or men, dares to assert that punishment ought not to be inflicted on him who acts unjustly.

EUTH. They will: and what you now say, Socrates, is summarily true.

SOC. But those who are dubious, as well gods as men, will be dubious respecting each of the transactions; if the gods disagree about any action,
and

and some of them say that it is done justly, but others unjustly. Is it not so?

EUTH. Certainly.

SOC. Come, then, my dear Euthyphro, teach me also that I may become more wise, what proof you have that all the gods think that he unjustly died, who having slain his fellow-servant, and being put in chains by the master of the deceased, perished before he that bound him received the answer from the interpreters, which was to inform him how he ought to act; and that, on account of such a man, it is right for a son to prosecute his father and accuse him of murder. Come, endeavour to demonstrate to me something clear about these things, and that all the gods consider this action to be right more than any thing. And if you demonstrate this to me sufficiently, I will never cease praising you for your wisdom.

EUTH. But perhaps, Socrates, this is no trifling employment, otherwise I could clearly demonstrate it to you.

SOC. I understand you: I appear to you to be more dull of apprehension than the judges; since you will evidently prove to them that your father's conduct was unjust, and that all the gods hate such-like actions.

EUTH. I shall demonstrate this very clearly, Socrates, if they will only hear what I have to say.

SOC. But they will hear, if you shall appear to speak well. However, while you was just now speaking, I thus thought and considered with myself: If Euthyphro should especially convince me that all the gods think a death of this kind to be unjust, in what respect shall I have the more learned from Euthyphro what the holy is, and also the unholy? For this action, as it appears, will be odious to divinity. It has not, however, yet appeared from this, what is holy, and what not. For that which is odious has also appeared to be dear to divinity. So that I will grant you this, Euthyphro, and if you please let all the gods think it to be unjust, and let them all hate it. Shall we, therefore, now make this correction in the definition, that what all the gods hate is unholy, and what they all love is holy; but that what some of them love, and others hate, is neither, or both? Are you willing that at present we should thus define concerning the holy and unholy?

EUTH. What should hinder, Socrates?

SOC. Nothing hinders me, Euthyphro; but do you, as to what relates to yourself,

yourself, consider whether, admitting this, you can so easily teach me what you promised?

EUTH. But I say the holy is that which all the gods love; and its contrary, the unholy, that which all the gods hate.

SOC. Shall we not therefore consider, Euthyphro, whether this is well said? Or shall we dismiss this consideration, and thus grant both to ourselves and others, that if any one only says that a certain thing is so, we shall admit that it is so? Or shall we consider what he who speaks says?

EUTH. Consider it certainly; though I think that this is now well said.

SOC. Perhaps, O good man, we shall know this more clearly. For consider as follows: Is the holy, because it is holy, beloved by the gods; or because it is beloved by them, is it holy?

EUTH. I do not know what you say, Socrates.

SOC. But I will endeavour to speak more clearly. We say that a thing may be carried, and that a thing carries; that a thing may be led, and that a thing leads; that a thing may be seen, and that a thing sees; and every thing else of this kind. Do you understand that these are different from each other, and in what they differ?

EUTH. I appear to myself to understand this.

SOC. Is therefore that which is beloved a certain thing, and that which loves another different from this?

EUTH. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Tell me, therefore, whether that which may be carried, may be carried because it is carried, or for some other reason?

EUTH. For no other reason but for this.

SOC. And is this the case with that which may be led, because it is led; and with that which may be seen, because it is seen?

EUTH. Entirely so.

SOC. A thing therefore is not seen because it may be seen; but, on the contrary, because it is seen, on this account it may be seen. Nor because a thing may be led, on this account is it led; but because it is led, on this account it may be led. Nor because a thing may be carried, is it carried; but because it is carried, it may be carried. Is then what I wish to say evident, Euthyphro? But what I wish to say is this: If any thing is making;

ing, or suffers any thing, it is not making because it may be made ; but because it is making it may be made. Nor because it may suffer does it suffer ; but because it suffers it may suffer. Or do you not admit this to be the case ?

EUTH. I do.

SOC. Is not this therefore also the case with that which is beloved, or making, or suffering something from some one ?

EUTH. Entirely so.

SOC. This therefore subsists in the same manner as the things before mentioned : it is not beloved by those by whom it is beloved, because it may be beloved ; but because it is beloved, it may be beloved.

EUTH. It is necessary.

SOC. What then do we say concerning holiness, O Euthyphro ? Is it not this, that it is beloved by all the gods, according to your assertion ?

EUTH. Yes.

SOC. Is it therefore beloved on this account, because it is holy, or for some other reason ?

EUTH. For no other reason but on this account.

SOC. Because it is holy, therefore, it is beloved ; but not because it is beloved, on this account it is holy.

EUTH. It appears so.

SOC. Because however it is beloved by the gods, it may be beloved, and be dear to divinity.

EUTH. Undoubtedly.

SOC. That which is dear to divinity, therefore, is not holy, O Euthyphro, nor must holiness be defined to be that which is dear to divinity as you say, but it is something different from this.

EUTH. How is this, Socrates ?

SOC. Because we have acknowledged that holiness is on this account beloved because it is holy ; and not that it is holy because it is beloved. Did we not ?

EUTH. Yes.

SOC. But that which is dear to divinity, because it is beloved by the gods, from this very circumstance that it is beloved, is dear to divinity ; but not because it is dear to divinity, on this account is it beloved.

VOL. V.

D

EUTH.

EUTH. True.

SOC. But, my dear Euthyphro, if that which is dear to divinity were the same with that which is holy, if holiness were beloved through its being holiness, that also which is dear to divinity would be beloved through its being dear to divinity. But if that which is dear to divinity were dear to divinity through being beloved by the gods, that which is holy would also be holy through being beloved. Now, however, you see that they are contrarily affected, as being perfectly different from each other. For the one, viz. what is dear to the gods because it is beloved, is a thing of that kind that it may be beloved; but the other, viz. holiness, because it is a thing which may be beloved, on this account is beloved. And you appear, O Euthyphro, when you was asked what holiness is, to have been unwilling to manifest the essence of it to me, but to have mentioned a certain affection pertaining to it, which this same thing holiness suffers, viz. the being beloved by all the gods; but you have not yet told me what it is. If therefore it is agreeable to you, do not conceal this from me, but again say from the beginning what holiness is, whether it be beloved by the gods, or has any other property whatever pertaining to it. For we shall not differ about this. But tell me readily what the holy, and also what the unholy is?

EUTH. But, Socrates, I cannot tell you what I conceive. For whatever position we adopt, is always some how or other circumvented, and is not willing to remain where we have established it.

SOC. The things which you have asserted, O Euthyphro, appear to be the offspring of our progenitor Dædalus¹. And if I indeed had said and adopted these things, perhaps you would have derided me, as if my works also, which consist in discourse, through my alliance with him, privately escaped, and were unwilling to remain where they were placed. But now (for they are your hypotheses) the raillery of some other person is necessary. For they are unwilling to abide with you, as it also appears to you yourself.

EUTH. But it appears to me, Socrates, that what is said ought to be exposed to nearly the same ridicule. For I am not the cause of the circuitous

¹ Dædalus was a most ingenious statuary, and is said to have made figures which moved of themselves, and seemed to be endowed with life. Socrates, therefore, calls Dædalus his progenitor, because his father was a statuary, and he himself when young exercised his father's art.

wandering of these assertions, and of their not abiding in the same place; but you appear to me to be the Dædalus. For so far as pertains to me, these things would have remained firm.

SOC. I appear therefore, my friend, to have become so much more skilful than that man in this art, in as much as he only made his own productions unstable; but I, besides my own, as it seems, make those of others to be so. And moreover, this is the most elegant circumstance pertaining to my art, that I am unwillingly wise. For I had rather that my reasonings should abide, and be established immovable, than that the riches of Tantalus, together with the wisdom of Dædalus, should become my possession. But enough of this.—Since, however, you appear to be delicate, I, in conjunction with you, will endeavour to show how you may teach me concerning holiness, and not be weary till this is accomplished. For see whether it does not appear to you to be necessary that every thing holy should be just.

EUTH. To me it does.

SOC. Is therefore every thing just also holy? or is every thing holy indeed just; but not every thing just holy, but partly holy, and partly something else?

EUTH. I do not comprehend, Socrates, what you say.

SOC. And yet you are younger no less than you are wiser than I am; but, as I said, you are delicate through the riches of your wisdom. However, O blessed man, collect yourself: for it is not difficult to understand what I say. For I assert the contrary to the poet^{*}, who says,

You Jove, the source of all, refuse to sing:
For fear perpetually resides with shame.

I therefore differ from this poet. Shall I tell you in what respect?

EUTH. By all means.

SOC. It does not appear to me, that wherever there is fear, there also there is shame. For there are many, as it seems to me, who fear diseases, poverty, and many other things of this kind, but who by no means are ashamed of these things which they fear. Does not the same thing also appear to you?

^{*} The name of this poet appears to be unknown.

EUTH. Certainly.

SOC. But wherever shame is, there also is fear. For is there any one who is ashamed of and blushes at any thing, but who does not at the same time fear and dread the opinion of improbity?

EUTH. He will certainly dread this.

SOC. It is not therefore right to say, that where there is fear, there also there is shame; but we should say that where there is shame, there also fear resides. For wherever there is fear, there is not also shame. For I think that fear extends further than shame; since shame is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of number. So that it does not follow that wherever there is number, there also is the odd; but wherever there is the odd, there also there is number. Do you now apprehend me?

EUTH. Perfectly so.

SOC. Respecting a thing of this kind, therefore, I inquired above, when I asked you whether where the just was, there also the holy was; or whether where the holy was, there also the just was, but the holy was not to be found every where in conjunction with the just. For the holy is a part of the just. Does it appear to you that we should thus speak, or otherwise?

EUTH. Not otherwise; but thus. For you appear to me to speak rightly.

SOC. See then what follows: for, if the holy is a part of the just, it is necessary, as it seems, that we should discover what part of the just the holy will be. If therefore you should ask me some of the things just now mentioned, as, for instance, what part of number the even is, and what number it is, I should say that it is not scalene, but isosceles¹. Or does it not appear so to you?

EUTH. It does.

SOC. Do you therefore also endeavour in like manner to teach me what part of the just the holy is, that we may tell Melitus he must no longer act unjustly by us, nor accuse us of impiety, as having now sufficiently learnt from you what things are pious and holy, and what not.

EUTH. This part then, Socrates, of the just, appears to me to be pious

¹ Socrates calls the even number isosceles, because it can be divided into two equal numbers as if they were sides; but this is not the case with the odd number, which may therefore be compared to a scalene triangle, because as in this all the sides are unequal, so all the parts of an odd number are unequal.

and holy, viz. that which is conversant with the culture of the gods; but that which is conversant with the culture of mankind is the remaining part of the just.

Soc. And you appear to me, Euthyphro, to speak well. However, I am still in want of a certain trifling particular. For I do not yet understand what culture you mean. For you certainly do not say that such as is the culture about other things, such also is that which pertains to the gods. For instance, we say not every one knows the culture of horses, but he who is skilled in equestrian affairs. Do we not?

EUTH. Certainly.

Soc. For equestrian skill is the culture of horses.

EUTH. It is.

Soc. Nor does every one know the culture of dogs, but this belongs to the huntsman.

EUTH. It does.

Soc. For the art of hunting is the culture of dogs.

EUTH. It is.

Soc. But the grazier's art is the culture of oxen.

EUTH. Certainly.

Soc. But holiness and piety are the culture of the gods, O Euryphro. Do you say so?

EUTH. I do.

Soc. All culture, therefore, effects the same thing, viz. the good and advantage of that which is cultivated. Just as with respect to horses, you see that being cultivated by the equestrian art, they are advantaged by it and become better. Or does it not appear so to you?

EUTH. It does.

Soc. Dogs also are benefited by the huntsman's art, and oxen by that of the grazier, and all other things in a similar manner. Or do you think that culture is the injury of that which is cultivated?

EUTH. Not I, by Jupiter.

Soc. But the advantage therefore?

EUTH. How should it not?

Soc. Is holiness, therefore, since it is a culture of the gods, an advantage
to

to the gods, and does it make the gods better? And do you admit this, that when you perform any thing holy, you render some one of the gods better?

EUTH. Not I, by Jupiter.

SOC. Nor do I, O Euthyphro, think that you say this: it certainly is far otherwise. And for this reason I asked you what this culture of the gods is, not thinking you would say a thing of this kind.

EUTH. And you thought rightly, Socrates: for I do not say any such thing.

SOC. Be it so. But what culture of the gods will holiness be?

EUTH. That culture, Socrates, which slaves pay to their masters.

SOC. I understand. It will be a certain subserviency as it seems to the gods.

EUTH. Entirely so.

SOC. Can you then tell me, with respect to the art subservient to physicians, to the accomplishment of what work it is subservient? Do you not think it is subservient to health?

EUTH. I do.

SOC. But what? with respect to the art subservient to shipwrights, to the accomplishment of what work is it subservient?

EUTH. Evidently, Socrates, to that of a ship.

SOC. And is not the art subservient to architects, subservient to the building of houses?

EUTH. Yes.

SOC. Tell me, then, O best of men: with respect to the art subservient to the gods, to the accomplishment of what work will it be subservient? For it is evident that you know, because you say that you have a knowledge of divine concerns beyond that of other men.

EUTH. And I say true, Socrates.

SOC. Inform me then, by Jupiter, what that all-beautiful work is which the gods effect, employing our subserviency.

EUTH. They are many and beautiful, Socrates.

SOC. The generals of an army too, my friend, accomplish many and beautiful things; but at the same time you can easily tell what that principal thing is which they effect, viz. victory in battle. Or can you not?

EUTH.

EUTH. How is it possible I should not?

SOC. Husbandmen also, I think, accomplish many and beautiful things; but at the same time the principal thing which they produce is aliment from the earth.

EUTH. Entirely so.

SOC. Of the many and beautiful things then which the gods accomplish, what is the principal?

EUTH. I told you a little before, Socrates, that to learn accurately how all these things subsist is an arduous undertaking; but I now tell you simply this, that if any one knows how to say and do things acceptable to the gods, praying and sacrificing to them, these things are holy. Things of this kind also preserve both private houses and cities; but the contraries to things acceptable to the gods are impious, and these subvert and destroy all things.

SOC. You might, if you had been willing, Euthyphro, have told me the sum of my inquiries in a much shorter manner. But it is evident that you are not readily disposed to instruct me. For now when you drew near for this purpose you receded; though if you had answered, I should before this perhaps have learnt from you what holiness is. But now (for it is necessary that he who interrogates should follow him who is interrogated wherever he may lead) what do you again say the holy, and holiness, is? Do you not say it is a certain science of sacrificing and praying?

EUTH. I do.

SOC. Is not to sacrifice to offer gifts to the gods; but to pray to request something of the gods?

EUTH. Very much so, Socrates.

SOC. From this it follows that holiness will be the science of requesting and giving to the gods.

EUTH. You have very well understood, Socrates, what I said.

SOC. For I am very desirous, my friend, of your wisdom, and I pay attention to it; so that what you say does not fall to the ground. But tell me what this subserviency to the gods is? Do you say it is to request of them and to give to them?

EUTH. I do.

SOC. Will it not follow, therefore, that to request rightly, will be to request of them those things of which we are in want?

EUTH.

EUTH. What else can it be?

SOC. And again, will not to give rightly consist in giving to them in our turn such things as they are in want of from us? For it would not be conformable to art to bestow upon any one those things of which he is not in want.

EUTH. You say true, Socrates.

SOC. Holiness, therefore, O Euthyphro, will be a certain mercantile art between gods and men.

EUTH. Let it be mercantile, if it pleases you so to call it.

SOC. But it is not pleasing to me unless it be true. Tell me therefore what advantage the gods derive from the gifts which they receive from us? For the advantage arising from their gifts is evident to every one; since we have not any good which they do not impart. But in what respect are they benefited from what they receive from us? Or have we so much the advantage in this merchandise, that we receive every good from them, but they receive nothing from us?

EUTH. But do you think, Socrates, that the gods are benefited by what they receive from us?

SOC. What is the use then, Euthyphro, of these our gifts to the gods?

EUTH. What other use do you think except honour and reverence, and, as I just now said, gratitude?

SOC. Holiness then, Euthyphro, is that which is acceptable to the gods, but not that which is profitable to, or beloved by them.

EUTH. I think it is the most of all things beloved by them.

SOC. This then again is as it seems holiness, viz. that which is dear to the gods.

EUTH. Especially so.

SOC. Asserting these things, can you wonder that your discourse does not appear to be fixed, but wandering? And can you accuse me as being the Dædalus that causes them to wander, when you yourself far surpass Dædalus in art, and make your assertions to revolve in a circle? Or do you not perceive that our discourse, revolving again, comes to the same? For you remember that in the former part of our discourse, the holy, and the dear to divinity, did not appear to us to be the same, but different from each other: or do you not remember?

EUTH.

EUTH. I do.

SOC. Now, therefore, do you not perceive that you say the holy is that which is beloved by the gods? But is this any thing else than that which is dear to divinity?

EUTH. It is nothing else.

SOC. Either therefore we did not then conclude well, or, if we did, our present position is not right.

EUTH. It seems so.

SOC. From the beginning, therefore, we must again consider what the holy is. For I shall not willingly, before I have learnt this, run timidly away. Do not then despise me, but paying all possible attention, tell me the truth in the most eminent degree. For you know it, if any man does; and you will not be dismissed like Proteus till you have told me. For if you had not clearly known what the holy, and also the unholy is, you never would have attempted, for the sake of a man who is a hireling, to accuse your father of murder, when he is now advanced in years; but you would have dreaded (lest you should not act rightly in this affair) the danger of incurring the anger of the gods, and the reproach of men. But now I well know that you clearly *suspect*¹, that you have a knowledge of what the holy and its contrary are. Tell me, therefore, most excellent Euthyphro, and do not conceal from me what you think it to be?

EUTH. It must be at some other opportunity then, Socrates: for now I am in haste, and it is time for me to leave you.

SOC. What do you do, my friend? By your departure you will throw me from the great hope I had entertained of learning from you what things are holy, and what are not so, and of liberating myself from the accusation of Melitus, by showing him that I was become wise through Euthyphro in divine concerns; that I shall no longer speak rashly, nor introduce any novelties respecting them through ignorance; and also that I shall act better during the remainder of my life.

¹ Plato here very properly uses the word *am, you suspect*, because Euthyphro not being freed from two-fold ignorance, or, in other words, being ignorant that he was ignorant, had nothing more than a *suspicion* of the nature of holiness.

THE MENO:

A

DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

V I R T U E.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE MENO¹.

THIS Dialogue has been always justly entitled "Concerning Virtue." For the true subject of it is the nature and origin of virtue. The question, indeed, proposed to Socrates by Meno in the very outset of the Dialogue, is this other, "How virtue is acquired." But Socrates immediately waves the question, and draws the conversation to an inquiry "what virtue is," as of necessity previous to the inquiry, "whence it comes." However, from the result of the reasoning, we shall perceive both these questions answerable together: we shall be convinced, that none can know the nature and essence of virtue, without knowing the fountain whence it is derived; and that whoever knows what this is, cannot fail of knowing at the same time what that is in which virtue consists. For, if we attend closely to the steps or gradual advances made in these inquiries, through the course of this Dialogue, we shall discover that virtue consists in that kind of knowledge and that kind of power, taken together, the capacity of both which is in the human, as the partakes of a divine intellect, whose essence is its own object, and whose energy is the contemplation of itself, and the government of the universe. That kind of knowledge, therefore, which belongs to virtue is the knowledge of true good; and that kind of power in the soul, through which, joined to that knowledge, a man is virtuous, is the power of the

¹ The whole of this Introduction is extracted from the Argument of Mr. Sydenham to this Dialogue; excepting a few passages, which, from his not being sufficiently skilled in the more profound parts of Plato's philosophy, it was necessary to alter.—T.

intellect

intellect over the inferior part of the soul, the imagination and the passions. The gradual advances made toward this discovery form the conduct of this divine Dialogue. And the first step is to show, that virtue, though it seems to be a very complex idea, and made up of many virtues, different in their natures, and respectively belonging to different persons, is but one simple idea, though called by different names, as the particular subjects on which it operates, or the particular objects which it has in view, differ one from another. In the next step, we find that this idea includes power and government, to which account immediately are subjoined, by way of explanation, these restrictions, power well and wisely exercised, and government well and justly administered. Here then we discover that the Well, the Wisely, and the Justly, are essential to the idea of virtue. Next, we march in some obscurity: for here we see only by help of a metaphor, seemingly introduced, but in the way of a similitude, to illustrate a point sufficiently made clear already, that is, the wholeness or rather oneness of the idea of virtue. The metaphor is taken from outward figure, the definition of which being given, that it is bound, the bound of solid bodies, suggests to every disciple or studious reader of Plato, that virtue itself is bound, that virtue intellectual is the bound of things within the mind, and that virtue practical is the bound of human actions and human manners*. We then move a step further, in the same manner, by the light only of metaphor. The metaphor here is taken from the corpuscular philosophy, then newly brought into vogue by Protagoras, who had learnt it from Democritus, and by Gorgias, who had learnt it from Empedocles. And Socrates here prosecutes the subject of inquiry in this dialogue, under a pretence of giving a definition of colour, according to the doctrine of this philosophy which Meno had imbibed. Colour, he says, is owing to effluvia from the surfaces of bodies entering the pores of the organs of sight; these being exactly fitted for the reception of such effluvia: by which means those effluvia, being commensurate

* Our explication of this part of the Dialogue may perhaps appear fanciful to readers unacquainted with Plato. To obviate this appearance, we are to observe, that, as Pythagoras used to illustrate things mental by mathematical numbers, so Plato frequently illustrates them from the principles of geometry, and frequently also through sensible images, or things corporeal. And perhaps these two ways of illustration are the easiest and the plainest ways, through which we can at first be led to conceive things purely abstract, the objects of intellect.—S.

with

with these pores, become the objects of sight. Thus the philosopher plays with the prejudices of Meno, a disciple of the sophists, and therefore not a proper subject for his instruction; and introduces, with a professed view of only gratifying him, a point which seems very foreign to the subject, and not at all necessary to illustrate his meaning. But to his own friends and followers, who were acquainted with his doctrine, and were then near him, he thus ænigmatically insinuates that virtue and vice are as it were the colours of human actions; that by the light of mind we are able to distinguish them; that the science of virtue is as natural to the human understanding, as the perception of outward objects is to the eye of sense; that the mental eye is exactly adequate to its objects; and that all truth in general, and moral truth in particular, the present subject, is commensurate with the mind. The next advance we make discovers to us that virtue consists in a love and desire of true good, and true beauty, necessarily consequent to the knowledge of what is truly good and truly beautiful: it being impossible to forbear loving what appears beautiful, or desiring what appears good. And having already found that the idea of virtue includes power and government, we find that the whole idea of virtue is the power of preserving or of recovering true good and beauty, known to be such, and loved and desired because known. The next step brings us to the end of our journey in this inquiry concerning virtue; by showing us that the knowledge of all truth, and consequently of true good and beauty, is connatural to the soul of man: and is so, because her origin is divine, and her essence immortal. Now, the demi-urgic intellect, the source of her being, is immortal and divine, and truth eternally there resides, the stable and invariable object of intellect. Plato, therefore, in proving to us, as he does in this part of the Dialogue by an incontestable instance, that the soul of man naturally assents to and embraces truth, when fairly presented to her, and exhibited in a clear light, proves to us at the same time, that she participates of this eternal intellect and truth.

Thus much concerning the first part, about one-half the Dialogue. In the latter half the inquiry into the nature of virtue is resumed, but in a different way. For Meno, having here urged the consideration of his first question, "how virtue is acquired," Socrates, in pretending to yield at length to this inquiry, brings us round by another road to the end, which he

himself had all along in view, the teaching "what virtue is." And here it is suggested, through a geometrical enigma, in the first place, that not every soul is capable of virtue; that a certain predisposition is requisite; that the parts of the soul must be well proportioned to each other, in their natural frame, in order that the whole man may, through virtue, be made *totus teres atque rotundus*. In the next place, we find, that virtue consists not in any particular virtuous habit or habits of the soul, whether intellectual or moral, but in the prudential use and exercise of them; whence it follows, that virtue is not acquired by mere practice or habit. Thirdly, we find that virtue consists not merely in a good disposition, without being well cultivated, and consequently comes not by nature. Fourthly, that it consists not in any particular science or sciences, and therefore is not acquired by learning, and is not to be taught in the ordinary method of instruction or discipline. Preparatory to this part of the inquiry, a new character is introduced into the Dialogue, Anytus, (a great enemy to the sophists, and desirous of being thought a politician,) as a necessary person to show, that neither the professed men of wisdom, the sophists, nor the allowed men of virtue, the preservers of the Athenian state through their good government, were fit masters or teachers in the science of virtue. At length, by the help of all these negatives, we find in what it positively doth consist, that is, in true wisdom, not only derived originally from the divine mind by participation, but also inspired immediately by it through continual communication; presupposing, however, as a necessary foundation, or fit subject for the reception of this wisdom, a soul well disposed by nature, cultivated by right discipline, and strengthened by constant care and attention. But as the two first requisites, a good natural disposition, and right institution, depend on the divine Providence; and as the last, the constant practice of virtue, depends on the divine assistance; all these co-operating causes of virtue are, in the conclusion of this Dialogue, summed up by Plato in one word, *θεῖα μοῖρα*, the divine portion or allotment to men justly styled divine. Thus much may suffice at present for unfolding the subject, and delineating the parts of this Dialogue. What is here wanting in clearness, or in fulness, we shall endeavour in the notes to illustrate and to amplify. The end and design of the Dialogue is to excite men, well-disposed by nature, and prepared by the rudiments of good education, to the assiduous culture and improvement of their minds by think-
ing

ing and reasoning. This design appears, first, from the uncommon warmth and zeal with which Socrates is represented in the latter half of the Dialogue, pressing an inquiry after lost knowledge, and an endeavour to discover latent truths. The same design appears further from the long time taken up in recounting many sad instances of a neglect of virtuous studies in the youths of highest rank in Athens; the enumeration of which, being so prolix, can have no other view than to deter us from the same neglect. But the tendency of the Dialogue best appears from that effect, which the grand doctrine of it, as before explained, naturally must have on every docile and candid mind. For, if the human partakes of a divine intellect, and of all therefore which is of its essence; if truth has thus descended from Heaven into the souls of men, and Divinity himself be there, ready to communicate more and more the heart-felt knowledge of things divine and eternal to every soul which retires within itself; who would not wish thither to retire, and there, in that sacred silence, the silence of the passions, in that sacred solitude, the absence of all the objects of imagination, that flight of the alone to the alone, *φυγή μόνου προς μόνον*¹, to enjoy the presence and converse of the divinely solitary principle of things? Agreeably to this design of Plato, and also on account of the audience, which was composed partly of strangers, and partly of the friends and followers of Socrates, (as usual in that place where the conversation was held,) the inquisitive turn is given to this Dialogue, partly exciting and partly assisting, by means of leading questions, every where proposed by Socrates, and of hints thrown in here and there of his profound meaning. Meno is represented but as an humble disciple of the sophists, and presumes not to dispute or to argue like his masters. And Anytus appears as an enemy to all philosophical disputation. There is not so much as the shadow of a skirmish throughout the Dialogue. Yet the division of Plato's Dialogues, made by Thrasyllus, and followed by Albinus, led them to number it amongst those of the Peirastic kind, as not knowing where else to place it with less impropriety. The outward form of it is purely dramatic; and the character of Anytus, as here exhibited, affords a just specimen of the part he soon afterwards acted in the accusation of Socrates, and the bringing him to a public trial as a malefactor.

¹ Thus Plotinus, in the close of his last Ennead, very finely and justly expresses our sense.—S.

THE MENO:

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE,

MENO¹, SOCRATES,

A Servant Boy of Meno's, ANYTUS².

SCENE.—*The LYCÆUM*³.

¹ This is the same Meno mentioned by Xenophon, in his expedition of Cyrus the Younger, as one of the generals of the Grecian allied army in that expedition. Plutarch, in his Life of Phocion, relates, that Meno commanded all the cavalry. Certain it is from Xenophon, that he had the command of the forces sent from Thessaly. Near the end of the second book of that incomparable history above mentioned, the elegant and faithful writer of it, having before given us an instance of Meno's baseness, presents us with a portrait of him drawn at full length, the features of which are odious. But at the time of his conversation with Socrates, recited in this Dialogue, he was so young, that his mind and true character could not as yet have appeared openly, or have been known in the world. He first made a figure in the expedition with Xenophon, whilst he was still in the flower of his youth; but he was soon taken prisoner, and brought to Artaxerxes, by whose orders he was put to a lingering and ignominious death, not as an enemy but as a malefactor. Some slight strokes, however, appear even in this Dialogue, giving us a sketch of his turn of mind; as will be observed in their proper places.

² Enough has been said of this fellow, in the Introduction to this Dialogue, to prepare the reader for his appearance in the figure he there makes.

³ The following circumstances, considered together, evince the scene to be laid in the Lycæum. First, it was the place ordinarily frequented every day by Socrates, with his disciples and followers. Next, it was the place of resort for all strangers, especially the young and noble, such as Meno was, to see the Athenian youth exercise themselves, and to hear the sophists, if any happened to be at Athens, dispute and harangue. See note on the scene of the Greater Hippias. Lastly, it cannot be supposed, that Socrates should meet with Anytus, his enemy, at any other than a public place, free to all men.—S.

MENO.

MENO.

CAN¹ you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue² is to be taught; or whether it is acquired, not through teaching, but through exercise and habit;

¹ The reader will observe this to be a very abrupt way of beginning a conversation, especially with a stranger, known only by his name and character. What makes it the more remarkable is, that a young person, but just arrived at the age of manhood, should thus accost an old man in his seventieth year, venerable from his known wisdom and a long life of virtue. Some may think that Plato intended here to paint the insolent familiarity of young men of large fortune and bad education, in their manner of addressing their inferiors in point of wealth. Such a thought has, perhaps, some foundation in truth. But Plato's principal purpose, in beginning the Dialogue with an impertinent question from the mouth of Meno, is, as appears plainly from the reply of Socrates, to exhibit to us the arrogant pretensions of the sophists, and particularly of Gorgias, in taking upon themselves to answer every philosophical question proposed to them. Meno had in his own country been used to this behaviour of theirs; and Socrates had, long before this, acquired a distinguished character for his superior skill in philosophical disputations. Meno, therefore, who knew no difference between Socrates and the sophists, attacks him directly, without the ceremony of a preface, with a question, point blank, on one of the most knotty subjects of inquiry in all philosophy. For he presumed that Socrates was sitting in the Lyceum, like one of the sophists, ready to answer all such questions. The only other dramatic Dialogue of Plato which begins thus abruptly is the *Minos*. There is the same kind of propriety in both. The only difference is this, that in the *Minos*, a Dialogue between Socrates and a sophist, Socrates is the questioner; and in the *Meno*, he is the person questioned.—S.

² Many years before the time of this Dialogue, Socrates had held a disputation with Protagoras on this very point, whether virtue could be taught; a disputation, recited by Plato in a Dialogue called after the name of that great sophist. The question was then debated before a numerous audience of sophists and their followers, as well as of the friends and disciples of Socrates himself. The disputants, however, came to no agreement on the matter in dispute. The result of their conversation was only this, that Protagoras, the prince of sophists, was so generous as to bestow his commendations on the great philosopher, and was graciously pleased to say, that "he should wonder if Socrates in time did not become considerable in fame for wisdom." The commendations of a sophist, no less renowned for his philosophical knowledge, than venerable on account of his experienced age, (for he was then about 75 years old,) increased the reputation of Socrates amongst the tribe of sophists; and it is probable that these men spread the fame of that disputation throughout all Greece. It seems, therefore, as if Meno, an admirer of the sophists, and bred up under one of their disciples, was desirous of hearing Socrates himself speak on that celebrated subject of former debate. Accordingly, meeting with Socrates in a convenient place, he attacks him at once with a question on that very point. We may observe, however, that Meno here states the question in a more ample manner than that in which it had been considered in the debate between Socrates and Protagoras: for he particularly mentions all the other ways, beside that of teaching, in which it ever was supposed that virtue was attainable. So that this Dialogue, *The Meno*, though not so entertaining as *The Protagoras*, is more comprehensive and affords a wider field for speculation.—S.

or whether it comes neither by exercise, nor yet by teaching, but is by nature with those who are possessed of it; or comes it to them by some other way?

Soc. You Thessalians, Meno, have been of old eminent among the Grecians¹. You have been long admired for your superior skill in horsemanship², and famed for the great wealth you are possessed of³. But I think you have now acquired no less fame for wisdom⁴. And amongst others of you, the fellow-citizens of your friend Aristippus⁵ of Larissa have distinguished themselves not a little in this respect. Now this is entirely the work of Gorgias. For in his travels, when he came to their city, he drew the chiefs of the Aleuadian family⁶ (one of whom is your friend Aristippus), and indeed all of highest quality in the other states of

¹ The Thessalians were the most antient inhabitants of Greece; and from time to time sending out colonies from their own country, Thessaly, spread themselves by degrees over all the rest of Greece; as we are told by the old geographers.—S.

² The people who lived in Thessaly had the reputation of being the best horsemen, and in war the best cavalry, in the world. See Suidas in voce 'Ιππεις λευκοθώρακες. This was owing to their breeding of excellent horses, which were every where valued as the best, both for service and for beauty; as may be seen in the *Zeuxis* and the *Eprates* of Lucian, and in a note to The Greater Hippias. And this valuable breed of horses was favoured by the soil of their country, which was partly mountainous, and partly well watered by fine rivers running through the midst of spacious and open plains.—S.

³ In the time of Plato these people were grown very rich; but were thought to have acquired their riches chiefly by very unjust means, by fraud, by theft, and by kidnapping and selling free men as slaves: for which crimes they were infamous throughout the rest of Greece. See Xenophon. *Memorabil.* lib. i. cap. 2. § 24.—S.

⁴ Meaning the pretended wisdom taught by the sophists.—S.

⁵ This Aristippus was a man of the highest rank and power in the city of Larissa. We here find him to have been sophisticated by Gorgias: and it may justly be inferred, from the mention of him in this manner, that he himself had sophisticated Meno. But it appears in the highest degree improbable that he should be the same person with an Aristippus mentioned by Aristotle in the beginning of the third Book of his *Metaphysics*: for this latter was a sophist by profession; and the profession of a sophist was no more becoming to men of high birth and quality, than that of an itinerant quack-doctor or strolling stage-player is now-a-days amongst us. See Plato in *Protag.*—S.

⁶ This was the noblest family in Larissa. They were descended from Aleuas, one of the kings of Thessaly, of the race of Hercules; and were at this time the oligarchic tyrants of their country. Meno is here complimented in the seemingly honourable mention thus made of his friend, whom we presume to have been also his immediate instructor. For at the time supposed in this Dialogue, Gorgias was upwards of ninety years of age, and Meno a very young man.—S.

Theſſaly,

Theffaly, to be the admirers of his wisdom¹. From him you Theffalians learned the habit of answering to any question whatever with an undaunted and a noble confidence, such indeed as becomes those who have a thorough knowledge of the subject proposed to them. For he² in the same manner offered himself to be freely interrogated by any one of the Grecians, whom it should please to ask him, concerning any point which the party questioning might choose: and to no question of any person did he ever refuse an answer. But we in this place, my friend Meno, are in a condition quite the contrary. Amongst us there is a dearth, as it were, of wisdom; which seems to have forsaken our country, and to have fled to yours. So that if you should take it into your head to propose to any one here the question you have proposed to me, there is not a man of us who would not laugh and say, "Friend stranger, you must think me wonderfully wise, to know whether virtue is a thing which can be taught, or by what other means it is

¹ The great reputation of Gorgias appears to have had its first rise in Theffaly. For thus Philostratus, in the Proem to his Lives of the Sophists,—*ἡρξε τῆς ἀρχαιοτερας [sc. σοφιστικῆς] Γεργίας ὁ Λεοντινός ἐν Θετταλοῖς*. Indeed Theffaly was the most proper of all places for Gorgias to display his art in, and by that means to acquire reputation. For his art was the art of deluding through sophistical oratory and sophistical argumentation; and these are the fittest and most successful engines that can be employed for the purpose of deceiving. If therefore the people of Theffaly were such as they are represented, Gorgias could not fail of meeting there with a multitude of followers and admirers. In fact, these people became so great proficient in the art of deceiving, and so famous for the practice of it, that every ingenious or dextrous stroke of deceit was proverbially called *Θετταλον σοφισμα*, a Theffalian sophism. In Athenæus, p. 308, Myrtilus, the sophist of Theffaly, is called *Θετταλον παλαισμα*, a cunning and crafty wrestler in disputation; or, as Eustathius explains the term, *Θετταλος ελεγκτικος*, subtle in refuting any argument. The same Myrtilus is called jocosely by the same author, p. 11, himself *Θετταλον σοφισμα*, a Theffalian cheat (in his way of arguing).

² Plato, in his Dialogue named Gorgias, utters in this great father and prince of sophists by relating, that he had just now, at a private house, challenged any of the company to interrogate him on whatever point they pleased, and had undertaken to answer all sorts of questions. This appears to have been usual with him. For Philostratus reports, that when he came to Athens he had the confidence to present himself in the midst of the theatre, and to say to the whole assembly *Προσάλλετε*, "propose," meaning, any argument for him to dissent on: agreeably to which is the account given of him by Cicero in the beginning of his second Book de Finibus, that he was the first that ever dared *in conventu poscere questionem*, in public to demand the question, *id est*, says Tully, *jubere dicere quid de re quis vellet audire*, to bid any man declare what subject he chose to hear a discourse upon.—S.

attained :

attained: when I am so far from knowing whether it can be taught, or not, that I have not the good fortune to know so much as what virtue is." Now this, Meno, is exactly my own case. I am in the same poverty of knowledge as to this affair, and confess myself to be totally ignorant concerning the essence of virtue. How then should I be able to say what qualities are to be attributed to that which is utterly unknown to me? Or do you think it possible for a man, wholly ignorant who Meno is, to know whether Meno is a man of honour, a man of fortune, a man of a generous spirit, or whether he is the reverse of all these characters? Do you think it possible?

MENO. I do not. But in good earnest, Socrates, do you really not know what virtue is? and do you give me leave to carry home such a character of you, and to make this report of you in my country?

SOC. Not only that, my friend, but this further—that I never met any where with a man whom I thought master of such a piece of knowledge.

MENO. Did you never then meet with Gorgias, during his stay in this city?

SOC. I did.

MENO. And did you think that he knew nothing of the matter?

SOC. I do not perfectly remember, Meno, and therefore am not able to say directly what I then thought of him. But perhaps not only was he himself knowing in the nature of virtue, but what he used to say on that subject you also know. Do you then remind me what account he gave of virtue; or, if you are unwilling so to do, give me an account of it yourself; for I suppose you agree with him in opinion.

MENO. I do.

SOC. Let us leave him, therefore, out of the question, especially considering that he is absent. But what you yourself think virtue to be, tell me, Meno, and freely communicate your knowledge of it, that I may be happy in being convicted of having uttered what is so happily an untruth, when I said that I never any where met with a man who knew what virtue was; when, at the same time, both yourself and Gorgias shall appear to have been so well acquainted with the nature of it.

MENO. Whatever you may imagine, Socrates, it is by no means difficult to tell what you desire to know. In the first place, to instance in the
virtue

virtue of a man, nothing is easier to tell than that a man's virtue consists in his ability to manage affairs of state, and, in managing them, to be of service to the public and to its friends, to distress its enemies, and to guard, at the same time, with vigilance and circumspection, against any harm that might arise from those enemies in their turn. Then, if you would know what is the virtue of a woman, it is easy enough to run over the particulars: it is to manage well the affairs of her family, carefully to keep safe all that is in the house, and to hearken with due observance to her husband. Another kind of virtue belongs to a child, different too in a girl from what it is in a boy: so is it likewise of the aged. And if you choose to proceed further, the virtue of a free man is one thing, that of a slave is another thing. Many more virtues are there, of all sorts; so that one cannot be at a loss to tell, concerning virtue, what it is. For in every action, and in every age of life, with reference to every kind of business, some peculiar virtue belongs to each person: and in vice also, I suppose, Socrates, there is the same respective difference, and the same variety.

Soc. I think myself much favoured by Fortune, Meno; for, when I was only in quest of one virtue, I have found, it seems, a whole swarm of virtues hiving in your mind. But, to pursue this similitude, taken from bees:—Supposing, Meno, I had asked you what was the nature of a bee, and you had told me that bees were many and various, what would you have answered me if I had demanded of you further, whether you called them many and various, and differing one from another, in respect of their being bees; or whether you thought they differed not in this respect, but with regard to something else, as beauty, or size, or other thing of like kind, accidental? What answer would you have made to such a question?

MENO. I should have answered thus; that so far as they were bees, and in this respect, they differed not at all one from another.

Soc. Suppose, then, that I had afterwards said, Tell me, therefore, Meno, concerning this very nature of bees, in respect of which they do not differ, but all agree and are alike; what say you that it is? Should you have had any answer to have given me to this question?

MENO. I should.

Soc. Just so is it with the virtues. Many indeed are they, and of various kinds: but they all agree in one and the same idea; through their agree-

ment in which they are, all of them alike, virtues. This idea the man, who is asked the question which I have asked of you, ought to have in his eye when he answers it; and, copying from this idea, to draw a description of virtue. Do you not apprehend the meaning of what I say?

MENO. Tolerably well, I think I do. But I am not in the possession of it so fully as I could wish.

SOC. Take it thus then.—Do you think after this manner concerning virtue only, that the virtue of a man is one thing, the virtue of a woman another thing, and so of other respective virtues, that they are all different? or have you the same way of thinking as to the health, size, and strength of the body? Do you think the health of a man to be one thing, the health of a woman to be a thing different? or is the same idea of health every where, wherever health is, whether it be in a man, or in whatever subject it be found?

MENO. The health of a man and the health of a woman, I think, are equally and alike health, one and the same thing.

SOC. Do you not think after the same manner with regard to size and strength; that a woman, if she be strong, is strong according to the same idea, and with the same strength, which gives a strong man the denomination of strong? By the same strength I mean this, that whether strength be in a man, or in a woman, considering it as strength, there is no difference; or do you think that there is any difference between strength and strength?

MENO. I think there is not any.

SOC. And will any difference, think you then, be found in virtue, with respect to its being virtue, whether it be in a child or in an aged person, in a woman or in a man?

MENO. This case of virtue, Socrates, seems somehow to be not exactly parallel with those other instances.

SOC. Why? Did you not tell me that the virtue of a man consisted in his well-managing of civil affairs, and that of a woman in the well-managing of her household?

MENO. I did.

SOC. I ask you, then, whether it is possible to manage any affairs well, whether civil or domestic, or any other affairs whatever, without a prudent and a just management?

MENO.

MENO. By no means.

Soc. If then the management be just and prudent, must not the managers manage with justice and with prudence?

MENO. They must.

Soc. Both of them, therefore, have occasion for the same things, to qualify them for being good managers, both the woman and the man, namely, justice and prudence.

MENO. It appears they have.

Soc. And how is it in the case of a child, or that of an old man? Can these ever be good, if they are dissolute and dishonest?

MENO. By no means.

Soc. But only by their being sober and honest?

MENO. Certainly.

Soc. All persons, therefore, who are good, are good in the same way; for they are good by being possessed of the same qualities.

MENO. It seems so.

Soc. Now if virtue were not the same thing in them all, they would not be good in the same way.

MENO. They would not.

Soc. Seeing, therefore, that virtue is the same thing in all of them, endeavour to recollect and tell me, what was the account given of it by Gorgias, which was the same, it seems, with the account you would give of it yourself?

MENO. What else is it than to be able to govern men? If you are in search of that, which is one and the same thing in all persons who have virtue.

Soc. It is the very thing I am in search of. But is this then the virtue of a child, Meno? And is it the virtue of a slave, to be able to govern his master? Do you think him to be any longer a slave, when he can govern?

MENO. I think he is then by no means a slave indeed, Socrates.

Soc. Neither is it proper, my friend, that he should be so. Consider this also further. You say it is virtue to be able to govern. Should we not immediately subjoin the word *justly*, and say, to govern justly? For you would not say, that to govern unjustly is virtue.

MENO. I think we should. For justice, Socrates, is virtue.

Soc. Virtue is it, Meno, or some certain virtue?

MENO. How mean you by this distinction?

Soc. I mean no otherwise than as every thing else whatever is distinguished: to instance, if you please, in roundness. Of this I should say that it is some certain figure, and not thus simply and absolutely that it is figure. And for this reason should I express myself in that manner, because there are other figures beside the round.

MENO. You would thus speak rightly. And indeed, to say the truth, I myself not only call justice a virtue, but say that other virtues there are beside.

Soc. Say, what these other virtues are. As I would recount to you, were you to bid me, other figures beside the round; do you recount to me, in like manner, other virtues beside justice.

MENO. Well then; courage I think to be a virtue, and temperance another, and wisdom, and magnanimity, and a great many more.

Soc. Again, Meno, we have met with the same accident as before; we have again found many virtues, while in search of one only; though then indeed in a different way from that in which we have now alighted on them: but the one virtue, which is the same through all these, we are not able to find.

MENO. For I am not able as yet, Socrates, to apprehend such virtue as you are inquiring after, that one in all, as in other things I am able.

Soc. Probably so; but I will do the best I can to help us onward in our inquiry. Already you apprehend, in some measure, that thus it is in every thing. For should any person have asked you what was figure, the thing I just now mentioned, and you had said it was roundness; were he then to ask you, according to the same distinction which I made concerning justice, whether roundness was figure, or some certain figure; you would answer, it was some certain figure.

MENO. Without all doubt.

Soc. And would you not answer thus for this reason, because there are other figures beside the round?

MENO. For that very reason.

Soc. And were he to ask you further, of what sort those other figures were, you would tell him?

MENO.

MENO. I should.

SOC. Again ; questioned in the same manner concerning colour, what it is ? had you answered, It is whiteness ; should the questioner immediately proceed to this further question, whether whiteness is colour, or some certain colour ? you would say, Some certain colour ; because there happen to be other colours.

MENO. I should.

SOC. And if he were to bid you enumerate those other colours, you would speak of colours, which happen to be colours no less than the white.

MENO. Certainly.

SOC. If then he were to prosecute the argument, as I do, he would say, We are always getting into multitude¹ ; deal not with me in this manner : but since to all this multitude you give one common name ; since you tell me there is none of them which is not figure ; and that, notwithstanding, they are contrary some to others² ; what is this which comprehends the round as well as the straight, this thing to which you give the name of figure, and tell me that the round is figure not more than is the straight ? or do you not say this ?

MENO. I do.

SOC. I ask you, then, whether when you say this, you mean it in respect

¹ For the senses are always drawing us into multitude ; which, considered as multitude, belongs only to sensible and outward things. But as soon as any multitude, or many, are considered together, and comprehended in one idea, they become the object of mind, and are then one and many ; sense and imagination being now accompanied by mind. To this consideration of things, this comprehension of many in one, Socrates here endeavours to lead Meno in the same way in which he elsewhere leads Thæætetus, that is, by means of mathematical objects, to which his mind was familiarized ; this being a step the easiest to him, and perhaps naturally the first toward the attainment of universal ideas, things purely mental. For the opening of the mind is in the first place to numbers ; thence she proceeds to figures as the bounds of body, and is at first sight delighted with figures mathematical. If afterwards she is taught the mathematical sciences, then in proportion as her powers open more and become enlarged, she easily attains to view many in one ; to view, for instance, the properties of all triangles contained in the triangle itself. And in the circle, the square, the pentagon, and all other figures, she has the same comprehensive view. With these mathematical figures Meno was well acquainted ; and upon this foundation did Socrates propose to him to consider the nature of figure in general, or that one thing in which all figures agree and are the same.—S.

² As rectilinear figures are contrary to circles ; the whole periphery of these latter being a curve line.—S.

of roundness, and that the round is not more round than is the straight? or with regard to straightness, and that the straight is not more straight than is the round?

MENO. I mean not thus, Socrates.

SOC. But it is with a view to figure, that you assert the round not more to be figure than is the straight, nor the straight more than is the round.

MENO. True.

SOC. Try then if you can tell me, what that thing is which is called by this general name of figure. Now suppose, that to an inquirer in this way concerning figure, or concerning colour, you were to say, I do not comprehend what it is you would have, man; nor do I know what it is you mean: he perhaps would wonder; and would say, Do you not comprehend that I am inquiring, what is the same in all these? Would you have nothing to say neither after this, Meno, were you to be asked, what that was in the round, in the straight, and in the other things you call figures, in all of them the same? Endeavour to find out and tell me what it is; that you may the better afterwards consider of, and answer to, the like kind of question concerning virtue.

MENO. Not so, Socrates; but do you yourself rather say what figure is.

SOC. Would you have me oblige you in this point?

MENO. By all means.

SOC. Shall you then be willing to tell me what virtue is?

MENO. I shall.

SOC. Let us then do our best; for the cause deserves it.

MENO. Without all doubt.

SOC. Come then; let us try if we can tell you what figure is. See if you can accept the following account of figure. Let us say, figure ¹ is that which of all things is the only one that always accompanies colour. Are you satisfied with this account? or do you inquire any further? For my part, I should be well contented if you would give me but as good an account of virtue ².

MENO.

¹ In this first definition of figure, Socrates considers it only as it belongs to body; that is, not mathematical figure, but corporeal; figure which always accompanies colour, because it is always seen by the same outward light, which exhibits to us the different colours of all bodies, and without which they have indeed no colour at all.—S.

² Socrates was very sensible, that his definition had not explained the nature of the thing, and that he had only described it by that which Porphyry terms *συμπεσῆναι ἀχρυστοῖς*, an inseparable

MENO. But, Socrates, this is weak and silly.

SOC. How so?

MENO. According to your account, that is figure which always accompanies colour.

SOC. Well.

MENO. But should any person now reply, that he knew not what colour was, and was equally at a loss concerning colour and concerning figure, what could you think of the answer that you had given to his question?

SOC. I?—that I had answered with truth. And if my questioner happened to be one of your wise men, your disputers and contenders, I would tell him ¹, that I had spoken; and that, if I had not spoken rightly, it was his business to take up the argument, and to refute what I had said. But if two parties, such as you and I here, as friends, and in a friendly way, were inclined to have discourse together, their answers to each other's questions ought to be made in a milder manner, and to be more rational. Now it is perhaps more rational, that an answer should not only be agreeable to truth, but besides, should be conceived in terms confessedly understood by the party questioning. Accordingly, I shall now attempt to make you such a kind of answer. For tell me; do you not call some certain thing by the name of end, speaking of such a thing as bound or extreme? For by all these words I mean the same thing. Prodicus, indeed, might possibly dispute it with us: but you would use these expressions indifferently, that such or such a thing is bounded, or, that it has an end. This is all I mean; nothing of subtle disquisition, or nice distinction.

able accident of it, that is, a circumstance which, though accidental, or not of necessity attending on its essence, yet in fact always did attend on it, namely, the accompaniment of colour. And he here professes, that he would be satisfied with such a description of virtue denoting any circumstance which always attended on her: as if we described virtue thus; Virtue is that which always accompanies wisdom.—S.

¹ Socrates, in conversing with the sophists, never used *λογον διδασκαλικον*, the instructive method of delivering his doctrine: because, fancying themselves sufficiently knowing and wise already, they were not disposed to learn. Nor did he ever take the truly dialectical way with them; or make use of *λογον διαλεκτικον*: because they were not concerned about truth in any argument; and because also they either had not, or would not, acknowledge any first principles to argue from. But he disputed with them always in their own way, *δια λογων εριστικων*; confuting them from their own concessions, and reducing to absurdities the answers which they gave to his questions.—S.

MENO,

MENO. Well ; there is something which I call end : and I think I understand what you mean.

SOC. And is there not something which you call superficies ? another, which you call solid ? such as those, I mean, which are the subjects of geometry.

MENO. I call certain things by the names you mention.

SOC. Now then, from these premises which you admit, you may understand what I mean by figure in general. In every figure, that which bounds the solid, I call figure. And to express this in one short proposition, I should say that figure is the bound of solid.

MENO. And what say you colour is ?

SOC. You use me ill now, Meno. You put an old man to the task of answering, yet are unwilling yourself to take the trouble only of recollecting and telling me what Gorgias said that virtue was.

MENO. But I will ; after you have told me what colour is.

SOC. A man with his eyes hoodwinked might perceive from your way of conversing, Meno, that you are handsome, and still have your admirers.

MENO. How so ?

SOC. Because you do nothing but command in conversation, as fine ladies do, that are used to have their wills in all things ; for they tyrannize so long as their beauty lasts. At the same time too, perhaps, you have discovered me, how easy I am to be subdued by beauty, and how apt to stoop to it. I shall do therefore as you would have me, and shall answer to your question.

MENO. By all means do, and gratify my request.

SOC. Do you choose that I should make my answer in the style of Gorgias¹, that by this means you may apprehend it the more easily ?

MENO.

¹ Gorgias, as appears from what follows, accounted for all the sensible qualities of things, that is, for every thing perceived through any of the five outward senses, by corpuscular, or little invisible bodies, continually *εκπνεύοντα*, flowing forth, or emitted, from all larger, visible, and apparently figured bodies, and striking the sense of all sensible animals within their reach. With regard to one kind of the sensible qualities of bodies, namely, odours, whether the fragrant or the fætid, the same account is given of them by most of the modern philosophers. For they are generally held to be the effluvia of bodies odoriferous, striking and affecting either agreeably or disagreeably

MENO. I should be glad that you would do so, most undoubtedly.

Soc. Do you not hold, you and Gorgias, that certain effluvia flow forth from bodies, agreeably to the doctrine of Empedocles¹?

MENO. We hold that doctrine strongly².

Soc.

disagreeably the olfactory nerves, where the particular sense of smell is supposed to be seated. We shall presently observe, in what manner the ancient Corpuscularians, whose system was more uniform and simple than that of the moderns, extended the power of these effluvia to all the rest of the outward senses.—S.

¹ Empedocles was a Pythagorean philosopher of Agrigentum in Sicily; and wrote a poem in three books, concerning Nature, on the principles of Pythagoras. For this great founder of the Italic sect, though he applied himself chiefly to the study of mind, the governing principle in nature, as the only way to understand nature rightly, yet philosophized also on the outward and corporeal part of the universe: the elements of which, consistently with his notions of mind, he held not to be irregular and infinite, as the Atomic and Atheistic philosophers imagined: but to be formed by rule in number, and in measure, as being the work of mind. Plato, in his *Timæus*, hath introduced the Pythagorean, from whom that dialogue takes its name, telling us the measures and proportions of these elements. It sufficeth at present to say of them, that they are the four generally considered ever since as the elements of nature, fire, air, water, and earth. On this foundation Empedocles built his poem, explaining all the appearances of outward nature from the combination and motion of these four elements. His poetry was deemed by the ancients, in point of versification, equal to that of Homer. And he seems to have been a celebrated poet, before he commenced philosopher. For though it does not appear that in this poem he divulged any of the Pythagorean secrets, yet his brothers of that sect, who were all strictly united together in fellowship, did, on the publication of his poem, as fearful of the precedent (and no writings had till then been ever published by any Pythagorean), expel him from their society; at the same time making a law, that from thenceforth no poet should ever be admitted amongst them as a member of their body.—S.

² Empedocles differed from the Atomic philosophers of old in this, that he held all natural bodies, and even their minutest parts, so long as they remained parts of those bodies, to be composed of the four elements. Now as air and fire, two of those four, are active elements perpetually in motion; and as all compound bodies are more or less porous; he supposed a continual efflux of igneous and aerial particles from those bodies into whose composition they had entered, through such measures or pores, whether straight or winding, as were fitted for their passage and their exit. To supply the place of these departed particles, and to maintain the same state in the composition of the bodies they had quitted, he supposed a continual influx of fresh air and fire from without, uniting themselves to their congenial elements within, and thus becoming ingredients in the frame of the compounded or mixt bodies into which they had entered. These fresh streams he held to be almost pure and elementary air and fire, as pure however as the circumambience. But the particles, streaming forth from those bodies, he supposed to be impure, and to be mixed or combined with aqueous particles, and also with earthy ones of various kinds, according to the nature

Soc. And do you not hold certain pores ¹, into which and through which those effluvia pass?

MENO. Certainly.

Soc. And that some of those effluvia ² are adapted to some of these pores, but are either less or greater than other pores?

MENO.

nature of the body from which they issued. For the union of the four elements in compound bodies he held to be so intimate, and the particles of different elements to adhere so closely one to another, that none pass out pure as they entered; but that every particle of the subtler and lighter elements, in departing, carries along with it some particles of the grosser and heavier, earth and water. Now this is obvious to sight in moist bodies, vehemently heated by fire from without acting on them; that is, in bodies into which so great a number of igneous particles have entered as tend to operate the dissolution of those bodies. For we here see the aqueous particles, pregnant with air and fire, issuing forth and ascending in the form of steams and vapours. And that earthy particles are combined with them, we may reasonably conclude from the different colours of these steams or vapours. For the steam, which arises from pure water heated, hath always the same uniform colour. The difference therefore of colour in steams or vapours must be derived from the different kinds of earthy particles, or, as the chemists love to express themselves, the different salts, in those liquors and those moist bodies, from which the diverse coloured steams or vapours arise. The like appearances may be observed in the perspiration of animal bodies, when they suffer a higher degree than usual of intestine heat; that is, when the igneous particles within are put into vehement commotion, and set loose through violent exercise of the body: the perspired moisture we may then see, by retaining it on linen, to be tinged with the colour of those salts, which are constantly separated from the blood by the kidneys and thrown off in urine. It may perhaps not be impertinent to take notice here by the way, that Empedocles, and the rest of the ancient Elementarian physiologists, attributed this difference of earth or earthy salts, from whence they supposed all bodies to derive the difference of their colours, to different mixtures of the four elements constituting those very minute earthy particles; the mere earthy part of which is the *caput mortuum* of the chemists, if this be indeed elementary pure earth. From hence the Corpuscularians, by parity of reason, drew this conclusion; that as, in all appearance, bodies derived their different colours from the different kinds of earth which made the grosser part of their composition, the colours which reached our eyes, and which we saw, were the finest earthy particles of those bodies, combined with particles of elementary fire, the essence of light uncoloured of itself, continually streaming forth in effluvia too minute for the eye to discern their figures, and visible only in the colour.—S.

¹ Meaning here the pores of other bodies, surrounding those which emit the effluvia, and either close to them in contact, or at least near to them enough to be reached by those effluvia, before their combination is quite broken, and they are resolved into their pure elements.—S.

² The Elementarian physiologists held, that the effluvia of all compound bodies were of different figures and dimensions, according to the natures and different proportions of their composing elements. And consequently to this they must have held, that the pores of these bodies

were

MENO. Things are so framed.

Soc. And do you not admit of something which you call sight?

MENO. I do.

Soc. These premises being granted, "Now let your mind accompany my words¹," as Pindar says. Colour then is the flowing off from figures, commensurate with the sight, and by that sense perceived².

MENO.

were large enough for the passage and emission of their own effluvia, as well as for the admission and reception of other particles from without to supply their places. But this was not sufficient to account for the different kinds of sensation, arising in the several senses of sentient animals, from the operation and effect of the effluvia of other bodies transmitted to them. They supposed, therefore, that the pores of the organs of sense were exactly adequate, in figure and dimension, to these foreign effluvia; not all of those pores adequate to all of these effluvia indiscriminately; for this is impossible, unless the souls of any animals had the power of adapting the pores of their organs of sensation, occasionally, to the reception of all kinds of effluvia: and in this case, all such animals would be like Milton's angels, all eye, all ear: and would feel, at pleasure, the other various kinds of sensation in all parts of their bodies indifferently. But the hypothesis of those physiologists we are speaking of was this, that the organs of each sense had their pores respectively fitted to admit those effluvia which were the objects of that sense, and none other; the eye, for instance, those effluvia which gave colour; the ear, those which made sound; and that the organs of the other senses were framed in like manner. The heterogeneous effluvia, therefore, which could not enter, as being either too large for the pores, or else figured differently, passed by; and the too minute passed in and through, without affecting the sense.—S.

¹ Socrates here cites a verse from Pindar, to usher in his definition with solemnity, as if it was to be something very fine. But this solemnity is merely burlesque: for it is in mimicry of the sophists, who valued at a high rate their doctrines of this kind, and taught them to their disciples as wonderful discoveries and pieces of profound wisdom.—S.

² Aristotle tell us, in his treatise *περί αἰσθητικῆς καὶ αἰσθητῶν*, that Empedocles held the eye, that is, the sight of the eye, to be fire; meaning pure elementary fire collected in the pupil of the eye; as appears from Timæus in Plato's dialogue of his name; and that he supposed vision to be performed by the emission of light from the eye, as from a lantern. In proof of which he cites a passage out of the fine poem of Empedocles, mentioned in a preceding note. We presume it may be agreeable to many of our learned readers, if we here present them with that beautiful passage at full length; and the more so, because Stephens has strangely omitted it, with many other choice fragments of the philosophic Greek poets, in that slender collection of his which he entitles *Poësis Philosophica*. The verses are these:

Ὡς δ' ὅτε τις, παρθὸν νοέων, ὠπλίσσατο λυχνίῳ,
 Χειμερινὴν διὰ νύκτα, πυρὸς σέλας αἰθόμενοι,
 Ἄψας πάντοιων ἀνεμῶν λαμπτήρας, ἀμοργούς, [ἢ ἀπειρούς;
 Οἱ τ' ἀνεμῶν μὲν πνεῦμα διασχιδᾶσιν αἰντῶν·

MENO. In this answer, Socrates, I think you have answered as well as possible.

Soc.

Φῶς δ' ἐξω διαβρωσκον, ὅσον ταναυτερον νην,
 Λαμπισκεν κατὰ βῆλαν ατειρεσιν ακτινεσσιν.
 'Ὡς δὲ τοτ', [f. ποτ'] εν μηνιγξιν εεργγενον, ωγυγιον πυρ
 Λεπτησιν οδονησιν εχευατο κυκλωπα κουρην*
 Αἱ δ' ἰδατος μεν βειθος απεστεγον αμφιναοντος*
 Πυρ δ' ἐξω διαβρωσκον, [f. διεβρωσκειν] ὅσον ταναυτερον νην.

We are unable to do justice to these elegant lines in a literal translation. Instead of it, therefore, we hope our English readers will not refuse to accept of the following paraphrase:

As when the trav'ler, in dark winter's night,
 Intent on journey, kindles up a light,
 The moon-like splendour of an oil-fed flame;
 He sets it in some lantern's horny frame.
 Calm and serene there fits the tender form,
 Screen'd from rough winds, and from the wintry storm.
 In vain rude airs assault the gentle fire:
 Their forces break, disperse, and they retire.
 Fences secure, though thin, the fair enclose;
 And her bright head she lifts amid her foes.
 Through the straight pores of the transparent horn
 She shoots her radiance, mild as early morn.
 Forth fly the rays; their shining path extends;
 Till, lost in the wide air, their less'ning lustre ends.
 So when the fire, fresh lighted from on high,
 Sits in the circling pupil of an eye;
 O'er it, transparent veils of fabric fine
 Spread the thin membrane, and defend the shrine;
 The subtle flame enclosing, like a mound,
 Safe from the flood of humours flowing round.
 Forth fly the rays, and their bright paths extend;
 Till, in the wide air lost, their lustres end.

After citing these verses, Aristotle is pleased to say, *ὅτε μὲν οὖν οὕτως ὅραν φησὶν* ὅτε δὲ ταῖς ἀπορροαῖς ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ὀρώμενων*. "Sometimes he [meaning Empedocles] accounts for vision in this manner; at other times, by the effluvia which proceed from the object." Now, in truth, these two seemingly different accounts are not only very consistent, the one with the other, but neither of them is sufficient, without the other, to explain how the objects of sight are seen, according to the mind of Empedocles. We say this on supposition that he agreed with Timæus, a philosopher of the same sect, who, if Plato represents him rightly, accounted for vision in the same way. He supposes, that part of the pure element of fire is seated in the eye; that the rays

issuing

Soc. It may be that you think so, because you are accustomed to a language of this kind; and because at the same time you perceive yourself, as I imagine, able from thence to account in the same way for sound¹, and smell, and many other things of like kind.

MENO. It really is so.

Soc. The answer, Meno, was theatrical and pompous; and so it pleased you more than that which I gave you concerning figure.

MENO. Indeed it did.

Soc. And yet I persuade myself, O son of Alexidemos, that not this, but that other, was the better answer. I think too, that you yourself would be of the same opinion, if you are not, as you said you were yester-

issuing from it are, in the darkness of night, extinguished by the air, which is then void of that element; but that as soon as the air, from the return of day, is filled with light, whose essence is the same pure element of fire, the rays of light, issuing from the eye, unite themselves to their kindred element without; and being in motion themselves, put into the same motion those particles of outward light with which they are united: that rays of light are in this manner extended from the eye to all bodies within a certain distance, wherever the eye directs the motion of her own rays; that these rays of light, thus extended to the surface of those bodies, meet there with the finest effluvia issuing from them, which are particles of the same element of fire, mixed and coloured with particles of the other elements, carried with them out of the same bodies; a mixture or composition by the chemists called oil: that these effluvia naturally unite themselves with the rays of light falling on the surfaces of those bodies whence they are emitted, as being chiefly of the same nature; so that those rays of light, pure and uncoloured of themselves, participate now of the colour of these effluvia; and being reflected back from bodies, into which the effluvia, streaming forth, hinder them from entering, communicate their colour, in returning, to all those continuous particles of light between the object and the eye, with which they unite themselves; forming continued rays coloured by those effluvia, and reaching home to the eye, whose pores they thus enter. Modern philosophers account for colour from different refractions of the rays of light reflected.—S.

¹ As thus; that sound was air, violently forced out of some body stricken, and propagating its motion by strokes continually repeated along the element of air, until it reach the ear; in the same manner as colour along the rays of light, until it reach the eye: that odours were the subtle oily effluvia of bodies, united with the ærial, emitted together with them, and therefore mixing with the element of air, and conveyed along it to the organ of smell: that from moist bodies, applied to the palate, juices were expressed, a grosser oil, insinuating themselves immediately into the pores of the organ of taste: that the causes of heat and cold were the sulphureous and the nitrous particles of body, or of the circumambient air, penetrating the pores of the skin, and thus affecting with those different sensations the sense of feeling.—S.

day, under a necessity of going away before the mysteries, but could stay and be initiated.

MENO. But if you would tell me many other things such as this, I would certainly stay and hear them.

Soc. My best endeavours to say other such things shall certainly not be wanting, for my own sake as well as yours. But I fear I shall not be able to utter many sentences of that kind. But now it comes to your turn to try if you can perform your part of the engagement, in giving me an account of what virtue is, virtue in general, the same in all particular virtues. And do not go on, making many out of one; as is often said jocosely of those who pound or beat any thing to pieces. But leaving virtue as it is, whole and entire, define the nature of it, and tell me what it is. Patterns of such a definition you have had from me.

MENO. I think then, Socrates, that virtue is agreeably to that of the poet,

To feel a joy from what is fair,
And [o'er it] to have pow'r!—

and accordingly I say, that virtue is this; having the desire of things that are fair, to have it in our power to gain them.

Soc. I ask you then, whether you suppose the persons who desire things that are fair, to desire things that are good?

MENO. Certainly.

Soc. In giving that definition of virtue then, did you suppose that some men there were who desire things which are evil, others who desire things which are good? Do you not think, my friend, that all men desire things which are good?

MENO. I do not.

Soc. But that some desire things which are evil?

MENO. I do.

Soc. Think you that these men desire things evil, with an opinion of

¹ This scrap of poetry is taken from some old lyric poet, whose works are not remaining: it is cited for this purpose, to prepare us for a matter of great importance, to be next brought upon the carpet.—S.

their

their being good? or that, knowing them to be evil, yet they nevertheless desire them?

MENO. I answer Yes to both those questions.

SOC. Is there any man then, do you imagine, who knowing the things which are evil to be what they are, that is, evil, yet nevertheless desires them?

MENO. Without doubt.

SOC. What do you mean, when you say he desires them? Do you not mean, that he desires to have them?

MENO. To have them. For what can I mean besides?

SOC. Does he desire them, think you, imagining that evil things are advantageous to the person who has them, or knowing that evil things are hurtful wherever they are?

MENO. There are persons who imagine of things which are indeed evil, that they are advantageous; and there are who know them to be hurtful.

SOC. Do you think that they know the evil things to be evil, those who imagine such evil things to be advantageous?

MENO. By no means do I think that.

SOC. Is it not then evident, that such persons desire not things evil, such as know not the nature of those things which they desire; but rather, that they desire things which they imagine to be good, but which in reality are evil? So that those who are ignorant of them, and falsely imagine them to be good, plainly desire good things. Do they not?

MENO. Such sort of persons, I must own, seem to be desirous of good things.

SOC. But those others, those who desire things which are evil, as you say, and who at the same time know that evil things are hurtful to the possessor, do they know that they themselves shall receive harm from those evil things in their having them?

MENO. It is clear that they must know it.

SOC. But know they not, that such as receive harm are in evil plight, so far as harm has befallen them?

MENO. This also must they know.

SOC. And know they not besides, that such as are in evil plight are unhappy too?

MENO.

MENO. I presume they do.

SOC. Is there any man then, who chooses to be in evil plight [†], and to be unhappy?

MENO. I suppose there is not any, Socrates.

SOC. No man, therefore, O Meno, wills or chooses any thing evil; if it be true, that no man wills or chooses to be in evil plight, or to be unhappy. For indeed what else is it to be thoroughly unhappy, than to desire things which are evil, and to have them our own?

MENO. I suspect that what you say, Socrates, is true. And no man wills or chooses any thing evil.

SOC. Did you not say just now, that virtue consisted in the willing or desiring things which are good, and in the having it in our power to gain them?

MENO. I did say so; it is true.

SOC. Is not this will or desire ^{*} according to what has been said in all men? so that, in this respect, one man is not at all better than another man.

MENO. It appears so.

SOC. It appears, therefore, that if one man is better than another, he must be so in respect of his power.

MENO. Undoubtedly.

SOC. This therefore, as it seems, according to your account, is virtue, the power of gaining things which are good.

MENO. The case seems to me, Socrates, to be entirely so, as you now state it.

[†] This is referable to that verse of an old poet, cited by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics, lib. iii. cap. 5.

Οὐδεις ἐκὼν ποτὸς, οὐδ' ἀκὼν μακάρ.

No man in evil willingly can rest:
No man with good unwillingly is blest.—S.

^{*} In the Greek *τούτου λεχθέντος*. But it appears from Ficinus's translation, that in his manuscript it was read *ἐκ του λεχθέντος*. The sense requires this reading; and we presume, therefore, that it ought to be so printed. We have followed both the Basil editions, and all the translations, in making the sentence interrogative: and in all future editions of Plato we hope it will be so marked.—S.

Soc.

Soc. Let us examine then if this account of yours be true: for perhaps it may be so. You say, that to be able to gain good things is virtue.

MENO. I do.

Soc. Good things do you not call such things as health and riches, that is, the possession of gold and silver, honours also in the state, and offices in the government? You do not speak of any other things as good, beside things of this kind?

MENO. No other; I mean all such sort of things.

Soc. Well then, to get money ¹ is virtue; as says Meno, the hereditary guest of the great king ². But let me ask you a question concerning this point; whether you would choose to add something to this account of virtue, and to say that virtue is to get money honestly and religiously? or whether this addition makes no difference in your account; but that, however unjustly it be acquired, you call the mere acquisition of money, equally in any way, virtue?

¹ We learn from Xenophon (in *Expedit. Cyri*, lib. ii.) that the passion predominant in Meno's soul was the love of money; that his desire of honours and of power in the state was subservient to that other his master-passion; for, that he regarded power and honour no otherwise than as the means of accumulating wealth. In the passage, therefore, before us, it seems as if Plato meant, slyly and indirectly, to exhibit to us this strong feature in the character of Meno, or rather as if Socrates had a mind, in his usual jocular manner, to exhibit to Meno a true picture of himself.

² In the more antient times of Greece, whenever men, illustrious for their birth or station in life, travelled from one Grecian state or kingdom to another, or crossed the sea to Asia, with a view of observing the manners of other people, or of learning the policy of other governments (and they seldom travelled with any different view), they were always nobly entertained at the house of some great man in every country to which they came. Persons of inferior rank, whenever they travelled, which they rarely did, were everywhere treated courteously at the public costs. In the former case, that of private entertainment, not only the noble host himself became entitled to the same hospitable reception from his guest, if ever he should return the visit on a like occasion; but the rights of mutual hospitality accrued also from thence to the descendants of both the parties. Meno it seems had this connection with the Persian monarch, being himself, probably, as well as his friend Aristippus, descended from one of the antient kings of Thessaly. However this was, that his family was very noble appears from his appointment to the command of the forces which his country sent to the assistance of Cyrus, in his youthful time of life.—Thus much for the explanation of the passage now before us. The beauty of it arises from the opposition here seen between Meno's high rank, naturally productive of high spirit, and his sordid avarice, that passion of the meanest souls.—S.

MENO.

MENO. By no means; for, to acquire it unjustly, I call vice and wickedness.

SOC. By all means, therefore, as it appears, this acquisition of money ought to be accompanied by honesty, or prudence, or sanctity, or some other part of virtue; for otherwise it will not be virtue, notwithstanding it procures for us good things.

MENO. For without that how should it be virtue?

SOC. And if a man forbear to gain money, whether for himself or others, when he cannot gain it without dishonesty, is not the forbearance of this gain also virtue?

MENO. It is apparent.

SOC. Not the gaining of these good things, therefore, must be virtue, more than the forbearance of that gain; but, as it seems, that which comes accompanied by honesty is virtue; that which is without any thing of that kind is vice and wickedness.

MENO. I think it must of necessity be as you say.

SOC. Did we not say, a little while since, that honesty and prudence, and every thing of that kind, was a part of virtue?

MENO. We did.

SOC. Then, Meno, you are in jest with me.

MENO. How so, Socrates?

SOC. Because, when I had desired you, as I did just now, not to split virtue into pieces, and had given you patterns to copy after, that you might answer as you ought; you, without paying any regard to them, tell me that virtue is the power of gaining good things with honesty or justice; yet this, you say, is only a part of virtue.

MENO. I do.

SOC. It is to be collected then, from your own concessions, that with a part of virtue, to do whatever one does, this is virtue. For justice, you say, is but a part of virtue, and so of every other thing of like kind.

MENO. What then? granting that I say this.

SOC. It follows that, having been requested to tell me what the whole of virtue is, you are far from giving such a complete account of it: for you say, that every action is virtue which is performed with a part of virtue; as though you had already told me what virtue was in the whole, and that I should

should now know it when you come to split it into parts. We must therefore, as it seems to me, take the matter again from the beginning, and recur to this question, What is virtue? Or should every action, accompanied with a part of virtue, be said to be virtue itself? For it is saying this, to say that every action, accompanied with justice, is virtue.—Do you think there is no occasion for us to resume the same question; but that a man may know a part of virtue, what it is, without knowing what virtue is itself?

MENO. I think he cannot.

SOC. For, if you remember, when I answered just now your question concerning figure, we rejected such a kind of answer as aimed at explaining the proposed subject in terms not as yet confessedly understood, but whose meaning was still the subject of inquiry.

MENO. And we did right, Socrates, in rejecting such an answer.

SOC. I would not have you imagine then, while we are as yet inquiring what virtue is, the whole of it, that by answering in terms which signify the parts of virtue, you will be able to explain to any man the nature of virtue; or, indeed, that the nature of any other thing can be explained in such a way, but that still there will be need of repeating the same question what virtue is, that which is the subject of our conversation. Or do you think that I speak idly and nothing to the purpose?

MENO. I think you speak rightly.

SOC. Begin again, therefore, and tell me what it is you hold virtue to be, you and your friend Gorgias?

MENO. Socrates, I heard, before I had conversed with you, that the only part you take in conversation is this:—You pretend to be at a loss and doubtful yourself upon all subjects, and make others too no less to be at a loss what to think and say. You seem to be now playing the same conjurers tricks upon me; you manifestly use incantations to bewitch me, and to fill me with such perplexity that I know not what to say. If you will allow me to joke a little, I think you resemble exactly, not only in form but in other respects also, that broad sea-fish called the cramp-fish; for that too never fails to give a numbness to every person who either touches or approaches it¹. You seem
to

¹ The benumbing faculty of this fish, by which it is enabled to catch its prey, is mentioned by Aristotle, in his History of Animals, b. ix. c. 37, where he tells us that some persons have been

to have done some such thing at present to me, and to have benumbed me. For I actually suffer a kind of numbness and stupidity, both in mind and body, and find myself disabled from giving you any answer; and yet have I a thousand times discoursed much about virtue, and to many persons, and extremely well too, as I thought; but I am now not in the least able to tell so much as what virtue is. I think that you have acted very prudently in never going out of your own country either by sea or land. For if you was to behave in this manner in any other city where you are a stranger, you would run a risk of being driven thence as a magician or enchanter.

Soc. You are full of craftiness, Meno; and I was very near being deceived by you.

MENO. Tell me how, Socrates, I pray you?

Soc. I know with what design you brought a simile to which you likened me.

MENO. With what design now, do you imagine?

Soc. That I, on my part, might bring some simile or resemblance of you. For this I know to be true of all handsome persons, they love to have images and pictures made of them. And indeed it is their interest; for of handsome persons the pictures are handsome too. But I shall forbear the drawing of your picture in return. And as to that which you have produced of me, if the cramp-fish be itself numb, and through its numbness benumb others also, then am I like to it, but otherwise I am not. For I do not lead others into doubtfulness on any subject, and make them be at a loss what to say; when at the same time I can easily explain the matter in hand, and have no doubts at all within my own mind: but as I am entirely distressed for true definitions of things myself; in this condition I involve in the same distresses those with whom I am conversing. Thus at present concerning the nature of virtue; what it is, I, for my part, know not: you indeed knew formerly, perhaps, before that you had touched me; but now you are like one ¹ who
knows

eye-witnesses of the manner in which it is done. Plutarch, in his Treatise of the Sagacity of Animals, relates the matter more circumstantially; and farther assures us, that this power of the numb-fish not only operates on other fish, but on men too; and that it acts at some small distance, as well as through immediate touch.—S.

¹ In all the editions of the Greek, we here read *οὐκ ἴδωμι*; *εἰ δὲ εἶδωμι*. This reading we have

knows nothing of the matter. I am desirous, however, of considering it together with you, and of our searching out jointly what kind of a thing virtue is.

MENO. But in what way, Socrates, will you search for a thing of which you are entirely ignorant? For by what mark which may discover it will you look for it when you know none of the marks that distinguish it? Or, if you should not fail of meeting with it, how will you discern it, when met with, to be the very thing you was in search of, and knew nothing of before?

SOC. I apprehend, Meno, what it is you mean. Do you observe how captious a way of reasoning you introduce? For it follows from hence, that it is impossible for a man to seek, either for that which he knows, or for that of which he is ignorant. For no man would seek to know what he knows, because he has the knowledge of it already, and has no need of seeking for what he has. Nor could any man seek for what he is ignorant of, because he would not know what he was seeking for.

MENO. Do you not think then, Socrates, that this way of reasoning is fair and right?

SOC. Not I, for my part.

MENO. Can you say in what respect it is wrong?

SOC. I can. For I have heard the sayings of men and women who were wise, and knowing in divine things?

MENO. What sayings?

SOC. Such as I think true, as well as beautiful.

MENO. But what sayings were they? and by whom were they uttered?

SOC. Those who uttered them were of the priests and priestesses, such as made it their business to be able to give a rational account of those things in which they were employed. The same sayings are delivered also by Pindar, and many other of the poets, as many as are divine. The sayings are these;

have followed in our translation, as thinking it to be right: but it is to be observed, that Ficinus seems, from his translation, to have read in his manuscript copy of Plato, *οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμοὶ σοφὸς εἰ μὴ εἶδέναι*. And as this reading produceth a sense agreeable to that mask of ignorance worn by Socrates throughout this dialogue, and wherever else he is introduced conversing with any of the sophists, or of their disciples, it deserves a place amongst the various readings which it will become a future editor of Plato to collect and publish.—S.

but do you consider with yourself whether you think them true. These persons then tell us that the soul of man is immortal; that sometimes it ends¹, which is called dying; and that afterwards it begins again, but never is dissolved; and that for this reason we ought to live, throughout our lives, with all sanctity. For

STROPHE.

* When guilt of lesser crimes the soul hath stain'd,
Not meriting sharp pains for aye;
And eight dark dreary years she hath remain'd
In Hades, barr'd from gladd'ning day;
Preserving all that time her sense
Of good, lamenting her lost innocence;
With sorrow if her guilt she rue,
And Proserpine should deem that sorrow true,
She accepts in full atonement such repentance due.

ANTISTROPHE.

Then the ninth year sends back the soul to light,
And former objects here on earth:
Of these, thro' death, again she loses sight;
Again to life renews her birth.
‡ At length, two trials well endur'd,
The soul, to lesser virtues well inur'd,
Is born some king, for good renown'd;
Or sage, well learn'd in wisdom's lore profound;
Or hero, by his prowess spreading peace around.

EPODE.

¹ That is, ends its present life, and begins a new life. For as Plato observes justly in his *Phædo*, life and death succeed each other alternately throughout nature. In the passage, however, now before us, the ending of the human soul and its beginning again may be taken in different senses. The most obvious meaning is the dissolution of that body which it inhabits, and its departure into the seeds of a new body, which it then animates, and gradually forms suitable to its own temper and disposition. This sense is agreeable to those verses immediately after cited out of Pindar.—S.

² In translating the fine fragment of Pindar, which Plato has here preserved to us, we found ourselves under a necessity of paraphrasing very largely, to free it from that obscurity in which it would otherwise appear to an English reader, partly because of the conciseness of Pindar's style, and partly because of the sentiments, taken from the ancient mythology, with which our age is little acquainted. However, we have adhered closely to the sense of our original, completing it only from the same mythology, without adding any new thoughts or conceits of our own.—S.

³ In this place we have made our translation conformable to the reading found, as we presume, by Ficinus in the manuscript from which he translated, and taken notice of by Stephens in the
margin

EPODE.

Thro' goodness, wisdom, virtue, truly great ;
 And greatly meriting advancement high ;
 Loosen'd from body, wing'd and fleet,
 Freely she mounts to purest sky ;
 Ne'er more on earth to live, ne'er more to die.
 Amongst the gods in starry sheen,
 Far off and wide thro' Nature seen,
 She fixes her abode ;
 Assuming her celestial throne,
 To godlike state of being grown,
 A deathless demi-god.
 Thence thro' the rest of time,
 In hymns religious and in holy rhyme,
 Mortals below shall lift their lays,
 The deathless demi-god to praise ;
 Who, freed from earthy dross,
 And ev'ry element of body gross,
 To intellectual bliss in heav'nly seat could climb.

The soul then being immortal, having been often born, having beheld the things which are here, the things which are in Hades, and all things, there is nothing of which she has not gained the knowledge. No wonder, therefore, that she is able to recollect, with regard to virtue as well as to other things, what formerly she knew. For all things in nature being linked together in relationship, and the soul having heretofore known all things, nothing hinders but that any man, who has recalled to mind, or, according to the common phrase, who has learnt, one thing only, should of himself recover all his ancient knowledge, and find out again all the rest of things ; if he has but courage, and faints not in the midst of his researches. For inquiry and learning is reminiscence¹ all. We therefore ought not to hearken to that sophistical way of reasoning afore-mentioned ; for our believing it to be true would make us idle. And, accordingly, the indolent, and such as are averse to

margin of his edition. Not only the sense of the fragment is bettered by that reading, but Plato's illustration of it evidently shows that he read it so himself.—S.

¹ For a defence of reminiscence, which Plato justly considers as ranking among the most important doctrines of philosophy, see the notes on the *Phædo*.—T.

taking pains, delight to hear it. But this other way of thinking, which I have just now given you an account of, makes men diligent, sets them at work, and puts them upon inquiry. And as I believe it to be true, I am willing, with your assistance, to inquire into the nature of virtue.

MENO. With all my heart, Socrates. But say you this absolutely, that we do not learn any thing; and that all, which we call learning, is only reminiscence? Can you teach me to know this doctrine to be true?

SOC. I observed to you before how full you are of craftiness, O Meno. And, to confirm my observation, you now ask me if I can teach you; I, who say that there is no such thing as teaching, but that all our knowledge is reminiscence; that I may appear directly to contradict myself.

MENO. Not so, Socrates, by Jupiter. I did not express myself in those terms with any such design; but merely from habit, and the common usage of that expression. But if any way you can prove to me that your doctrine is true, do so.

SOC. This is by no means an easy task. However, for your sake, I am willing to try and do my utmost. Call hither to me then one of those your numerous attendants, whichever you please, that I may prove in him the truth of what I say.

MENO. I will, gladly. Come hither, you.

SOC. Is he a Grecian, and speaks he the Greek language?

MENO. Perfectly well. He was born in my own family.

SOC. Be attentive now, and observe whether he appears to recollect within himself, or to learn any thing from me.

MENO. I shall.

SOC. Tell me, boy; do you know what a square space is? Is it of such a figure as (fig. 1) this?

Boy.

* The best explanatory notes to this part of the Dialogue will be mathematical figures, drawn after the manner of those used in demonstrating geometrical propositions. Socrates is here supposed, in the first place, to draw a square; and afterwards, while he is putting questions to the boy, he is supposed to be drawing new lines, such as form and bound the several other figures of which he speaks. But, in reading, the figures must be represented as already drawn; and therefore, in every part of the process, a new figure is necessary. All these we have exhibited together, printed from a copper plate; numbering each figure, and referring to each, in its proper place, by the same number. Such figures ought to have been printed in the editions of Plato himself. The

editors

Boy. It is.

Soc. A square space then is that which has (fig. 2) all these lines equal, AB, BC, CD, DA, four in number.

Boy. It is so truly.

Soc. Has it not also (fig. 3) these lines, which are drawn through the middle of it, AC and BD, equal each to the other?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. Cannot you imagine a space, square like this, but larger; and another such, but lesser?

Boy. Yes, for certain.

Soc. Now if (fig. 2) the side AB should be two feet long, and the side AD should be two feet long also, how many feet square will the whole space contain? Consider it in this manner. If, in the side AB, the space should be two feet long, and in the side AD it should be but one foot; would not the square be that of two feet once told?

Boy. It would.

Soc. But since it is two feet this way as well as the other way, is it not a space of two feet twice told?

Boy. Just so.

Soc. It is then a space of two feet¹?

Boy. So it is.

Soc. How many feet are twice two? reckon them, and tell me.

Boy. Four feet, Socrates.

Soc. May not a space be made (fig. 4), EFGH, double to that other in size, but of the same kind, having, like that, all its sides equal?

Boy. Yes, sure.

Soc. How many square feet then will this space be of?

Boy. Eight.

Soc. Come now, try and tell me, of what length is each of the sides in this square space. Now the sides of that square, you know, we have sup-

editors of Aristotle have not been so much wanting in this respect, where it was necessary: though sometimes indeed, through carelessness, they have printed wrong figures, which are worse than none; as, for instance, equilateral triangles instead of right-angled.—S.

¹ Meaning square feet.—S.

posed to be two feet long. Of what length then are the sides of this square, which is double in largeness to that other?

Boy. It is plain, Socrates, that they are twice as long.

Soc. You see, Meno, that I teach him none of these things which he asserts; I only ask him questions. And now this boy imagines that he knows of what length the lines are which contain a space of eight square feet. Do you not think he does?

MENO. I do.

Soc. And does he really know?

MENO. Certainly not.

Soc. But he imagines them to be twice as long as the lines, which contain a space of four square feet.

MENO. He does.

Soc. I now view him ready to recollect, from this time forward, rightly and as he ought. Now hear me, boy. You say that lines, double in length to the sides of the square $ABCD$, contain a space double to it in largeness: I mean a space of the same kind; not one way long, the other way short; but every way of equal length, like the space $ABCD$, only twice as large, that is (fig. 4), a space of eight square feet¹. Consider now whether you still think this square $EFGH$ to be measured by a line twice as long as the line which measures the square $ABCD$.

Boy. I do.

Soc. Suppose we add to the line AB , from hence, from the point B , another line of equal length (fig. 5), the line BI . Is not the line AI of a length double to that of the line AB ?

Boy. Yes, sure.

Soc. Now, from the line AI , do you say that a space will be made of eight square feet, if four lines, each of them as long as the line AI , be drawn so as to contain space?

Boy. I do.

Soc. Let us then draw (fig. 6) these four equal lines so as to contain space, AI , IK , KL , LA . Is this space now any other than that which you say is of eight square feet?

¹ Meaning a square equal in largeness to eight square feet.

Boy. No ; it is the very same.

Soc. Are there not in this space AIKL these (fig. 7) four spaces, ABMO, BIPM, MPKN, NLOM, each of which is equal to that space of four square feet, ABCD?

Boy. So there be.

Soc. How large is the whole space AIKL? Is it not four times as large as the space ABCD?

Boy. To be sure it is.

Soc. Is it only double now to the space ABCD, when it is four times as large?

Boy. No, by Jupiter.

Soc. What proportion then has it to the space ABCD?

Boy. A quadruple one¹.

Soc. From a line, therefore, double in length, is drawn a square space, not double, but quadruple, in largeness.

Boy. Why, it is very true.

Soc. Four times four make sixteen : do they not?

Boy. They do.

Soc. But from a line of what length is to be drawn a square, such a one as we suppose (fig. 4) the square EFGH to be, that is a space of eight square feet? You see that from the (fig. 6) line AI is drawn a square, quadruple in largeness to the square ABCD.

Boy. I see it.

Soc. And from the line AB, which is half of the line AI (fig. 6), a square, you see, is drawn, which is but the fourth part of the square AK.

Boy. It is.

Soc. Well ; but that square of eight feet EFGH, is it not twice as large as the square ABCD, and half as large as the square AIKL?

Boy. It is so, to be sure.

¹ We may observe that this boy, whom Meno seems to have chosen out from his retinue on account of his ignorance and total want of education, is represented as not wholly ignorant of common arithmetic. Perhaps Socrates meant to gain some ground in his argument by this circumstance ; insinuating, that the principles of the art of numbering were natural to man, and required no teaching. Accordingly we find that the most barbarian nations, and the most uncultured persons in those which are civilized, acquire of themselves so much of that art as is necessary for the uses of common life.—S.

Soc. Must it not then be drawn from a line longer than the line AB , and shorter than the line AI ?

Boy. I think it must.

Soc. You say well; for speak that only which you think. And tell me, was not the line AB supposed to be two feet long, and the line AI four feet long?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. The side therefore of the square $EFGH$ must be shorter than a line of four feet, and longer than a line of two feet.

Boy. It must so.

Soc. Try now, and tell me how long you think it is.

Boy. Three feet long.

Soc. If then it be so, let us take half of the line BI (fig. 8), namely, BQ , and add it to the line AB ; and now this line AQ will be such a line as you speak of, a line three feet long. For the lines AB , BI , are each of them two feet long, and the line BQ is half of the line BI , and therefore is one foot long. In the same manner, let us take half of the line OL , namely OR , and add it to the line AO ; and thus the line AR will be three feet long also. For the lines AO , OL , are each of them two feet long, and the line OR is one foot long. From these two lines, AQ , AR , let us complete the square $AQSR$; and it is such a square as you were speaking of, the square of a line three feet long.

Boy. It is so.

Soc. If then the whole space be three feet long and three feet broad, it is a space of thrice three feet.

Boy. It appears so to be.

Soc. And how many feet are thrice three?

Boy. Nine.

Soc. But how many feet were there to be in a square twice as large as the square $ABCD$?

Boy. Eight.

Soc. It is not true then that from a line three feet long is to be drawn a square containing only eight square feet.

Boy. It is not.

Soc. Try and tell us then exactly how long the line must be from which
such

such a square is to be drawn. Or, if you choose not to tell us the measure of it in numbers ¹, at least point out to us from what line it may be drawn ².

BOY. Now, by Jove, Socrates, I do not know.

SOC. Do you observe, Meno, what progress this boy has already made, and whereabouts he is, in the way to recollection? You see that, from the beginning of his examination, he knew not from what line a square eight feet large was to be drawn; as indeed neither does he yet know; but he then fancied that he knew, and answered boldly as a knowing person would, without suspecting that he should ever be at a loss for a true answer. But he now finds himself at a loss, and thinks himself as ignorant as he really is.

MENO. You say what is true.

SOC. Is he not then in a better disposition with regard to the matter which he was ignorant of?

MENO. I agree with you in this too.

SOC. In making him therefore to be at a loss what to answer, and in benumbing him after the manner of the cramp-fish, have we done him any harm?

MENO. I think, we have not.

SOC. And more than this, we have advanced him a little, as it seems, in the way of finding out the truth in the subject laid before him. For, being now sensible of his ignorance, he is prepared to seek and to inquire. But he then fancied, that he could readily, at any time, and in the presence of any number of people, show with certainty, that a square, twice as large as some other square, was produced from a line twice as long.

MENO. So it seemed.

SOC. Think you then, that he would have set about seeking or learning that, which, however ignorant of it, he fancied that he knew; till he had

¹ If Socrates had not added this, he would seem to have put the boy on telling what was impossible for him to tell. For how long the side is of a square, equal in largeness to eight square feet, is impossible to be told in any whole number.—S.

² For it lay before his eyes; being the line A C (fig. 3), the diameter of the square A B C D.—S.

found himself at a loss, and felt his ignorance; and was become therefore desirous of finding it out?

MENO. I think, Socrates, that he never would.

Soc. The benumbing him then was of advantage to him.

MENO. I think it was.

Soc. Now observe how, from this sense of his ignorance, he will find out the truth in searching for it with me; though the part which I shall bear in the inquiry will be merely to ask questions, and not to teach. But be sure to mind, if any where you can catch me teaching or telling him any thing, instead of asking him his own opinions. Now, boy, tell me, is not this space (fig. 2) ABCD our square, four feet large? Do you apprehend me?

Boy. I do.

Soc. Suppose we add to it this other square (fig. 9) BTUC, equal to it in largeness?

Boy. Well.

Soc. And a third square too, this (fig. 10), DCWX, equal in largeness to either of the others?

Boy. Very well.

Soc. What, if we add another square of equal size, to fill up the corner here, this (fig. 11), UCWY?

Boy. Very well: and so it does.

Soc. Are not then these four squares equal all, ABCD, BTUC, CDXW, WYUC?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. This whole large square then, ATYX, how much larger is it than the square ABCD?

Boy. Four times as big.

Soc. But we wanted a square only twice as big. Do you not remember?

Boy. I remember it very well.

Soc. Do not these lines, which I draw from corner to corner in each of these squares (fig. 12), BD, BU, DW, WU, cut each square in half?

Boy. They do.

Soc.

Soc. Are not these four lines drawn of equal length, these, which enclose the square space, BDWU?

Boy. They be so.

Soc. Now consider, how large this square is which is enclosed by those four lines.

Boy. Why, I do not know.

Soc. Are not those four squares (fig. 12), ABCD, BTUC, CDXW, WYUC, cut each of them in half by these four lines, BD, BU, DW, WU, drawn within them; or are they not?

Boy. They be.

Soc. In the square (fig. 12), ATYX, how many spaces are there then, as large as the space ABCD?

Boy. Four.

Soc. And how many such in the square (fig. 12), BDWU, from which half the other is cut off?

Boy. Two.

Soc. How many more are four than two?

Boy. Twice as many.

Soc. How many square feet then doth this square, BDWU, contain?

Boy. Eight.

Soc. From what line is it drawn?

Boy. From this here.

Soc. From (fig. 12) the line BD, do you say, reaching from corner to corner of the square ABCD, which contains four square feet?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. The sophists call such a line the diameter. If the diameter then be its name, from the diameter of a square, as you say, you boy of Meno's, may be drawn a square twice as large as the square of which it is the diameter¹.

Boy.

¹ This theorem, said to have been discovered by Pythagoras, is perhaps the most beautiful of all simple theorems in geometry: and yet is not to be found, in express terms, among those fundamental theorems, demonstrated in Euclid's Elements. It is cited, however, in the demonstration of the last proposition in the tenth book: and a reference is there made to the 47th proposition of the first book; in which indeed this fine theorem is implicitly contained: for

Boy. It is so, Socrates, for certain.

Soc. Well; what think you, Meno? Has this boy, in his answers, given any other opinion than his own?

MENO. None other: he has given his own opinion only.

Soc. And yet, but a little before, as we both observed, he had no knowledge of the matter proposed, and knew not how to give a right answer.

MENO. True.

Soc. But those very opinions, which you acknowledge to be his own, were in him all the time: were they not?

MENO. They were.

Soc. In a man therefore, who is ignorant, there are true opinions concerning those very things of which he is ignorant.

MENO. It appears there are.

Soc. Those opinions then are stirred up afresh in the mind of that boy, as fancies are in dreaming. And if he should frequently be questioned of these things, and by many different persons, you may be assured he will at length know them with as much certainty as any man.

MENO. Indeed, it seems so.

Soc. Will he not then know them without being taught them, having only been asked questions, and recovering of himself from within himself his lost knowledge?

MENO. He will.

Soc. But our recovery of knowledge from within ourselves, is not this what we call reminiscence?

MENO. Without doubt.

Soc. And this knowledge, which he now has, must he not at some time or other have acquired it, or else have always been possessed of it?

MENO. Certainly.

Omne majus continet in se minus.—Proclus, in his Commentary on the First Book of those Elements, admires Euclid, because the noble theorem, introduced here by Plato, relating only to right-angled isosceles-triangles, is by Euclid extended to all right-angled triangles, scalene as well as isosceles. We heartily join with him in this admiration; but could wish that the original theorem of Pythagoras had been subjoined, as a corollary, to that truly admirable proposition, the 47th.—S.

Soc.

SOC. Now if he was always possessed of it, he was always a person of knowledge. But if at any time he first received it, was it not in this present life? unless some person has taught him the science of geometry. For he will make his answers with no less certainty in every part of geometry, and indeed in all the other mathematical sciences ¹. Is there any one, then, who has taught the boy all this? I ask you; because you ought to know, since he was born and bred up in your family.

MENO. I am certain that no person has ever taught him those sciences.

SOC. And yet he entertains those opinions, which he has just now declared: does he not?

MENO. It appears, Socrates, that he must.

SOC. If then he had this knowledge within him ², not having acquired it in this present life, it is plain that in some other time he had learnt it and actually possessed it.

MENO. It appears so.

SOC. And was not that time then, when he was not a man?

MENO. Certainly.

SOC. If true opinions then are in him, at both these times, the time when he is ³, and the time when he is not a man; opinions which, awakened and roused by questions ⁴, rise up into science; must not his soul be well furnished with this discipline ⁵ throughout all ages? for it is plain, that in every age he either is, or is not a man.

MENO. In all appearance it must be so.

¹ For every mathematical demonstration depends on viewing equal and unequal, like and unlike, in all computations, in all diagrams, and in all measures, whether of sound or of motion.—S.

² In the Greek we here find a negative, *οὐκ ᾔδει τούτο*, which, however, if it be retained, alters not the sense upon the whole; but the sentence is then to be translated thus; "If then, not having acquired this knowledge in the present life, just now he had it not," (because he had forgotten it;) &c. But the meaning seems easier to be conceived, if the *οὐκ* be omitted.—S.

³ Future editors of Plato may consider, whether we ought not here to read *ὅταν ἢ χρονον*, instead of *ὅταν ἢ χρόνον*. Cornarius also, we find, has made this emendation.—S.

⁴ We have here supposed, that the Greek of this place should be thus read, *αἱ αὖ ἐρωτήσεις ἐπηρεύθηναι*.—S.

⁵ That is, with the principles of science essential to the soul of man.—S.

SOC.

Soc. If the truth of things ¹ therefore is always in the soul, the soul should be immortal. So that whatever you happen now not to know, that is, not to remember, you ought to undertake with confidence to seek within yourself, and recall it to your mind.

MENO. You seem to me, Socrates, some how or other to speak rightly.

Soc. As to my own part, Meno, I would not contend very strenuously for the truth of my argument in other respects; but that in thinking it our duty to seek after the knowledge of things we are at present ignorant of, we should become better men, more manly, and less idle, than if we suppose it not possible for us to find out, nor our duty to inquire into, what we know not; this I would, if I was able, strongly, both by word and deed, maintain.

MENO. In this also, Socrates, you seem to me to say well.

Soc. Since then we are agreed in this point, that what a man knows not, he ought to inquire after and seek to know, are you willing that we attempt jointly to inquire into the nature of virtue?

MENO. By all means, willing. Not but that I should have most pleasure in taking into consideration, and hearing what you have to say on the question I first asked you, whether, in setting about our inquiries concerning virtue, we should consider it as a thing that may be taught, or as being by nature with those who have it, or as attainable by some other means, and what they are.

Soc. Were I to govern not only myself, Meno, but you too, we would not consider whether virtue could be taught or not, before we had inquired, in the first place, what virtue was. But since you, without so much as attempting to govern yourself, for fear (I suppose) of being less free and less a gentleman, undertake however to govern me, and actually do govern me, I shall yield to you. For indeed how can I help myself? or what is to be done without it? We are to consider then, it seems, what belongs to some certain thing, whilst yet we know not what the thing is. But if you

¹ The words of Plato are *αληθεια των οντων*.—The truth or reality of all things which are, depends on the truth of the first principles of things. For truth metaphysical is here meant. But in truths logical it is the same: all these depend on the truth of the first principles of science.—S.

still persist, however relax a little the strictness of your command, and suffer the question, whether virtue can be taught a man, or how otherwise it is attained, to be considered hypothetically. By hypothetically I mean in the same manner as geometers often treat a question; for instance, when they are asked concerning some geometrical figure ¹, whether it is possible for (fig. 13) such a particular triangle to be inscribed ² in (fig. 14) such a particular circle. A geometer would answer,—I know not ³ as yet, of what kind this triangle is ⁴. But I can make a supposition, which I think may be of use in answering your question,—this;—Supposing the triangle to be of such a kind, as that a circle being drawn about ⁵ a given side of it, the whole space of the triangle be included within the circular space described around it ⁶, the consequence will then be one thing; but quite another consequence will follow, if it cannot be so included ⁷. Laying

¹ Or rather the largeness of the space contained in that figure. The words of Plato are *περι χωρίου*. And *χωρίον* was a term used by the old Greek mathematicians to signify the space comprehended by the lines of any geometrical figure.—S.

² The Greek word here is *εμβαθύνει*, that is, *to be extended within*. The meaning of which words seems, at first sight, to be the same with that of *εγγραφισθαι* in Euclid's Elements, Lib. iv. Def. 3. But probably there is a difference between them, as will presently be remarked.—S.

³ The angles of this triangle being not, as yet, either measured or supposed.—S.

⁴ Whether right-angled, obtuse, or acute-angled.—S.

⁵ It seems necessary here to make a small alteration in the text as it is printed: by reading ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΝ ΔΟΘΕΙΣΑΝ ΑΥΤΟΥ ΓΡΑΜΜΗΝ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΕΙΝΑΝΤΑ, instead of *παρα* and *παρτείναντα*.—Περιτείνειν seems, at first view, to have the same meaning with *περιγραφειν* in the fourth book of Euclid's Elements. The difference between them, as also between *εντείνειν* and *εγγραφειν*, will be conjectured in a subsequent note.—S.

⁶ If the alteration, made in the preceding note, be just, we are obliged, in consequence of it, to read here ΠΕΡΙΤΕΤΑΜΕΝΟΝ in the Greek, instead of *παρτεταμένον*, the word in Stephen's edition. The former editions, by a mistake still greater, give us *παρτεταμένων*. For want of this small emendation, Grynæus, who undertook to amend Ficinus's translation, was led to fancy I know not what parallelograms; which throw so much obscurity over this whole passage, that the true meaning of it has never since been so much as conjectured. Ficinus himself indeed seems to have had a shrewd guess at it, even without making the emendation; as appears by his marginal reference to the fourth book of Euclid's Elements, and by the triangles he presents us with.—S.

⁷ That is, if it be impossible to include the whole triangle within that circle, which is drawn about one of its sides. And impossible this is, when some part of the circle *ὑπερβαλλει* exceeds, or reaches beyond the circle; and *οὐκ ἔλλειπει* does not full within it, as it does in the other, the case put first. See the figures referred to. It seems to be supposed in both the cases, that it may appear by inspection, or be found by mensuration of the diameters, whether a circle, drawn about the given side of the triangle, be equal or unequal to the circle given.—S.

down therefore these two hypotheses distinctly, I can tell you what will follow, in each of these cases¹, as to the inscribing that triangle within the circle, whether it be impossible or possible. Now the same way shall we take in our inquiry concerning virtue: since we know not, either what it is, or what is to be attributed to it, we shall lay down an hypothesis concerning it; and, on the footing of that hypothesis, shall consider whether it is to be taught or not. Let us then state the question thus: Supposing virtue to be in that order of things which belongs to the soul, is virtue, on this hypothesis, to be taught, or not to be taught? In the first place, it is either a different kind of thing from knowledge, or a thing of the same kind with knowledge: and on each of these hypotheses let us inquire, whether virtue is or is not to be taught, or (as we lately expressed it) recalled to mind; for whichever of these expressions we use, let it make no difference to us. The question is then, whether virtue is to be taught. Now is it not evident to every one, that man is taught no other thing than knowledge?

MENO. To me it seems so.

Soc.

¹ In stating the question, it must be supposed as evident, that the given side of the triangle is not greater than the diameter of the given circle. For if it be greater, no such question can be proposed by any man; the absurdity of it, or impossibility of the thing proposed to be done, appears too plainly.—It should seem also, that this given side is to be made the diameter of the circle to be drawn, by taking the middle point of this side for the centre. For thus, and thus only, can the circle properly be said *περιτείνεσθαι περι την δοθεσαν γραμμην*, to be drawn around or about the given side. If this be granted; then, in the case which is put first (the possible one), that angle of the triangle, which is subtended by the given side, must be either (fig. 15) a right angle, or (fig. 16) an obtuse angle: in the other (the impossible) case, that angle must be (fig. 17) acute. If the angle be supposed a right angle, then will the circle drawn be *περιγεγραφομενον*, circumscribed about the triangle; and the triangle may also *εγγραφεσθαι*, be inscribed within the equal given circle: for every angle of it would touch the circumference of that circle. Now in the case, first supposed by Plato, had he meant this only, we presume he would have used those very words of Euclid, *περιγεγραφομενον* and *εγγραφεσθαι*. For Euclid, the author of the Elements, was one of Plato's disciples; and it is probable, besides, that the terms of geometry were settled before the time of Plato. But if the angle in question be supposed (fig. 18) an obtuse angle, then though the triangle may *εγγραφεσθαι*, be inscribed in a circle, whose diameter is greater than the side subtending the obtuse angle; yet it cannot *εγγραφεσθαι*, be inscribed (fig. 16) in a circle, whose diameter is equal to that side. However, it may properly enough be said *ενταλναι*, to be extended within such a circle; because the utmost extent of it is included within that circle. And just in the same manner, though such a circle (fig. 16) cannot be said, in speaking strictly, and according to Euclid's definition, *περιγεγραφεσθαι*, to be circumscribed about it; yet is the circle *περιτεννουμενον*, stretched

Soc. If virtue, therefore, be a certain kind of knowledge, it is evident that virtue is to be taught.

MENO. Undoubtedly.

Soc. We have quickly then dispatched this part of the inquiry; and are fairly come to this conclusion, that if virtue be a thing of the same kind with knowledge, it is to be taught; otherwise not.

MENO. Very true.

Soc. Next after this, it seems, that we should consider whether virtue be knowledge or of a kind different from knowledge.

MENO. We ought, I think, in the next place to consider this.

Soc. Well now; shall we suppose that virtue is a thing which is good; and shall we abide by this hypothesis, laying it down for certain that virtue is something good?

MENO. By all means.

Soc. Now if there be also any other good separated from knowledge, then perhaps virtue may not be a certain kind of knowledge. But if there be no sort of good which is not comprehended under knowledge, then a suspicion that virtue was knowledge of a certain kind would be a just suspicion.

MENO. What you say is true.

Soc. But further; is it not through virtue that we are good?

MENO. It is.

Soc. And if good, then advantageous. For all things that are good are advantageous: are they not?

MENO. They are.

Soc. Virtue then is a thing advantageous too.

stretched around it, and contains it. So by the Greek historians is a wall said περιτεισθαι, around a camp or a city, when the wall furrounds and encloses it, although no tent or house should touch the wall. But Plato's meaning is, we think, put out of dispute by the word ελλειπειν, which agrees not to a triangle that touches the circle by every one of its angles; and is compatible only to a triangle, one angle of which, at the least, falls short of the circumference of that (fig. 16) circle drawn around it. Ελλειπειν is also opposed to υπερβαλλειν. And in the latter case, supposed by Plato, where the whole triangle cannot be contained within the (fig. 17) circle drawn about the given side, the angle, which is subtended by this side, must be an acute angle; and the sides, which contain this angle, will, to meet and form the angle, reach beyond the circumference of the circle.—S.

MENO. It follows of necessity from what we just now granted.

Soc. Now let us consider what sort of things those are which profit and are advantageous to us; enumerating the particulars: health, we all say, and strength, and beauty, and riches. These things and others of like kind we call advantageous: do we not?

MENO. We do.

Soc. And say we not, that these very things are sometimes hurtful to us? or do you pronounce otherwise?

MENO. No otherwise; I say the same.

Soc. Consider now, what is the leading cause when any of these things profit us; and¹ what when they hurt us. Is it not, when right use presides in the management of them, that they profit us, and when right use is wanting, that they hurt us?

MENO. Certainly so.

Soc. Further then, let us consider things belonging to the soul. Do you admit that temperance is something in the soul; and so of justice, and fortitude, and docility, and memory, and magnanimity, and all things of like kind?

MENO. I do.

Soc. Now consider such of these things, as you think not to consist in knowledge, but to be of a kind different from knowledge. Do not these procure us sometimes hurt, and sometimes advantage? for instance, fortitude; unless fortitude is not where prudence is wanting: let our instance then be boldness. When a man is bold without reason or understanding, does he not incur mischief? And when he is bold rationally and wisely, does he not gain advantage?

MENO. It is true.

Soc. Is it not true of temperance also, and docility, that to a man who

¹ We have made our translation here conformable to the text of Plato, as printed by Stephens, and explained in the margin of his edition, *ὅταν τι, βλαπτει*. But we suspect an error in those words, and that the right reading is, *ὅταν μη, βλαπτει*. For if Plato wrote *τι*, *wrong use* ought to be mentioned in what immediately follows. But it is not; and rightly not: because wrong use is nothing positive, and can manage nothing; it is only the want of right use. As a crooked line is nothing certain or determinate; it is a deviation only from a straight line.—S.

has

has learnt and is provided with them, if his soul at the same time be fraught with understanding, they are advantageous; but, if he wants understanding, they are hurtful?

MENO. Most undoubtedly.

SOC. In a word, all the abilities of the soul, whether they be of the active kind or of the passive, under the conduct of prudence, do they not tend to happiness; but managed with imprudence, do they not produce the contrary effect?

MENO. It is probable they do.

SOC. If virtue then be one of those things belonging to the soul, and if it be of necessity, as you say, always advantageous, virtue must be prudence: for we see, that all other things belonging to the soul are of themselves neither advantageous nor hurtful; but let there be added to them imprudence or prudence, and they thus become either hurtful or advantageous. Now according to this reasoning, virtue being always advantageous, must be some kind of prudence.

MENO. To me it seems so.

SOC. Now then as to those other things, which we said just now were sometimes beneficial and sometimes hurtful, riches, and the rest of external goods; I ask whether or no as prudence, presiding in the soul, and governing her other powers and possessions, applies them to our advantage; and as imprudence, having the lead, turns them all to mischief; whether in the same manner the soul, rightly using and administering those outward things, employs them for our benefit, but by a wrong use renders them prejudicial and pernicious?

MENO. Most certainly.

SOC. And are not things administered and used rightly by a soul possessed of prudence; but amiss and ill by a soul possessed with folly?

MENO. They are.

SOC. Thus then we may pronounce it to hold good universally: to man all external things¹ depend on his soul; and all things belonging to the soul itself depend on prudence for their being good and beneficial to him. Now

¹ In the Greek *τα αλλα*, all other things; all which are not within the soul. The stoical word we have used is exactly agreeable to the mind of Plato.—S.

it follows from this reasoning, that prudence is always advantageous. But did we not just now say the same of virtue too?

MENO. True.

SOC. We conclude, therefore, that prudence is virtue; either the whole of virtue, or some part at least.

MENO. What has been said seems to me, Socrates, to have been well said.

SOC. If then it be so, the good are not good by nature.

MENO. It seems to me, they are not.

SOC. For then, this too would follow. If the good were good by nature we should have, somewhere or other, persons who knew which of our youth were good and virtuous in their natures; and these, when they had discovered them to us, we should take and guard in the citadel, putting our seal on them more carefully than we should on gold; that no person might corrupt them, and that when they arrived at the age of manhood, they might become useful to the state.

MENO. It is likely, Socrates, that in that case this would be done.

SOC. Since the good, therefore, are not good by nature, whether are they good by teaching or not?

MENO. I think it now necessary to hold this in the affirmative. And it is plain, Socrates, that if virtue be knowledge, according to our hypothesis before, then it may be taught.

SOC. Perhaps so, by Jove. But I fear we did amiss in admitting that hypothesis.

MENO. And yet very lately it seemed to be maintained fairly.

SOC. But I suspect, it ought not only to have lately seemed to be maintained fairly, but to seem so at present, and hereafter too, if there be any thing in it sound or faultless.

MENO. What is the matter now? in what respect do you find fault with it? and why doubt of its being true, that virtue is a kind of knowledge?

SOC. I will tell you, Meno. That virtue is to be taught, supposing it to be a science, or some kind of knowledge, this position of ours I call not into question, nor have any doubt of its being true. But consider whether I appear not to have reason for doubting the truth of the supposition, that

virtue

virtue is a kind of knowledge. For answer me to this question; whatever is taught, I speak not of virtue only, but of every other subject of discipline or teaching, must there not be of necessity both teachers of it and scholars?

MENO. I think there must.

SOC. That thing, therefore, on the contrary, of which there are neither teachers nor scholars to be found, should we not think rightly, in thinking it probable that it is not the subject of teaching?

MENO. True. But do you really think that no masters are to be found who teach virtue?

SOC. Though I have often sought about, and inquired if there were any teachers of virtue, with my utmost endeavours I cannot find any. And yet I invite many persons to join with me in the search, especially such as I might presume to have the most experience in that affair. And just now, Meno, in happy time, is this man¹ sat down by us, who may be a party in our inquiry. And it should seem reasonable for us to make him a party: for, in the first place, he is the son of the wealthy and the wise Anthemion, a man who is become rich, not by accident, nor yet by legacy, as he has done to whom the riches of Polycrates² are now of late devolved, Ismenias³ of Thebes, but having acquired his wealth through his own wisdom and industry; and then as to his other good qualities, he is a citizen who is thought neither contemptuous and insolent, nor ostentatious and giving.

¹ Shewing Anytus to Meno, without mentioning his name, because Meno was well acquainted with him, as being at that time entertained at his house. It is probable, that Anytus had now seated himself close to Socrates, to catch at some words or other in his discourse with Meno, for a better handle to the accusation he was now meditating against him.—S.

² The Polycrates, whom we presume to be here meant, was tyrant of Samos, so famous for succeeding in every affair that he engaged in, (as we learn from Herodotus, lib. iii.) that Lucian, in his *Charon*, calls him *πανευδαίμων*, *fortunate in all things*; and so immensely rich, that the same Lucian, in his *πλοιοι*, ranks him with Cræsus in that respect. The unhappy end he met with, in being murdered by one of his slaves, at the procurement of one of his courtiers, Orontes, a Persian nobleman by birth, who seized on all his vast riches, was fortunate for Ismenias, to whom at length they came by legacy.—S.

³ Ismenias was commander in chief of all the Theban forces, and ambassador from Thebes at the court of Artaxerxes, where he ingratiated himself so much by his address, in complying with the ceremonial of that haughty court, without departing from the dignity of a free Grecian, that he not only met with success in the public ends of his embassy, but obtained that prodigious increase.

giving trouble to all about him, but behaves decently and conducts himself like a modest and frugal man. And besides all this, he has educated and instructed his son here excellently well, in the opinion of the Athenian multitude; for they elect him to the highest offices in the state. Such men it is right to make of our party, when we are inquiring after masters who teach virtue, whether any are to be found and who they are. Join yourself therefore, Anytus, to us, to me, and Meno here, your guest at Athens, in our inquiry concerning virtue, who are the teachers of it. And consider the question thus; Suppose this Meno had an inclination to be made a good physician, and applied to us for our advice in the affair, to what masters should we send him? should we not send him to the physicians?

ANY. By all means.

Soc. And to make him a good carrier¹, should we not send him to the carriers?

ANY. To be sure.

Soc. And in all other subjects of instruction, should we not take the same way?

ANY. Without doubt.

Soc. But concerning this point, let me ask you another question. In sending him to the physicians, we say we should do well, if we intended the making him a good physician. Now when we say this, do we not mean, that we should act with prudence in sending him, not to any who profess not the art of healing, but to those who make it their profession; and who, besides, are paid for teaching² it to others; and thus, by this very acceptance of pay, take upon themselves to teach any one who is willing to come and

increase of his private fortune, the inheritance of Orontes, left to him probably by the last of Orontes's descendants. That piece of address, however, as related by Plutarch in his *Life of Artaxerxes*, and more fully by Ælian in his various histories, was no other than such as would have recommended him to our King James the First. Not that we call in question the personal merit of Ismenias; for we suppose it to be with regard to this very merit, as well as to the reward it met with, that he is here set in contrast with Anthemion.—S.

¹ A reflection this on the education of Anytus, slyly hinting that he was fit for nothing else. Plato, in this part of the dialogue, indulges a little his satirical genius, out of revenge for the death of Socrates, contrived and compassed by this Anytus.—S.

² It appears from this passage, that there were, in those days, professors of physic at Athens, such as there are in modern universities.—S.

learn?

learn; I ask you whether it is not from these considerations that we should do well in sending him to the physicians?

ANY. I answer, yes.

SOC. In the learning music too, and every other art, are not the same considerations just? Surely it is great want of understanding in us, if we are desirous of having some person taught music, not to choose for his masters such as profess the teaching of the art, and the taking of money too for their teaching; but, instead of this, to give trouble to other people, expecting him to learn from those who do not pretend to be teachers, and have not one scholar in that learning in which we expect our student should be by them instructed. Think you not that such an expectation would be very unreasonable?

ANY. I do, by Jupiter; and a great sign of ignorance too, besides.

SOC. You say well. Now then you have an opportunity of considering together with me, and giving your advice about this guest of yours, Meno here. For he has often told me long ago¹, Anytus, that he wished to acquire that wisdom and virtue², through which men govern well both their families and the commonwealth; through which also they behave respectfully to their parents; and know how to entertain both their countrymen and foreigners, and what presents to make them at their departure, in such a manner as becomes a good man. Were we then to recommend to him any persons³ from whom he might learn this virtue, consider whom we should do right in recommending. Is it not clear that, agreeably to what we have just now said in other cases, they would be those persons who profess to be teachers of virtue, and publicly through all Greece offer themselves to teach it to any one who desires to learn; fixing the price of this their teaching, and demanding it as their just fee?

¹ This was probably in some former trip which Meno had made to Athens when a youth.—S.

² Here we have an account of the principal topics of praise and admiration in those ancient days.—S.

³ In the Greek of this passage it is evident there is some word omitted. Stephens saw this, and in the margin of his edition conjectures the word *δια* to be wanting in the beginning of the sentence. But as this conjecture is not satisfactory to us, we beg leave to offer to the future editors of Plato one or two of our own; viz. to read either *διδασκοντας*, or *μαθησκουμενους*, after *αρετης*, in the middle of the sentence, or the latter of those two words at the end of it.—S.

ANY. And what persons, Socrates, do you mean?

SOC. You cannot be ignorant that I speak of those who are called sophists¹.

ANY. O Hercules! speak not so shamefully, Socrates. May none of my relations, friends, or acquaintance, fellow-citizens, or foreign guests, ever be seized with such a madness as to go and be spoiled by those men. For the bane and corruption those men are of all who follow them.

SOC. How say you, Anytus? Are these the only men among those who profess the knowledge of something beneficial to human kind, so widely different from all the rest, as not only not to improve and make better what is put into their hands as the others do, but on the contrary to corrupt and spoil it? and do they think fit openly to demand fees to be paid them for so doing? I cannot tell how I should give credit to this account of yours. For I know one man in particular, Protagoras, to have acquired singly more riches from having this wisdom, than Phidias has from his works so celebrated for their beauty, together with any ten other statuaries besides. It is a prodigy what you tell me; when the menders of old shoes and of old clothes could not escape a month from being publicly known, if they returned the clothes or shoes in a worse condition than they received them; but doing so would be soon reduced to starving; yet, that Protagoras should corrupt and spoil his followers, and send them home worse men than when they first came to him, without being discovered by all Greece, and this for above forty years. For I think he was near seventy years of age when he died, after having spent forty of them in the practice of his profession. And during all that time he maintained a high reputation, which continues even to this day. And not only Protagoras met with this success, but very many others: some of whom were prior to him in time, and some flourish at present. Now shall we suppose that they deceived and corrupted the youth, as you say they did, knowingly? or shall we suppose they did so unconscious of it to themselves? Shall we deem them to be so much out of their senses, such men, who are said by some to be the wisest of mankind?

¹ That Socrates in this speaks ironically and in jest, the readers of Plato will of themselves observe. But let them be pleased to observe further, how little Anytus could know of Socrates, of his way of thinking, or his common conversation, in taking him as he does to be here in earnest.—S.

ANY.

ANY. They are far from being out of their senses, Socrates : rather so are those of the youth, who give them money for corrupting them ; and still more so than these youths are their relations in committing them to the guidance of such men ; but most of all so are those cities which suffer such men to come in amongst them, and drive not away and banish every man, whether foreigner or citizen, who sets up in any such profession.

Soc. Has any of the sophists done you any injury, Anytus ? or why else are you so angry with them ?

ANY. I have never, by Jupiter, conversed with one of them myself ; nor would I suffer so to do any person who belonged to me.

Soc. You have no experience at all then of those men.

ANY. And never desire to have any.

Soc. How then should you know if there is any good or any harm in their teaching, when you have no experience of it at all ?

ANY. Easily enough. For I know what sort of fellows they are, whether I have had any experience or not of them and of their teaching.

Soc. You have the gift of divination perhaps, Anytus. For how otherwise you could know what they are, according to your own account, I should much wonder. But we were not inquiring to what persons Meno might go, and be made a bad man. As to these, if you will, let them be the sophists. But now tell us of those others : and do an act of kindness to this hereditary friend of yours, in directing him to what persons in this great city he may go and be made eminent in that virtue which I gave you a description of just now.

ANY. But why did not you direct him to such persons yourself ?

Soc. What persons I had imagined were the teachers of these duties I have told you. But I happen to have said nothing to the purpose, as you inform me.

ANY. There is some truth however in that perhaps.

Soc. Now, therefore, do you in your turn tell him to whom of the Athenians he should go. Name any one you choose.

ANY. What occasion has he to hear any one man's name ? For of the men of honour and virtue among the Athenians, there is not one, the first he meets with, who would not make him a better man than the sophists would, if he will but hearken and be observant.

Soc. But did these men of honour and virtue become such spontaneously, and without having learnt from any man to be what they are? and are they able to teach others what they were never taught themselves?

Any. They, I presume, learnt from those who went before them, men of like honour and virtue. Or think you not that our city has produced many excellent men?

Soc. I think, Anytus, that in this city there are men excellent in political affairs, and that there have been others no less excellent before them. But were they good teachers of that political excellence? For it is this which happens to be the subject of our present debate: not whether men of honour and virtue are to be found at present in this city or not; nor whether such were to be found here formerly: but whether virtue is to be taught or not. This we have been of a long time considering and inquiring; and in prosecuting the inquiry, we are fallen upon this question, whether those excellent men, either of these or of former days, knew how to impart, or to deliver down to others, that virtue in which they themselves are so excellent; or whether it be impossible for man to deliver down or to impart virtue, and for men to receive it one from another. This it is which we have been long examining, I and Meno. Consider the question now in this manner, on the footing of your own argument. Would you not say that Themistocles¹ was a man of virtue?

Any. I would; and that he was so the most of all men too.

Soc. And would you not then say, that if ever any man could teach his own virtue to another, Themistocles was a good teacher?

Any. I suppose he was, had he had a mind to teach.

Soc. But do you suppose that he had no mind to have some others made men of honour and virtue, and especially his own son? or do you imagine that he maliciously and designedly withheld from him that virtue in which he himself was excellent? Did you never hear that Themistocles taught² his

¹ For the character of this excellent general and statesman see Plutarch, who has written his life.—S.

² Plutarch had in view this passage of Plato, where, in reckoning up the children of Themistocles, and coming to Cleophantus, he says, *οὐ καὶ πλάτων ὁ φιλόσοφος ὡς ἱππεὺς ἀρίστου, τὰλλα δ' οὐδενὸς ἀξίου γενομένου, μνημονεύει*, *that he is mentioned also by Plato the Philosopher, as an excellent horseman, but in other respects worthless*.—S.

son Cleophantus¹ to be an excellent horseman? and that his son attained to such a pitch of excellence, that he would keep himself for a long time standing upright upon horses in full speed, and in this situation would throw his javelin; and performed many other surprising feats² of horsemanship, in which his father had him instructed; and that he made him skilled in all other accomplishments, such as depend on having had good masters? Have you heard all this from elderly people who remember it?

ANY. I have.

SOC. The disposition of his son therefore is not to be found fault with as untowardly and unteachable.

ANY. Perhaps it is not.

SOC. But what say you to this? That Cleophantus the son of Themistocles was a skilful and an excellent man in the same way as his father was, have you ever heard this from any man, either young or old?

ANY. No, truly.

SOC. Do we imagine then that he chose to breed him up in such studies and exercises as he did; and yet, in that wisdom and skill in which he himself excelled, to make him, his own son, not at all a better man than his neighbours, if virtue could be taught?

ANY. That indeed is, perhaps, not to be supposed.

SOC. Such a teacher of virtue now is this teacher of yours, a man whom you yourself acknowledge to have been one of the best men of the last age. And now let us consider another, Aristides³, the son of Lyfimachus. Do you not agree that he was a man of virtue?

ANY. I do entirely.

¹ In the Greek of this sentence the word *εἶναι* is plainly dropped, and ought to be restored in all future editions of Plato. In the Dialogue *περί ἀρετῆς*, attributed by some to Æschines the Socratic, but which is almost copied from this part of the Meno, the necessary word *εἶναι* is not omitted. It is strange that neither Cornaro nor Stephens observed so gross an omission in the manuscripts of Plato.—S.

² It is observable that Plato here uses the plural number: from whence we may conclude that the same wonderful performances in horsemanship were then taught at Athens which have lately been exhibited in our own country, such as the stepping or skipping upright from horse to horse in full gallop, &c.—S.

³ How great and how good a statesman Aristides was appears in Plutarch's Life of him.—S.

Soc. And did he not give his son Lyfmachus ¹ the best education to be had at Athens, so far as depended on masters and teachers? and do you think he has made him a better man than common? You have had some acquaintance with him, and you see what sort of a man he is ². Let another instance, if you please, be Pericles ³, a man so magnanimously wise ⁴. You know that he bred up two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus ⁵.

ANY. I do.

Soc. These, as you know also, he taught horsemanship so as to make them equal in that skill to any of the Athenians. In music too, and gymnastic, and all other accomplishments which depend on art, he instructed them so well that none excelled them. But had he no mind to make them good men? I believe he wanted not inclination so to do ⁶; but I suspect it to be impossible to teach virtue. And that you may not imagine that I speak only of a few, and those of the meanest birth ⁷ among the Athenians, and such as

¹ It was common amongst the Athenians to give the eldest son the name of his grandfather; so that two names were continued alternately in the same family.—S.

² We find nothing more of this Lyfmachus, than what we read in Plutarch, that the Athenians, out of respect to the memory of his father, who died poor, gave him a little landed estate, a sum of money in hand, and a small pension; probably finding him unfit for any office in the state. He is one of the speakers, however, in Plato's Dialogue called Laches: in which he complains that his father, Aristides, had too much indulged him in leading an idle and luxurious life, and, giving himself up wholly to state affairs, had neglected to cultivate his son's mind and to form his manners.—S.

³ Plutarch has written the life of this consummate politician, this truly great man.—S.

⁴ In the Greek *πρω μεγαλοπρεπως σοφον*. With what propriety this epithet is bestowed on him may be seen in Plutarch.—S.

⁵ Concerning Paralus, nothing is recorded by Plutarch to his disadvantage. Indeed he only mentions his name, and that he, as well as his brother and sisters, died of the plague, that great plague described in so lively a manner by Thucydides the historian. But as to Xanthippus, we learn from the great biographer, how unworthy he was of such a father as Pericles, and how disrespectful and undutiful to him was his conduct.—S.

⁶ This instance of Pericles is produced for the same purpose as it is here, by Plato in his Protagoras.—S.

⁷ It is here plainly intimated, that the three great men, whom he had just before celebrated, were of mean extraction. Of Themistocles this is expressly confirmed by Plutarch, who says that he was of an obscure family. Of Aristides it is probable, from the great poverty under which he laboured all his life-time. But of Pericles, Plutarch reports, on the contrary, that his mother was of a considerable family, and his father a man of great personal merit.—S.

wanted

wanted abilities for such an affair, consider that Thucydides ¹ also bred up two sons, Melesias and Stephanus ², giving them a good education in all other respects, and particularly in the exercise of wrestling, in which they excelled all their countrymen. For he had one of his sons instructed by Xanthius, the other by Eudorus ³; and these two masters, in the art of wrestling, were thought to be the best of the age. Do you not remember this?

ANY. I remember that I have heard so.

SOC. Is it not evident then, that he would never have taught his children those things, the teaching of which must have put him to expense, and, at the same time, have neglected what would have cost him nothing, the teaching them to be good men, if such a thing was possible to be taught? But Thucydides, perhaps it may be imagined, was a mean inconsiderable person, who had but few friends among the Athenians or their allies. It was not so. For he was of a noble house ⁴, and had great power in Athens, and much weight in the other Grecian states ⁵. So that, if his sons could have made good

¹ Thucydides, here mentioned by Plato, was a different person from the historian of the same name. Plutarch tells us, and it is confirmed by Marcellinus, that he was a great politician and haranguer in the forum, and was set up by the aristocratical party in the commonwealth to oppose Pericles, who favoured the other side, the democratic. It is highly probable that he was the same Thucydides who, as we are told by the celebrated writer of the History of the Peloponnesian War, was one of the commanders of the Athenian fleet sent to Samos, to second that which had been sent thither before, under the command of Pericles; for the son of Melesias seems to have been a proper person to counterpoise the excessive weight of the power of Pericles, and to please and conciliate to the Athenians the aristocratic party among the Samians.—S.

² This Melesias is introduced by Plato in his Laches, as joining Lyfmachus in lamenting his want of the better parts of education, and in complaining of his father Thucydides's too great indulgence to him.—S.

³ In all the editions of Plato he is called Euodorus; a name, we believe, not to be met with elsewhere. We have therefore not scrupled to follow the translation of Cornarius, who, we presume, read in his manuscript Eudorus, a name to be found in Homer.—S.

⁴ Of the greatness of his family, we know not of any thing appearing on record expressly to confirm this passage. But his alliance with Cimon, the son of Miltiades, makes it probable: for it is not usual for either men or women, of noble ancestry, to intermarry with the base-born. Now Plutarch says of this Thucydides, that he was *κηδεστis Κιμωνis*, a near relation of Cimon's by marriage.—S.

⁵ This is very probable, if he was, as Plutarch relates, *εις των καλων καταδων ανδρων*, one of the men of honour and virtue in that age. Plutarch, in another place, calls him *ανδρα σωφρονα*, a man of sound understanding. Stesimbrotus the Thracian, also wrote a treatise, as we are informed

good men by teaching, he might easily have found out some person to make them so, either one of his own countrymen, or a foreigner, if he himself wanted leisure, on account of his public employments and his administration of the state. But I fear, friend Anytus, that virtue is a thing impossible to be taught¹.

ANY. You seem to me, Socrates, to be ready at abuse, and to speak ill of others with great facility. But I would advise you, if you choose to hearken to me, to be more cautious, and to take care of yourself. For that, in other cities too, it is perhaps an easy matter to do a man a mischief, as well as a piece of service; but here, at Athens, it is so more especially²; and, if I mistake not, you are³ sensible of it yourself⁴.

by Athenæus, p. 589, concerning Themistocles, Thucydides, and Pericles. From the company, therefore, in which he is placed, both by Plato and Stefimbrotus, it appears how very considerable a person he was accounted.—We have written these last notes to prevent its being thought that Socrates speaks here of Thucydides ironically, and really meaning to disparage him. But we cannot conceive what, beside malice, could darken the understanding of Athenæus to such a degree, as to make him imagine that Plato in this dialogue speaks ill of and vilifies Pericles and Themistocles, those greatest of the Grecians, says that writer, p. 506. Anytus, however, as we shall presently see, was smitten with the same blindness, and perhaps from the same cause, the malignity of his own temper.—S.

¹ Meaning that it is impossible for those to learn it who want the *εὐφυΐα*, a truly good natural disposition; and impossible also for those to teach it who cannot teach it scientifically, for want of the principles of wisdom, that is, impossible for any but true philosophers. For this is what Plato would insinuate in all this latter part of the dialogue.—S.

² Because of the power of the populace, who were easily led away by some favourite demagogue. On which account Socrates, as Ælian reports in his *Various Histories*, b. iii. ch. xvii. likened the Athenian democracy to a tyranny, the arbitrary government of one man; or to a monarchy (absolute), where the legislative power is in the hands of one: so far was it from an equal republic or commonwealth, which secures the rights, both natural and acquired, of every citizen; and is equitable alike to all.—Within three years before the death of Socrates, an oligarchy was forced upon the Athenians by their Lacedæmonian conquerors. Then was that great Leviathan, with the demagogic head, thrown to the ground, and a monster with thirty heads tyrannized in his room, slaughtered thousands without even pretence of law, and favoured only its own abettors.—The time of this dialogue seems to be, either towards the end of the oligarchic tyranny, or soon after the restoration of the democracy: what Anytus here says is equally applicable to both.—S.

³ Hinting at the dangers which Socrates had incurred under both governments, by a manly opposition to the acts of tyranny committed in each, and by a strict adherence to the ancient laws of his country, as interpreted and explained by the eternal laws of justice and equity.—S.

⁴ Anytus, having finished his menacing speech, appears to have turned himself away from Socrates

Soc. Anytus seems to me to be angry, Meno. And I am not at all surprised at it. For, in the first place, he supposes that I spoke ill of those persons I mentioned: and then he takes himself¹ to be such another as they were. Now if this man should ever come to know what it is to speak ill of others, he will cease to be angry: but at present he is ignorant of it. Do you therefore answer now, and tell me; are there not amongst us men of honour and virtue?

MENO. Certainly there are.

Soc. But are these men willing to offer themselves to the youth to teach them virtue? do they profess the teaching of it? or do they agree that virtue is a thing which can be taught?

MENO. No, by Jupiter, Socrates, they do not. For you may hear them sometimes maintaining that it may be taught, at other times that it cannot be taught.

Soc. Shall we say then that these men are teachers of virtue, when they have not settled so much as this point, whether virtue can be taught or not?

MENO. I think we should not, Socrates.

Soc. Well; but what say you of those sophists, the only persons who profess to teach virtue, think you that they are the teachers?

MENO. It is for this, O Socrates, that I especially admire Gorgias; for that one shall never hear him making any such professions, or taking upon himself an office of that kind. On the contrary, he laughs at those others whenever he hears them engaging to teach men to be virtuous; and thinks it the office of a sophist only to make men great orators and powerful in speaking.

Soc. You do not think then that the sophists neither are the teachers of virtue?

MENO. I know not what to say, Socrates, to this point. They have the same effect on me as they have on most other people; sometimes I think they are, and sometimes that they are not.

Socrates, but not to have withdrawn from the scene of conversation, which is continued on between Socrates and Meno to the end of the dialogue.—S.

¹ That is, he takes himself to be a great man like them; *μεγαλοφρονων εφ' εαυτου*, *thinking bigly of himself*, says Laertius, in his Life of Socrates, referring to the Meno; meaning undoubtedly this passage, and rightly explaining it.—S.

Soc. Do you know, that not only yourself and those others, who are versed in civil affairs, sometimes think that virtue is acquired through teaching, and sometimes that it is not; do you know that Theognis the poet is of the same mind, and speaks exactly in the same manner?

MENO. In what verses of his?

Soc. In his Elegiacs¹; where he says,

Mix evermore with men, through virtue, great;
And near to theirs be placed thy happy seat:
Still be companion of their board and bowl,
And still to what delights them bend thy soul.
For good through sweet contagion shall be caught,
And virtue be by living manners taught.
But converse of bad men is folly's school;
Where sense, taught backward, sinks into a fool.

Do you perceive, that in these verses he speaks of virtue as if it might be acquired through teaching?

MENO. It appears so to me.

Soc. And yet in other verses² a little farther on he says,

To fools their wisdom could the wise impart;
Could understanding be infus'd by art;
Or could right thought into the mind be driv'n;
For this how oft would great rewards be giv'n?

That is, to those men who were complete masters in this skill. And again, he says,

¹ An elegiac verse, properly speaking, is a pentameter, a verse consisting of four feet and two half feet, equally divided; two feet and a half constituting the former part of the verse, and two feet and a half the latter. But very few poems were ever written purely in this metre. Those verses were commonly called elegiac, where hexameter and pentameter verses were used alternately; such as the verses cited here by Plato. They are found in that collection of the verses of Theognis, extant at this day, under the title of *Γρῦμαι ἐλεγιακαί*, beginning at verse 33. One would imagine, from the last question of Meno and this answer of Socrates, that Theognis wrote some other poems in a different metre. Fabricius accordingly says, that *Γρῦμαι* were written by Theognis in 2800 verses of heroic measure: and cites Suidas as his authority for this. We presume that he read thus in some manuscript or old edition of Suidas: but in Kufter's edition we read elegiac and not heroic.—S.

² The verses here cited, and those which follow, begin at line 434 of Theognis.—S.

Ne'er

Ne'er did bad son from virtuous father rise,
 If duly nurtur'd by his precepts wife.
 But whate'er culture careful we bestow,
 Ne'er in bad soil can seed of virtue grow.

Do you observe, that in speaking again upon the same subject, he contradicts himself, and says the very reverse of what he had said before?

MENO. So it appears.

SOC. Can you tell me now of any other thing, where they who profess to be teachers are held by all men to be so far from teaching it to others, as to be ignorant of it themselves, and to have no merit in that very thing which they pretend to teach; and where those who are by all men allowed to be excellent themselves, sometimes say it may be taught, and sometimes that it cannot? Those who are so unsettled and perplexed about any subject whatever, would you say that they are the proper masters and teachers of it?

MENO. By Jupiter, not I.

SOC. If then neither the sophists, nor those who are themselves excellent men, are teachers of virtue, it is plain there can be no others beside.

MENO. I think there can be none.

SOC. And if no teachers, then no scholars neither.

MENO. I think what you say is true.

SOC. But we agreed before, that a thing in which neither teachers of it nor scholars are to be found, is not the subject of teaching, and cannot be taught.

MENO. We were agreed in this.

SOC. Of virtue now there appear no where any teachers.

MENO. Very true.

SOC. And if no teachers of it, then no scholars in it neither.

MENO. It appears so.

SOC. Virtue therefore must be a thing which cannot be taught.

MENO. It seems so, if we have considered the matter rightly. And hence, Socrates, I am led to wonder, whether any men really good are ever to be found or not; and if there are, by what means they became such.

SOC. We are in danger, O Meno! of being found, you and I, both of us, very insufficient reasoners on the point in question; and you not to have been fully instructed by Gorgias, nor I by Prodicus. Above all things

therefore ought we to apply our minds to ourselves ; and to search out a person who by some certain means would make us better men. I say this with regard to the inquiry now before us ; in which we have been so foolish as not to consider, that it is not under the conduct of science that the affairs of men are administered rightly and well ; or, if we should not choose to grant that, at least that it is not under the conduct of science only, but of some other thing also which is different from science ; and perhaps the knowledge of the means by which men become good hath escaped us.

MENO. How so, Socrates ?

SOC. I will tell you how. That those men who are good and virtuous must also be advantageous to us we have agreed rightly ; and that it is impossible it should be otherwise. Is not this true ?

MENO. Certainly.

SOC. And that they are advantageous to us on this account, because they conduct our affairs rightly, should we not do well in admitting this ?

MENO. Without doubt.

SOC. But we seem not to have done well in granting, that unless a man be prudent, it is not possible for him to conduct affairs rightly.

MENO. What mean you now by the word rightly ?

SOC. I will tell you what I mean. If a man who knew the way to Larissa¹, or wherever else you please, were to walk at the head of others whom he had undertaken to conduct thither, would he not conduct them well and rightly ?

MENO. Without doubt.

SOC. And how would it be were a man to undertake this who had only a right opinion about the way, but had never gone thither himself, nor had any certain knowledge of the way, would not he also conduct them rightly ?

MENO. To be sure.

SOC. And so long as he had any how a right opinion of the way, which the other man knew with certainty, he would not in the least be a worse guide, though only surmising justly, and not knowing clearly, than the other with all his perfect knowledge ?

¹ The road to Larissa is made the instance, because most familiar to Meno, who was of Pharfalus, a city of Thessaly, near to Larissa, the chief city of all that part of the country, and with which Meno was particularly well acquainted.—S.

MENO. Not at all worse.

SOC. Right opinion, therefore, with regard to right action, is not at all a worse guide than science or perfect knowledge. And this it is which we omitted just now in considering the nature of virtue; when we said that prudence only or knowledge led to right action; it is this, right opinion.

MENO. It seems so.

SOC. Right opinion therefore is not at all of less advantage to man than certain knowledge.

MENO. In this respect, however, Socrates, it is; in that he who has a perfect knowledge of his end, would always attain to it; but the man who had only a right opinion of it, sometimes would attain to it, and sometimes would not.

SOC. How say you? would not the man, who had a right opinion of it, always attain to it, so long as he entertained that right opinion?

MENO. It appears to me that he must. And therefore I wonder, Socrates, this being the case, on what account it is that science is so much more valuable than right opinion; and indeed in what respect it is that they differ at all one from the other.

SOC. Do you know now why you wonder? or shall I tell you?

MENO. By all means tell me.

SOC. It is because you never considered attentively those images^a made by Dædalus. But perhaps you have none of them in your country.

MENO. With what view is it now that you speak of these images?

SOC. Because these, if they are not fastened, run away from us, and become fugitives: but if they are fastened, they abide by us.

MENO. Well; and what then?

SOC. To have in one's possession any of these works of his loose and unfastened, is like to the being master of a runaway slave, a matter of little value, because not permanent: but when fastened and secured, they are things of great value; for indeed they are works of great beauty. But you ask, with what view it is that I speak of these images. I answer,—It is with a view to true opinions. For true opinions also, so long as they abide

^a These were small figures of the gods, reported to have in them the power of self motion.—S.

by us, are valuable goods, and procure for us all good things: but they are not disposed to abide with us a long time; for they soon slip away out of our souls, and become fugitives. Hence are they of small value to a man, until he has fastened and bound them down, by deducing them rationally from their cause¹. And this, my friend Meno, is reminiscence, as we before agreed. But when they are thus bound and fastened, in the first place they become truly known, and in consequence of this they become stable and abide with us. Now it is on this very account that science is a thing more valuable than right opinion; and in this respect it is they differ, in that the parts of science only are fastened one to another, and bound down together.

MENO. By Jupiter, Socrates, they are similar to some such things as those to which you resemble them.

SOC. Nay, for my part, I speak thus not from knowledge; but only from conjecture. But that right opinion and science are two different things, this, as it appears to me, I do not merely imagine or conjecture. For if I were to profess the knowledge of any things whatever (and there are but

¹ In the Greek, *αιτίας λογισμῷ*, by a rational account of the cause; or by proving, how and from what cause it is that they are true. The cause of every truth is some other truth, higher and more general, in which it is included. To those who have considered the method, naturally used by the mind in reasoning, commonly but improperly called the art of reasoning, this will appear from hence;—A proposition is an opinion of the mind expressed in words, which affirm or deny some one thing to belong to some other. If the proposition, that is, if the opinion be true, it admits of a rational proof. And all rational proof consists in showing or exhibiting of some general truth, or true proposition, in which is virtually included the proposition to be proved. In syllogistical reasoning (the only way of reasoning upwards, or tracing any truths from their causes) that truth, or true proposition, which is more general than the proposition to be proved, is called the major proposition on that very account, because it is of larger extent, or more general than the proposition to be proved, the conclusion; containing in it the truth of that conclusion, together with many other truths, collateral to one another, and all of them subordinate to, or less general than, the major proposition itself. In the same manner, the truth of this major and more general proposition is to be traced out and deduced from another proposition still more general; and so on till we arrive at some truth self-evident, apparently the cause from which is deduced the truth of those other propositions less general, which gradually and in order lead the mind up to it; the cause why they are true. If many subordinate truths arise out of one and the same general truth, as they all equally depend from this, so by means of this too they are all connected together, like the collateral chains, mentioned in the way of similitude (though to another subject) by Plato in his *Io*, depending all from the iron ring at top fastened to the magnet.—S.

a few things which I could profess to know), this I would set down for one of them ¹.

MENO. You are entirely right, Socrates ².

Soc. Well; and am I not right in this also, that true opinion, having the conduct of any work or action whatever, executes her office full as well as science?

MENO. In this too I think you are in the right.

Soc. Right opinion, therefore, is a thing not at all inferior to science, nor less beneficial with regard to the execution of any work ³, or the performance of any action: nor is the man, who has right opinions, inferior (in this respect) to the man of science.

MENO. Very true.

Soc. And we agreed before, that a good man was beneficial or advantageous to others.

MENO. We did.

Soc. Since, therefore, it is not through science only that men have been good and beneficial to their country (if any such men there may have been),

¹ This sentence, together with that which immediately precedes it, seems to us the right key to open that part of the conversation of Socrates with his friends, in which he was generally supposed to dissemble his great knowledge. We find him here disclaiming the knowledge of those things which are not the proper objects of knowledge, but of imagination and opinion only; and such are almost all the subjects even of philosophical conversation: and we find him at the same time openly avowing, not with irony, but with much seriousness, that he knew the different nature of those two judgments of the soul, science and opinion; one of which is from mind, the other from sense. Now if all science depends on knowing the principle of science, if this principle is mind, and if the human soul partakes of mind, it follows, that the human mind knowing herself, knows in what she differs from the lower faculties of the soul, and how her own judgment of things, which is science, differs from theirs, which amounts to no more than mere opinion: it follows, that she knows what science is, and consequently knows what falls short of it: it follows also, that she knows what the objects are of science, and what those of opinion; having and contemplating the former sort in herself; but rejecting and disclaiming the latter, as not belonging to her province. Accordingly we shall find that Socrates, who knew himself, his true self, his mind, on the one hand never pretended, as ignorant men are apt to do, to know things which cannot be known; nor on the other hand, affected not to know the nature of the human mind, the principles of it, or any of its objects, so far as they are communicated to particular minds from and by mind universal.—S.

² That is, in distinguishing science from right opinion.—S.

³ This is because right opinion principally verges to sensibles; but science to intelligibles.—T.

but

but also by means of right opinion ; and since neither of these is with men by nature, neither science nor right opinion ; or ¹ do you think that either of them comes by nature ?

MENO. Not I.

Soc. Since then, they are not by nature, by nature neither is it that men could have been good and virtuous.

MENO. Certainly not.

Soc. Seeing now, that virtue comes not by nature, we should, in the next place, after this consider if it comes through teaching.

MENO. To be sure we should.

Soc. Did it not appear to us both, that if virtue was wisdom, then it came through teaching ?

MENO. It did.

Soc. And that if virtue came through teaching, then virtue would be wisdom ?

MENO. Very true.

Soc. And that if there were any teachers of virtue, virtue would in that case be a thing that came through teaching ; otherwise not ?

MENO. Just so.

Soc. But we have agreed that there were no teachers of it.

¹ Just here, in all the editions of the Greek, are added these two words, *οὐτ ἐπικτήτα*, *neither are they acquired*. Which part of the sentence is apparently false : for science and right opinion are both of them acquired ; science through teaching ; and right opinion through other adventitious means : but supposing it ever so true with regard to right opinion ; and supposing also, that the word *ἐπικτήτα* means in this place *acquired through teaching* ; it would be impertinent to this part of the argumentation, and premature : for Socrates is here proving only this, that virtue comes not by nature : and this he proves by showing that all men who act rightly and well, act thus either from science or from right opinion ; neither of which principles of action men have from nature. It is not till afterwards, in the next place, that he proves virtue not to be acquired through teaching. With great judgment, therefore, did Cornarius, in his translation, take no notice of those two words ; and, in his *Eclogæ*, has with great probability supposed the words *ἀλλ' ἐπικτήτα* to have been an ancient scholium written in the margin, and by subsequent transcribers, as happened frequently, assumed into the text ; and afterwards the word *ἀλλ'* to have been changed into *οὐτ* by some later copyist, not attending to the course of the argumentation, but to the conclusion only. The necessity of the omission is so clear, that we wonder not so much at the acuteness of Cornarius in seeing it, as at the blindness of Stephens in not seeing but expressly denying it.—S.

MENO.

MENO. True.

Soc. We are agreed, therefore, that virtue comes not through teaching ; and that virtue is not wisdom.

MENO. Certainly so.

Soc. But we agreed besides, that virtue was something good.

MENO. True.

Soc. And that whatever conducted affairs rightly was a thing good and serviceable to us.

MENO. We did clearly.

Soc. And that affairs are conducted rightly by these two things only, true opinion and science ; possessed of either of which two, a man makes a good leader and guide. Whatever comes from fortune is not the effect of human conduct. But so far as man has to do in conducting rightly, it is only through one of these means, true opinion and science.

MENO. I think so.

Soc. Now since virtue comes not through teaching, it is not the effect of science.

MENO. It appears that it is not.

Soc. Of the two only things then, which are good and serviceable to man's right conduct, we have thrown one out of the question ; having agreed that science is not the thing through which civil affairs are administered and conducted rightly.

MENO. I think it is not.

Soc. Not therefore through any wisdom, nor as being wise, did such men govern in the state ; such as Themistocles, and the rest, whom Anytus here just now recounted. And for this very reason they were not capable of making others to be such men as themselves ; because it was not science that made them what they were.

MENO. The case, O Socrates, seems to be as you represent it.

Soc. If then it is not science, it follows that it must be the other thing which remains of the two, namely, right opinion, through which public affairs are administered rightly by our statesmen and politicians ; men who, in point of wisdom, are not at all superior to the oracle fingers and divine prophets. For these also utter many true sayings, but have no real knowledge of any one thing they utter.

MENO. I suspect this to be the case.

SOC. Now do not those men, O Meno, deserve the character of divine men, who either speak or act aright in many things of great importance, without any intellectual knowledge of the subjects concerning which they speak or act?

MENO. By all means do they.

SOC. Rightly then should we call those men divine, whom we just now mentioned, the oracle fingers and the prophets, and all who are inspired by the Muses. Nor at all less divine men than these should we say that the politicians are, no less enthusiasts, inspired divinely, and possessed by the Divinity, when in their speeches they direct aright many and great affairs, without any real knowledge of the subjects they are speaking of.

MENO. Certainly we should.

SOC. And accordingly the women, you know, Meno, call men of virtue by the name of divine men. And the Lacedæmonians, when they celebrate with encomiums any man of virtue, are used to say of him that he is a divine man.

MENO. And they appear, O Socrates, to speak justly too. And yet, perhaps, Anytus here is offended at what you say.

SOC. I give myself no manner of concern about it. With him, Meno, we shall have some discourse at another time. But if we, at this time, during all this conversation, have pursued our inquiries and reasonings aright, virtue can neither come by nature, nor yet through teaching; but to those with whom it is, it must come by a divine portion or allotment, without the intelligence or true knowledge of it; unless amongst the politicians there should be found some person capable of making another man a good politician. But if there should, he might almost be said to be such a one amongst the living, as Homer tells us that Tiresias is amongst the dead; where, speaking of him and of the rest who are in Hades, he says ¹,

Fill'd is he only with discerning mind;
The rest flit, empty shadows, dark and blind.

Exactly the same pre-eminence hath such a man; being as it were the

¹ In his *Odyssey*, lib. x. ver. 495.

truth and substance of things, compared with shadows †, in respect of virtue.

MENO. What you say, O Socrates, seems to me to be in the highest degree just.

SOC. From this reasoning then, Meno, it appears to us, that such as are possessed of virtue, have it as a divine portion or allotment to them. But on this point we shall then arrive at certainty, when, previous to our inquiries by what means it is that virtue comes to men, we set about searching first, what the essence is of virtue.—But it is now time for me to go somewhere else. And do you, since you are persuaded yourself of the truth of those conclusions, the result of our inquiries, persuade your friend Anytus to believe them also. For he may thus be softened and become milder; and you, by thus persuading him, may possibly do a piece of service to your country.

† It is obvious to be seen, that this is a metaphor taken from the simile here used, of Tiresias and the rest of the ghosts in Hades; or an application of the simile to that which it is brought to illustrate in terms used properly in the simile, but metaphorically in the application. For the application of the simile is this:—As all the other ghosts in Hades are to Tiresias, so are men of right opinion only, void of scientific principles, to men of true science, men who are knowing in those principles. In the simile, the common herd of ghosts are unreal, unsubstantial shades, or shadows, compared with Tiresias, who therefore, with respect to them, is real substance. In the subject, resembled to this simile, men of right opinion are as shadows when compared with men of real science.—The justness of the similitude depends on these doctrines of Plato: that matters of opinion are objects of the imagination, and matters of science are objects of the mind or intellect; that all objects of the imagination are only images of the objects of sense, or things sensible; and that these objects of sense, or things sensible, are but the shadows of things intelligible, the objects of intellect.—S.

THE PROTAGORAS:

OR,

THE SOPHISTS.

THE PROTAGORAS

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

An ASSOCIATE,		ALCIBIADES,
SOCRATES,		CALLIAS,
HIPPOCRATES,		CRITIAS,
PROTAGORAS,		PRODICUS ¹ ,

And HIPPIAS.

ASSOCIATE.

WHENCE come you, Socrates? or is it not evident that you come from hunting about the beauty of Alcibiades? For to me, as I lately beheld him, the man appeared to be beautiful. I say the man: for between ourselves, Socrates, he may be called so, since his beard begins now to make its appearance.

Soc. But what then? Do you not indeed praise Homer², who says, that the age of a young man when he begins to have a beard is most agreeable? And this is now the age of Alcibiades.

¹ As the same question is discussed in this Dialogue, though not so fully as in the *Meno*, viz. Whether virtue can be taught, an introduction to it is unnecessary. I shall therefore only observe, that the liveliness and variety of the characters in it; the mirth and pleasantry of Socrates; the simplicity and nobleness of the narratives; and the knowledge of antiquities it displays, are beauties no less obvious than inimitable. For an account of Protagoras, that prince of sophists, see the *Theætetus*.

² This sophist was of Cos, and flourished about 396 years before Christ. Among his pupils were Euripides, Socrates, Theramenes, and Isocrates. He made his auditors pay to hear him harangue, which has given occasion to some of the antients to speak of the orations of Prodicus, for 50 drachms. Among his numerous writings, he composed that beautiful epifode in which virtue and pleasure are introduced attempting to make Hercules one of their votaries.

³ See the 10th Book of the *Odyssey*, where Homer represents Mercury as assuming the shape of a young man that begins to have a beard.

Assoc. But do you not at present come from him? And how is the young man disposed towards you?

Soc. He appears to be well affected towards me, and especially so to-day; for he said many things in defence of me; and I am just now come from him. However, I wish to tell you something very strange: though he was present I did not attend to him, and even forgot to look at him.

Assoc. What great affair then happened to both of you? for you could not meet with any other beautiful person in this city.

Soc. I did, however, and with one far more beautiful.

Assoc. What do you say? Was he a citizen or a stranger?

Soc. A stranger.

Assoc. Whence came he.

Soc. From Abdera.

Assoc. And did this stranger appear to you so beautiful as to surpass in beauty the son of Clinias?

Soc. How can it be otherwise, O blessed man, but that the wisest must appear to be the more beautiful person?

Assoc. Do you come to us then, Socrates, from a certain wise man?

Soc. I do, and from the wisest indeed of those that exist at present; if Protagoras appears to you to be most wise.

Assoc. What do you say? Is Protagoras arrived hither?

Soc. He has been here these three days.

Assoc. And have you then just now been with him?

Soc. I have; and I have also both spoken and heard many things.

Assoc. Will you not therefore relate this conversation to us? For if nothing hinders, you may sit here, since this boy will give you his place.

Soc. I will certainly relate it to you: and I shall also thank you for attending to it.

Assoc. And we shall thank you for the narration.

Soc. There will then be reciprocal thanks. Hear therefore:—This morning, while it was yet dark, Hippocrates, the son of Apollodorus and the brother of Phaedon, knocked very hard at my gate with his stick, and as soon as it was opened he hastily came to my bedchamber, crying with a loud voice, Socrates, are you asleep?—And I knowing his voice said, This is Hippocrates, do you bring any news?—None, he replied, but what is good.—You

speak well, said I, but what is it? and what brought you hither?—Protagoras, said he, is come, and dwells near me.—He has been here, I replied, for some time; and have you only just heard it?—I only heard it, by the gods, said he, this evening; and at the same time, taking a couch, he sat down at my feet, and said, I returned last night very late from the village of Oinoe; for my boy Satyrus had made his escape from me, and being desirous to tell you that I should pursue him, something else occurring, I forgot it. But after I had returned, supped, and was going to bed, then my brother told me Protagoras was come. On hearing this, I immediately attempted to go to you; but afterwards it appeared to me that the night was already far advanced. Soon therefore falling asleep from weariness, when I awoke, I came hither.—And I knowing the fortitude of Hippocrates, and seeing his astonishment, said, What is this to you? Has Protagoras injured you in any respect?—By the gods, said he laughing, he has, because he alone is wise, and has not made me to be so.—But, by Jupiter, said I, if you had given him money, and had persuaded him, he would have made you also wise.—O Jupiter, and the other gods, he replied, I should neither spare my own property, nor that of my friends, to accomplish this, and I now come to you, that you may speak to him in my behalf. For I am younger than you, and at the same time I never either saw or heard Protagoras; for I was a boy when he first came to this place. However, Socrates, all men praise him, and say that his discourses are most wise. But why do we not go to him that we may find him within? And he resides, as I have heard, with Callias¹ the son of Hipponicus. Let us then go.—To this I replied, We will not yet go thither, O good man, for it is too early; but let us go into our court, where we will walk and converse till it is light; and afterwards we will pay a visit to Protagoras. For, as he stays very much at home, we shall most probably find him within.—After this we rose and went into the court, and I, in order to try the strength of Hippocrates, looked at him attentively, and said, Tell me, O Hippocrates, do you now endeavour to go to Protagoras, that by giving him money he may teach you something? What kind of man do you suppose him to be? and what kind of a man would you wish him to make you? Just as if you

¹ This Callias was one of the first citizens of Athens, and his father Hipponicus had been general of the Athenians, together with Nicias, at the battle of Tanagre.

should go to your namesake, Hippocrates of Cos, who is a descendant of Esculapius, and should offer him money on your own account, if any one should ask you, O Hippocrates, to what kind of man do you give money, and on what account? what would you answer?—I should say, he replied, that I give it as to a physician.—And with what view would you give it?—That I might become a physician, said he.—But if you went to the Argive Polycletus, or the Athenian Phidias, and gave them a reward on your own account, should any one ask you to what kind of men, and for what purpose, you offered money to Polycletus and Phidias, what would you answer?—I should answer, said he, that I gave it as to statuary, and in order that I myself might become a statuary.—Be it so, I replied. But we are now going, I and you, to Protagoras, and we are prepared to give him money on your account, if we have sufficient for this purpose, and can persuade him by this mean; but if it be not sufficient, we must borrow from our friends. If therefore some one, on perceiving our great eagerness about these particulars, should say, Tell me, O Socrates and Hippocrates, to what kind of man, and for what purpose do you intend to give money in offering it to Protagoras? what answer should we give him? What other appellation have we heard respecting Protagoras, as with respect to Phidias we have heard him called a statuary, and with respect to Homer, a poet? What thing of this kind have we heard concerning Protagoras?—They call this man, said he, a sophist, Socrates.—Shall we go therefore, and offer money as to a sophist?—Certainly.—If then some one should ask you what do you design to become by going to Protagoras?—He replied, blushing (for there was now day-light sufficient for me to see him), from what we have already admitted, it is evident that my design is to become a sophist.—But, by the gods, said I, will you not be ashamed to proclaim yourself a sophist among the Greeks?—I shall, by Jupiter, if it is requisite to speak what I think.—Your design then, Hippocrates, in acquiring the discipline of Protagoras, is not to become a sophist, but you have the same intention as when you went to the school of a grammarian, or that of a musician, or of a master of gymnastic: for you went not to those masters to learn their art, that you might become a professor yourself, but for the sake of acquiring such instruction as becomes a private and a free man.—The discipline which I shall receive from Protagoras, said he, perfectly appears to me to be rather a thing of this kind.—Do you know therefore, I replied,

what you now intend to do? or is it concealed from you?—About what?—That you are about to commit your soul to the care of a man, who, as you say, is a sophist; and yet I should wonder if you know what a sophist is. Though if you are ignorant of this, neither do you know to whom you deliver your soul, nor if to a good or a bad thing.—But I think, said he, that I know.—Tell me then what you think a sophist is?—I think, said he, as the name implies, that he is one knowing in things pertaining to wisdom.—But, I replied, the same thing may also be said of painters and architects, that they also are knowing in things pertaining to wisdom. And if any one should ask us in what wise particulars painters are knowing, we should answer him, that their wisdom consisted in the production of images; and we should reply in a similar manner with respect to the rest. But if some one should ask in what particulars is a sophist wise; what should we answer? Of what art is he the master?—He is master, Socrates, of the art which enables men to speak eloquently.—Perhaps, said I, we speak the truth, yet we do not speak sufficiently. For this answer demands from us another interrogation, viz. in what a sophist renders men eloquent. For does not a harper also enable those that are instructed by him, to speak about that in which he is knowing, viz. the playing on the harp? Is it not so?—It is.—Be it so then. But about what does a sophist render men eloquent? For it is evident, that it must be about things of which he has a knowledge.—It is likely.—What then is that thing about which the sophist is knowing, and which he teaches to others?—By Jupiter, he replied, I can no longer tell you.—And I said after this, Do you know therefore to what danger you are going to expose your soul? or if you were going to subject your body to the hazard of becoming in a good or a bad condition, would you not diligently consider whether you should expose it to this danger or not? Would you not call your friends and relations to consult with them? And would you not take more than one day to deliberate on the affair? But though you esteem your soul far more than your body, and upon it depends your happiness or unhappiness, according as it is well or ill disposed, yet, concerning this, you neither ask advice of your father nor brother, nor of any one of us your associates, whether you should commit your soul to this stranger. But having heard of his arrival yesterday evening, you come next morning before break of day, without considering whether it is proper to commit yourself to him or not, and are

prepared to employ not only all your own riches for that purpose, but also those of your friends, as if you already knew that you must by all means associate with Protagoras, whom, as you say, you neither know nor have ever spoken to. But you call him a sophist, though what a sophist is, to which you are about to deliver yourself, you are evidently ignorant.—And he having heard me, replied, What you say, Socrates, appears to be the truth.—Whether or not, therefore, O Hippocrates, is a sophist a certain merchant and retailer of things by which the soul is nourished?—He appears to me, Socrates, to be a character of this kind; but with what is the soul nourished?—By disciplines, I replied. But we must take care, my friend, lest the sophist, while he praises what he sells, deceive us, just as those merchants and retailers do respecting the food of the body. For they are ignorant whether the articles of their traffic are salubrious or noxious to the body, but at the same time they praise all that they sell. Those also that buy these articles are alike ignorant in this respect, unless the purchaser should happen to be a master of gymnastic, or a physician. In like manner, those who carry about disciplines in cities, and who hawk and sell them to those that desire to buy them, praise indeed all that they sell, though perhaps some of these also, O most excellent youth, may be ignorant whether what they sell is beneficial or noxious to the soul. And this also may be the case with those that buy of them, unless the purchaser should happen to be a physician of the soul. If therefore you scientifically know what among these is good or bad, you may securely buy disciplines from Protagoras, or any other; but if not, see, O blessed youth, whether you will not be in extreme danger with respect to your dearest concerns. For there is much greater danger in the buying of disciplines than in that of food; since he who buys meats and drinks of a victualler or merchant may take them away in other vessels, and, before he receives them into his body, may place them in his house, and calling in some person skilled in these things, may consult what should be eaten and drank, and what should not, and how much and when it is proper to eat and drink; so that there is no great danger in buying provisions. Disciplines, however, cannot be taken away in another vessel; but it is necessary that he who buys a discipline, receiving and learning it in his soul, should depart either injured or benefited. Let us therefore consider these things with those that are older than we are: for we are too young to discuss an affair of such great importance. Let us
now,

now, however, go whither we intended, and hear the man ; and after we have heard him, let us also communicate with others. For not only Protagoras is there, but Hippias the Elean, and Prodicus too, I think, and many other wise men.

This being agreed upon by us, we go on ; but when we entered the porch, we stopt to discuss something which had occurred to us in the way. That it might not therefore be unfinished, but that being terminated we might thus enter the house, we stood discoursing in the porch, until we agreed with each other. It appears therefore to me that the porter, who was a eunuch, heard us ; and that on account of the multitude of the sophists he was enraged with those that came to the house. When therefore we had knocked at the gate he opened it, and seeing us, Ha, ha, said he, certain sophists. He is not at leisure. And at the same time taking the gate with both his hands, he shut it with all his force. We then knocked again, and he, without opening the gate, said, Did not you hear me tell you that he is not at leisure ?—But, my good man, said I, we are not come to Callias, nor are we sophists. Take courage, therefore, for we come requesting to see Protagoras. Announce this to him. Notwithstanding this the man would scarcely open the gate to us. However, he opened it at length, and when we entered, we met with Protagoras walking in the vestibule of the porch. Many followed him ; on one side Callias the son of Hipponicus, and his brother by the mother ; Paralus the son of Pericles ; and Charmides the son of Glauco. On the other side of him were Xanthippus the other son of Pericles, and Philippides the son of Philomelus, and Antimocrus the Mendæan, who was the most illustrious of all the disciples of Protagoras, and who is instructed in his art that he may become a sophist. Of those behind these, who followed them listening to what was said, the greater part appeared to be strangers, whom Protagoras brings with him from the several cities through which he passes, and whom he charms by his voice like another Orpheus : and they, allured by voice, follow him. Some of our countrymen also were in the choir. On seeing this choir I was very much delighted in observing how well they took care not to be an impediment to Protagoras in walking before him ; but when he turned, and his company with him, these his auditors that followed him opened to the right and left in a becoming and orderly manner, and always beautifully ranged themselves behind him. After Protagoras,

goras, as Homer¹ says, I saw Hippias the Elean seated on a throne in the opposite vestibule of the porch, and round him on benches sat Eryximachus, the son of Acumenus, Phædrus the Myrrhinusian, Andron the son of Androton, and some others, partly strangers and partly his fellow citizens. They appeared, too, to be interrogating Hippias concerning the sublime parts of nature, and certain astronomical particulars; but he, sitting on a throne, considered and resolved their questions. I likewise saw Tantalus: for Prodicus the Cean was there; but he was in a certain building which Hipponicus had before used for an office, but which Callias, on account of the multitude that came to his house, had given to the strangers, after having prepared it for their reception. Prodicus therefore was still in bed wrapt up in skins and coverings, and Pausanias of Ceramis was seated by his bedside; and with Pausanias there was a youth, who appeared to me to be of a beautiful and excellent disposition. His form indeed was perfectly beautiful; and his name, as I have heard, was Agatho. Nor did I wonder that he was beloved by Pausanias. There were also the two Adimantes, the one the son of Cephis, and the other the son of Leucolophides, and many others. But as I was without, I was not able to learn what was the subject of their discourse, though I very much desired to hear Prodicus: for he appears to me to be a man perfectly wise and divine. But a certain humming sound being produced in the chamber through the grave tone of his voice, prevented me from hearing distinctly what he said. Just as we had entered, Alcibiades, the beautiful as you say, and as I am persuaded he is, and Critias the son of Calliarchus, came after us.

After we had entered therefore, and had discussed certain trifling particulars, and considered what passed, we went to Protagoras; and I said, O Protagoras, I and Hippocrates are come to see you.—Would you wish, said he, to speak with me alone, or in the presence of others?—It makes no difference, I replied, to us; but when you hear on what account we come, you yourself shall determine this.—What is it then, said he, that hath brought you?—Hippocrates here is our countryman, the son of Apollodorus, and is of a great

¹ See the 11th Book of the *Odyssey*, where Ulysses is represented conversing with the shades of the dead in Hades. Plato, by alluding to this part of the *Odyssey*, doubtless intended to insinuate, as Dacier well observes, that these sophists are not real men, but only the phantoms and shadows of men.

and

and happy family, and seems to contend with his equals in age for natural endowments. But he desires to become illustrious in the city; and he thinks that he shall especially effect this if he associates with you. Consider, therefore, whether it is proper for him to converse alone with you about these particulars, or in conjunction with others.—Your forethought, said he, Socrates, with respect to me is right. For a stranger who goes to great cities, and persuades young people of the greatest quality to leave the associations both of their kindred and others, both the young and the old, and adhere to him alone, that they may become better men by his conversation, ought in doing this to be cautious. For things of this kind are attended with no small envy, together with much malevolence and many stratagems. I say indeed that the sophistic art is antient, but that those men who first professed it, fearing the hatred to which it would be exposed, sought to conceal it, some with the veil of poetry, as Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides, and others with that of the mysteries and prophecy, as Orpheus and Musæus, and their followers. I perceive also, that some have called this art gymnastic, as Iccus of Tarentum, and as a sophist at present does who is inferior to none, viz. Herodicus the Selymbrianian, who was originally of Megara. But your Agathocles, who was a great sophist, Pythocles of Ceos, and many others, concealed it under the veil of music. All these, as I said, being afraid of envy, employed these arts as veils. I however, in this particular, do not accord with all these: for I think they did not effect any thing which they wished to accomplish; since these concealments are understood by men of great authority in cities. The vulgar indeed do not perceive them; but praise certain things which they hear from the sophists. This subterfuge therefore, not being attended with any effect, but becoming apparent, necessarily shows the great folly of him that attempts it, and makes men much more inimical: for they think that a man of this kind is crafty in every thing. I therefore have taken an opposite path: for I acknowledge myself to be a sophist, and a teacher of men: and I think that by this ingenuous confession I avoid envy more safely than by dissimulation. I also direct my attention to other things besides this; so that, as I may say, with the assistance of Divinity, I have suffered nothing dire through confessing that I am a sophist; though I have exercised this art many years: for my age is very great, and I am old enough to be the father of any one of you. So that it will be by far the most pleasant

fant to me, if you discourse with me concerning these particulars in the presence of all those that are in the house.

I then, suspecting that he wished to exhibit himself to Prodicus and Hippias, and to boast that we came to him as being enamoured of his wisdom, said, Why may not Prodicus and Hippias be called, and those that are with him, that they may hear us?—By all means, said Protagoras, let them be called.—Callias therefore said, Shall we prepare seats for you, that you may discourse sitting?—It was agreed to be proper so to do. And at the same time all of us being pleased, as those that were to hear wise men converse, took hold of the benches and couches, and disposed them near to Hippias; for the benches had been there previously placed. In the interim came Callias and Alcibiades, bringing with them Prodicus, who had then risen from his bed, and those that were with him. When therefore we were all seated, Now, Socrates, said Protagoras, you may tell me before all this company what you a little before mentioned to me about this youth. And I said, My exordium, O Protagoras, is that which I employed before, viz. with what design we came to you. Hippocrates then, here, is desirous of your converse; and says he shall gladly hear what advantage he shall derive from associating with you. This is all we have to say to you.—Protagoras then said in reply, O young man, the advantage which you will derive from associating with me is this, that on the day in which you come to me you will go home better than you was before; you will also be more improved on the second than on the first day, and you will always find that you have every day advanced in improvement.—And I, hearing him, said, O Protagoras, this is by no means wonderful, but it is fit that it should be so; since you also, though so old and so wise, would become better, if any one should teach you what you do not know. But that is not what we require. But just as if Hippocrates here should immediately change his mind, and should desire to associate with the youth lately arrived at this place, Zeuxippus the son of Heracleus, and coming to him in the same manner as he is now come to you, should hear from him the same things as he has heard from you, that every day by associating with him he would become better, and advance in improvement; if he should ask him, In what do you say I shall become better, and advance in proficiency, Zeuxippus would answer him, In the art of painting. And if he were to associate with the Theban Orthagoras, and should hear from him the same things

things as he has heard from you, and should ask him in what he would daily become better by associating with him, he would reply, In the art of playing on the pipe. In like manner do you also reply to the youth, and to me asking for him: for you say that Hippocrates here, by associating with Protagoras, will daily become better and advance in improvement; tell us then, O Protagoras, in what he will make this proficiency?—Protagoras, on hearing me thus speak, said, You interrogate well, Socrates, and I rejoice to answer those who ask in a becoming manner. For Hippocrates, if he comes to me, will not suffer that which he would suffer by associating with any other of the sophists. Other sophists indeed injure youth: for they force them to apply to arts which they are unwilling to learn, by teaching them arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, and music. And at the same time looking at Hippias¹, he added, But he who comes to me, will not learn any thing else than that for the sake of which he came. The discipline too which he acquires from me is the ability of consulting well about his domestic affairs, so that he may govern his house in the best manner, and so that he may be capable of saying and doing all that is advantageous for his country.—I understand you, I replied: for you appear to me to speak of the political art, and to profess to make men good citizens.—This, said he, is the profession which I announce.—What a beautiful artifice, said I, you possess! if you do possess it. For nothing else is to be said to you than that which I conceive. For I, O Protagoras, do not think that this can be taught, and yet I cannot disbelieve what you say. It is just, however, that I should inform you whence I think it cannot be taught, nor by men be procured for men. For I, as well as the other Greeks, say that the Athenians are wise. I see, therefore, when we are collected in the assembly, and when it is necessary to do something respecting the building of houses, that the architects being sent for, are consulted about the business; but that when something is to be done concerning the building of ships, shipwrights are consulted; and in a similar manner with respect to other things which they think may be taught and learnt. But if any other person whom they do not think to be an artist attempts to give them advice in these particulars, though he may be very fine and rich and noble, they pay no more attention to him on this account, but

¹ Protagoras says this, because Hippias professed to be very skilful in these sciences.

laugh and make a noise, until he either desists from speaking through the disturbance, or till the archers, by order of the magistrates, lead or carry him out. In this manner therefore they act respecting things which pertain to art. But when it is requisite to consult about any thing which relates to the government of the city, then the builder, the brazier, the shoemaker, the merchant, and the sailor, the rich and the poor, the noble and the ignoble, rise, and similarly give their advice, and no one disturbs them, as was the case with the others, as persons who, though they have never learnt nor have had a preceptor, yet attempt to give advice. For it is evident that they do not think this can be taught. Nor does this take place only in public affairs, but in private concerns also; the wisest and best of the citizens are not able to impart to others the virtue which they possess. For Pericles, the father of these youths, has beautifully and well instructed them in those things which are taught by masters; but in those things in which he is wise, he has neither himself instructed them, nor has he sent them to another to be instructed; but they, feeding as it were without restraint, wander about, to see if they can casually meet with virtue. If you will too, this very same man Pericles, being the tutor of Clinias the younger brother of this Alcibiades, separated them, fearing the former should be corrupted by the latter, and sent Clinias to be educated by Ariphron. Before, however, six months had elapsed, Ariphron, not knowing what to do with him, returned him to Pericles. I could also mention many others to you, who being themselves good men, never made any other man better, neither of their kindred nor strangers. I therefore, O Protagoras, looking to these things, do not think that virtue can be taught. When, however, I hear you asserting these things, I waver, and am of opinion that you speak to the purpose, because I think that you are skilled in many things, and that you have learned many and discovered some things yourself. If, therefore, you can more clearly show us, that virtue may be taught, do not be envious, but demonstrate this to us.

Indeed, Socrates, said he, I shall not be envious. But whether shall I show you this by relating a fable, as an older to younger men, or shall I discuss it by argument? Many, therefore, of those that sat with him, left it to his choice. It appears, therefore, to me, said he, that it will be more agreeable to you to relate a fable.

"There was a time, then, when the gods were alone¹, but the mortal genera did not exist. But when the destined time of generation came to these, the gods fashioned them within the earth, by mixing earth and fire together; and such things as are mingled with these two elements. And when they were about to lead them into light, they commanded Prometheus and Epimetheus² to distribute to and adorn each with those powers which were adapted to their nature. But Epimetheus requested Prometheus that he might distribute these powers: And, said he, do you attend to my distribution. And having thus persuaded him, he distributed. But in his distributing, he gave to some strength without swiftness, and adorned with swiftness the more imbecile. Some he also armed; but giving to others an unarmed nature, he devised a certain other power for their security. For those whom he had invested with a small body, he either enabled to fly away through wings, or distributed them in a subterranean habitation; but those whom he had increased in magnitude he preserved by their bulk. And thus equalizing, he distributed other things, taking care that no genus should be deprived of the means of preservation.

"After, then, he had secured them from mutual destruction, he took care to defend them against the injuries of the air and seasons, by clothing them with thick hairs and solid skins, so that they might be sufficiently protected in the winter frosts and summer heats; and so that these very things might become appropriate and spontaneous beds to each when they went to rest. Under their feet, likewise, he partly added arms, and partly hairs and solid and bloodless skins. He also imparted to different animals different nutriment; to some, indeed, herbs from the earth, to others the fruits of trees, and to others roots. There were some also whom he permitted to feed on the flesh of other animals: and to some, indeed, he gave the power of generating but a few of their own species, but to those that are devoured by these he imparted fecundity, thus extending safety to the race. However, as Epi-

¹ By this nothing more is meant than that a divine is prior to a mortal nature, according to causal, but not according to temporal, priority. For, whatever Divinity produces, it produces continually; and hence every effect proceeding from a divine cause is consubstantial with that cause, in the same manner as shadow with its forming substance.

² Prometheus, as we have observed in the notes on the Gorgias, is the inspective guardian of the descent of the rational soul; and Epimetheus is the guardian of the irrational soul.

metheus was not very wise, he ignorantly bestowed all his powers on irrational animals; but the human race still remained unadorned by him. Prometheus, therefore, came to him while he was doubting, and considered the distribution which he had made. And he saw that other animals were well provided for, but that man was naked, without shoes, without a bed, and unarmed. But now the fatal day was arrived, in which it was necessary that man should emerge from the earth into light. Prometheus, therefore, being dubious what safety he could find for man, stole the artificial wisdom of Vulcan and Minerva¹, together with fire; since it was impossible that the possession of this wisdom could be useful without fire; and thus he imparted it to man. By these means, therefore, man possessed the wisdom pertaining to life. He had not, however, political wisdom. For this was with Jupiter; and Prometheus was no longer permitted to ascend to the citadel, the habitation of Jupiter². To which we may add, that the guards of Jupiter were terrible. Prometheus, therefore, secretly entered into the common habitation of Minerva and Vulcan, in which the arts were exercised; and stealing the fiery art from Vulcan, and the other from Minerva, he gave them to man: and from this arises the fertility of human life. But Prometheus afterwards, as it is said, through Epimetheus, was punished for his theft. Since, however, man became a partaker of a divine allotment, in the first place through this alliance with divinity, he alone of the other animals believed that there were gods, and endeavoured that the altars and statues of the gods should be established. In the next place he articulately distinguished by art, voice and

¹ In these two divinities the cause of all arts is primarily comprehended: the former of these first imparting the fabricative power which the arts possess; and the latter illuminating them with that which is gnostic and intellectual.

² Prometheus was not permitted to ascend to the citadel of Jupiter, with whom the political science first subsists, because the guards of Jupiter, i. e. the Curetes, who are of an unpolluted guardian characteristic, preserve him exempt from all partial causes, among which Prometheus ranks. Through these guardians also, being firmly established in himself, he pervades through all things without impediment, and being present to all his progeny, is expanded above wholes according to supreme transcendence. The citadel also of Jupiter (says Proclus, in Plat. Theol. p. 299), according to the rumours of theologists, is a symbol of intellectual circulation and of the highest summit of Olympus, which all the wise suspend from Jupiter's intellectual place of survey. To this place likewise (he adds) Jupiter extends all the mundane gods, thence imparting to them intellectual powers, divine light, and vivific illuminations.

names,

names, and invented houses and garments, shoes and beds, and nourishment from the earth. But men, being thus provided for in the beginning, lived dispersed; for cities were not: hence they were destroyed by wild beasts, through being every where more imbecile than them; and the fabricating art was indeed a sufficient aid to them for nutriment, but was inadequate to the war with wild beasts: for they had not yet the political art, of which the military is a part. They fought therefore to collect themselves together, and to save themselves, building for this purpose cities. When, however, they were thus collected in a body, they injured each other, as not possessing the political art; so that, again being dispersed, they were destroyed by the beasts. Jupiter, therefore, fearing for our race, lest it should entirely perish, sent Hermes, and ordered him to bring Shame and Justice to men, that these two might be the ornaments and the bonds of cities, and the conciliators of friendship. Hermes, therefore, asked after what manner he should give Shame and Justice to men. Whether, said he, as the arts are distributed, so also shall I distribute these? for they are distributed as follows:—One man who possesses the medicinal art is sufficient for many private persons; and in a similar manner other artificers. Shall I, therefore, thus insert Shame and Justice in men? or shall I distribute them to all?—To all, said Jupiter, and let all be partakers of them: for cities will not subsist, if a few only participate of these, as of the other arts. Publish also this law in my name, that he who is incapable of partaking of Shame and Justice shall be punished as the pest of the city.”

Thus, Socrates, and on this account, both others and the Athenians, when they discourse concerning building, or any other fabricative art, think that a few only should be consulted; and if any one unskilled in these affairs offers to give advice, they do not allow him, as you say; and it is reasonable, as I say, that they should not. But when they proceed to a consultation concerning political virtue, the whole of which consists from justice and temperance, they very properly permit every man to speak; because it is fit that every one should partake of this virtue, or there can be no cities. This, Socrates, is the cause of that which was doubted. And that you may not think I deceive you in asserting that all men in reality think that every man participates of justice, and of the rest of politic virtue, take this as an argument: in other arts, as you say, if any one asserts that he is a good piper, or skilled in any
other

other art of which he is ignorant, those that hear him either laugh at, or are indignant with him, and his friends admonish him as one insane; but in justice and the other political virtue, though it be known that a certain person is unjust, yet if he asserts the truth of himself before the multitude, they think that he is insane, and that he should not unfold his iniquity; and they say that all men should acknowledge themselves to be just, whether they are or not; or that he who does not pretend that he is just must be mad; as if it were necessary that every one should, in a certain respect, partake of justice, or no longer be a man. I say these things, to show that every man is very properly permitted to give his advice concerning this virtue, because every one is thought to be a partaker of it. But that men do not think that it subsists from nature, nor from chance, but that it may be taught and obtained by study, this I will in the next place endeavour to show you. No one is enraged with another on account of those evils which he thinks arise either from nature or art; nor does he admonish, or teach, or punish the possessors of these evils in order to make them otherwise than they are; but, on the contrary, he pities them. Thus, for instance, who would be so mad as to reprehend the deformed, or the little, or the diseased? For I think they know that these things, viz. such as are beautiful and the contrary, happen to men from nature and fortune. On the contrary, when they think that any one possesses certain evils from study, custom, and learning, then they are indignant, admonish, and punish; among the number of which evils are injustice and impiety, and in short every thing which is contrary to political virtue. And as this species of virtue is obtained by study and discipline, they are on this account indignant with and admonish every one who neglects to acquire it. For if you are willing, O Socrates, to consider what the punishment of the unjust is able to effect, this very thing will teach you that men think virtue is to be acquired. For no one endued with intellect punishes him who has acted unjustly, merely because he has so acted; for he who acts in this manner punishes like a wild beast, irrationally. But he who endeavours to punish with reason, does not punish for the sake of past guilt (for that which has been done cannot be undone), but for the sake of future injustice, that neither this offender himself, nor any other who sees him punished, may again act unjustly. And he who has this conception must be persuaded that virtue may be taught: for punishment is inflicted for the
sake

fake of turning others from guilt. All, therefore, that punish, as well privately as publicly, have this opinion. And both other men, and especially the Athenians your fellow citizens, take vengeance on and punish those whom they think have acted unjustly ; so that, according to this reasoning, the Athenians also are among the number of those who think that virtue may be acquired and taught. Very properly, therefore, do your fellow citizens admit the brazier and shoemaker to give advice in political concerns ; and, as it appears to me, Socrates, it has been sufficiently demonstrated to you that they consider virtue as a thing which may be taught and acquired.

There still, however, remains the doubt which you introduced concerning illustrious men, viz. on what account they teach their sons, and make them wise in things which may be obtained from preceptors, but do not render them better than others in the virtue for which they themselves are renowned. In order to remove this doubt, Socrates, I shall no longer employ a fable, but argument. For thus conceive : whether is there any one thing or not, of which it is necessary all the citizens should partake, or a city cannot subsist ? In this thing your doubt is solved, but by no means otherwise. For if there is this one thing, which is neither the art of the architect, nor of the brazier, nor potter, but is justice, and temperance, and holiness, and in short the virtue of man ; if this be the thing, of which it is necessary all should partake, and together with which every man should learn and perform whatever else he wishes to learn or do, but by no means without this ; or if he does not partake of it, that he should be taught and punished, whether boy, or man, or woman, till through punishment he becomes better ; and he who is not obedient, when punished or taught, is banished from the city, or put to death as one incurable ; if this then be the case, and those illustrious men teach their children other things, but not this, consider in how wonderful a manner they become excellent men : for we have shown that they think virtue may be taught both privately and publicly. But since it may be taught, do you think that fathers teach their children other things, the ignorance of which is neither attended with death nor a penalty ; but that in other things in which a penalty, death, and exile are the punishments attendant on their children, when they are not instructed nor exercised in virtue, and besides death, the confiscation of their goods, and in short the ruin of their families, they neither teach them these things,
nor

nor use their utmost endeavours that they may acquire them? It is necessary to think, Socrates, that fathers, beginning with their children when they are very young, will teach and admonish them as long as they live. For as soon as a boy understands what is said to him, his nurse, mother, pedagogue, and the father himself, strive to the utmost that the boy may become a most excellent character; teaching and pointing out to him, in every word and deed, that this is just, and that unjust; that this is beautiful and that base; and that this is holy, and that unholy: likewise that he should do these things, and not those. And if the boy is willingly persuaded, they think they have done well; but if not, they form him to rectitude by threats and blows, as if he were a distorted and bent piece of wood. In the next place they send him to masters, and these they much more enjoin to pay attention to the morals of the boys, than to the teaching them to read and play on the harp. The preceptors likewise take care of the children; and when the boys have learnt their letters, and their attention is directed to the meaning of what they read, instead of oral precepts, the masters give them the compositions of the best poets to read, and compel them to commit them to memory; because in these there are many admonitions, and many transactions, and praises, and encomiums, of antient illustrious men, that the boy may be zealous to imitate them, and may desire to become a similar character. The masters of the harp also do other things of a like kind; for they pay attention to temperance, and take care that the boys do not commit any vice. Besides this too, when they have learnt to play on the harp, they teach them the compositions of other good lyric poets, singing them to the harp; and they compel rhythms and harmonies to become familiar to the souls of the boys, that becoming milder, more orderly, and more harmonious, they may be more able both to speak and act: for every life of man requires rhythm and harmony. Further still, besides these things, they send them to masters of exercise, that their bodies being rendered better, may be usefully subservient to the rational part of the soul, and that they may not be compelled to cowardice, through the depravity of their bodies, in war and other actions. And these things are done by those who are most able to do them: but the most able are the most wealthy; and the sons of these begin their exercises the earliest, and continue them the longest. But when they leave their masters, the city compels them to learn the laws, and to live according to the paradigm of these, that they may not

act casually from themselves ; but in reality, just as writing masters give their scholars, who have not yet learnt to write well, letters to be traced over by them which they have written, and thus compel them to write conformably to their copy ; so the city prescribing laws which were the inventions of illustrious and antient legislators, compels them to govern and to be governed according to these. But it punishes him who transgresses these ; and the name which is given to this punishment, both by you, and in many other places, is *ἐπιτιμῆς*, *corrections*, as if it were justice *correcting* depravity.

As so much attention therefore is paid, both privately and publicly, to virtue, can you still wonder and doubt, O Socrates, whether virtue may be taught ? It is not, however, proper to wonder that it can be taught, but it would be much more wonderful if this were not the case. But why then are unworthy sons frequently the offspring of worthy fathers ? Learn again the reason of this. For this is not wonderful, if what I have before said is true, that this thing virtue ought not to be peculiar to any one person, in order to the existence of a city. For if this be the case, as I say (and it is so the most of all things), consider and select any other study and discipline whatever. Thus, for instance, suppose that this city could not subsist unless we were all of us players on the pipe, should we not all apply ourselves to this instrument ? and would not every one teach every one, both privately and publicly, to play on it ? and would he not reprove him who played unskilfully, and this without any envy ? Just as now, no one envies or conceals things just and legal, as is the case in other arts. For mutual justice and virtue are, I think, advantageous to us : and on this account every one most willingly discourses about and teaches things just and legal. If then in playing on the pipe we are thus disposed, with all alacrity and without reserve, to teach each other, do you think, Socrates, said he, that the sons of the most excellent players on the pipe would become good pipers, rather than the sons of bad players on this instrument ? I indeed think not ; but the boy most happily born for that art would be found to be him who made the greatest proficiency ; and he who was not naturally adapted for it would pursue it without glory. And the son of an excellent piper would often be unskilled in that art ; and again, a good piper would frequently be the offspring of a bad one. However, they would be all sufficiently excellent, if compared with the unskilful, and with those who know nothing of the piper's art. In like manner think that the man

who appears to you to be the most unjust of those who are nurtured by the laws, and among men, is just and the artificer of this thing (justice), if he is compared with men, who have neither discipline, nor courts of justice, nor laws, nor any necessity which compels them to pay every attention to virtue, but are mere savages, such as those which Pherecrates the poet caused to be acted last year, during the festivals of Bacchus. And if you should chance to be among such men as the misanthropes in that play, you would rejoice if you met with Eurybates and Phrynendas¹, and deploring your fortune, you would desire the depravity of our men. But now you are delicate, Socrates, because all men are teachers of virtue to the utmost of their abilities, though no one appears to you to be so. For if you should search for the man who taught us to speak the Greek tongue, he would be no where to be found: nor, if you were to inquire who it is that can teach the sons of manual artificers this very art which they have learnt from their father, and which both the father and the fellow artists his friends exercise, you would not, I think, O Socrates, easily find the preceptor of these; but it is every where easy to find teachers of the ignorant. And thus it is also with respect to virtue and every thing else. We should likewise rejoice, if he who surpasses us causes us to advance in virtue, though but in a small degree, among the number of which I think I am one, and that I know in a manner, superior to other men, what will contribute to the beautiful and the good, and that I am worthy of the reward which I receive for my instruction, and indeed of more than I receive, as is also the opinion of my disciples. Hence this is the bargain which I usually make: when any one has learnt from me, if he is willing, he pays me the sum of money which I require; but if not, going to a temple and swearing how much the disciplines which I teach are worth, he deposits the sum which he is to pay me. And thus much, said he, O Socrates, I, and the fable, and argument have asserted, to prove that virtue may be taught; and the Athenians also are of the same opinion. We have likewise shown that it is not in any respect wonderful that depraved sons should be the offspring of excellent fathers, since the sons of Polycletus, who are of the same age with Paralus and Xanthippus, are nothing when compared with their father;

¹ These were two notorious profligates, who had given occasion for the proverbs, "An action of Eurybates: it is another Phrynendas."

and

and in like manner with respect to the sons of other artists. These, however, are not yet to be condemned ; for they are young, and hope may be yet entertained of their making a proficiency. •

Protagoras therefore, having pointed out these and similar things, ceased to speak ; and I having been for a long time charmed, looked still at him, as desiring to hear him still speak. But when I perceived that he had in reality finished his discourse, and when I had with difficulty collected myself, looking to Hippocrates I said, O son of Apollodorus, how much do I thank you for having brought me hither ! For I make much of what I have heard from Protagoras ; since before this, I thought that it was not human care by which worthy men become worthy, but now I am persuaded that it is. There is however a small impediment to my belief, which Protagoras will doubtless easily remove, since he has unfolded so much. For if some one should discourse with any one of the popular orators, perhaps he would hear arguments of this kind, such as Pericles delivered, or some other eloquent man ; but if some one should ask them concerning any thing, they like a book would have nothing to reply, nor any thing to say. And if a man should ask them any trifling particular respecting what was said, they would resemble brass when struck, which keeps and extends its sound for a long time, unless some one lays hold of it. For thus rhetoricians, when asked some trifling thing, reply in an extended speech. But Protagoras here is sufficient to deliver both long and beautiful discourses, as he has just now made it appear ; and he is also sufficient, when interrogated, to answer with brevity, and interrogating, to wait for and receive an answer ; which can be asserted but of a few. Now then, O Protagoras, I am in want of a certain trifling particular, and if you answer me this, I shall have all that I want. You say that virtue may be taught ; and I, if I could be persuaded by any man, should be persuaded by you. But I beseech you to remove the wonder which you excited in my mind while you were speaking. For you say that Jupiter sent justice and shame to men ; and afterwards, in many parts of your discourse, you speak of justice, temperance, and sanctity, and of all these collectively, as if virtue were but one thing. Accurately explain to me, therefore, this very thing, whether virtue is one certain thing, but the parts of it are justice, temperance, and sanctity ; or whether all these which I have just now mentioned are names of one and the same thing. This it is

which I still desire to know.—But it is easy, said he, Socrates, to answer this question, that virtue being one thing, the particulars which you have adduced are the parts of it.—But whether, said I, are they parts, in the same manner as the mouth, nostrils, eyes and ears are parts of the face? or are they parts like the parts of gold, which do not differ from each other and the whole, except in magnitude and parvitude?—It appears to me, Socrates, that the parts of virtue have the same relation to the whole, as the parts of the face to the whole face.—Whether then, said I, do different men receive a different part of virtue? or is it necessary that he who receives one part should possess all the parts of virtue?—By no means, said he; since many men are brave, but unjust; and others again are just, but not wise.—But, said I, are these parts of virtue, viz. wisdom and fortitude?—Certainly, the most of all things, he replied; and the greatest of all the parts, is wisdom.—But, said I, of these parts, is this one thing, and that another?—Yes.—Has each of them also its proper power, in the same manner as each of the parts of the face? As for instance, the eye is not similar to the ears, nor is the power of it the same; nor do any of the other parts resemble each other, nor are their powers the same, nor are they mutually similar in any other respect. Is it therefore thus also with the parts of virtue, so that the one does not resemble the other, neither in itself, nor in its power? Or is it not evident that it is so, since it is similar to the paradigm which we have introduced?—But it does thus subsist, Socrates, said he.—And I replied, no other part of virtue therefore, is such as science, nor such as justice, nor such as fortitude, nor such as temperance, nor such as sanctity.—It is not, said he.

But come, said I, let us consider in common what kind of a thing each of these is. And, in the first place, is justice a certain thing, or is it nothing? For to me it appears to be something. But what does it appear to you to be?—That it is also something.—What then? If some one should ask you and me, O Protagoras and Socrates, tell me with respect to this very thing which you have just now named justice, whether it is just or unjust? I indeed should answer him that it is just. But what would you say? would your answer be the same with mine or not?—The same, said he.—I therefore should say that justice is a thing similar to the being just, in reply to the interrogator. And would not you also assert the same?—Yes, said he.—If then, after this, he should ask us, Do you also say that sanctity is something?

something? we should reply, I think, that we do.—We should, said he.—But whether do you say that this very thing sanctity is actually adapted to be unholy, or to be holy? For my part, I should be indignant with this question, and should say, Predict better things, O man: for by no means will any thing else be holy unless holiness itself be holy. But what do you say? would not you thus answer?—Entirely so, said he.—If then, after this he should say, asking us, How then have ye spoken a little before? Or have I not rightly understood you? For you appear to me to assert that the parts of virtue subsisted in such a manner with respect to each other, that one of them does not resemble the other; I should reply, that as to other things, you have understood rightly, but you are mistaken in thinking that I also have said this: for Protagoras gave this answer, but I interrogated him. If then he should say, he speaks the truth, Protagoras: for you say that one part of virtue does not resemble another. This is your assertion. What would be your answer to him?—It is necessary, said he, Socrates, to acknowledge it.—What then, O Protagoras, assenting to these things, shall we answer him, if he should add, holiness therefore is not of such a nature as to be a just thing, nor is justice such as a holy thing, but such as that which is not holy; and holiness is such as that which is not just. So that what is just is unholy. What shall we say to him in reply? For I, for my own part, should say that justice is holy, and that holiness is just. And for you, if you will permit me, I should reply this very thing, that either justice is the same with holiness, or that it is most similar to it; and that the most of all things, justice is such as holiness, and holiness such as justice. But see whether you hinder me from giving this answer; or does this also appear to you to be the case?—It does not entirely, said he, Socrates, appear to me to be simply thus, so as to grant that justice is holy, and holiness just; but there appears to me to be a certain difference between them. However, of what consequence is this? For, if you will, let justice be holy, and let holiness be just.—I have nothing to do, said I, with *I will*; and if it is agreeable to you, let it be reprobated. And let us also be persuaded that the subject of our conversation will be discussed in the best manner, when the particle *if* is removed from it.—But indeed, he replied, justice has something similar to holiness. For one thing always resembles another in a certain respect, contraries alone excepted: for white has no similitude to black, nor hard to soft; and so with respect to

to other things which appear to be most contrary to each other, and which, as we before observed, possess another power, and of which one does not resemble the other. But there are other things, such as the parts of the face, in which the one is similar to the other. So that although you should confute these things after this manner, if you are of opinion that all things are similar to each other, yet it is not just to call those things similar which possess a certain similitude to each other; as neither is it just to call those things which possess a certain dissimilitude, dissimilar, though they have but very little of the similar.—And I wondering, said to him, do the just and the holy appear to you to be so mutually related, as to possess but a small degree of similitude to each other?—Not entirely so, said he; nor yet again, do I consider them in the same way as you appear to me to consider them.—But I replied, Since these things do not seem to be agreeable to you, we will dismiss them, and consider this other thing which you say. What do you call folly? Do you not say that wisdom is perfectly contrary to it?—To me it appears to be so, said he.—But when men act rightly and profitably, do they then appear to you to act temperately; or when they act in a contrary manner?—They appear to me, said he, to act temperately, when they act rightly and profitably.—And do they not act temperately by temperance?—It is necessary.—Do not therefore those that act wrongly, act foolishly, and thus acting, not act by temperance?—I agree with you, said he, that they do.—The acting foolishly, therefore, is the contrary to acting temperately.—He said it was.—Are not, therefore, things which are done foolishly, so done by folly, but by temperance things which are done temperately?—He granted it.—If then any thing is done by strength, is it not done strongly, and if by weakness, weakly.—So it appears.—And if any thing is done with swiftness, is it not done swiftly, and if with slowness, slowly?—He said it was.—And if any thing is done after the same manner, is it not done by the same, and if in a contrary manner by the contrary?—He granted it.—Come then, I replied, is there something beautiful?—He admitted there was.—And is any thing contrary to this except the base?—There is not.—But what? Is there something good? And is any thing contrary to this except evil?—There is not.—Is there also something acute in voice?—He said there is.—And is any thing contrary to this except the grave?—There is not, said he.—To every one of contraries therefore, I replied, there is only one contrary, and not many.

many.—He granted it.—Let us then, said I, repeat the particulars to which we have assented. We have acknowledged that there is only one contrary to one thing, but not more than one.—We have.—But that which is done contrarily is done by things contrary.—He admitted it.—We also granted that what is done foolishly is done in a manner contrary to that which is done temperately.—He said we did.—But that which is done temperately is done by temperance, and that which is done foolishly, by folly.—He granted it.—But if a thing is done contrarily, is it not done by a contrary?—Yes.—And the one is done by temperance, and the other by folly.—Yes.—And are they not done contrarily?—Entirely so.—Are they not therefore done by contraries?—Yes.—Folly therefore is contrary to temperance.—So it appears.—Do you remember, then, that it was before acknowledged by us, that folly is contrary to wisdom?—He agreed that it was.—And did we not also say, that there is only one contrary to one thing.—We did.—Which therefore of these positions, O Protagoras, shall we reject? That which says there is only one contrary to one thing, or that in which it is asserted, that wisdom is different from temperance? but that each is a part of virtue? And that besides being different, both they and their powers are dissimilar, in the same manner as the parts of the face? Which therefore of these shall we reject? for both of them are not very musically asserted; since they do not accord, nor coharmonize with each other. For how can they accord, if it be necessary that there should only be one contrary to one thing, but not to more than one? But to folly, which is one thing, wisdom and temperance have appeared to be contrary. Is it so, said I, O Protagoras, or not?—He acknowledged that it was so, but very unwillingly.—Will not, therefore, temperance and wisdom be one thing? And again, prior to this, it appeared to us that justice and sanctity were nearly the same thing. But come, said I, Protagoras, let us not be weary, but consider what remains. Does it then appear to you that a man who acts unjustly is wise, because he acts unjustly?—I, said he, Socrates, should be ashamed to acknowledge this, though it is asserted by many men.—Whether then shall we address ourselves to them, or to you?—If you are willing, said he, speak first to this assertion of the many.—But it makes no difference to me, if you only answer, whether these things appear to you or not; for I especially direct my attention to the assertion. It may, however, perhaps happen, that I shall both explore myself interrogating, and him who answers.

At

At first, therefore, Protagoras began to assume some consequence (for he was averse to discuss this affair, and said it was difficult); but afterwards he submitted to answer.—Come then, said I, answer me from the beginning: Do certain persons who act unjustly, appear to you to be wise?—Let them be so, said he.—And does not the being wise consist in consulting well, even when they act unjustly?—Be it so, said he.—But whether, I replied, does this take place if they do well, acting unjustly, or if they do ill?—If they do well.—Do you then say that certain things are good?—I do.—Whether, therefore, said I, are those things good which are advantageous to men?—By Jupiter, said he, they are; and I also call some things good, though they are not advantageous to men. And Protagoras, when he said this, appeared to me to be ruffled, afraid, and averse to answer. Seeing him, therefore, in this condition, I cautiously and gradually interrogated him; and I said, Whether, O Protagoras, do you speak of things which are advantageous to no man, or of those which are in *no respect* advantageous? And do you call such things as these good?—By no means, said he; but I know many things which are useless to men, meats and drinks, and medical potions, and ten thousand other things; and I also know some things which are advantageous to them. There are likewise some things which are by no means profitable to men, but are beneficial to horses; some which are advantageous to oxen only; and others to dogs: others again which are beneficial to no one of these, but to trees; and others which are good to the roots of trees, but pernicious to their blossoms. Thus, for instance, dung is beneficial to the roots of all trees when thrown upon them; but if you were to throw it on their branches and shoots, you would destroy them all. Thus too, oil is a very excellent thing for all plants: but is most hostile to the hairs of all animals except man. For it is beneficial to the hairs of man, and to the rest of his body. And so diversified and all-various a thing is good, that this very thing, oil, is good to the external parts of the body of man, but is most pernicious to his inward parts. And on this account all physicians forbid the diseased the use of oil; or at least only permit them to use it in a very small degree, and just sufficient to correct the bad smell of the food which they take.

Protagoras having thus spoken, those that were present loudly applauded him as one that had made a good speech. And I said, O Protagoras, I am a man naturally forgetful, and if any one makes a long discourse to me, I forget

what

what was the subject of his discourse. As, therefore, if I were deaf, and you intended to discourse with me, it would be necessary for you to speak a little louder to me than to others; so now, since you happen to have met with a forgetful man, cut your answers for me, and make them shorter, if you wish that I should follow you.—How would you have me shorten my answers? Must I answer you, said he, shorter than is necessary?—By no means, I replied.—But as much as is proper, said he?—Yes, said I.—Whether, therefore, must my reply be such as appears to me to be necessary, or such as appears to be so to you?—I have heard, I replied, that you can both speak with prolixity yourself about the same things, and teach another to do the same, so as never to be in want of words; and again, that you can speak with brevity, so that no one can deliver himself in fewer words than you. If, therefore, you intend to discourse with me, use the other method, that of speaking with brevity.—O Socrates, said he, I have had verbal contests with many men, and if I had done this which you urge me to do, viz. if I had spoken as my antagonist ordered me to speak, I should not have appeared to excel any one; nor would the name of Protagoras have been celebrated in Greece.—And I (for I knew that the former answers did not please him, and that he would not be willing to answer my interrogations) thought that I had no longer any business in the conference. I therefore said, O Protagoras, I do not desire you to discourse with me contrary to your will; but if you are disposed to converse so that I can follow you, then I will discourse with you. For you, according to report, and as you yourself say, are able to speak both with prolixity and brevity: for you are wise. But I am unable to make these long speeches; though I wish that I had the ability. It is fit, however, that you, who are capable of doing both, should yield to my inability, in order that conversation may take place. But now, as you are not willing to do this, and a certain business prevents me from staying to hear your long speeches, I must depart whither it is requisite I should go; though perhaps it would not be unpleasant to me to hear these things from you.—And at the same time having thus spoken, I rose in order to go. But as I was rising, Callias taking hold of me with his right hand, and of my cloak with his left, said, We shall not dismiss you, Socrates: for if you depart, our conversation will be at an end. I beseech you, therefore, stay with us: for there is not any one thing which I would more willingly hear than you and Protagoras discoursing

VOL. V. s together.

together. Gratify all of us therefore.—And I said (for I was now standing as being ready to go), O son of Hipponicus, I have always admired your philosophy; but I now both praise and love it; so that I should wish to gratify you, if you request of me possibilities. But at present, it is just as if you should desire me to run a race with Criso the Himeræan, who is now in the vigour of youth, or with one of those who run and accomplish the longest course, or with some diurnal courier; I should say to you, that I wish much more than you do that I could keep pace with these runners, but that I cannot. If, therefore, you would see me and Criso running a race together, you must request him to keep pace with me: for I am not able to run swiftly, but he is able to run slowly. In like manner, if you desire to hear me and Protagoras, you must request him, that as he at first answered me with brevity the questions that were asked, he will now also answer me in the same manner: for if he does not, what will be the mode of our discourse? I indeed thought that it is one thing to converse together, and another to harangue.—But you see Socrates, said Callias, that Protagoras appears to speak justly, when he says that he ought to be permitted to speak as he pleases, and you as you please. Alcibiades, therefore, taking up the discourse, said, You do not speak well Callias: for Socrates here acknowledges that he cannot make a long speech, and in this yields to Protagoras. But in the ability of discoursing, and knowing how to question and answer, I should wonder if he yielded to any man. If, therefore, Protagoras confesses that he is inferior to Socrates in disputation, it is sufficient for Socrates; but if he denies it, let him dispute, both by questioning and answering, without making a long speech to every interrogation, and without deviating from the subject so as to prevent another from speaking, and lengthening his discourse till the greater part of the auditors forget what was the subject of investigation. For as for Socrates, I will be security for him that he will not forget any thing: since he only jests when he says he is forgetful. To me, therefore, Socrates appears to be more reasonable in what he demands: for it is fit that every one should declare his own opinion. But after Alcibiades, it was Critias, I think, who said, O Prodicus and Hippias, Callias indeed appears to me to be very much for Protagoras; but Alcibiades is always fond of contention in every thing to which he applies himself. We, however, ought not to contend with each other, either for Socrates or Protagoras, but we should request both of them

in common not to dissolve the conference in the middle. But he having thus spoken, Prodicus said, You appear to me, Critias, to speak well : for it is requisite that those who are present at these conferences should be the common, but by no means equal auditors of both speakers. For these two are not the same : for it is requisite to hear both in common, but not to distribute equally to either ; but to the wiser more, and to the more unlearned less. I indeed, O Protagoras and Socrates, think that you ought to concede something to each other, and to contend together, but not to quarrel : for friends contend with friends through benevolence ; but adversaries and enemies quarrel with each other. And thus this conference will be conducted in the most beautiful manner. For you, the speakers, will be especially approved, I do not say praised, by us the hearers : for auditors approve from their soul without deception ; but praise is frequently bestowed in words, falsely, contrary to the real opinion. And thus again, we, the hearers, shall be especially delighted, but not pleasurably affected : for he is delighted who learns any thing and participates of wisdom in his dianoëtic part ; but he is pleasurably affected who eats something, or is passive to some other pleasant sensation in his body.

Prodicus having thus spoken, many of those that were present approved what he said. But after Prodicus, Hippias the wise thus addressed them :— I consider all ye that are present as kinsmen, friends, and fellow-citizens by nature, and not by law : for the similar is naturally allied to the similar. But law being the tyrant of men, compels many things to be done contrary to nature. It would be disgraceful, therefore, if we who know the nature of things, who are the wisest of the Greeks, and who are now come for the purpose of displaying our knowledge into the very prytaneum itself of wisdom, and into this house, which is the greatest and most fortunate in the city, should exhibit nothing worthy of this dignity, but disagree with each other like the vilest of men. I therefore both request and advise you, O Protagoras and Socrates, to submit yourselves to us, as if we were arbitrators assembled for the purpose of bringing you to an agreement. Nor do you, Socrates, pursue this accurate form of dialogue, which is so very concise, unless it is agreeable to Protagoras ; but give up the reins to discourse, that it may appear to us to be more magnificent and elegant. Nor do you, Protagoras, extending all your ropes, fly with swelling sails into the wide sea of discourse,

discourse, and lose sight of shore : but let both endeavour to preserve a middle course. Be persuaded also by me, and let some moderator and president be chosen, who shall oblige each of you to keep within bounds.—This expedient pleased those that were present, and all of them praised it. And Callias said, that he would not suffer me to go, and required me to choose a moderator. I therefore said, that it would be disgraceful to select a judge of our discourses : for if he be our inferior, it will not be right that the subordinate should preside over the more excellent ; and if he be our equal, neither thus will it be right. For he who is just such a one as we are, will act similarly to us ; so that the choice will be vain. But to choose one better than we are, is, I think, in reality impossible : since one wiser than Protagoras here, cannot be chosen. And if you should choose a man in no respect more able, but whom you assert however to be so, this also will be disgraceful to Protagoras, by subjecting him to a president, as if he were some contemptible person : for it makes no difference as to myself. I am willing, therefore, to act as follows, that conversation and dialogue may take place between us, which are the objects of your desire : If Protagoras is not willing to answer, let him interrogate, and I will answer ; and at the same time I will endeavour to show him in what manner I say he who is interrogated ought to answer. But when I reply to that which he may be willing to ask, he again in a similar manner shall reply to me. If, therefore, he shall appear not to be cheerfully disposed to answer the interrogation, both you and I in common must demand of him, that which you now demand of me, not to dissolve the conversation. Nor for the sake of this is there any occasion to appoint a president : for all of you will be presidents in common.—It appeared to all that this was what ought to be done. And Protagoras, indeed, was not very willing to comply ; but at the same time he was compelled to consent to interrogate ; and that when he had sufficiently interrogated, he would in his turn answer with brevity. He began therefore as follows :

I think, said he, O Socrates, that the greatest part of a man's erudition consists in being skilled in poetical compositions. But this is the ability of knowing what is well or ill said by the poets, so as to be capable of assigning a reason when interrogated concerning their poems. And now indeed let the question be respecting virtue, the subject of our present discourse ; differing only in this, that the disquisition is transferred to poetry. Simonides then
says

says to Scopas, the son of Creon the Theſſalonian, "That it is difficult to become a truly good man, ſo as in hands, feet, and intellect, to be faſhioned a blameleſs ſquare." Do you know the verſe, or ſhall I repeat the whole paſſage to you?—And I ſaid, there is no neceſſity for this; for I know, and have paid great attention to the verſe.—You ſpeak well, ſaid he. Whether, therefore, does Simonides appear to you to have done well and rightly, or not?—Very well, ſaid I, and rightly.—But does the poet appear to you to have done well if he contradicts himſelf?—By no means, I replied.—Conſider more attentively, ſaid he.—But, my good man, I have ſufficiently conſidered it.—You know therefore, ſaid he, that in the courſe of the poem he ſays, "The aſſertion of Pittacus does not pleaſe me, though it was delivered by a wiſe man, viz. that it is difficult to continue to be a good man." Do you underſtand that the ſame perſon made this and the former aſſertion?—I do, I replied.—Does it therefore, ſaid he, appear to you that theſe things accord with thoſe?—To me they do appear to accord. And at the ſame time fearing leſt he ſhould ſay any thing in addition, I ſaid, But do they not appear to do ſo to you?—How, he replied; can he who made both theſe aſſertions accord with himſelf, when he firſt ſays, that it is difficult to become a truly good man, and a little after, forgetting what he had aſſerted, he blames Pittacus for ſaying the ſame thing that he had ſaid, viz. that it is difficult to continue to be a good man, though it is evident that in blaming him who ſaid this, he alſo blames himſelf? So that either the former or the latter aſſertion is not right.—Protagoras having thus ſpoken, many of the auditors made a noiſe, and applauded him. And I indeed at firſt, as if I had been ſtruck by a ſkilful pugiliſt, was incapable of ſeeing, and became giddy, on his ſaying theſe things, and the reſt making a tumult; but afterwards (to tell you the truth), that I might have time to conſider what the poet ſaid, I turned myſelf to Prodicus, and calling him, I ſaid, Simonides, O Prodicus, was your fellow-citizen, and it is juſt that you ſhould aſſiſt the man. I appear therefore to myſelf to call upon you, in the ſame manner as Homer¹ ſays Scamander called upon Simois when beſieged by Achilles, "Dear brother, let us both join to repel the prowels of this man." For I ſay the ſame to you, let us take care that Simonides be not ſubdued by Protagoras. For in order to aſſiſt Simonides, that elegant device of yours is requiſite, by which you diſtinguiſh between *to will*

¹ Iliad xxi. v. 308.

and to *desire*, as not being the same, and by which you have just now said many and beautiful things. And now consider whether the same thing appears to you as to me : for I do not think that Simonides contradicts himself. But do you, Prodicus, first declare your opinion. Does it appear to you that *to become* is the same as *to be*, or that it is something different ?—Something different, by Jupiter, said Prodicus.—Does not Simonides then, said I, in the first assertion, declare his own opinion, that it is difficult to *become* a truly good man ?—You speak the truth, said Prodicus.—But he blames Pittacus, I replied, not as Protagoras thinks, for saying the same thing that he had said, but for asserting something different from it. For Pittacus does not say this, that it is difficult to *become* a good man, as Simonides does, but that it is difficult to *continue to be* so. But as Prodicus says, *to be* is not the same as *to become*. And if this be the case, Simonides does not contradict himself. And perhaps Prodicus here, and many others, may say with Hesiod¹, “ It is difficult to become good : for the gods have placed sweat before virtue. But he who has arrived at the summit will find that to be easy, which it was difficult to acquire.” Prodicus therefore having heard these things, praised me ; but Protagoras said, your emendation, Socrates, is more erroneous than that which you correct.—And I said, Then I have done ill, as it seems, O Protagoras, and I am a ridiculous physician ; since by attempting to cure, I increase the disease.—Thus however it is, said he.—But how ? I replied.—The poet, said he, would have been very ignorant, if he had asserted that virtue is so vile a thing that it may be easily acquired, though, as it appears to all men, its possession is the most difficult of all things.—And I said, by Jupiter, Prodicus, here, is opportunely present at our conference. For the wisdom of Prodicus appears, O Protagoras, to be of great antiquity, whether it originated from Simonides, or from a source still more antient. But you, who are skilled in many other things, appear to be unskilled in this, and not skilled in it as I am, in consequence of being the disciple of this Prodicus. And now you appear to me not to understand that this thing which is said to be difficult, was not perhaps so apprehended by Simonides, as you apprehend it ; but it is with that as with the word *δεινός*, *deinos*, concerning which Prodicus continually admonishes me, when in praising you, or any other, I say, that

¹ Op. et Dier.

Protagoras is a wise and *skilful* (δεινός) man, by asking me if I am not ashamed to call things excellent *dreadful* (δεινός). For το δεινόν, says he, signifies something bad. Hence no one says *dreadful* riches, nor *dreadful* peace, nor *dreadful* health; but every one says *dreadful* disease, and *dreadful* war, and *dreadful* poverty, as if that which is (δεινόν) *deinon*, is *bad*. Perhaps, therefore, the inhabitants of Ceos and Simonides apprehended by the word *difficult* (χρῆλον) either that which is bad, or something different from what you conceive it to mean. Let us therefore inquire of Prodicus (for it is just to ask him the signification of words employed by Simonides); What, O Prodicus, does Simonides mean by the word *difficult*?—He meant, said he, *bad*.—On this account, therefore, I replied, he blames Pittacus for saying that it is *difficult* to continue to be good, just as if he had heard him saying, that it is *bad* to continue to be good.—But what else, Socrates, said he, do you think Simonides intended, than to blame Pittacus because he did not know how to distinguish terms rightly, as being a Lesbian, and educated in a barbarous language?—Do you hear Prodicus, said I, O Protagoras? And have you any thing to say to these things?—This is very far, O Prodicus, said Protagoras, from being the case; for I well know that Simonides meant by the word *difficult*, not that which is *bad*, but that which we and others mean by it, viz. a thing which is not easy, but is accomplished through many labours.—But I also think, I replied, that Simonides meant this, and that Prodicus knows that he did; but he jests, and is willing to try whether you can defend your assertion. For that Simonides did not by the word *difficult* mean any thing *bad*, is very much confirmed by what he adds immediately after: for he says, that Divinity alone possesses this honourable gift. He does not indeed say, that it is bad to continue to be good, and afterwards add that Divinity alone possesses this, and attribute this honour to Divinity alone: for if this were the case, Prodicus should have called Simonides a *profligate*, and not a divine man¹. But I wish to tell you what Simonides appears to me to have understood in this verse, if you think proper to make trial of my poetical skill. Or, if it is agreeable to you, I will hear you.—Protagoras, therefore, hearing me thus speak, said, Do so, if you please, Socrates: but Prodicus, Hippias, and the rest, very much urged

¹ Instead of οὐδ' αὖτις κτερόν, as in the printed text, it is necessary to read, as in our version, οὐδ' αὖτις κτερόν; as Dacier also well observes.

me to do it.—I will endeavour then, said I, to explain to you my conceptions respecting this verse.

Philosophy is very antient among the Greeks, and particularly in Crete and Lacedæmon; and there are more sophists there than in any other country. They dissemble, however, and pretend that they are unlearned, in order that it may not be manifest that they surpass the rest of the Greeks in wisdom (just as Protagoras has said respecting the sophists); but that they may appear to excel in military skill and fortitude; thinking if their real character were known, that all men would engage in the same pursuit. But now, concealing this, they deceive those who laconize in other cities. For there are some that in imitation of them cut their ears, have a cord for their girdle, are lovers of severe exercise, and use short garments, as if the Lacedæmonians surpassed in these things the other Greeks. But the Lacedæmonians, when they wish to speak freely with their own sophists, and are weary of conversing with them privately, expel these laconic imitators, and then discourse with their sophists, without admitting any strangers to be present at their conversations. Neither do they suffer any of their young men to travel into other cities, as neither do the Cretans, lest they should unlearn what they have learnt. But in these cities, there are not only men of profound erudition, but women also. And that I assert these things with truth, and that the Lacedæmonians are disciplined in the best manner in philosophy and discourse, you may know from the following circumstance: For if any one wishes to converse with the meanest of the Lacedæmonians, he will at first find him, for the most part apparently despicable in conversation, but afterwards, when a proper opportunity presents itself, this same mean person, like a skilful jaculator, will hurl a sentence worthy of attention, short, and contorted; so that he who converses with him will appear to be in no respect superior to a boy. That to laconize, therefore, consists much more in philosophizing, than in the love of exercise, is understood by some of the present age, and was known to the antients; they being persuaded that the ability of uttering such sentences as these is the province of a man perfectly learned. Among the number of those who were thus persuaded, were Thales the Milesian, Pittacus the Mitylenæan, Bias the Prienean, our Solon, Cleobulus the Lindian, Miso the Chenean, and the seventh of these is said to be the Lacedæmonian Chilo. All these were emu-

lators,

lators, lovers, and disciples of the Lacedæmonian erudition. And any one may learn that their wisdom was a thing of this kind, viz. short sentences uttered by each and worthy to be remembered. These men also assembling together, consecrated to Apollo the first fruits of their wisdom, writing in the Temple of Apollo at Delphi those sentences which are celebrated by all men, viz. "Know thyself," and "Nothing too much." But on what account do I mention these things? To show that the mode of philosophy among the ancients was a certain laconic brevity of diction. But the sentence which is ascribed to Pittacus in particular, and which is celebrated by the wise, is this: "It is difficult to continue to be good." Simonides, therefore, as being ambitious of wisdom, knew that if he could overthrow this sentence, and triumph over it like a renowned athletic, he himself would be celebrated by the men of his own time. In opposition to this sentence, therefore, and with a view to renown, he composed the whole of this poem, as it appears to me. Let all of us, however, in common, consider whether what I assert is true.

In the first place, then, the very beginning of the poem would indicate that its author was insane, if he, wishing to say that it is difficult to become a good man, had afterwards inserted the particle ($\mu\alpha$) *indeed*. For this would appear to have been inserted for no purpose. Unless it should be said, that Simonides in what he says contends as it were against the sentence of Pittacus: and that Pittacus, having asserted that it is difficult to continue to be good, Simonides disputing this, says it is not difficult; but it is difficult *indeed*, O Pittacus, to become a good man, and to be *truly* good. For he does not use the word *truly*, as if there were some men that are *truly* good, and others that are good indeed, but not truly so (for this would have been stupid and unworthy of Simonides); but it is necessary to consider the word *truly* as an hyperbaton¹ in the verse; and we must suppose Pittacus speaking, as if there was a dialogue between him and Simonides, and saying, O men, it is difficult to continue to be good; but Simonides answering, O Pittacus, your assertion is not true: for it is not difficult to *be* truly good, but to *become* so, in hands and feet, and intellect, being fashioned a blameless square.

¹ An hyperbaton is a rhetorical figure, and signifies the transposition of words from their plain grammatical order.

And thus it appears that the particle *indeed* is introduced with reason, and that the word *truly* is rightly added in the last place. All that follows likewise testifies that this is the meaning of the passage. There are also many sentences in this poem, each of which might be proved to be well written; for it is very elegantly and accurately composed. To evince this, however, would take up too much time; but let us summarily consider the whole form and intention of the poem, that we may show that the design of it throughout is more than any thing to confute that sentence of Pittacus. For a little after he says, as follows: "It is indeed truly difficult to *become* a good man; yet for a certain time it is possible to *be* so. But *having become* a good man, to continue in this habit, and to *be* a good man, (as you say¹, O Pittacus,) is impossible. For this is not human, but Divinity alone possesses this honourable gift. For man, who may be overwhelmed by unexpected calamity, cannot continue free from vice.

Whom, then, does an unexpected calamity overwhelm in the government of a ship? Evidently not an idiot; for the idiot is always overwhelmed. As therefore no one throws to the ground him who is lying on it, but sometimes he who stands upright is thrown down, so as to be prostrate; but this is never the case with him who is already prostrate; so an unexpected calamity may sometimes overwhelm a skilful man, but never him who is always unskilful. And a mighty storm bursting on the head of the pilot may render him unskilful; bad seasons may confound the husbandman; and things similar to these may be applied to the physician: for a good may indeed become a bad man. And this is also testified by another poet, who says, "A good man is sometimes bad, and sometimes worthy." But it is not possible for a bad man to become bad, but it is always necessary that he should be so. So that when an unexpected calamity overwhelms a skilful, wife, and good man, it is not possible for him not to be wicked. But you, O Pittacus, say, that it is difficult to continue to be good. The truth however is this, that it is difficult indeed, but possible, to *become* good; but impossible to *continue* to be good. For every man who acts well is good; but bad if he acts ill. What then is a good action with respect to literature? and what makes a man excellent in literature? Evidently the being disciplined in it. What

Meaning that it is impossible for man in the present life to continue invariably good.

good

good action likewise makes a good physician? Evidently the learning the art of curing the sick. For a good physician cures properly¹, but a bad one improperly. Who is it then that becomes a bad physician? Evidently the man to whom it belongs in the first place to be a physician, and in the next place to be a good physician; for he may become a bad physician. But we who are ignorant of the medicinal art, can never by acting ill become bad physicians; nor being ignorant of architecture can we become bad architects, or any thing else of this kind. But whoever does not become a physician by acting ill, it is evident that neither is he a bad physician. Thus also a good man may sometimes become a bad man, either from time, or labour, or disease, or from some other circumstance (for this alone is a bad action to be deprived of science); but a bad man can never become bad (for he is always so); but if he is to become bad, it is necessary that prior to this he should have been good. So that to this also the verses of Simonides tend, that it is not possible to be a good man, so as to be perseveringly good; but that it is possible to become a good man, and for this same good to become a bad man. And also that for the most part, those are the best men whom the gods love. All these things therefore are said against Pittacus, which the verses following these still more clearly evince. For he says, "Wherefore I shall not explore in vain and hope for that which cannot be found, viz. a man nourished by the fruits of the earth, who lives a blameless life and is perpetually good." Afterwards he adds, "I will tell you when I have found him." So vehemently, and through the whole of the poem, does he attack the saying of Pittacus. He also adds, "I willingly praise and love the man, who does nothing base; and the gods themselves are not able to contend with necessity." And this likewise is said in opposition to Pittacus. For Simonides was not so unlearned as to say that he praised him who willingly did nothing bad, as if there were some who committed base actions willingly. For I nearly think this, that no wise man considers any man as erring voluntarily, and as acting basely and wickedly with the concurrence of his will; but he well knows that all those who act basely and wickedly, do so involuntarily. But

¹ In the original here there is nothing more than κακός δε κακῶς; but from the version of Ficinus, it appears that the words ἀγαθός γὰρ ἰατρός θεραπεύει καλῶς must be supplied as in our translation. The sense indeed evidently requires this addition.

Simonides does not speak as if he said, that he praises the man who does not willingly do wrong, but he says this word *willingly* of himself. For he thought that a worthy and good man is frequently compelled to love and praise a certain person. Thus, for instance, it often happens that a man has a monstrous father, or mother, or country, or something else of this kind. Depraved characters, therefore, when any thing of this nature happens to them, are in the first place glad to see it, and in the next place blame and every where divulge the depravity of their parents or country, that they may not be accused of having neglected these, nor fall into disgrace for their neglect. Hence they blame their parents or country in a still greater degree, and add voluntary to necessary enmity. But the worthy man conceals the faults of his parents or country, and if any unjust conduct has led him to be enraged with them, he is their mediator to himself, and compels them to love and praise their own offspring. I also think that Simonides himself frequently praised and was the encomiast of a tyrant, or some other character of this kind; and this not willingly, but by compulsion. This, then, is what he says to Pittacus; "I, O Pittacus, do not blame you, from being myself one who loves to blame: for I am satisfied if a man is not wicked, nor very indolent, as knowing that a sane man benefits his country. Nor will I find fault; since I am not a lover of detraction. For the race of fools is infinite; so that he who delights in blaming will be satiated with it. All things, indeed, are beautiful with which such as are base are not mingled." His meaning however in this, is not as if he had said, all things are white with which black is not mingled (for this would be very ridiculous), but he intends to signify that he admits mediocrity, so as not to blame it. "And I do not seek," says he, "a man perfectly blameless, or expect to find him among such as gather the fruits of the wide-bosomed earth: for I will tell you when I find such a one. So that on this account I shall praise no one as perfect. But I am satisfied with a man of moderate excellence, and who does no ill: and all such as these I both love and praise." Here too he uses the language of the Mitylenæans as speaking to Pittacus, and saying, "I willingly praise and love all these." But here it is necessary to consider the word *willingly* as connected with the words "Who does nothing base," and to separate it from the verse in which he says, "There are also those whom I unwillingly praise and love. You therefore, O Pittacus, I should never have
blamed,

blamed, if you had spoken of that equitable and true mediocrity ; but now, though you are very much mistaken about things of the greatest moment, yet you *appear* to speak the truth, and on this account I blame you.”—It appears to me, said I, O Prodicus and Protagoras, that Simonides composed this poem in consequence of these conceptions.

Then Hippias answering said, You seem to me, Socrates, to have well explained these verses : and I also have something pertinent to say concerning them, which, if you please, I will point out to you.—Do so, O Hippias, said Alcibiades, but let it be at another time ; for now it is just to attend to the coincidence in opinion of Protagoras and Socrates with each other. And indeed, if Protagoras wishes still to interrogate, Socrates should answer ; but if he wishes to reply to Socrates, then Socrates should interrogate.—And I said, I leave it to Protagoras to do whichever of the two is more agreeable to him : but if he is willing, let us dismiss any further consideration about the verses. And I would gladly, O Protagoras, complete with you the discussion of those things, concerning which I at first interrogated you. For it appears to me, that a discourse about poetry is most similar to the banquets of vile and rustic men ; since these, not being able, through the want of education, to converse with each other while they are drinking, in their own language, and with their own words, introduce the players on the flute as honourable persons, hire at a great expense a foreign voice, viz. that of flutes, and through the sound of these associate with each other. But when worthy, good, and well-educated men feast together, you will see neither pipers, nor dancers, nor singers, but they being sufficient to converse with themselves, without these trifles and sportive amusements, speak in their own language, and in a becoming manner reciprocally hear each other, even though they have drank a considerable quantity of wine. In like manner, such conversations as the present, when they are between men such as most of us assert ourselves to be, require no foreign voice, nor poets, of whom it is impossible to ask the meaning of what they say, and to whom most of those by whom they are cited attribute different conceptions, without being able to explain their real meaning. Wise men, therefore, bid farewell to such conferences as these, but converse with each other through themselves, and in their discourses make trial of each other's skill. It appears to me, that you and I ought rather to imitate conferences

conferences of this kind, laying aside the poets, and discoursing with each other through ourselves, make trial of the truth of ourselves. And if you wish still to interrogate, I am prepared to answer you; but if you do not wish it, impart yourself to me, and assist me in giving completion to those things, the discussion of which we left unfinished.—When I had said these and other such like things, Protagoras did not clearly signify what part he would take. Alcibiades, therefore, looking to Callias, said, Does Protagoras, O Callias, appear to you to do well, in not now being willing to say clearly, whether he will answer or not? For to me he does not; but let him say, whether he is willing or not willing to converse, that we may know this from him, and that Socrates may converse with some other person, or that some one of the company who is so disposed may discourse with some other.—And Protagoras, as it seemed to me, being ashamed in consequence of Alcibiades thus speaking, and Callias, and nearly all those that were present, soliciting him, scarcely at length agreed to dispute, and desired me to interrogate him that he might answer.

I then said to him, O Protagoras, do not think that I shall converse with you with any other design, than that those things may be discussed of which I am continually in doubt. For I think that Homer speaks very much to the purpose, when he says, “When two come together, the one apprehends prior to the other.” For with respect to us men, we are all of us more prompt in every deed, and word, and conception, when collected together. But he who thinks of any thing by himself alone, immediately searches for some one to whom he may communicate it, and from whom he may derive stability till he meets with the object of his search. Just as I, also, for the sake of this, more willingly converse with you than with any other, thinking that you discriminate the best of all men, both about other things which it is likely a worthy man would make the object of his consideration, and also concerning virtue. For what other person can do this besides you? Since you not only think yourself to be a worthy and good man, as some others also are indeed themselves worthy, but are not able to make others so; but you are both worthy yourself, and are able to make others good. And you have such confidence in yourself, that while others conceal this art, you openly proclaim yourself to all the Greeks to be a sophist, declare that you are a master of erudition and virtue, and you are the first that has thought

fit to set a price on his instructions. Is it not proper, therefore, to call upon you to the consideration of these things, and to interrogate and communicate with you concerning them?—There is no reason why this should not be done.—And now, with respect to those things which were the subject of my former interrogations, I again desire from the beginning, partly to be reminded of them by you, and partly to consider them in conjunction with you. But the question, I think, was this, whether wisdom, temperance, fortitude, justice, and sanctity, which are five names, belong to one thing, or whether a certain proper essence pertains to each of these names, so that each is a thing having a power of its own, and no one of them possesses a quality similar to the other. You said, therefore, that these were not names belonging to one thing, but that each of these names pertained to a proper thing. You likewise observed, that all these are parts of virtue, not in the same manner as the parts of gold are similar to each other, and to the whole of which they are parts, but just as the parts of the face are dissimilar to the whole of which they are parts, and to each other, and each possesses a proper power of its own. Inform me if these things still appear to you as they did then; or if you think otherwise concerning them. For I shall not accuse you, if you now speak differently; since I should not wonder if you said these things for the purpose of trying me.—But, Socrates, he replied, I say that all these are parts of virtue; and that four of them may justly be considered as similar to each other, but that fortitude very much differs from all these. By the following circumstance you may know that I speak the truth. You will find men who are most unjust, most unholy, most intemperate, and most unlearned, who are notwithstanding remarkably brave.—Stop, said I; for what you say deserves to be considered. Whether do you call brave men, daring men, or any thing else?—I do, he replied, and I likewise say that they rush headlong on things, which the multitude are afraid to approach.—Come then; Do you say, that virtue is something beautiful; and that you are a teacher of it, as of a thing beautiful?—Yes, said he, and a thing most beautiful, unless I am insane.—Whether then, said I, is one thing belonging to it base, and another beautiful? Or, is the whole beautiful?—The whole is as much as possible beautiful.—Do you not know, then, that there are some who boldly merge themselves in wells?—I know that divers do.—Whether do they do this in consequence of possessing knowledge, or on account of some-
 thing

thing else?—In consequence of possessing knowledge.—But who are they that fight boldly on horseback? Are they horsemen, or those that are unskilled in horsemanship?—They are horsemen.—And who are they that fight boldly with short shields? Are they those that are skilled in the use of such shields, or those that are not skilled?—Those that are skilled. And in every thing else, said he, you will find that those who possess knowledge, are bolder than the ignorant; and the same men after they have been disciplined are bolder than they were before.—But did you ever see any, I said, who being ignorant of all these things, were yet daring with respect to each of these?—I have, he replied, and such as were very daring.—Are, therefore, those daring persons brave also?—If they were, said he, fortitude would be a base thing, since these men are insane.—What then, said I, have you asserted of the brave? Is it not that they are bold?—I have, said he, and now also I assert the same.—But, I replied, do not those who are thus bold appear, not to be brave, but insane? And again, did not the most wise appear to us to be also the most daring? And being most daring, were they not also most brave? And according to this reasoning, will not wisdom be fortitude?—You do not well remember, Socrates, said he, what I said, and what was my answer to you? For being asked by you if the brave were bold, I acknowledged that they were; but you did not also ask me if the bold were brave. For if you had asked me this, I should have said that all the bold were not brave. But you have by no means shown that I was not right in granting that the brave are bold. In the next place, you show that men, when they possess knowledge, are bolder than when they were ignorant, and than others who are ignorant; and in consequence of this, you think that fortitude and wisdom are the same. But from this mode of reasoning, you may also think that strength is wisdom. For in the first place, if you should in like manner inquire of me, if the strong are powerful, I should say that they are; and in the next place, if you should ask me, if those who know how to wrestle are more powerful than those who do not possess this knowledge, and if they are more powerful after they have learnt than before, I should say that they are. But from my acknowledging these things, it will be possible for you, by using the same arguments, to say that, by my own confession, wisdom is strength. I, however, shall by no means here acknowledge that the powerful are strong; but I shall admit,

indeed,

indeed, that the strong are powerful ; since power and strength are not the same. For, indeed, power may be produced from insanity, and from anger ; but strength derives its subsistence from nature, and the proper nutrition of bodies. In like manner, boldness and fortitude are not the same ; so that it will happen, that the brave are bold, but not that all the bold are brave. For boldness is produced in men from anger, and from insanity, in the same manner as we observed of power ; but fortitude arises from nature, and the proper nutrition of souls.—But do you say, O Protagoras, that some men live well, and others ill ?—I do, said he.—Does, therefore, a man appear to you to live well, if he lives in molestation and sorrow ?—He does not, said he.—But what, if he has lived pleasantly to the end of life, will he not thus appear to you to have lived well ?—To me he will, said he.—To live pleasantly, therefore, is a good, but unpleasantly a bad thing.—If, said he, he has lived delighted with worthy things.—But what, O Protagoras, Do you, like the multitude, call certain things that are pleasant bad, and some things that are disagreeable good ?—I do.—How do you say ?—So far as they are agreeable, are these things according to this not good, unless something else happens from them ?—And again, is this also the case with things disagreeable ?—It is.—Are they not then bad so far as they are disagreeable ?—I do not know, Socrates, said he, whether I should simply answer as you ask me, that all pleasant things are good, and all disagreeable things evil ; but it appears to me to be more safe to answer, not only to the present question, but also to every other during the rest of my life, that there are some pleasant things which are not good, and again, that there are some disagreeable things which are not evil ; and that there are also a third sort, which are neither good nor evil.—But do you not call, I said, those things pleasant, which either participate of pleasure, or produce pleasure ?—Entirely so, said he.—I ask, therefore, whether they are not good, so far as they are pleasant ; asking with respect to pleasure itself, if it is not good ?—Just as you continually say, Socrates, he replied, we must examine it, and if it shall seem to be conformable to reason, and the same thing shall appear to be pleasant and good, we must acquiesce in it ; but if not, we must controvert it.—Whether, therefore, said I, are you willing to be the leader of the inquiry ? or shall I lead ?—It is just, said he, that you should lead : for you began the conference.—Perhaps then, said I, that which we investigate will become

manifest after the following manner : for just as if any one, directing his attention to the form or health of a man, or any other of the works of his body, on beholding his countenance and his hands, should say, Come, strip yourself, and show me your breast and back, that I may see more clearly ; I also desire something of this kind in the present inquiry, perceiving that you being so affected as you say you are, with respect to the good and the pleasant, it is requisite I should say to you some such thing as this, Come, Protagoras, lay your mind open to me, and inform me what are your conceptions with respect to science. Does the same thing appear to you concerning it as to other men, or not ? But a thing of this kind appears to the many concerning science ; that it is not strong, and that it neither possesses a leading nor a governing power ; nor is it conceived to be a thing of this kind : but science being frequently inherent in man, they are of opinion, that it is not science that governs him, but something else ; at one time anger, at another pleasure, and at another pain : and that he is sometimes governed by love, and frequently by fear. And, in short, their conceptions of science are, as if it were a slave dragged about by every thing else. Does, therefore, a thing of this kind appear to you also respecting it ? Or, do you think that science is something beautiful, and as it were the governor of man ? And, that he who knows good and evil, will never be subdued by any thing, so as to act contrary to the mandates of science, but that intellectual prudence will be a sufficient aid to such a man ?—It appears to me also, he replied, Socrates, as you say : and it would be base in me, if it ever were so in any man, not to assert that wisdom and science are the most powerful of all human affairs.—You speak well, and with truth, I said.—You know, therefore, that the multitude of men are not persuaded by you and me, but say that many who know what is best, are unwilling to do it, when they have the power of acting in the best manner, but do other things. And such as I have asked what is the cause of this, have replied, that being vanquished by pleasure or pain, or some one of the things which I have just now mentioned, they have acted in this manner. For I think, said he, Socrates, that men assert many other things erroneously.

Come then, said I, endeavour with me to persuade and teach men what this passion is, which they call the being vanquished by pleasures, and through which they do not perform the most excellent things, though they have a
knowledge

knowledge of them. For, perhaps, if we should say, you speak erroneously, O men, and are deceived, they would ask us, O Protagoras and Socrates, if this passion is not the being vanquished by pleasure, but something else, tell us what you say it is?—But, why is it necessary, Socrates, that we should consider the opinion of the multitude, who speak that which casually presents itself?—But I think, I replied, that this will contribute to our discovering how fortitude is related to the other parts of virtue. If, therefore, you are willing to abide by that which was just now agreed upon by us, that I should be the leader, follow me in that in which I think this thing will become most beautifully apparent; but if you are not willing, dismiss it, if you think fit.—You speak well, said he; but proceed as you begun.—Again, therefore, said I, if the multitude should ask us, What then do you assert this thing to be, which we call the being vanquished by pleasures? I should answer them as follows: Hear then, for I and Protagoras shall endeavour to tell you, Do you, O men, say that any thing else happens to you in this case, than that which often happens to those who are subdued by meats and drinks, and venereal pleasures; who, though they know that these things are baneful, yet at the same time they do them because they are pleasant? They will say, that nothing else happens. You and I, therefore, will again ask them, Do you say that these things are baneful? Whether, therefore, is it because they immediately impart pleasure, and each of them is pleasant? Or is it because that in some future time they produce diseases and poverty, and procure many other things of this kind? Or, though they should be followed by nothing of this kind, are they bad in consequence of causing men to rejoice? Shall we think, O Protagoras, that they will answer any thing else than that they are not evil from the immediate pleasure which they produce, but from the diseases and other things with which they are followed?—I indeed think, said Protagoras, that the multitude would thus answer. If they cause diseases, therefore, and poverty, do they not also cause sorrow?—I think they would acknowledge that they did.—Protagoras assented.—It appears, therefore, O men, as I and Protagoras say, that these things are bad, for no other reason than because they end in sorrow, and deprive their votaries of other pleasures.—It appeared to both of us, that they would acknowledge this to be the case.—Again, therefore, if, taking the contrary side, we should ask them, O men! ye who say that disagreeable things are good, do you not speak of such things

things as gymnastic exercises, military labours, and things which are effected through burnings, and incisions, and medicines, and fasting? And do you not say, that these things are indeed good, but disagreeable? They would say so.—It also appeared to Protagoras, that they would.—Whether, therefore, do you call these things good, because they immediately impart extreme pain and torment; or because they are followed by health, and a good habit of body, together with the safety of cities, dominion and wealth? They would say, because of the latter consequence.—And to this also Protagoras assented.—But are these things good through any thing else, than because they end in pleasures, and liberations from pain? Or can you mention any other end than pleasures and pains to which looking they call these things good? They will say, I think, that they cannot.—So, likewise, it appears to me, said Protagoras.—Do you, therefore, pursue pleasure as being good, and avoid pain as an evil? They will say, that they do.—And to this also Protagoras assented.—You, therefore, are of opinion, that this thing is evil, viz. pain, and that pleasure is good; since delight also is then said to be evil, when it deprives us of greater pleasures than it possesses, or when it procures pains greater than the pleasures which it contains. For if you call delight an evil on any other account, and look to any other end, you would also be able to inform us; but you cannot.—Nor do they appear to me, said Protagoras, to regard any other end.—Again, therefore, after the same manner with respect to pain, do you not then call the being in pain a good, when it liberates from pains greater than those which it contains, or when it procures pleasures greater than the pains? For if you looked to any other end, when you call the being in pain a good, than that which I have mentioned, you would be able to inform us; but you cannot.—You speak the truth, said Protagoras.—Again, therefore, said I, if you should ask me, O men, on what account I speak so much and so frequently about this, I should say, Pardon me. For, in the first place, it is not easy to show what this thing is which you call the being subdued by pleasures; and, in the next place, all demonstrations are contained in this. But now, also, you are at liberty to inform me, if you have any thing else which you assert to be good besides pleasure, or any thing else besides pain, which you call evil. Or are you satisfied with passing your life pleasantly without pain? For if you are satisfied with this, and if you cannot mention any good or evil which
does

does not end in these things, hear what follows: I say, then, that, if this be the case, the assertion is ridiculous when you say that frequently, though a man knows that evil things are evil, he at the same time does them (though he has the power of not doing them), in consequence of being led and astonished by pleasure: and again, when you say that a man, knowing what is good, is not willing to do it, in consequence of being vanquished by immediate pleasure. For it will be manifest that these things are ridiculous, unless we employ a multitude of names; such as *pleasant* and *disagreeable*, *good* and *evil*. But since it appears that there are these two things, we must also call them by two names; in the first place by *good* and *evil*, and in the next place by *pleasant* and *disagreeable*. These things, therefore, being admitted, we will say that a man, knowing things evil to be evil, at the same time does them. If, then, some one should ask us why he does them, we must say, because he is vanquished. By what? he will say to us. But we are no longer permitted to say, by pleasure; for it assumes another name in the place of pleasure, viz. good. We must, however, answer him, and say that he does it because he is vanquished. By what? he will say. By good, we must say, by Jupiter. If it should happen, therefore, that he who interrogates us is an insolent man, he will laugh and say, You speak of a ridiculous thing when you assert that any one does evil, knowing that it is evil (and it is not proper to do it), in consequence of being vanquished by good. For he will say, Is such a one vanquished because the good in him is not worthy to vanquish the evil? Or is it because it is worthy? We shall evidently say in reply, that it is because it is not worthy. For otherwise he would not err whom we say is subdued by pleasure. But perhaps he will say, Why is the good in such a one unworthy to vanquish the evil? Or the evil to vanquish the good? Is it for any other reason than because the one is greater, and the other lesser? or because the one is more, and the other fewer in number? Have we any other cause to assign than this? It is evident, therefore, he will say, that this thing which is called the being vanquished, is to receive greater evils instead of lesser goods. And thus much for these particulars.

Let us then again change the names, and introduce in these very same things the pleasant and disagreeable, as follows: We formerly said that a man does evil; let us now say that he does things disagreeable, knowing that
they

they are disagreeable, in consequence of being vanquished by pleasures, viz. by such as are unworthy to conquer. And what other unworthiness is there in pleasure with respect to pain, than the excess and defect of each other; that is, when they become greater and lesser, more or less numerous? For if any one should say, Immediate pleasure, O Socrates, very much differs from future pleasure and pain, I indeed should reply by asking, Whether it differs in any thing else than in pleasure and pain? For it cannot differ in any thing else. But it is just as if a man who is skilful in weighing, having collected together things pleasant and painful, and placed those which are near, and those which are remote, in the balance, should say which are the more numerous. For if you weigh pleasures with pleasures, the greater and more numerous must always be chosen; but, if you weigh pains with pains, the fewer and the smaller must be selected. If likewise you weigh pleasures with pains, if the disagreeables are surpassed by the pleasures, those that are near by those that are remote, or those that are remote by those that are near, we must yield to the more weighty; but if the pleasures are surpassed by the disagreeables, this conduct must not be adopted. Is it not so, O men, with respect to these things? I know that they will not be able to say otherwise. It also appeared to Protagoras that they would not. Since, therefore, this is the case, I will thus interrogate them, Do the same magnitudes appear to your sight greater when near, but lesser when at a distance? They will say, that they do. And is not this the case also with things bulky, and with things numerous? And are not equal voices greater when near, but lesser when at a distance? They will say that they are. If therefore our acting well consisted in this, viz. in making and receiving great masses, but rejecting and not making such as are small, what would appear to be the safety of our life? Would it be the art of measuring, or the power of sight which judges of that which is apparent? Or rather would not the latter deceive us, and involving us in error, often compel us to judge differently at different times of the same thing, and change our opinion in the actions and elections of things great and small? But the art of measuring would make this phantasm void, and manifesting the truth, would cause the soul, by abiding in reality, to be at rest, and would preserve our life. Would the men assent to these things, and acknowledge that the art of measuring preserves us, or that this is effected by any other art? They would acknowledge that we should be preserved

served by the measuring art. But what, if the safety of our life consisted in choosing the even and the odd, so as to know when more ought to be rightly chosen, and when less, either one of these with respect to itself, or one with respect to the other, whether they be near or at a distance, what is it that in this case would preserve our life? Is it not science? For it would no longer be the art of measuring, since this is the art of excess and defect. But since that of which we are speaking is the art of the even and the odd, is it any thing else than arithmetic? The men would acknowledge that it is nothing else: or would they not? It appeared also to Protagoras that they would. Be it so, O men; but since the safety of our life has appeared to consist in the right choice of pleasure and pain, and in the choice of the more and the less, of the greater and the smaller, of the more distant and the nearer; of these, in the first place, does not the art of measuring appear to be the consideration of the excess and defect, and also of the equality of these to each other? Necessarily so. But since it is conversant with measuring, it is necessary that it should be both an art and a science. They will agree to this. What then this art and science may be, we will consider hereafter; but that it is a science is sufficient to the demonstration which it is necessary that Protagoras and I should give to your question. And, if you remember, when we mutually agreed that nothing is superior to science, but that this always governs, wherever it may be, both pleasure and every thing else, then you said that pleasure frequently subdues a man, even though he possesses science. But as we did not agree with you, after this you asked us, O Protagoras and Socrates, if this passion is not to be vanquished by pleasure, tell us what it is, and what you assert it to be? If, therefore, we then had immediately said to you that it is ignorance, you would have derided us. For ye have acknowledged that those that err in the choice of pleasures and pains (and these are things good and evil) err through the want of science; and not only through the want of science, but, ye have also added, of the science of measuring. But an erroneous action without science, is, as ye also know, performed through ignorance. So that to be vanquished by pleasure is the greatest ignorance; of which Protagoras here, Prodicus and Hippias, say they are the physician. But ye, because ye think this is something else than ignorance, neither go yourselves, nor send your children to the sophists, the teachers of these things, as if this science of measuring could
not

not be taught : and by saving your money, and not giving it to these men, ye get badly both in private and public. And in this manner we should answer the multitude.

Together with Protagoras, however, I ask you, O Hippias, and you, O Prodicus (for let my discourse be in common to you), whether I appear to speak the truth, or that which is false?—It appeared to all that what had been said was transcendently true.—You confess, therefore, I said, that the pleasant is good, but the disagreeable evil. But I request Prodicus to excuse my adopting his division of names. For whether you call it pleasant, or delightful, or joyful, or in whatever way you may think fit to denominate things of this kind, O most excellent Prodicus, only answer what I wish to ask you.—Prodicus therefore laughing assented, and so likewise did the rest.—I then said, But what, my friends, as to this particular, are not all actions which contribute to the living well and pleasantly, beautiful and profitable? And is not a beautiful deed good and profitable?—They granted this.—If, therefore, I said, the pleasant is good, no one either knowing or thinking that other things are better than those which he does, and is able to do, will afterwards do these things, when he has the power of doing those that are better. Nor when a man is inferior to himself, is it any thing else than ignorance; nor, when he is superior to himself, is it any thing else than wisdom.—To this all of them assented.—But what? Do you say that ignorance is a thing of this kind, viz. to have a false opinion, and to be deceived about things of great importance?—And to this, likewise, all of them assented.—Does it not then follow, said I, that no one willingly betakes himself to things evil, or to those things which he thinks are evil? For, as it appears, it is not in the nature of man to betake himself to things which he considers as evil, instead of applying himself to such as are good. And when it is necessary to choose one of two evils, no one will choose the greater if he has it in his power to choose the lesser.—All these things were assented to by all of us.—What then, said I, do you call dread and fear? Is it that which I say it is to you, O Prodicus, viz. a certain expectation of evil, whether you call it fear or dread?—It appeared to Protagoras and Hippias that dread and fear were this; but to Prodicus it appeared that dread was this, but not fear.—It is, however, said I, O Prodicus, of no consequence; but this is of importance, whether what has been formerly asserted is true. Is, therefore, any man

willing to betake himself to those things which he dreads, when he has the power of betaking himself to things which he does not dread? Or is not this impossible from what we have granted? For we have granted that he thinks those things to be evil which he dreads; and that no one betakes himself to, or willingly receives things which he considers as evil.—These things, likewise, were assented to by all of them.—This, then, being admitted, said I, O Prodicus and Hippias, let Protagoras, here, defend to us the rectitude of his first answer. For then, there being five parts of virtue, he said that no one of them resembled the other, but that each had a peculiar power of its own. I do not, however, urge this at present, but I speak of that which he afterwards said, viz. that four of the parts might justly be considered as similar to each other, but that one of them, fortitude, very much differed from the rest. He also said that this might be known from the following circumstance. You will find, said he, Socrates, men that are most unholy, most unjust, most intemperate, and most undisciplined, but who are, at the same time, most brave; by which you may know that fortitude very much differs from the other parts of virtue. And I indeed, at that time, immediately very much wondered at the answer, and my surprise has been greatly increased since I have discussed these things with you. I therefore asked him this, If he called brave men bold men? He said he did, and likewise impetuous. Do you remember, Protagoras, that this was your answer?—I do, said he.—Tell us, then, said I, in what, according to you, the brave are impetuous? Is it in things which the timid attempt?—It is not, said he.—In other things, therefore.—Yes.—But whether do the timid engage in bold attempts, but the brave in such as are dreadful?—It is so said, Socrates, by the multitude.—You speak the truth, I replied. I do not, however, ask this: but in what do you say the brave are impetuous? Is it in dreadful things, thinking that they are dreadful, or in things that are not dreadful?—But, said he, this, in what you just now said, has been shown to be impossible.—And in this, also, I replied, you speak the truth. So that if this is rightly demonstrated, no one betakes himself to things which he thinks are dreadful, since it has been found that it is ignorance for a man to be inferior to himself.—He acknowledged it.—All men, however, both the timid and the brave, engage in things in which they boldly confide; and, in consequence of this, both the timid and the brave engage in the same things.—But indeed, Socrates, said

he, the things in which the timid and the brave engage are perfectly contrary to each other; for the latter wish, but the former are unwilling to engage in war.—But whether, said I, is it a beautiful, or a base thing to engage in war?—A beautiful thing, said he.—If, therefore, it is a beautiful thing, we have above agreed that it is a good thing. For we have acknowledged that all beautiful are good actions.—You speak the truth, and to me this has always appeared to be the case.—Right, said I. But which of the two do you say is unwilling to engage in war, though it is a beautiful and good thing.—The timid, he replied.—If, therefore, said I, it be beautiful and good, is it not also pleasant?—It is granted, said he.—Are the timid, therefore, unwilling to proceed to that which is beautiful, better, and more pleasant, knowing it to be such?—But, said he, if we assented to this, we should destroy what we have before acknowledged.—But what with respect to the brave man? Does he not engage in that which is more beautiful, more excellent, and more pleasant?—It is necessary, said he, to acknowledge that he does.—Hence, in short, the brave have not any base fears when they are afraid; nor when they are bold, are they basely daring.—True, said he.—But if they are not basely, does it not follow that they are beautifully daring?—He assented.—And if their boldness is beautiful, is it not also good?—Yes.—Are not, therefore, the timid, and the rash, and the insane, on the contrary, basely afraid, and basely bold?—He agreed they were.—But are they basely and wickedly bold, through any thing else than ignorance and the want of discipline?—It is so, said he.—What then? Do you then call this thing, through which the timid are timid, timidity or fortitude?—Timidity, said he.—But have not the timid appeared to be what they are, through the ignorance of things dreadful?—Entirely so, said he.—They are timid, therefore, through this ignorance.—He acknowledged it.—But that through which they are timid, you have granted to be timidity.—He said, he had.—Will not, therefore, the ignorance of things dreadful, and not dreadful, be timidity?—He assented.—But, said I, fortitude is contrary to timidity.—It is.—Will not then the wisdom of things dreadful, and not dreadful, be contrary to the ignorance of these things?—To this also he assented.—But is not the ignorance of these things timidity?—He, with great difficulty, assented to his.—The wisdom, therefore, of things dreadful, and not dreadful, is fortitude, being contrary to the ignorance of these.—Here, however, he was no

longer willing to assent, but was silent.—And I said, Why, O Protagoras, do you neither assent to, nor deny what I say?—Come to a conclusion, said he.—Immediately, said I; let me only first ask you, if it still appears to you as it did before, that there are certain men who are most ignorant, and yet most brave?—You still, Socrates, seem to be very anxious that I should answer you. I will therefore gratify you; and I say, that from what has been granted, it appears to me impossible that this should be the case.—But, said I, I do not ask you all these particulars on any other account, than because I wish to consider how the things pertaining to virtue subsist, and what virtue itself is. For I know that this becoming apparent, that which has been the subject of a long discussion to you and me will be made manifest; I indeed, asserting, that virtue cannot be taught, but you that it can. And it seems to me, that the conclusion of our arguments, as if it were a man, reviles and derides us; and that if it had a voice, it would thus address us:—You are absurd, O Socrates, and Protagoras; you indeed, in asserting in the former part of your discourse, that virtue cannot be taught, and now, being anxious to contradict yourself, by endeavouring to show that all these things, viz. justice, temperance, and fortitude, are science; by which mode of proceeding virtue will especially appear to be a thing which may be taught. For if virtue were any thing else than science¹, as Protagoras endeavours to evince it is, it clearly could not be taught; but now, if it should appear that it is science, as you, Socrates, are anxious to infer, it will be wonderful if it cannot be taught. Again, Protagoras at first admitted that it could be taught, but now, on the contrary, he seems earnestly to endeavour that virtue may appear to be any thing else rather than science; and thus it will be a thing in the smallest degree capable of being taught. I therefore, O Protagoras, seeing all these things agitated upwards and downwards with such dire confusion, am in the highest degree anxious that they may become apparent. And I could wish that we, in consequence of discussing these things, might discover what virtue is: and again, that we might speculate concerning it, whether it can be taught, or whether it can-

¹ Instead of *εἰ γὰρ ἄλλο τι πν ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ ἀρετή*, as in the printed text, the sense requires we should read *εἰ γὰρ ἄλλο τι πν ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ ἀρετή*. Ficinus in his version has adopted the error of the original; for he renders this passage, “Si enim aliud quiddam esset scientia quam virtus.”

not. For I fear that your Epimetheus has frequently deceived us in our inquiry, just as you say he neglected us in the distribution which he made. I am more pleased, therefore, with Prometheus in the fable, than with Epimetheus. Hence, following his example, and paying a *providential attention* to the whole of my life, I diligently consider all these things. And if you are willing, as I said at the beginning, I would most gladly examine these particulars with you.—To this Protagoras said—I, O Socrates, praise your alacrity, and the evolution of your discourse. For I am not, in other respects, I think, a bad man, and I am envious the least of all men : indeed I have often said respecting you to many, that I admire you by far the most of those with whom I associate, and consider you as greatly surpassing your equals in age. And I say, that I shall not wonder if you rank among the men renowned for wisdom. And, with respect to these things, we will again discuss them when you please ; but it is now time for me to betake myself to something else.—But, I replied, it is requisite so to do, if it seems fit to you. For I ought to have gone elsewhere some time ago ; but I staid in order to gratify the beautiful Callias.—Having spoken and heard these things, we departed.

THE END OF THE PROTAGORAS.

THE THE AGES:

A DIALOGUE

ON

POLITICAL WISDOM.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE THE AGES.

IN order to understand the design of this Dialogue, it is necessary to observe that wisdom is two-fold, the one absolute, the other conditional. The absolute is that which is denominated wisdom simply, and without any addition; but the conditional is that which is not simply called wisdom, but a certain wisdom. The former of these is defined to be the knowledge of those things which are the objects of science, and the objects of science are things which possess a necessary eternal and invariable subsistence, such as are those luminous causes and principles of things resident in a divine intellect, which Plato denominates ideas, and Aristotle ¹ things most honourable by nature. But conditional wisdom is common to all arts: for the summit or perfection of every art is called a certain wisdom. Of all those arts however, which possess conditional wisdom, the principal is political wisdom, to which the rest are ministrant. This is called as well the political as the royal discipline; of which the subject is a city, the end the common good, and its servants all the arts.

As this political wisdom, the subject of this Dialogue, forms an important part of virtue considered as a whole, Socrates, conformably to what he had delivered in the Meno, indicates that it can only be obtained by a *divine delusion*

¹ Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics, defines wisdom absolutely considered to be "Science, and the intellect of things most honourable by nature, and the intellect of principles." Η σοφία ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ νοῦς τῶν τιμωτάτων τῇ φύσει, καὶ νοῦς τῶν ἀρχῶν.

(*Θείη μοιρα*), without which all the endeavours of the most consummate masters are useless; and this he confirms by various examples.

This conversation, according to Dacier, passed that year in which the Athenians were vanquished at Ephesus by Tisaphernus; which was the 4th year of the 92d Olympiad, and 470 years before the birth of Christ. Plato being twenty years of age, was then the disciple of Socrates.

THE THEAGES.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

DEMODOCUS, SOCRATES, THEAGES.

DEMODOCUS.

I WANT, Socrates, to speak with you in private about certain things, if you are at leisure; and if you are not, unless your business is of great importance, make leisure for my sake.

SOC. But I am indeed at leisure, and very much at your service. You have my permission therefore to speak, if you wish to say any thing.

DEM. Are you willing therefore that we should retire from this place into the porch of Jupiter Eleutherius, which is very near?

SOC. If you please.

DEM. Let us go then, Socrates. All plants, whatever is produced from the earth, other animals, and man, appear to subsist after the same manner. For in plants this thing is easy to such of us as cultivate the earth, viz. to prepare every thing prior to planting, and the planting itself; but when that which is planted lives, then the attention which the plant requires is great and very difficult. The same thing also appears to take place respecting men. For I form a conjecture of other things from my own affairs. For of this my son, the planting, or the procreating, or whatever else it may be requisite to call it, is the easiest of all things; but his education is difficult, and occasions one to be in continual fear about him. With respect to other things, therefore, much might be said; but the desire which he now possesses very much terrifies me. It is not indeed ignoble, but it is dangerous. For he desires, Socrates, as he says, to become a wise man. And as it appears to me, certain plebeians of the same age with him, coming to this city, and re-

peating certain discourses which they have heard, have very much disturbed him. Of these he is emulous, and some time ago was troublesome to me, thinking it fit that I should pay attention to him, and give a sum of money to some one of the sophists, who might make him a wise man. I am not indeed much concerned about the expense; but I think that the object of his pursuit will lead him into no small danger. Hitherto, therefore, I have restrained by soothing him; but as I am no longer able to effect this, I have thought it best to comply with his wishes, lest by frequently associating with others without me he should be corrupted. Hence I am come for this very purpose, that I may place him with some one of those who appear to be sophists. Our meeting with you, therefore, is a fortunate circumstance: for as I am going to engage in affairs of this kind, I wish very much to consult you about them. If then you have any advice to give respecting what you have heard from me, it is both lawful and proper for you to give it.

Soc. Counsel, however, O Demodocus, is said to be a sacred thing. If therefore any other thing whatever is sacred, this will be so which is now the object of your consultation: for it is not possible for man to consult about any thing more divine than about the erudition of himself and of those that belong to him. In the first place, therefore, you and I should mutually agree, what we think this thing to be about which we consult; lest I should frequently apprehend it to be one thing, and you another, and afterwards very much dissenting from each other in our conference, we should perceive ourselves to be ridiculous: I who give, and you who request, advice not agreeing in any one thing.

DEM. You appear to me, Socrates, to speak rightly, and it is proper so to do.

Soc. I do say right, and yet not entirely, since I make an alteration in a certain trifling particular: for I am thinking that perhaps this youth may not desire that which we think he desires, but something else. And if something else is the object of his wishes, we shall act absurdly in consulting about that which is different from them. It appears therefore to me to be most right to begin by inquiring of him what it is which he desires.

DEM. It appears indeed, as you say, to be best to do so.

Soc. But tell me what the name is of this fine youth: what must we call him?

DEM.

DEM. His name, Socrates, is Theages.

Soc. You have given to your son, O Demodocus, a beautiful and sacred name. But tell us, O Theages, do you say that you desire to become a wife man, and do you think it is fit that this your father should find out a man, who by associating with you may make you wife.

THEA. I do.

Soc. But whether do you call those men wife, who are scientifically knowing, whatever that may be about which they possess this knowledge; or do you call those wife who do not possess scientific knowledge?

THEA. I call the scientific wife.

Soc. What then? Has not your father taught and instructed you in those things, in which others here are instructed who are the sons of respectable fathers; viz. letters, to play on the harp, to wrestle, and other exercises?

THEA. He has.

Soc. Do you think, then, that there is still a certain science wanting, which it is proper your father should pay attention to for your sake?

THEA. I do.

Soc. What is it? Tell us also, that we may gratify you.

THEA. My father also knows what it is, Socrates: for I have often mentioned it to him. But he designedly says these things to you, as if he did not know what I desire: for in other things also he similarly opposes me, and is not willing to place me with any one.

Soc. But all that you have hitherto said to him has been said without witnesses: now therefore make me a witness, and before me say what the wisdom is which you desire: for come now, if you should desire that wisdom by which men steer ships, and I should ask you, O Theages, what is the wisdom, of which being in want, you blame your father as unwilling to place you with a man through whom you might become wife? what answer would you give me? What would you say this wisdom is? Is it not that of piloting?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. But if you desired to be wife according to that wisdom by which they drive chariots, and afterwards blamed your father, on my asking you what this wisdom is, what answer would you give me? Would you not say it is the charioteering art?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. But with respect to the wisdom which you now desire, whether is it without a name, or has it a name?

THEA. I think it has a name.

Soc. Whether therefore do you know the thing itself, but not its name? Or do you also know its name?

THEA. I also know its name.

Soc. Say, therefore, what it is.

THEA. What other name, Socrates, can any one say it has than that of wisdom?

Soc. Is not then the charioteering art also wisdom? Or does it appear to you to be ignorance?

THEA. It does not.

Soc. But wisdom?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. What is the use of it? Is it not that we may know how to manage horses when yoked to a chariot?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. Is not therefore the piloting art also wisdom?

THEA. To me it appears to be so.

Soc. Is it not that by which we know how to manage ships?

THEA. It is.

Soc. But what is the wisdom of which you are desirous? Or, what is that which, when we obtain it, we shall know how to govern?

THEA. To me it appears to be that by which we know how to govern men.

Soc. What, sick men?

THEA. No.

Soc. For that wisdom is the medicinal art. Is it not?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. Is it that, then, by which we know how to regulate fingers in choirs?

THEA. It is not.

Soc. For this is music.

THEA. Certainly.

Soc.

Soc. But is it that by which we know how to govern those that engage in gymnastic exercises?

THEA. It is not.

Soc. For this is gymnastic.

THEA. It is.

Soc. Is it the wisdom by which those who do something effect their purpose? Endeavour to tell me, in the same manner as I have told you above.

THEA. It appears to me to be that wisdom by which we know how to govern those in a city.

Soc. Are there not, therefore, in a city also those that are sick?

THEA. Yes: but I do not speak of these only, but also of others in the city.

Soc. I understand then the art of which you speak. For you appear to me not to say, that it is that art by which we know how to govern mowers, vine-dressers, ploughmen, sowers, and threshers: for that by which we know how to govern these is agriculture. Is it not?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. Nor is it that by which we know how to govern those that handle the saw, the plane, and the lathe; for this belongs to the carpenter's art. Does it not?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. But perhaps you speak of that wisdom by which we govern all these, viz. husbandmen, carpenters, all artificers, and private persons, both men and women.

THEA. It is this wisdom, Socrates, of which I wished to speak some time ago.

Soc. Are you, therefore, disposed to say that Ægisthus, who slew Agamemnon in Argos, had dominion over these things of which you speak, viz. all artificers and private persons, both men and women, or over certain other things?

THEA. He only had dominion over such as these.

Soc. But what? Did not Peleus, the son of Acacus, have dominion over these very things in Phthia?

THEA. Yes.

Soc.

Soc. And have you not heard that Periander, the son of Cypselus, governed Corinth.

THEA. I have.

Soc. And did he not rule over these very same things in his city?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. But what? Do you not think that Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, who lately governed ¹ in Macedonia, had dominion over these very things?

THEA. I do.

Soc. But over what things do you think Hippias ², the son of Pisistratus, who rules in this city, has dominion? Is it not over these things?

THEA. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Can you tell me, then, what Bacis ³ and the Sibyl, and our Amphilytus, are called?

THEA. What else, Socrates, than diviners?

Soc. You speak rightly. Endeavour, therefore, also to tell me what name you give to Hippias and Periander through the same dominion?

THEA. I think they are tyrants: for what else can they be called?

Soc. Whoever, therefore, desires to have dominion over all the men in the city, desires this very same dominion, the tyrannic, and to be a tyrant.

THEA. So it appears.

Soc. Do you therefore say that you desire this dominion?

THEA. It seems so from what I have said.

Soc. O you wicked one! Do you desire to tyrannise over us? And did you some time ago blame your father because he did not send you to some tyrannic preceptor? And are not you, O Demodocus, ashamed; who, having for some time known what your son desires, and having likewise the

¹ It was five or six years before. He was killed at the end of this very year.—Dacier.

² Hippias, the son of Pisistratus, was tyrant of Athens four years. According to Thucydides he succeeded his father, and not Hipparchus. After he had reigned four years he was banished; and twenty years after his exile was slain at the battle of Marathon, where he bore arms for the Persians.—Dacier.

³ Bacis was a prophet, who, long before Xerxes made a descent into Greece, predicted to the people all that would befall them. Herodotus relates some of his prophecies in his 8th book, and considers them to be so formal and plain, since their accomplishment, that he says he neither dares accuse those oracles of falsehood himself, nor suffer others to do so, or to refuse to give credit to them. Aristophanes speaks of this prophet in his comedy of Peace.—Dacier.

ability of sending him to be made that artist in wisdom which he aspires to be, have, notwithstanding, envied him this object of his wishes, and have not been willing to send him to obtain it? Now, however, since he accuses you before me, let us consult in common, you and I, whither we should send him; and through associating with whom he may become a wise tyrant.

DEM. Let us indeed, by Jupiter, Socrates, consult: for it appears to me that no despicable counsel is requisite about this affair.

SOC. Permit us first, O good man, to make inquiry of him sufficiently.

DEM. Interrogate him.

SOC. What then, O Theages, if we should make use of Euripides? For he somewhere says,

Tyrants are wise that with the wise converse.

If, therefore, some one should ask Euripides, In what, O Euripides, do you say tyrants become wise by the conversation of the wise? just as if he had said,

Farmers are wise that with the wise converse:

and we should ask him, In what are they rendered wise? What answer would he give us? Would he reply that they are rendered wise in any thing else than in things pertaining to agriculture?

THEA. He would not.

SOC. But what? If he had said,

Wise are the cooks that with the wise converse:

and we should ask him, In what they become wise? What do you think he would answer? Would it not be, that they become wise in things pertaining to cooking?

THEA. Yes.

SOC. Again, if he had said,

Wrestlers are wise that with the wise converse:

and we should ask him, In what they are rendered wise? Would he not say in things pertaining to wrestling?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. But since he says,

Tyrants are wife that with the wife converse:

if we should ask him, In what do you say they become wife, O Euripides? What would be his answer?

THEA. By Jupiter, I do not know.

Soc. Are you willing, then, I should tell you?

THEA. If you please.

Soc. These are the things which Anacreon, says Callicrete¹, knew. Or are you not acquainted with the verse?

THEA. I am.

Soc. What then? Do you also desire to associate with a man of this kind, who possesses the same art with Callicrete the daughter of Cyane, and who knows tyrannic concerns, in the same manner as the poet says she did; and this, that you may become a tyrant to us and the city?

THEA. You have for some time, Socrates, derided and jested with me.

Soc. But what? Do you not say that you desire this wisdom, by which you may have dominion over all the citizens? And doing this, will you be any thing else than a tyrant?

THEA. I think, indeed, that I should pray to become the tyrant of all men, or, if not of all, of the greater part; and I think that you, and all other men, would do the same. Or, perhaps, *you* would rather pray that you might become a god². But I did not say that *I* desired this.

Soc. But what then, after all, is this which you desire? Do you not say that you desire to govern the citizens?

THEA. Not by violence, nor as tyrants do; but I desire to govern the willing, in the same manner as other excellent men in the city.

Soc. Do you speak of such men as Themistocles, and Pericles, and Cimon, and such as were skilful in political affairs?

¹ This was a virgin who employed herself in teaching politics, as Aspasia, Diotima, and some others, did after her. The verses which Anacreon made on her are lost.—Dacier.

² Theages here alludes to what Socrates was wont to say, that men should endeavour to become similar to divinity.

THEA.

THEA. By Jupiter, I speak of these.

Soc. What then, if you desired to become wise in equestrian affairs, would you obtain the object of your wish, by going to any other than those who are skilled in the management of horses?

THEA. By Jupiter, not I.

Soc. But you would go to these very men who are skilled in these things, who possess horses, and who continually use both their own and many that are the property of others.

THEA. Certainly.

Soc. But what! If you desired to become wise in things pertaining to the throwing of darts, would you not go to those who are skilled in these affairs, and who continually use many darts, both those belonging to others and their own?

THEA. It appears so to me.

Soc. Tell me then, since you wish to become wise in political affairs, do you think you will become wise by going to any others than these politicians, who are skilful in political affairs, who continually use their own city, and many others, and who are conversant both with Grecian and Barbarian cities? Or do you think, that by associating with certain other persons you will become wise in those things in which they are wise, but not in these very things?

THEA. I have heard assertions, which they say are yours; that the sons of these political men are in no respect better than the sons of shoe-makers; and you appear to me to have spoken most truly, from what I am able to perceive. I should be stupid, therefore, if I should think that any one of these could impart to me his wisdom, when he cannot in any respect benefit his own son; or if I should suppose that he could in these things benefit any other man.

Soc. What then would you do, O best of men, if you had a son who caused you molestation of this kind; and who should say that he desired to become a good painter; and should blame you, his father, because you are not willing to be at any expense for the sake of these things; while he, on the other hand, despised those artists, the painters, and was unwilling to learn from them; or, if he acted in this manner towards pipers or harpers, being at the same time desirous to become a piper or harper? What would

you do with him, and where would you send him, being thus unwilling to learn from these persons ?

THEA. By Jupiter, I do not know.

SOC. Now, therefore, doing these very things to your father, can you wonder at and blame him, if he is dubious what he should do with you, and where he should send you ? For, if you are willing, he will immediately place you with those Athenians that are most skilled in political affairs : and with these you will not be at any expense, and at the same time will be much more generally renowned than by associating with any others.

THEA. What then, Socrates ; are not you among the number of excellent and worthy men ? For if you are willing to associate with me, it is sufficient, and I shall seek for no other.

SOC. Why do you say this, Theages ?

DEM. O Socrates, he does not speak badly ; and at the same time by doing this you will gratify me. For there is not any thing which I should consider to be a greater gain, than for my son to be pleased with your conversation ; and for you to be willing to associate with him. And indeed I am ashamed to say how very much I wish this to take place. I therefore entreat both of you ; you, Socrates, that you will be willing to associate with him ; and you, my son, that you do not seek to associate with any other than Socrates ; and you will thus liberate me from many and dreadful cares. For I now very much fear lest my son should meet with some other person who may corrupt him.

THEA. You need not fear any longer, O father, for me, if you can but persuade Socrates to permit me to associate with him.

DEM. You speak very well. And after this, all the conversation, Socrates, will be directed to you. For I am ready, in short, to give up myself to you, and whatever is most dear to me that you may require, if you will love this my Theages, and benefit him to the utmost of your ability.

SOC. O Demodocus, I do not wonder that you are so importunate, if you think that your son can be especially benefited by me. For I do not know any thing about which he who is endued with intellect ought to be more anxious, than how his son may become the best of men. But whence it has appeared to you that I am more able to assist your son in becoming a
good

good citizen, than you yourself, and whence you have thought that I can benefit him more than you, I very much wonder. For you, in the first place, are older than I am; and in the next place, you have exercised the principal offices among the Athenians; nor is any one more honoured than you by the Anagyrusian populace and the rest of the city. But neither of you fees any one of these things in me. If herefore Theages, here, despises the associating with political men, and seeks after certain others who profess to give instruction, there and here, Prodicus of Ceos, Gorgias the Leontine, Polus the Agrigentine, and many others, who are so wise, that going into cities they persuade the noblest and most wealthy of the youth, who are permitted to associate gratis with any one of the citizens they please,—they persuade these, I say, to renounce those of their own city, and adhere to them, though the youth give them a considerable sum of money, and thanks besides, for their instruction. It is fit, therefore, that you and your son should choose some one of these; but it is not fit that you should choose me: for I know none of these blessed and beautiful disciplines; though I wish I did; but I always profess to know nothing, as I may say, except a certain small discipline of amatory affairs. In this discipline, I acknowledge myself to be more skilful than any one of the past or present age.

THEA. Do you not see, O father, that Socrates does not appear to be very willing to associate with me. For, as to myself, I am ready, if he is willing; but he says these things in jest to us. For I know some of the same age with myself, and others who are a little older, who before they were familiar with him were of no worth, but when they associated with him, in a very little time appeared to be the best of all men, and surpassed those to whom they were before inferior.

Soc. Do you know, therefore, O son of Demodocus, how this comes to pass?

THEA. Yes, by Jupiter, I do; and if you were willing, I also should become such as they were.

Soc. Not so, O excellent youth; but you are ignorant in what manner this takes place. However, I will tell you how it happens:—There is a certain dæmoniack power¹ which has followed me by a divine allotment from childhood.

¹ This passage incontestably proves that the dæmon of Socrates was not the intellect of that philosopher.

childhood. This is a voice, which when it takes place always signifies to me that I should abandon what I am about to do; but it never at any time incites me. And, if any one of my friends communicates any thing to me, and I hear the voice, it dissuades me from this thing, and does not suffer me to do it. Of these things I will adduce to you witnesses: You know the beautiful Charmides, the son of Glauco; he once came to me, in order to communicate to me his intention of contending in the Nemean games¹; and immediately, on his beginning to tell me that he meant to contend, I heard the voice. And I forbade him, and said, While you was speaking to me, I heard the voice of the dæmoniackal power; do not, therefore, contend. Perhaps, said he, the voice signified to you that I should not conquer; but, though I should not be victorious, yet by exercising myself at this time I shall be benefited. Having thus spoken, he engaged in the contest. It is worth while, therefore, to inquire of him what happened to him from contending in these games. If you are willing also, ask Clitomachus, the brother of Timarchus², what Timarchus said to him when he was about to die, for having despised the admonition of the dæmonical power. For he and Euathlus, who was famous for running races, and who received Timarchus when he fled, will tell you what he then said.

THEA. What did he say?

SOC. O Clitomachus, said he, I indeed am now going to die, because I was unwilling to be persuaded by Socrates. But why Timarchus said this I will tell you. When Timarchus rose from the banquet, together with Philemon the son of Philemonides, in order to kill Nicias the son of Herofcomander, for none but they two were in the conspiracy,—Timarchus, as he rose, said to me, What do you say, Socrates? Do you indeed continue drinking; but it is necessary that I should depart. I will, however, return shortly, if I can. I then heard the voice, and I said to him, By no means should

philosopher, nor any part of his soul, as has been rashly asserted by some moderns unskilled in the writings and philosophy of Plato. For a full account of this dæmon see the note at the beginning of the first Alcibiades.

¹ One of the four famous games of Greece, which were celebrated once in three years.

² I suppose this is Timarchus of Cheronea, who desired to be interred near one of the sons of Socrates, who died a little before. I could never find any footsteps of this history elsewhere.—Dacier.

you

you leave us; for I have heard the accustomed dæmoniacal signal. Upon this he stayed; and having remained with us for a time, he again rose up to depart, and said, Socrates, I am going: and again I heard the voice. Again, therefore, I compelled him to stay. The third time wishing to escape me unnoticed, he rose without saying any thing to me, when my attention was otherwise engaged, and thus departing he did that which was the cause of his death. Whence he said this to his brother, which I have now told you, viz. that he was going to die, because he would not believe me. Further still, you may also learn from many in Sicily, what I said concerning the destruction of the army. And with respect to things that are past, you may hear them from those that know them; but you may now make trial of the dæmoniacal signal, if it says any thing to the purpose. For Sannion, the son of Calus, is gone to the army; and on his going, I heard the dæmonical signal. But he is now gone with Thraſyllus¹, in order to wage war immediately with Ephesus and Ionia; and I think that he will either die, or that some misfortune will befall him. And I very much fear² for the rest of the enterprise. I have said all these things to you, because this power of the dæmon is able to effect every thing with respect to the conversations of those that associate with me. For it is adverse to many, nor can those be benefited by associating with me whom the dæmon opposes: so that it is not possible for me to live with these. With many, however, he does not prevent me from conversing; and yet they are not all benefited by associating with me. But those whose conversation with me is favoured by the power of the dæmon, these are they whom you have noticed: for in a short time they make a proficiency. And of these, some possess this advantage with firmness and stability; but many, as long as they are with me, advance in a wonderful manner, but when they leave me, they again differ in no respect from other men. This Aristides, the son of Lyſimachus and grandson of Aristides, once experienced: for, associating with me, he made a very great proficiency in a short

¹ Thraſyllus was chosen general with Thraſybulus, the fourth year of the ninety-second Olympiad.—Dacier.

² Indeed the Athenians were vanquished at Ephesus. Xenoph. lib. i. Hence Plutarch says, in the life of Alcibiades, that the army of Thraſyllus was terribly galled under the walls of Ephesus; and that in memory of this defeat the Ephesians erected a trophy of brass, to the shame of the Athenians.—Dacier.

time; but afterwards he failed from hence, in order to engage in some military expedition. When he returned, he found Thucydides, the son of Melesias and grandson of Thucydides¹, associating with me. But this Thucydides, the day before, had quarrelled with me in a certain conference. Aristides, therefore, seeing me, after he had saluted me, and some conversation had passed between us, said,—I hear, Socrates, that Thucydides thinks highly of himself, with respect to some things, and is angry with you, as if he were an extraordinary person. It is so, said I. But what? said he, does he not know what a slave he was before he associated with you? It does not seem that he does, said I, by the gods. But a ridiculous circumstance, said he, has happened to me, Socrates. What is it, said I. It is this, said he, that before I went to the army, I was able to converse with any man whoever he might be, nor did I appear to be inferior to any one in argument, so that I sought after the company of the most elegant men; but now, on the contrary, I shun any one whom I perceive to be learned, so ashamed am I of my own vileness. But, said I, whether did this power leave you suddenly, or by degrees? By degrees, he replied. When was it present with you, said I? Was it present while you were learning something from me, or was it in some other way? I will tell you, said he, Socrates, a thing incredible indeed, by the gods, but true: for I never, at any time, learnt any thing from you, as you know, but I made a proficiency when I associated with you, even if I was only in the same house that you were, though not in the same room; but my proficiency was greater when I was in the same room with you. I also appeared to myself to improve much more when, being in the same room with you, I looked at you when you spoke, than when I looked another way. But I made by far the greatest proficiency when I sat near you and touched you. Now, however, said he, all that habit has entirely fled. Such, therefore, O Theages, is the association with me: for if it pleases divinity, you will make a very great and rapid proficiency; but you will not, if he does not please. See then, whether it is not safer for you to be instructed by some one of those who have power over the benefit which they impart to men, than by me who benefit, or not, just as it may happen.

¹ This grandson of Thucydides rivalled Pericles in the government.

THEA. It appears to me, therefore, Socrates, that we should act in this manner, viz. that we should make trial of this dæmoniacal power by associating together. And, if he is favourable to us, the best consequences will ensue; but if he is not, then let us immediately consult what is to be done, whether we should associate with some other, or endeavour to appease the divine power, that is present with you, by prayers and sacrifices, or any other means which our diviners teach.

DEM. Do not oppose the lad any longer, Socrates, in these things: for Theages speaks well.

Soc. If it appears proper thus to act, let us do so.

THE END OF THE THEAGES.

THE LACHES:

A DIALOGUE

ON

FORTITUDE.

THE LACHES¹.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

LYSIMACHUS²,
MELESIAS,

|| NICIAS³,
LACHES⁴,

The Sons of LYSIMACHUS and MELESIAS, and SOCRATES.

¹ We have already observed, in the introduction to the *Parmenides*, that the dialectic energy is triple; either subsisting through opposite arguments, or alone unfolding truth, or alone confuting falsehood. As the design of the present dialogue, therefore, is to confute the false opinions of Laches and Nicias concerning fortitude, and thus to liberate them from two-fold ignorance, the reader must not expect to find in it an accurate definition of fortitude. As, however, he will doubtless be anxious to obtain this definition, I shall present him with the luminous conceptions of the divine Jamblichus on this subject.

Fortitude, considered according to its most principal subsistence, is an immutable intellectual power, and a most vigorous intellectual energy; or, in other words, it is a sameness and stable habit of intellect in itself. And of this kind will the species of fortitude be, which are beheld about life, whether they are considered as subsisting by themselves, or as imparting their strength to the firm stability of reasoning. But from these, those species of fortitude proceed, which are seen in the passions, about things dreadful and the contrary, and in fear and boldness; which generously resist pleasure and pain, and always preserve the same right opinions, and commensurate and moderate manners. In common with these, manifold species of fortitude arise from passion, reason, and free deliberation, through which human life derives a strenuousness of action, incapable of being subdued. This strenuous energy likewise voluntarily performs whatever is beautiful, and to be chosen for its own sake; and for the sake of good, endures all labours and dangers. It also cheerfully and readily gives itself to things which appear to be difficult; boldly encounters and meditates on death; and easily bears pain and calamity of every kind.

This Dialogue is supposed to have been written soon after the defeat of the Athenians at Delium, which happened in the first year of the 89th Olympiad.

² The son of Aristides the Just.

³ The general of the Athenians.

⁴ Another Athenian general.

LYSIMACHUS.

YOU have seen, O Nicias and Laches, this man fighting in armour¹: and indeed we did not then tell you on what account I and Melesias here called you to see him; but now we will tell you; for we think it is proper to speak freely to you. There are, indeed, some who laugh at things of this kind; and if any one consults them, they will not tell you what they think; but conjecturing the thing about which their advice is asked, they speak contrary to their own opinion. Thinking, however, that you are sufficiently qualified to know, and that knowing you will in short say what you think, we have made you our associates in the subject of our deliberation. The thing, therefore, about which I have for a long time prefaced so much is this:—These are our sons. That youth, the son of Melesias, is called Thucydides, by his grandfather's name; and this which is mine, is called Aristides, after my father. It has appeared therefore to us, that we should pay all the attention to them in our power, and that we should not act in the same manner as many do, who, when their children become lads², suffer them to do as they please, but we now begin to take all the care of them we are able. Seeing, therefore, that you also have children, we thought that you especially must have considered how they may be educated so as to become the best of men. If, however, you have not frequently paid much attention to this thing, we now remind you that it is not proper to be negligent of it, and we call upon you to deliberate, in common with us, concerning the education of children. But whence we have been led to think in this manner, O Nicias and Laches, it is proper you should hear, though the narration may be somewhat prolix.

I and Melesias, here, have but one table, and these lads eat with us. As I told you therefore at first, we shall speak freely to you. For both of us are able to relate to the youths many beautiful deeds of our fathers, both in war and peace, during the time that they managed the affairs of their allies

¹ It is well observed by Dacier, that this fighting in armour appears to have been similar to the exercise which is at present taught in fencing schools.

² In the original *μεταμιας*, which seems to correspond to our English word *lads*. For according to the anonymous Greek interpreter of Ptolemy's books *De Judiciis*, p. 166, the seven ages of man are *βρεφος*, *παις*, *μεταμιας*, *νεος*, *ανηρ*, *πρεσβυτης*, *γερον*. i. e. an infant, a boy, a lad, a youth, a man, an elderly man, an old man.

and

and of the city; but we cannot relate to them any deeds of our own. This covers us with shame, and we accuse our fathers for suffering us to live delicately when we became lads, while they in the mean time were busily employed about the affairs of others. These very things we point out to these youths, telling them that if they neglect themselves, and are not persuaded by us, they will become ignoble; but that, if they pay attention to themselves, they may quickly become worthy of the name which they bear. They therefore say that they will obey us; but we consider what that is through which they by learning or studying may become the best of men. Hence, a certain person recommended to us, that the young men should learn to fight in armour, and said that this was a beautiful discipline. He also praised him, whom you have just now beheld exhibiting, and advised us likewise to see him. It appeared to us, therefore, proper to come and take you along with us, that you might not only be spectators together with us, but might also assist us with your advice, if you were willing, concerning the attention which should be paid to children. These are the things which we wish to consider in common with you. It is now, therefore, your part to consult about this discipline, whether it appears proper to learn it or not; and with respect to other things, whether you have any discipline or study for the youths worthy of praise; and in short to tell us, what mode of conduct you intend to adopt for your own children.

NIC. I indeed, O Lysimachus and Melesias, praise your conception, and am prepared to join with you in this deliberation, and I think that Laches here is prepared for the same purpose also.

LAC. You think with truth, O Nicias. And what Lysimachus just now said about his father, and the father of Melesias, appears to me to have been very well said, both against them and us, and all such as engage in political affairs: for those things nearly happen to them which he said, both with respect to children and other domestic concerns, viz. that they are neglected and despised by them. These things, therefore, O Lysimachus, you have well said. But I am surprised that you should call us to join with you in consulting about the education of youth, and should not call Socrates here: for, in the first place, he is our fellow-citizen; and in the next place, he is always busily employed in considering that which is the object of your investigation, viz. what discipline or pursuit is proper for youth.

Lys.

LYS. How do you say, O Laches? Does Socrates here pay attention to any thing of this kind?

LAC. Entirely so, Lyfimachus.

NIC. I also can assert this with no less confidence than Laches. For he lately introduced as a stranger to me, for the sake of instructing my son in music, Damon the disciple of Agathocles, a man most acceptable not only for his skill in music, but also for other things which qualify a man to associate with such youths as these.

LYS. Indeed, O Socrates, Nicias, and Laches, I, and such as are my equals in age, have no longer any acquaintance with younger persons, because we for the most part keep within doors on account of our age. But, O son of Sophroniscus, if you have any thing to advise for the good of this your fellow-citizen, it is proper that you should communicate it: for it is just that you should; since you are a paternal friend to us; for I and your father were always associates and friends; and our friendship lasted till his death without interruption. At present I have some recollection of the name of Socrates: for these lads, when discoursing with each other at home, frequently make mention of Socrates, and very much praise him; but I never have yet asked them whether they spoke of Socrates the son of Sophroniscus. Tell me, however, O boys, whether this is that Socrates of whom you so often make mention?

Sons of MEL. and LYS. Yes, O Father, it is the same.

LYS. It is well, by Juno, Socrates, that you do credit to your father, who was the best of men; and henceforward your interests shall be mine, and mine yours.

LAC. And, indeed, O Lyfimachus, you must not let this man go: for I have elsewhere seen him, not only doing credit to his father, but also to his country. For, at the defeat at Delium¹, he retired along with me; and I can assure you, that if the rest had conducted themselves as he did, our city would have stood firm, and would not then have suffered such a ruin.

LYS. O Socrates, this indeed is a beautiful praise, which is now given

¹ In this battle Socrates saved the life to Xenophon, who fell in consequence of his horse being killed under him; and Socrates being on foot, took him on his back, and carried him several miles.

to you by men who are worthy to be believed, and who deserve to be celebrated for the same things for which they praise you. Be well assured, therefore, that I, hearing these things, rejoice that you are renowned; and think that I am among the number of those who are most benevolently disposed towards you. Hence it is requisite that you should first come to us, and believe that we are your familiars, as it is just you should. Now, therefore, from this very day, since we have recognized each other, you should not do otherwise; but be familiar with us and these youths, that mutual friendship may be preserved between us. Do you therefore do these things, and we will again recall them to your memory. But with respect to the things which we began to inquire into, what do you say? Does it appear to you that this discipline is adapted to lads, or not; I mean the learning to fight in armour?

Soc. Concerning these things, O Lyfmachus, I will endeavour to give you what advice I am able; and again, to do all that you request. It appears indeed to me to be most just, that I being the younger, and less experienced in these things, should first hear what these persons say, and learn from them. And if I should have any thing to say different from their opinion, then I will declare my sentiments, and endeavour to persuade you and them of their truth. But, O Nicias, why do not you speak the first?

Nic. Nothing hinders, Socrates; for it appears to me that the knowledge of this discipline is very generally useful to youth. For it is well not to be busily employed about those things with which young men love to be conversant when they are at leisure, but to engage in this whence the body necessarily acquires a better condition. For it is not inferior to any of the exercises, nor has it less labour; and at the same time this exercise and equestrian skill are especially proper for a liberal man. Indeed, in the contest in which we are athletæ, and in those exercises in which a contest is proposed to us, those alone contend who are exercised in these warlike instruments. In the next place, this discipline is of advantage in battle itself, when it is necessary to fight in rank with many others. But it is most beneficial when the ranks are broken, and when it is necessary, in single combat, either to pursue one resisting, or in flight to repel one attacking. For he who is skilled in this art, will not be vanquished by one, nor perhaps by many

many enemies, but will every where through this be superior to his opponent. Further still, a thing of this kind incites a desire of another beautiful discipline. For every one who has learnt to fight in armour, will also desire the discipline consequent to this, viz. that concerning the ranks of an army; and having received these disciplines, and being ambitious of excelling in them, he will be impelled to every thing which concerns the command of an army. And this being the case, it is evident that he will apply himself to those beautiful disciplines and studies consequent to these, which it is well worth while for a man to learn and study, and of which this discipline is the leader. We may also add to it this, which is no trifling addition, that this science will make every man in no small degree more daring and brave in battle than he was before. Nor is this also to be passed over in silence (though it may appear to be very trifling), that it gives a man a graceful carriage, in those places where it is proper he should appear to possess it; and where also through this gracefulness of carriage he will at the same time appear more terrible to his enemies. To me therefore, O Lysimachus, as I have said, it appears to be necessary to teach young men these things, and for the reasons which I have assigned. But I shall be glad to hear if Laches has any thing to say in opposition to what I have advanced.

LAC. But it is difficult, O Nicias, to say with respect to any discipline, that it is not proper to learn it: for it appears to be good to know all things. And indeed, as to this art respecting arms, if it is a discipline, (as those say it is who teach it, and if it is such as Nicias asserts it to be,) it is necessary to learn it; but if it is not a discipline, and those deceive us who promise to teach it us as such, or if being a discipline, it is not of much worth, why is it necessary to learn it? But I say these things concerning it, looking to this circumstance, viz. that if it were of any value, I think it would not have been concealed from the Lacedæmonians, who are concerned for nothing else in life than to seek and study that by which they may surpass others in war. And if this art were concealed from them, yet it could not be concealed from the teachers of it, that the Lacedæmonians, the most of all the Greeks, pay attention to things of this kind, and that he who is renowned for these things, will accumulate much wealth both from them and from others, just as a tragic poet when he is renowned among us. For indeed, he who thinks that he can compose excellent tragedies, does not, wandering out of Attica,
make

make the circuit of other cities, in order to attract notice, but immediately comes hither, and very properly exhibits himself to our citizens. But I see that those who fight in armour consider Lacedæmon as an inaccessible temple, and do not enter into it even on tip-toe, but they wander round it, and rather exhibit themselves to others, and especially to those who acknowledge themselves to be inferior to many others in warlike concerns. In the next place, O Lyfimachus, I have been present with not a few of these men in the work itself, and I have seen what kind of men they are. But we may form a judgment of them from this circumstance, that no man who has applied himself to armorial concerns has ever become illustrious in war; though in all other things men have been celebrated for their skill in their respective professions. But these men, as it seems, are particularly unfortunate in this respect beyond others. For this very same Stefileus, whom you beheld together with me exhibiting himself in so great a crowd, I have seen truly displaying himself elsewhere, in a far better manner, though unwillingly. For when the ship he was in attacked a merchantman, he fought with a spear headed with a scythe that his arms might be as different as himself was from the rest of the combatants. Other particulars therefore respecting the man do not deserve to be related; but the success of this stratagem of heading a spear with a scythe must not be passed over in silence: for while he was fighting, his scythe became entangled in the tackling of the enemy's ship; Stefileus therefore pulled in order to disengage it, but was not able to effect his purpose; and the one ship passed by the other. In the mean time he followed the course of the ship holding his spear. But when the enemy's ship steered off, and was drawing him in, as he was still holding his spear, he suffered it to slip through his hands, till he had only hold of it by the small end. The crew of the merchantman laughed and shouted at this circumstance of his being drawn by his spear, and at the figure which he made. At length some one having thrown a stone that fell just at his feet, on one of the rowers' seats, he quitted his spear. Then, indeed, those that were in the three-banked galley were no longer able to restrain their laughter on seeing that spear headed with a scythe hanging from the ship. Perhaps therefore, this art may be of some use, as Nicias says; such however are the particulars of which I was a spectator. Hence, as I said at first, if it be a discipline, it possesses but little utility; and if it be not, but they dissemble who say it is, it is not worth while

to endeavour to learn it. For it appears to me, that if any coward should think he ought to learn this art, acquiring confidence through it, his cowardice would become more apparent; but that if a brave man should learn it, in consequence of being observed by every one, if he erred but in a small degree he must endure great calumnies. For the profession of this science is attended with envy; so that unless he surpasses others in virtue in a wonderful degree, he who acknowledges that he possesses this science cannot avoid becoming ridiculous. Such, O Lysimachus, does the pursuit of this discipline appear to me. But it is requisite, as I said at first, not to dismiss this Socrates, but to request him to give his opinion on this subject.

LYS. But I indeed request, O Socrates, that you will do so: for it appears to me that we want an umpire to decide the difference. Had these indeed agreed in opinion, a thing of this kind would have been less necessary. But now (for you see that Laches dissents from Nicias) it will be well to hear from you to which of the men you give your suffrage.

SOC. But what, O Lysimachus? If many praise us, will you make use of them?

LYS. What else can any one do, O Socrates?

SOC. And will you also, O Melesias, act in this manner? And if it were necessary for you to consult about exercise for your son, would you rather be persuaded by the many, than by one who had learned under a skilful master, and who had exercised himself?

MEL. It is fit, Socrates, I should be persuaded by the latter.

SOC. You would rather, therefore, be persuaded by him than by us four?

MEL. Perhaps so.

SOC. For it is necessary, I think, to judge by science, and not by multitude, if a man intends to judge well.

MEL. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Now, therefore, it is necessary to consider this very thing in the first place, viz. whether any one of us is an artist, in the thing about which we consult, or not. And if any of us is, we should be persuaded by him being one, dismissing the rest. But if no one of us is an artist in this particular, we must seek after some other person. Or, do you and Lysimachus think that this is an affair of small consequence, and that it is not concerning

cerning that which is the greatest of all your possessions? For the government of the whole paternal house will be according as the children are worthy, or the contrary.

MEL. You speak the truth.

Soc. It is necessary, therefore, to pay much attention to this subject.

MEL. Certainly.

Soc. How then should we consider that which I just now mentioned, if we wished to find which of us is most expert in contest? Should we not consult him who had learned and studied this art of contending, and who had been instructed in it by good masters?

MEL. To me it appears that we should.

Soc. Should we not, therefore, prior to this, consider what this thing is in which we seek for masters?

MEL. How do you say?

Soc. Thus, perhaps, what I say will be more manifest. It does not appear to me, to have been acknowledged by us at first what that is about which we consult and speculate, in order to know which of us is most skilled in it, and has had masters for the sake of this, and which of us is not.

NIC. Did we not, O Socrates, consider about fighting in armour, whether it was proper lads should learn it or not?

Soc. Entirely so, O Nicias: but when any one considers about a remedy for the eyes, whether it is proper to apply it or not, whether do you think the consultation should then be about the remedy, or about the eyes?

NIC. About the eyes.

Soc. Hence also, when any one considers about a bridle for a horse, whether it should be used or not, and when it should be used, he will then consult about the horse, and not about the bridle.

NIC. True.

Soc. In one word, therefore, when any one considers a certain thing for the sake of something, his consultation will be about that thing for the sake of which he speculates, and not about that which he seeks for the sake of something else¹.

¹ Thus, in the above instance of the bridle and the horse, the horse is that for the sake of which a man considers about a bridle; but the bridle is that which is sought for the sake of the horse.

NIC. Necessarily so:

SOC. It is necessary, therefore, to consider whether the person whose advice we ask is skilled in that thing for the sake of which we engage in the present inquiry.

MEL. Certainly.

SOC. Do we not therefore say, that we now inquire concerning discipline for the sake of the soul of youth?

NIC. Yes.

SOC. Whether, therefore, any one of us is skilled in the art of taking care of the soul, and is able to accomplish this employment well, and has had good masters in this art himself, must be considered.

LAC. But what, O Socrates, have you never yet seen some persons become more skilful in a certain thing without than with masters?

SOC. I have, O Laches; whom, however, you would not be willing to believe, if they said that they were good artists, unless they could show you some excellent production of their art, and not only one but many.

NIC. What you say is true.

SOC. It is necessary, therefore, O Laches and Nicias, since Lysimachus and Melesias have called upon us to consult with them concerning their sons, in consequence of being anxious that their souls may become most excellent,—I say, it is necessary that we, if we acknowledge that we have had masters, should show who they were, they in the first place being good masters, and having cultivated the souls of many youths; and in the next place, who shall appear to have also instructed us. Or, if any one of us shall say that he has had no master, he ought to be able to speak of the works which he has performed, and to show what Athenians or foreigners, what slaves or freemen, have acknowledged themselves to have been benefited by him. But if we can do neither of these, we must order them to seek for advice from others, and not subject ourselves to the danger of corrupting the sons of other men, and thus be exposed to the greatest reproach from those with whom we are most familiar. I therefore, O Lysimachus and Melesias, in the first place, say concerning myself, that I have had no preceptor of this thing, though my desire has always tended to it from my youth. But I am not able to give a reward to the sophists, who alone profess themselves to be capable of making me a worthy man; and even now I am unable to discover
this

this art myself. If, however, Nicias or Laches shall have either discovered or learned it, I shall not wonder : for they are richer than I am, so that they might learn it from others ; and they are at the same time older, so that they may now have discovered it. But they appear to me to be able to instruct a man : for they never would so intrepidly have decided concerning worthy and base pursuits, unless they had believed that they had a sufficient knowledge of them. I believe them, therefore, as to other things ; but I wonder that they differ from each other. Hence, as Laches just now ordered that you should not dismiss but interrogate me ; in like manner I now call upon you not to dismiss Laches and Nicias, but to interrogate them ; at the same time telling them, that Socrates says he has no knowledge of the thing, and is not qualified to judge which of you speaks the truth ; for he is neither the inventor nor the disciple of any one about things of this kind. But do you, O Laches and Nicias, tell us what man you have met with most skilled in the education of youth ; and whether you know these things in consequence of having learnt them from some one, or from having discovered them yourselves. And, if you have learnt them, tell us who was your master, and who those are that are similar artists ; that if the affairs of the city should not afford you leisure sufficient to attend to us, we may go to those masters, and may persuade them, either by gifts or caresses, or both, to take care of our children and yours, that they may not, through becoming depraved characters, be a disgrace to their ancestors. But if you yourselves discovered this art, give us instances of those who by your care have, from being depraved, become worthy characters. For if you now begin to give instruction for the first time, it is requisite to consider that you will be exposed to the danger, not of making trial in Car¹, but upon your sons, and the sons of your friends, and, in short, according to the proverb, that you will teach a potter² in a tub. Tell us, then, what you can do, and what not. Inquire these things of them, O Lysimachus, and do not dismiss the men till they have answered.

Lys. Socrates, my friends, appears to me to speak well ; wherefore, O Nicias and Laches, consider whether it will be agreeable to you to be interro-

¹ This is said of those that engage in perilous concerns, and in the affairs of others, when they are attended with danger.

² See this explained in a note on the Gorgias.

gated about, and reply to such like particulars. For to me and Melesias here, it will certainly be very agreeable, if you are willing to discuss all that Socrates may ask. For I said from the first, that we called upon you for advice, because we thought that you would pay attention to these things in a becoming manner, and because your sons, as well as ours, are now nearly arrived at that age in which they ought to be instructed. If, therefore, it makes no difference to you, speak, and consider the affair in common with Socrates, giving and receiving arguments from each other: for this was well said by him, that we are now consulting about the most important of our concerns. See, therefore, whether it appears to you that this ought to be done.

NIC. O Lysimachus, you seem to me to know Socrates only from his father, and not to have associated with him; unless, perhaps, when he was a boy, you may have met with him in public assemblies following his father, or in a temple, or some other convention of the people; but it is evident that you never had any correspondence with him since he came to be a man.

LYS. Why do you say this, O Nicias?

NIC. You seem to me not to know that whoever draws near to Socrates by discourse, as if by family alliance, and converses with him, although he may begin to discourse about something else, will not cease to be led about by his arguments, till he falls on the necessity of giving an account of his present mode of life, and the manner in which his past life has been spent. And when he has fallen on this necessity, Socrates will not dismiss him till he has well and properly examined all these particulars. But I am accustomed to his manner, and I know that it is necessary to suffer these things from him; and I also well know that I must suffer them now: for I rejoice, O Lysimachus, to draw near to the man; and I think it is no bad thing to be reminded that we have acted or shall act in an improper manner. But, indeed, he who is not averse to this must necessarily be more cautious in future, being willing and thinking it worth while, according to the saying of Solon, to learn as long as he lives, and not expecting that age, when it comes, will bring intellect along with it. To me, therefore, it is neither unusual nor unpleasant to be examined by Socrates; but, indeed, I have nearly for some time perceived that our discourse, as Socrates is present, would not be about the lads, but about ourselves. As I said, therefore, as to myself nothing hinders

ders me from discoursing with Socrates in whatever manner he pleases. But see how Laches here is disposed about a thing of this kind.

LAC. The manner in which I am affected, O Nicias, with respect to discourse, is simple, or, if you will, is not simple, but double : for to some one I may appear to be a philologist, and not a misologist. For when I hear a man discoursing concerning virtue, or concerning a certain wisdom, he being one who is truly a man, and worthy the arguments which he uses, I rejoice transcendently, contemplating at the same time him who speaks and what is said, how they fit and harmonize with each other. And, indeed, such a man appears to me to be a musician, and one who produces the most beautiful harmony ; not that he is harmonized according to the melody of the lyre, or instruments of sport ; but in reality he attunes his life. Such a one too lives in concord with himself both in words and deeds, not indeed according to the Ionic¹, or Phrygian, or Lydian harmony, but according to the Dorian, which is alone the Grecian harmony. Such a man, therefore, when he speaks, causes me to rejoice, and to seem to be a lover of words, with such avidity do I receive what he says. But he who acts in a manner contrary to this man pains me, and by how much the better he appears to speak, by so much the more does he make me seem to be a hater of words. I have not yet, indeed, had any experience of the words of Socrates ; but of his works, as it seems, I formerly have ; and there I found him a man worthy of beautiful assertions and of all liberty of speech. If, therefore, he is such a man, I will consult him, and most willingly shall I be interrogated by, and not be averse to learn from him. I also assent to the saying of Solon, with the addition only of one thing : for I wish to learn as I grow old, but from the worthy alone. Let this then be granted to me that he is a worthy preceptor, lest while I learn unpleasantly, I should appear to be indocile. For it is with me a thing of no consequence, if he who teaches me should be younger than I am, or should not yet be renowned, and the like. I announce to you, therefore, O Socrates, that you may confute and teach me whatever you please : for I am favourably disposed towards you from that day,

¹ The Ionic harmony was effeminate and soft ; the Lydian was doleful and adapted to lamentation ; the Phrygian vehement, and capable of producing ecstasy, and on this account Proclus informs us that it was used in the mysteries ; and the Dorian was grave and masculine, and on this account was preferred by Plato to all the rest. See the third book of the Republic.

in which you was my companion in danger, and in which you gave such a specimen of your virtue, as it became a just man to give. Say therefore whatever you please, and pay no attention to our age.

Soc. We cannot then accuse you, as it seems, that you are not ready jointly to consult and investigate with us.

Lys. This is our business, Socrates; for I regard you as one of us. Consider, therefore, instead of me, for the sake of the youths, what we ought to inquire of them, and consult by conversing with them. For I have forgotten many things, through my age, which I had intended to ask them; and again, I do not very well remember what I hear, if any other conversation intervenes. Do you therefore speak about, and discuss among yourselves, the things which we have proposed to be investigated; and when I have heard what you have to say, I will do, together with Melesias here, whatever shall appear to you proper to be done.

Soc. O Nicias and Laches, we must obey Lysimachus and Melesias. The things then which we just now endeavoured to consider, viz. who were our masters in a discipline of this kind, or what other persons we had made better, it will not perhaps be improper to investigate among ourselves. But I think that such a consideration as this tends to the same thing; or nearly it will be something which rather flows as from a principle. For if we have a scientific knowledge of any thing, which when communicated to another renders him better, and if we are also able to communicate it to another, it is evident that we know the thing itself, and also how it may be acquired in the easiest and best manner. Perhaps you do not understand what I say, but thus you will easily comprehend my meaning. If we know that sight, when present to the eyes, makes those eyes to which it is present better, and if besides this we have the power of making it present to the eyes, it is evident that we know what the sight is, and can inform him who consults us for this purpose how it may be acquired in the easiest and best manner. For if we have no knowledge of this very thing, what the sight is, or what the hearing is, we cannot be counsellors or physicians worthy of any regard, either about the eyes or the ears, with respect to the manner in which either the hearing or the sight may be most beautifully obtained.

Lys. You speak the truth, O Socrates.

Soc. Do not therefore these persons, O Laches, now call upon us to consult
with

with them after what manner virtue, being present to the souls of their sons, may render them better?

LAC. Entirely so.

SOC. Is it not, therefore, essentially necessary to know this, what virtue is? For if we are entirely ignorant what virtue is, how can we become advisers to any one, so as that he may be able to acquire it in the most beautiful manner?

LAC. By no means can we, as it appears to me, Socrates.

SOC. Shall we say then, O Laches, that we know what virtue is?

LAC. We shall certainly say so.

SOC. If, therefore, we know, cannot we also tell what it is?

LAC. Undoubtedly.

SOC. We will not, therefore, O best of men, immediately speculate concerning the whole of virtue (for that perhaps would be a very laborious work); but let us first see with respect to a certain part of it, if we are sufficiently able to know it, and thus, as it is probable, the speculation will be easy to us.

LAC. Let us do so, Socrates, since it is agreeable to you.

SOC. Which of the parts of virtue then shall we select? Is it not evident that it must be this, to which the discipline of arms appears to tend? But it appears to the many to tend to fortitude. Or does it not?

LAC. And very much does it appear so.

SOC. In the first place, therefore, O Laches, let us endeavour to say what fortitude is; and in the next place let us after this consider how it may be acquired by youth, so far as it is possible for it to be acquired by studies and disciplines. But endeavour to say what fortitude is.

LAC. By Jupiter, Socrates, it is not difficult to say what it is. For if any one is willing, keeping in his rank, to oppose the enemy, and does not fly, I well know that he will be a brave man.

SOC. You speak well, O Laches; but perhaps I, from not speaking clearly, am the cause of my perceiving that you do not answer that which I asked, but something else.

LAC. Why do you say this, Socrates?

SOC. I will tell you, if I am able. A brave man, as you say, is one who, keeping in his rank, fights the enemy.

LAC. So I say.

Soc. And I also. But is not he likewise a brave man, who flying and not keeping in his rank fights the enemy?

LAC. How flying?

Soc. Just as the Scythians are said to fight no less flying than pursuing. And Homer, praising the horses of Æneas, says,

Swiftly they every where pursue and fly.

And for this very thing he praises Æneas himself, viz. for his being skilled in flying, and says, that he was expert in retreating.

LAC. And very properly, Socrates: for he there speaks concerning chariots; but you speak concerning the horse of the Scythians. For their cavalry fight in this manner; but the infantry of Greece fight as I said.

Soc. Except perhaps the Lacedæmonians, O Laches. For they say that the Lacedæmonians, in the battle of Platæa, when they were engaged with the *Gerropbori*¹, were not willing to fight standing their ground against them, but fled; but that after the ranks of the Persians were broken, they rallied and fought like cavalry, and thus became conquerors in that battle.

LAC. You speak the truth.

Soc. On this account, therefore, I said that I was the cause that you did not answer well, because I did not interrogate you well. For I wished to ask you not only concerning those who are brave in the infantry, but also concerning those who are brave in the cavalry, and in all the forms of war; and not only concerning those that are brave in battle, but also concerning those that are brave in dangers on the sea,—in diseases,—in poverty,—and in political affairs: and again, not only concerning those who are brave in pains or fears, but also concerning those who are powerful in contending against desires or pleasures, both by standing their attacks, or retreating from them: for some men, O Laches, are also brave in things of this kind.

LAC. And very much so, O Socrates.

Soc. All these, therefore, are brave; but some of them possess fortitude in pleasures, others in pains, others in desires, and others in fears; and others, I think, possess timidity in these very same things.

¹ These were Persian troops armed with bucklers of willows.

LAC. Entirely so.

Soc. What then each of these is, this is the thing which I ask. Again, therefore, endeavour to tell me, in the first place, what fortitude is which is the same in all these. Or do you not yet understand what I say?

LAC. Not very much.

Soc. But I say, just as if I should ask what swiftnes is, which is present with us in running, in playing on the harp, in speaking, in learning, and in many other things. For we nearly possess it in such things as the following, which it is worth while to mention, viz. either in the actions of the hands or feet, or mouth and voice, or in those of the dianoëtic part. Or do not you also say so?

LAC. Entirely so.

Soc. If, therefore, any one should ask me, O Socrates, What do you call this thing which you denominate swiftnes in all things? I should say to him, that I call that power swiftnes which accomplishes many things in a short time, about the voice, and about the course, and about all other things.

LAC. And you would say rightly.

Soc. Do you also endeavour, O Laches, thus to define fortitude, and tell us what that power is which is the same in pleasure and in pain, and in all the above-mentioned cases, and which in all these is called fortitude.

LAC. It appears, therefore, to me to be a certain endurance of the soul, if it is necessary to speak of that which accords with fortitude in all things.

Soc. But this indeed is necessary, if we are to reply to the question that was asked us. This therefore appears to me, that you do not consider every kind of endurance to be fortitude. But I infer this from hence: for I nearly know, O Laches, that you think fortitude to be among the number of things which are very beautiful.

LAC. I do indeed, and I also think that it ranks among things the most beautiful.

Soc. Is not, therefore, that endurance which subsists in conjunction with prudence beautiful and good?

LAC. Entirely so. But what of that endurance which subsists with folly? Is it not on the contrary bad and pernicious?

LAC. Yes.

Soc. Do you then say that a thing of this kind is beautiful, though it is bad and pernicious?

LAC. This would not be just, O Socrates.

Soc. You do not, therefore, acknowledge such an endurance as this to be fortitude, since it is not beautiful; but fortitude is beautiful.

LAC. That is true.

Soc. Prudent endurance, therefore, according to your assertion, will be fortitude.

LAC. So it seems.

Soc. Let us see then in what this endurance is prudent; or whether it is prudent in all things both great and small. Thus, for instance, if some one endures to spend his money prudently, knowing that he shall be enriched by thus spending it, would you call him a brave man?

LAC. By Jupiter, not I.

Soc. And if some one, being a physician, had a son or some other patient ill with an inflammation in his breast, and this patient should request him to give him something to eat or drink, but the physician should inflexibly persist in denying his request, would you call this endurance fortitude?

LAC. I should not.

Soc. But in war; here is a man of endurance who is willing to fight; and he prudently reasons with himself, that others will give him assistance, and that he fights against those who are fewer and more despicable than those of his own party, and still further that he has the advantage of the ground: will you say that this man, enduring with such like prudence and advantage, is braver than him in the contrary army who is willing to stand his ground and endure?

LAC. The man in the contrary army, O Socrates, appears to me to be the braver.

Soc. And yet the endurance of the one is more imprudent than that of the other.

LAC. That is true.

Soc. Will you, therefore, say that a man who endures in an equestrian contest with equestrian science, is less brave than him who endures without science?

LAC. To me it appears that he is.

Soc. And will you also say the same of a slinger, or an archer, or of any other who endures in any other art?

LAC. Entirely so.

Soc. And with respect to such as are willing to descend into a well, and there to endure swimming in it, though they are not skilled in this employment, or in any thing else of this kind,—will you say that such men are braver than those that are skilled in these things?

LAC. What else can one say, O Socrates?

Soc. Nothing, if he thinks so.

LAC. But I, indeed, do think so.

Soc. And yet, O Laches, such men encounter danger, and endure more imprudently than those who do this in conjunction with art.

LAC. So it appears.

Soc. Did not, therefore, base and imprudent boldness and endurance appear to us to be noxious in our former conclusions?

LAC. Entirely so.

Soc. But fortitude was acknowledged by us to be something beautiful.

LAC. It was acknowledged.

Soc. But now again we say that that base and imprudent endurance is fortitude.

LAC. So it appears.

Soc. Do we therefore appear to you to speak well?

LAC. By Jupiter, Socrates, to me we do not.

Soc. In your own language, therefore, O Laches, you and I are not Dorically harmonized: for our works do not accord with our words. For some one, as it seems, may say that we participate of fortitude in our deeds; but not, as I think, in our words, if he should hear us now discoursing.

LAC. You speak most truly.

Soc. What then? Does it appear to you to be beautiful that we should be in this condition?

LAC. By no means.

Soc. Are you willing, therefore, that we should yield our assent to what we said?

LAC. To what assertion of ours do you allude?

Soc.

Soc. To that which ordered us to endure. If you are willing, therefore, let us persevere in our inquiry, and endure, lest fortitude itself should deride us for not bravely investigating what it is; if, indeed, endurance itself is often fortitude.

LAC. I, indeed, O Socrates, am ready to stand my ground, though I am unaccustomed to such like conferences. But a certain pertinacity instigates me against what has been said, and I am in reality indignant that I am so incapable of telling my conceptions. For I seem to myself to know what fortitude is; but I know not how it just now fled from me, so that I cannot comprehend in words and say what it is.

Soc. But a good huntsman, my friend, ought to run after the beast he hunts, and not remit his pursuit.

LAC. By all means he ought.

Soc. Are you willing, therefore, that we call Nicias also to this hunting, that we may try if he is in any respect more sagacious than us?

LAC. I am willing: for why should I not?

Soc. Come then, O Nicias, gratify your friends, and assist them in their doubts in this conference, if you possess any power; for you see how we are embarrassed. Do you, therefore, tell us what you think fortitude is, free us from this doubt, and confirm by argument what you conceive it to be.

NIC. You have appeared to me, for some time past, Socrates, not to have well defined fortitude; for you make no use of that which I have heard you so well assert.

Soc. What is that, O Nicias?

NIC. I have often heard you assert that every one of us is good with respect to those things in which he is wise, but bad with respect to those of which he is ignorant.

Soc. By Jupiter, what you say is true, O Nicias.

NIC. If, therefore, a brave is a good man, he is clearly a wise man.

Soc. Do you hear, O Laches?

LAC. I do, but I do not very much understand what he says.

Soc. But I seem to understand him, and he appears to me to call fortitude a certain wisdom.

LAC. What kind of wisdom, O Socrates?

Soc. Will you not therefore inquire this of him?

LAC,

LAC. I will.

Soc. Come then, O Nicias, tell him what kind of wisdom fortitude will be according to you : for it is not that which belongs to the pipe.

NIC. By no means.

Soc. Nor yet that which belongs to the harp.

NIC. It is not.

Soc. But what is it then, or of what is it the science?

LAC. You very rightly interrogate him, Socrates ; and let him tell us what wisdom it is.

NIC. I say then, O Laches, that it is the science of things dreadful and daring, both in war and in all other things.

LAC. How absurdly he speaks, Socrates !

Soc. Looking to what do you say this, O Laches ?

LAC. To what ? Why wisdom is separate from fortitude.

Soc. Nicias does not say so.

LAC. He does not, by Jupiter ; and therefore he raves.

Soc. Let us therefore teach and not revile him.

NIC. He does not revile me ; but it seems to me, O Socrates, that Laches is desirous that I also may appear to say nothing, because this was just now the case with him.

LAC. Entirely so, O Nicias ; and I will endeavour to evince this : for you say nothing. Without going any further, in diseases do not physicians know things that are dreadful ? Or do brave men appear to you to know this ? Or do you call physicians brave men ?

NIC. By no means.

LAC. Neither do you give that name, I think, to husbandmen, though they know things that are dreadful in agriculture ; and all other artificers know things that are dreadful and daring in their own arts, and yet they are not in any respect the more brave for this.

Soc. What does Laches, O Nicias, appear to you to say ? for he certainly appears to say something.

NIC. He does indeed say something, and yet not what is true.

Soc. How so ?

NIC. Because he thinks that physicians know something more about the sick than the being able to say that a thing is healthful or unhealthful ; but
they,

they alone know this. But whether to be well is a thing dreadful to any one rather than to be ill; do you think, O Laches, that physicians have any knowledge of this? Or do you not think that it is better to many for them not to recover from disease than to recover? For tell me this: Do you say that it is better to all men to live, and that it is not more advantageous to many to die?

LAC. I do say this.

NIC. To those, therefore, to whom it is advantageous to die, do you think the same things are dreadful, as to those to whom it is better to live?

LAC. Not I.

NIC. But do you allow that physicians know this, or that it is known by any other artificer than the man who is skilled in things dreadful, and whom I call a brave man?

SOC. Do you understand, O Laches, what he says?

LAC. I do; and I perceive that he calls prophets brave men: for whom else knows to whom it is better to live than to die? And I ask you, O Nicias, whether you acknowledge yourself to be a prophet, or to be neither a prophet nor a brave man?

NIC. But what? Do you think it belongs to a prophet to know things dreadful and daring?

LAC. I do; for to whom else does it belong?

NIC. Much more, O best of men, to him of whom I speak; since it is necessary that a prophet should only know the signs of future events, whether they portend death to any one, or disease, or the loss of riches, or victory, or the being vanquished in battle or in any other contest. But, why does it rather belong to a prophet, than any other, to judge for whom it is better to suffer or not suffer any one of these things?

LAC. I do not understand, Socrates, what he means to say: for he does not render it manifest that it is either a prophet, or a physician, or any other person, whom he calls brave, unless he says that this brave person is a certain god. Nicias, therefore, appears to me to be unwilling ingenuously to confess that he says nothing, but he is rolled upwards and downwards, concealing his perplexity; though you and I might have been similarly rolled, if we had wished not to appear to contradict ourselves. If, indeed, we were
pleading

pleading in a court of justice, it might be reasonable to act in this manner; but now in such a conference as this, why should any one vainly adorn himself with empty words?

Soc. For no reason, as it appears to me, O Laches. But let us see; perhaps Nicias thinks that he says something to the purpose, and does not assert these things merely for the sake of speaking. Let us, therefore, inquire of him more clearly what he means; and if it shall appear that he says any thing pertinent, let us assent to him; if not, we will teach him better.

Lac. Do you, therefore, O Socrates, if you will, ask him; for I have interrogated him sufficiently.

Soc. Nothing will hinder me: for the interrogation will be in common to me and you.

Lac. Entirely so.

Soc. Tell me then, O Nicias, (for I and Laches unite in this question,) Do you say that fortitude is rather the science of things dreadful and daring, than of any thing else?

Nic. I do.

Soc. But it is not the province of every man to know this, since neither a physician nor a prophet possesses this knowledge; nor will a man be brave, unless he acquires this science. Do you not say so?

Nic. I do.

Soc. According to the proverb, therefore, in reality, every hog does not know this, nor will every hog be valiant.

Nic. It does not appear to me that it will.

Soc. It is evident, therefore, O Nicias, that neither do you believe that the Crommyonian sow was brave. But I do not say this in jest: for I think it is necessary that he who asserts these things should admit that no brute is brave; nor ought he to grant that any wild beast is so wise, that what few men know through the difficulty of acquiring knowledge, *that* a lion, or a leopard, or a certain boar knows. But he who defines fortitude, as you have done, must necessarily say that a lion and a stag, a bull and an ape, are similarly formed by nature with respect to fortitude.

Lac. By the gods, Socrates, you speak well: and in reality inform us, O Nicias, whether you say that these wild beasts, which we all of us acknow-

ledge to be brave, are wiser than we are, or, contrary to the opinion of all men, will you dare to deny that they are brave ?

NIC. Indeed, Laches, I do not call either a wild beast, or any thing else brave, which through ignorance is not terrified at things dreadful, but is fearless and stupid. Or, do you think, that I call all boys brave, who through ignorance fear nothing? But I am of opinion, that *the fearless* is not the same with *the brave*. For, I think, that fortitude and forethought are to be found in very few; but that confidence and boldness, and a privation of fear, together with the want of forethought, may be seen in very many men and women, boys and wild beasts. That, therefore, which you and the many call fortitude, I call rashness; but I call the brave, the prudent and the wise, about whom I now speak.

LAC. You see, Socrates, how well this man decorates himself, as he thinks, with words; but those whom all men acknowledge to be brave he endeavours to deprive of this honour.

NIC. Not I indeed, Laches; but take courage. For I say that you and Lammachus¹ are wise, if you are brave; and that this is also true of many others of the Athenians.

LAC. I say nothing against these things, though I could reply to them, lest you should say that I am in reality a slanderer.

SOC. Nor should you speak against them, O Laches; for you appear to me not to have perceived that Nicias here received this wisdom from our associate Damon; and Damon is very intimate with Prodicus, who appears to distinguish appellations of this kind in a manner superior to the other sophists.

LAC. For it rather becomes a sophist, O Socrates, to think highly of himself on account of things of this kind, than a man whom the city thinks worthy to be its governor.

SOC. It becomes indeed him, O blessed man, who presides over things of the greatest consequence, to participate of the greatest wisdom. But it appears to me to be worth while to consider with a view to what Nicias thus defines fortitude.

¹ This Lammachus was general of the Athenians, with Nicias and Alcibiades, in the expedition of Sicily, where he was killed.

LAC. Consider this then, Socrates, yourself.

Soc. I shall do this, O best of men. Do not, however, think that you are to be excluded from this conference, but attend and consider what is said.

LAC. Let these things be so if it appears to be proper.

Soc. But it does appear to be so. And do you, Nicias, tell us again from the beginning; for you know that at the beginning of our conference we considered fortitude as a part of virtue.

NIC. Entirely so.

Soc. Did not you, therefore, also answer, that it was a part of virtue, there being likewise other parts, all which are called virtue?

NIC. For how is it possible I should not?

Soc. Do you, therefore, call the same things the parts of virtue as I do? For I, besides fortitude, call temperance and justice, and certain other such like things, parts of virtue. And do not you also?

NIC. Entirely so.

Soc. Attend then: for these things are granted by us. But let us consider concerning things terrible and daring, lest you should form one opinion of them, and we another. For we will tell you what we think concerning them; and do you, if you do not accord with us, teach us better. We then think those things to be dreadful which occasion fear, and that those things are daring, or may be dared, which do not occasion fear. Neither, however, past nor present evils occasion fear, but those which are expected: for fear is the expectation of a future evil. Or does it not likewise appear so to you, O Laches?

LAC. Very much so, Socrates.

Soc. Do you, therefore, O Nicias, hear our assertions, that things dreadful are future evils; but that things which may be dared are future goods, or at least are not evils. Do you say this, or something else about these things?

NIC. I say this.

Soc. But do you call the science of these things fortitude?

NIC. I do.

Soc. Let us then still further consider whether a third thing appears the same to you as to us.

NIC. What is that?

Soc. I will tell you. For it appears to me and Laches, that of whatever things there is science, there is not one science of a thing which is past, by which we know that it was made, another concerning things present, by which we know that they are made, and another concerning that which is not yet made, by which we know that it may and will be made in the most beautiful manner; but to know all these is the province of the same science. Thus, for instance, with respect to that which is salubrious at all times, there is no other science than medicine, which being one and the same, sees what has been, what is, and what will be salubrious. And agriculture subsists in a similar manner with respect to things which grow out of the earth. Thus too, in warlike concerns, you yourselves can testify that the science of commanding an army, provides in the most beautiful manner for other things and for what will happen in future. For this art does not think it fit that it should be subservient to divination, but preside over it, as better knowing things which do and will take place about wars. And the law also orders this, not that the diviner shall command the general, but that the general shall command the diviner. Shall we assert these things, O Laches?

LAC. We must assert them.

Soc. But what? Do you agree with us, O Nicias, that it is the province of the same science to possess a knowledge of the same things, whether they be considered as past, or as present, or as future?

NIC. I do: for thus it appears to me, O Socrates.

Soc. Is not, therefore, O best of men, fortitude, as you say, the science of things dreadful and daring?

NIC. It is.

Soc. But it has been acknowledged that things dreadful are future evils, and things daring future goods.

NIC. Entirely so.

Soc. But the same science has a knowledge of things past, present, and future.

NIC. It has.

Soc. Fortitude, therefore, is not only the science of things dreadful and daring: for it not only has a knowledge of future goods and evils, but also of such as are past and present and in short it surveys all things like the other sciences.

NIC.

NIC. So it seems.

SOC. You have, therefore, O Nicias, only defined to us in your answer the third part of fortitude, though we asked you what the whole of fortitude is. And now, as it seems, according to your assertion, fortitude is not only the science of things dreadful and daring, but nearly of all good and evil, and in short of all things, from your argument, in whatever manner they may subsist. Do you thus determine, or how do you say, O Nicias?

NIC. To me it appears to be so, O Socrates.

SOC. Does then such a virtue as this appear to you, O blessed man, to be deficient in any respect, if it knows all goods, and in what manner they have been, are, and will be produced, and in the same manner as to evils? And do you think that he is indigent of temperance, or justice, or piety, to whom alone it belongs to be cautious with respect to such things as are dreadful and such as are not, both concerning gods and men; who also knows how to obtain what is good, and to associate in a proper manner with others?

NIC. You appear to me, O Socrates, to say something.

SOC. That therefore, O Nicias, which is now adduced by you, will not be a part of virtue, but all virtue.

NIC. So it seems.

SOC. Nevertheless we said that fortitude is one of the parts of virtue.

NIC. We did say so.

SOC. But that which is now said does not appear to be a part of virtue.

NIC. It does not.

SOC. We have not, therefore, O Nicias, discovered what fortitude is.

NIC. It does not appear that we have.

LAC. And yet I should have thought, my dear Nicias, that you would have discovered it, by your contempt of me when I answered Socrates. And therefore I had very great hope that you would have discovered it from the wisdom of Damon.

NIC. Excellent indeed, O Laches, that you should think it a thing of no consequence, that you just now appeared to know nothing about fortitude; but should be alone concerned that I also may appear to be as ignorant as yourself: and as it seems you are satisfied, if I as well as you am ignorant of things, of which it becomes him to have a knowledge who wishes to be a man of any consequence. You therefore appear to me to act in reality
after

after the manner of men, because you do not at all look to yourself but to others. I think, however, that I have spoken tolerably well on this subject; and if any thing that I have asserted is defective, I shall afterwards correct it, and this with the assistance of Damon, whom you think proper to deride, though you have never seen him. I shall also do this by calling in the aid of others: and when I have obtained a firm conviction of these things, I will likewise instruct you without envy; for you appear to me to be in very great want of instruction.

LAC. You are indeed wise, O Nicias: but, at the same time, I advise Lysimachus here and Melesias to bid farewell to you and me concerning the education of youth; but not to dismiss this Socrates, as I said from the first: for I would thus act, if my children were of a proper age.

NIC. I also grant you, that if Socrates is willing to take the lads under his care, no other person should be sought after. Indeed, I should most gladly send Niceratus to him, if he were willing; but when I say any thing to him on this subject, he recommends others to me, and is unwilling to undertake this office himself. But see, O Lysimachus, whether Socrates will more willingly comply with your request.

LYS. It is just, O Nicias, since I also am willing to do many things for him, which I should not be very willing to do for many others. What then do you say, O Socrates? Will you comply with our request, and will you take charge of these lads, so that they may become most excellent characters?

SOC. It would certainly be a dreadful thing, O Lysimachus, not to be willing to endeavour that they may become most worthy. If, therefore, in the preceding conference, I have appeared to be skilful, but the other persons of the dialogue not, it will be just to call me especially to this employment; but now, since we are all similarly involved in doubt, which of us ought to be preferred? To me indeed it seems that no one of us should have the preference. And since this is the case, consider whether I appear to advise you rightly: for I say it is requisite, O men, (since our conference is only among ourselves,) that we should all of us in common inquire, in the first place, after the best master for ourselves, for we stand in need of one; and in the next place for these lads, sparing neither money nor any thing else; but I shall not advise our continuing in the condition in which we now are. And

if

if any one should deride us for applying to teachers at these years, it appears to me that it will be proper to adduce Homer¹, who says,

“Shame ill-accompanies a man in need.”

We therefore, bidding farewell to reproach, will pay attention in common to ourselves and the lads.

Lys. What you say, Socrates, pleases me ; and by how much the older I am, by so much the more readily shall I desire to learn together with the youths. Do then as you have said : come to-morrow morning early to my house without fail, that we may consult about these very things : for it is now time that we should dissolve this conference.

Soc. I will do these things, O Lysimachus ; and, if it please God, I will be with you to-morrow morning.

¹ In the 17th book of the *Odyssey*.

THE LYSIS:

A DIALOGUE

ON

FRIENDSHIP.

INTRODUCTION

19

THE LYSIS.

WHEN Socrates, says Ficinus, disputes with the sophists and their followers, he confutes false opinions, and signifies, rather than teaches, such as are true. This is evident from the Euthydemus, Protagoras, Meno, Hippias, Euthyphro, and Lysis. But where he discourses with his disciples, and those who were anxious to be instructed, he unfolds and teaches, as is evident from many of the preceding dialogues. In this Dialogue, therefore, in which he disputes concerning friendship among the disciples of the sophists, he is rather studious of confuting false opinions than of demonstrating such as are true.

But, that we may take a cursory view of the contents of the Lysis, in the first place, Socrates reproves those who pervert the power of love, and, under the pretext of friendship, are subservient to base lust. In the second place, he admonishes those who, looking no higher than corporeal beauty, think themselves worthy to be beloved for this alone. And, in the last place, he indicates to the sagacious a certain path by which friendship may be investigated and discovered. Again, while Socrates ironically derides Hippothales and Ctesippus, he signifies that they were captivated by base love. And, while in their presence he prepares youth for moral discipline, he admonishes lovers how they should live together, and what kind of attachment they should entertain for each other. Having instructed lovers in the second part of the Dialogue, he instructs those that are the objects of love;

and, by a long series of induction, teaches that wisdom and prudence ought to be explored by friends, which compose the true beauty of the soul, and not the shadowy form of this fleeting body. In the third place, he confutes, and first the opinion of Solon, who said that those who are beloved are friends; for these often hate their lovers. He adds, that neither are lovers only fi ends, because these are frequently the objects of hatred. And here he concludes that reciprocal benevolence should be called friendship. In the next place, he reproves Empedocles, who was of opinion that any kind of similitude is sufficient to produce friendship. This, however, the similitude of many arts shows to be false, which more frequently generates envy and hatred than friendship. In the last place, the assertion of Hesiod and Heraclitus is adduced, that dissimilars are friendly to each other.—That they are not, however, appears from this, that hatred and love, since they are dissimilars, will not be friendly, nor will a just and an unjust man; and of others in a similar manner. And, if it should be said that sometimes a thing desires that which is dissimilar to itself, as that which is dry, moisture, or that which is hot, the cold, the answer is, that it does not in this case love its contrary, but seeks after a restitution of itself from a contrary. For that which is preternaturally hot is reduced through cold to its proper temperament; so that it does not love cold, but through it desires a temperament accommodated to its nature.

Having confuted these assertions, Socrates, as if prophesying, introduces a certain opinion as his own, and says that there appear to him to be three genera of things, the good, the evil, and that which is neither good nor evil. But the evil, on account of diversity, cannot be a friend to the good, and the evil, through injustice, are injured by the evil. These, therefore, cannot be mutually friends. It is likewise impossible for him who is neither good nor evil to love the evil; for evil, since it is noxious, is always attended with hatred. It remains, therefore, that friendship must subsist between the good and the good, and between that which is neither, and the good. But here certain objections arise which Socrates openly introduces, but the solutions of which he occultly indicates. In the first place, the good is similar to the good; but it was said, in opposition to the opinion of Empedocles, that similars are not friendly to each other. It must, however, be observed, that it was not asserted that similars are by no means friendly; but it was denied that every kind

kind of similitude is sufficient to the production of friendship. Again, when, in the second place, it is objected that the good man is sufficient to himself, that on this account he does not desire another, is without love, and therefore is not the friend of the good;—it must be observed that this absurdity does not follow from the doctrine of Plato, but from the assertions of Empedocles and Heraclitus superficially considered, in which the desire of love is not apparently distinguished from friendship. And as desire is a want, for it always tends to something unpossessed, it follows, from this doctrine, that friendship is always attended with desire. To admit this, however, would be to confound friendship with love. But, according to Plato, they are different, because they are directed to different ends: for friendship tends to the good, and love to the beautiful.

In short, friendship, considered with relation to man, is a union among worthy characters, arising from a similitude of disposition and pursuits. Love also is a union between the lover and the beloved; but it differs from the union of friendship in this, that the former is inseparable from indigence, from which likewise it originates; while, on the other hand, the latter arises from plenitude, with which it is constantly attended in proportion to the perfection which it possesses. In the friendships, indeed, of the most worthy men, this union is not without desire, and is consequently accompanied with want; but this is because the object of friendship is not in this case the highest good. Hence friendship with divinity is the only union in which a perfect plenitude is produced, desire dies, and indigence is unknown.

The character of this Dialogue, like that of the *Theætetus*, is *maieutic*, and the conceptions here, of which Socrates is the midwife, as well as there, are abortive.

THE LYSIS.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, || CTESIPPUS*,
HIPPOTHALES, || MENEXENUS,
And LYSIS.

ON going from the Academy, in a straight line to the Lyceum, which is indeed out of the walls, but close to them, when I arrived at the gate, where there is the fountain Panopis, I met with Hippothales the son of Hicronymus, and Ctesippus Pæanæus, and other young men who were assembled together with these. And Hippothales, on seeing me approaching, O Socrates, says he, whither are you going, and whence do you come?—I replied, I came from the Academy, and am going in a direct road to the Lyceum.—But will you not come to us, says he? For it is worth while.—I replied, Whither do you wish me to go, and to whom among you?—Hither, says he, showing me a certain enclosure, and an open gate, opposite to the wall. Here we, and many other very worthy persons, pass away our time.—I then asked him, What is this place, and what do you employ yourselves about?—It is a Palæstra, says he, newly built: but we spend our time for the most part in discourse, which we shall gladly communicate to you.—You do well, said I. But who is the preceptor in that place?—Your associate and encomiast, says he, Miccus.—By Jupiter, said I, he is not a vulgar man, but a sufficiently great sophist.—Are you willing therefore, says he, to follow me, that you may see those that are assembled in that place?—But I should first of all gladly hear

* Ctesippus was a son of Chabrias the Athenian general. After his father's death he was received into the house of Phocion, the friend of Chabrias. Phocion in vain attempted to correct his natural foibles and extravagancies.—Plut. in Phoc.

for what purpose I am to enter, and who that beautiful person is.—To some of us, says he, Socrates, he does not appear to be beautiful.—But what does he appear to you to be, O Hippothales? Tell me this.—But he being thus interrogated, blushed.—And I said, O Hippothales, son of Hieronymus, you need no longer inform me whether you love or not: for I know that you not only love, but that you are far advanced in love. For, with respect to other things, I am vile and useless, but divinity has given me the ability of very rapidly knowing a lover, and the person beloved.—And on hearing this, he blushed in a still greater degree than before. Ctesippus therefore said, You are polite, Hippothales, because you blush, and refuse to tell Socrates the name of your beloved. But you will do nothing but commend him, if Socrates stays only a short time with you. As to our ears, Socrates, they are perfectly filled and rendered deaf with the name of Lysis: and when Hippothales has drunk largely, it is easy for us to think, when we are roused from sleep, that we hear the name of Lysis. And the things which he relates concerning him in prose, though dire, are not altogether so, except when he robs us of our poems, and other writings; and what is still more dire, when he sings his loves with a wonderful voice, which we are under the necessity of enduring to hear. But now being asked by you, he blushes.—This youth then, it seems, I said, is Lysis. But I conjecture this; for I do not know it, from having heard his name.—They very seldom, says he, call him by his own name, but he is yet called by the name of his father, because he is a man very much known. But I well know, that you are far from being unacquainted with the form of the youth: for he may be sufficiently known from this alone.—I then said, Tell me whose son he is?—He is the son of Democrates, says he, who is the eldest son of Exoneus.—Be it so then, said I, O Hippothales, that you have found this generous and juvenile love. But come, evince to me the things which you have shown to these persons, that I may see whether you know what a lover ought to say respecting the objects of his love, either to himself or to others.—Do you examine, says he, Socrates, any thing that he asserts? But do you deny that you love him, as he says?—I do not, said he. But I affirm that I do not compose any thing, either in prose or verse, with a view to my amours.—He is not, well, says Ctesippus, but is delirious and insane.—Upon this, I said, O Hippothales, I neither request to hear any verses, nor any song, which you may
have

have composed on the young man, but I desire to become acquainted with your thoughts, that I may know in what manner you conduct yourself in your amours.—Ctesippus here, says he, will tell you: for he accurately knows and remembers; since, as he says, he has heard me continually talking about him.—Entirely so, by the gods, says Ctesippus. Though indeed it is very ridiculous that he being a lover, and paying far more attention to the youth than others, should have nothing of his own to say. Would not even a boy say that this is ridiculous? For what the whole city proclaims about Democrates, and Lysis the grandfather of the youth, and about all his ancestors, his wealth, his store of horses, his victories in the Pythian, Isthmian, and Nemean games, and his contests with four horses, and with one horse, these are the very things which he celebrates. And besides these, he speaks of things still more common: for he lately related to us, in a certain poem, the reception of Hercules as a guest, viz. how an ancestor of Democrates and Lysis entertained Hercules on account of his alliance to him, through being also the offspring of Jupiter and the daughter of the prince of the people;—a circumstance, indeed, which even old women sing. He likewise celebrates, Socrates, many other such like particulars. And these are the things which he compels us to hear him relating and singing.—Upon hearing this, I said, O ridiculous Hippothales, before you have vanquished you make and sing an encomium on yourself.—But I neither make nor sing these things for myself, Socrates, says he.—I replied, You do not think that you do.—How do you mean?—These odes, I said, tend to you the most of all things. For if you should find a beloved person of this kind, your assertions and songs will be an ornament to you, and an encomium on yourself as a conqueror, for having made such an acquisition. But if you are deceived in this respect, by how much greater the encomiums are which you make on your beloved, by so much the more you will appear to be deprived of things beautiful and good, and become ridiculous. Whoever therefore, my friend, is wise in amatory affairs, will not praise his beloved till he is well acquainted with him, in consequence of being fearful of the event. For at the same time it must be observed, that such as are beautiful are filled with pride and ostentation when any one praises and extols them. Or do you not think this is the case?—He replied, I do.—Does it not therefore follow, that by how much the more
insolent

insolent they are, by so much the more difficult it is to catch them?—It is likely.—What kind of a hunter, therefore, would he appear to you to be, who should drive wild beasts out of their lurking places, and increase the difficulty of taking them?—Doubtless, a vile one.—And is it not a mark of great unskillfulness, to exasperate men, instead of alluring them by discourse and songs?—To me it appears to be so.—But consider, O Hippothales, whether you do not render yourself obnoxious to all these things through your poetry. Indeed, I think you are not willing to acknowledge that a man who injures himself in his poems can be a good poet.—I am not, by Jupiter, says he: for this would be very absurd. But on account of these things, Socrates, I communicate my thoughts to you. And consult with yourself, whether you have any thing else to offer, by which it may appear how a man by speaking and acting may become acceptable to the objects of his love.—This, I replied, is not easy to relate: but if you are willing to make Lysis join us in discourse, perhaps I may be able to show you what ought to be said to him, instead of those things which they say you have asserted and sung.—He replied, there is nothing difficult in this. For if you enter this place together with Ctesippus, and sitting down discourse, I think that he will join us: for he is remarkably fond, Socrates, of hearing others converse. Observe too, that both young men and boys are mingled together in this place, as being engaged in Mercurial contests. He will therefore come to you: and if he does not, since he is familiar with Ctesippus, through Menexenus the cousin of Ctesippus, (for he is in the highest degree of intimacy with Menexenus,) let him call him, if he does not join us of his own accord.—I replied, it is proper to act in this manner: and at the same time, laying hold of Ctesippus, I entered the Palæstra, and the others came after us. But on entering, we found that the boys were sacrificing, and that the particulars pertaining to the victims were nearly finished: but all of them were playing at dice, and properly dressed. Many of them, therefore, were playing out of the Palæstra in the porch; but some of them in a corner of the place, where they put off their clothes, were playing with a great multitude of dice, and selecting them from certain little baskets. But others stood round these, beholding them; among whom was Lysis, who was standing crowned, among the boys and young men, and transcending all of them in the beauty of his person. Nor did he alone deserve to be heard for his beauty, but because he was worthy

and good. But we, withdrawing from the crowd, seated ourselves opposite to him: for the place where we sat was quiet; and we there entered into conversation with each other. Lyfis, therefore, turning round, often looked at us; and it was evident that he desired to join us; but, in the mean time, he hesitated, and was averse to come to us alone. Afterwards Menexenus came from the porch, in the midst of the games, and as soon as he saw me and Ctesippus, came and seated himself by us. Lyfis, therefore, seeing him, followed, and sat down with Menexenus. Others likewise came; but Hippothales, after he saw that many were assembled in this place, desiring to be concealed, betook himself to a part where he thought he should not be seen by Lyfis, fearing lest he should be offended with him; and, standing in this manner, he heard the discourse. And I, beholding Menexenus, said, O son of Demophon, which of you is the elder?—He replied, we are not certain.—I then said, Do you therefore contend which of you is the more generous?—Entirely so, said he.—And in a similar manner, likewise, which of you is the more beautiful?—At this question both of them laughed.—But I said, I do not also ask you which of you is the more rich, for you are friends: are you not? They replied, entirely so.—The possessions of friends, therefore, are said to be common; so that about this you will not, in any respect, disagree, if this assertion about friendship is true.—To this they assented.—But after this, as I was endeavouring to ask, which of them was the more just and wise, a certain person interrupted us, by telling Menexenus that he was called by the master of the Gymnasium. But it appeared to me that he was called by the sacrificer. Menexenus therefore left us; and I thus interrogated Lyfis:

Inform me, O Lyfis, if your father and your mother very much love you?—He replied, entirely so.—Do they not, therefore, wish you to be most happy?—Undoubtedly they do.—Does that man appear to you to be happy who is in a state of subjection, and who is not permitted to do any thing which he desires to do?—By Jupiter, says he, to me he does not.—If, therefore, your father and your mother love you, and wish that you may be happy, they will certainly, by every possible means, endeavour that you may become so.—How is it possible they should not, said he.—Do they, therefore, permit you to do what you please, and in no respect oppose your desires?—By Jupiter, says he, Socrates, they oppose me in very many things.—How do you say? I replied.

plied.—At the same time that they wish you to be blessed, do they prevent you from acting as you please? But answer me this question; If you should desire to ride in some one of your father's chariots, and for this purpose should take the reins, when he is going to contend in the games, would he not suffer you? or would he prevent you?—By Jupiter, says he, he would not suffer me.—But would he not permit some one to do this?—There is a certain charioteer who is hired for this purpose by my father.—How do you say? Would your father rather suffer a mercenary to do what he pleases to the horses than you, and, besides this, pay him for so doing?—But what then? says he.—But I think he would permit you to drive the yoked mules, and, if you were willing, to take the whip and strike them.—Why should he permit me to do this? says he.—Why not? said I. Is no one permitted to strike them?—Yes, said he, the mulæteer, very much so.—Is he a slave, or free-born?—A slave.—It seems, therefore, that your parents think more highly of a slave than of you who are their son, and commit their affairs to him rather than to you, and that they permit him to do what he pleases, but do not give this liberty to you. And farther still, answer me this question, Do they suffer you to govern yourself? or neither do they permit you to do this?—For how, says he, should they permit me? Who then governs you?—The pædagogus, says he.—Does he do this, being a slave?—But what then? he is our slave, says he.—But I replied, Is it not a dire thing for one who is free-born to be governed by a slave? And what does this pædagogus when he governs you do?—He leads me, says he, to my master.—And do not these masters also govern you?—Certainly, entirely so.—Your father, therefore, voluntarily places over you many despots and governors. But when you return home to your mother, does she suffer you to do what you please, that you may be blessed, either about the wool or the web, when she weaves? For she doubtless does not prevent you from touching the two-handed sword, or the shuttle, or any other instrument subservient to the working of wool.—But he laughing replied, By Jupiter, Socrates, she not only prevents me, but beats me if I touch them.—By Hercules, said I, have you in any respect injured your father or your mother?—Not I, by Jupiter, said he.—On what account then do they in so dire a manner prevent you from being happy, and from doing what you please? And why every day do they educate you so as to be in subjection to some one, and, in one word, do not in the least suffer you to gratify

gratify your desires? So that, as it seems, neither are such great riches of any advantage to you (since every one has dominion over them rather than you), nor even your body, though it is so noble, but this also is fed and taken care of by another. But you, O Lyfis, have no authority over any one, nor do you do any thing that you desire to do.—For I am not yet old enough, Socrates, says he.—But see whether it is not this which prevents you, O son of Democrates. For thus much I think both your father and mother will concede to you, and will not wait till you are more advanced in years. I mean, when they wish any thing to be read to or written for them, they will, I think, order you to do this the first in the house, or will they not?—Entirely so, says he.—Are you therefore allowed, in this case, to write which of the letters you please first, and which second? And are you allowed to read in the same manner? And again, when you take up a lyre, does neither your father nor your mother prevent you from stretching and relaxing the chords as much as you please, and from gently touching and striking them with the plectrum? or do they prevent you?—They certainly do not.—What then is the cause, Lyfis, that they do not prevent you in these things, but prevent you in those which we just now mentioned?—Because, I think, says he, I know the one, but am ignorant of the other.—Be it so, I replied, O most excellent youth. Your father, therefore, does not wait for age, to give you permission to do as you please in all things; but on whatever day it shall appear to him that you are become more prudent, on this day he will permit you to govern yourself, and your own affairs.—I think he will, said he.—Be it so, I replied.—But what? Will not a neighbour conduct himself towards you in the same manner as your father? Whether do you think he will commit to you the government of his family, when he is of opinion that you are more skilled in œconomics than himself, or in this case govern it himself?—I think he will commit the government of it to me.—But what with respect to the Athenians? Do you not think that they will commit to you the management of their affairs, when they perceive that you are sufficiently wise?—I do.—But what with respect to the great king? Would he suffer his eldest son, who will succeed to the government of all Asia, to throw into broth whatever he pleases, rather than us, if going to him we should convince him that we were more skilled in the preparation of a banquet than his son?—He replied, It is evident he would rather suffer us.—Is it not also clear that he would not permit

permit his son to throw any thing, however trifling, into the broth, but that he would permit us, if we wished to throw in a quantity of salt, to do so?—Undoubtedly.—But what if his son should be diseased in his eyes? Would he therefore suffer him to meddle with his own eyes, at the same time that he thinks he is not a physician, or would he prohibit him?—He would prohibit him.—But if he considered us as good physicians, I think he would not prevent us, even though we should wish to open his eye-lids and scatter ashes on his eyes.—True.—Would he not, therefore, rather commit to us than to himself or his son every thing else in which we appeared to be more wise than either of them?—He replied, it is necessary, Socrates.—This then, I said, is the case, friend Lysis, that all persons, both Greeks and Barbarians, men and women, will permit us to act as we please with respect to things in which we are skilled, nor will any one voluntarily hinder us from so acting; but in these particulars we shall be free, and the governors of others. And these things will be ours, for we shall be benefited by them. But no one will permit us to act as we please respecting things of which we are ignorant; but all men will hinder us as much as they are able, not only strangers, but our parents, and whatever else may be more allied to us than these. And in these we shall become the servants of others, and they will be things foreign to us, for we shall derive no benefit from them. Do you agree that this will be the case?—I do.—Shall we, therefore, be friends to any one, and will any one love us in those things in which we are useless?—By no means, said he.—Now, therefore, neither your father nor any other person will ever love you, so far as you are useless.—It does not appear he will, said he.—If then you become wise, O boy, all men will be your friends, and will be familiar with you; for in this case you will be useful and good. But if you do not, neither will any other person, nor your father nor mother, nor any of your kindred, be your friend, or be familiar with you. Is it possible, therefore, that any one can think highly of himself with respect to things in which he has not yet acquired any skill?—How can he? said he.—If, therefore, you require a master, you are not yet wise.—True.—And hence you are not magnanimous, if you are yet unwise.—By Jupiter, says he, Socrates, I do not appear to myself to be so.

Upon hearing him say this, I looked at Hippothales, and was very near committing an error; for it occurred to me to say, after this manner, O Hippothales,

pothales, it is requisite to discourse with those of a puerile age, viz. humbling and repressing them, and not, as you do, flattering and rendering them effeminate. But perceiving him anxious and disturbed, on account of what had been said, I recollected that, a little while since, he wished to conceal himself from Lysis; I therefore recovered myself, and was silent. In the mean time Menexenus came again, and seated himself near Lysis, in the place whence he rose before. Lysis, therefore, in a very playful and friendly manner, but without Menexenus observing him, said to me, O Socrates, tell Menexenus what you have told me.—And I replied, You should relate these things yourself to Menexenus, for you have heard me with very great attention.—Entirely so, says he.—Endeavour, therefore, I replied, to recollect these particulars as much as possible, that you may clearly tell him the whole. But if you should happen to forget any one of them, you may again inquire of me the first time that you meet with me.—I will by all means do so, said he, Socrates; of this you may be well assured. But you should say something else to him, that I also may hear, till it is time to return home.—I replied, this must be done, since you command: but see how you will be able to defend me, if Menexenus should endeavour to confute me. Or do you not know that he is contentious?—Very much so, says he, by Jupiter; and on this account I wish to hear you discourse with him.—I replied, Do you desire this, in order that I may become ridiculous?—By Jupiter I do not, said he, but in order that you may punish him.—I replied, This is a thing not easy to accomplish: for he is a skilful man, and the disciple of Ctesippus. And besides, do not you see Ctesippus himself is present?—Be not at all concerned at this, Socrates, said he; but come, discourse with him.—I replied, We will discourse.—As, therefore, we were thus speaking to each other, Ctesippus said, Why are you thus feasting alone, and do not impart your discourse to us?—But indeed, I replied, we shall impart it; for Lysis here does not understand something which I have said, but thinks that Menexenus will understand it, and therefore orders me to interrogate him.—Why then, said he, do you not interrogate him?—I replied, But I will.—Give me an answer, then, Menexenus, to that which I shall ask you; for from my childhood I have had a desire of a certain possession, just as another person may have had of a different thing; for one man desires to possess horses, another dogs, another gold, and another honours; but I was indifferent with respect to these things,

but

but was affected in a very amatory manner with respect to the possession of friends. Hence I was more desirous of finding a good friend than the most excellent quail or cock; and, by Jupiter, I preferred this to the best horse or dog. I likewise think, by the dog, that I should prefer the possession of an associate far beyond the wealth of Darius, or even Darius himself: such a lover of an associate am I. Perceiving, therefore, you and Lysis, I was immediately struck, and proclaimed you happy, because, young as you are, you have so rapidly and easily acquired this possession; you with such celerity having made him so much your friend, and he you. But I am so far from this possession, that I do not even know after what manner one man becomes the friend of another. But in this I wish to be informed by you, who are a skilful person: Tell me, therefore, when any one loves another, which of the two becomes the friend of the other? Whether the lover becomes the friend of the beloved, or the beloved of the lover? Or is there in this case no difference?—It does not appear to me, said he, that there is any difference.—To this I replied, How do you say? Do both therefore become friends of each other, if one alone loves the other?—It appears so to me, said he.—But what? May there not be a lover who is not in his turn beloved by the object of his love?—There may.—Is it not possible, therefore, that a lover may be hated? which lovers sometimes appear to suffer from the objects of their love: for though they most ardently love, they are not beloved in return, but, on the contrary, are sometimes hated. Or does not this appear to you to be true?—Very much so, said he.—In a case of this kind, therefore, I replied, does not the one love, and is not the other beloved?—Yes.—Which, then of these is the friend of the other? Is the lover the friend of the beloved, whether he is loved in return, or hated, or the beloved of the lover? Or in this case, is neither the friend of neither, since a mutual love does not subsist between them?—It appears so.—Now, therefore, the case appears to us to be otherwise than what it appeared to us before. For then it seemed, that if one alone loved, both were friends; but now, that neither is a friend, unless both mutually love.—This appears to be the case.—No one, therefore, is a friend to the object of his love, unless he is beloved in return.—It does not appear that any one is.—Neither, therefore, are those the friends of horses, whom horses do not love in return; nor are those the friends of quails and dogs, of wine and gymnastic, who are not mutually beloved by these; nor are those friends of wisdom, whom wisdom does not love in return:

return: for each of these is a lover without being a friend. The poet therefore speaks falsely who says, "Happy the man that possesses beautiful boys, horses with solid hoofs, hunting dogs, and a foreign guest." Does he appear to you to speak the truth?—Yes.—The beloved, therefore, is the friend of the lover, as it seems, O Menexenus, whether he loves or whether he hates; just as children recently born, partly do not yet love, and partly hate when they are chastized by their mother or father; and at the very time in which they hate, they are in the highest degree beloved by their parents.—It appears to me, said he, that this is the case.—The lover, therefore, from this reasoning, will not be the friend, but the beloved.—It appears so.—Hence too, he who is hated is an enemy, but not he who hates.—So it appears.—Many, therefore, are beloved by their enemies and hated by their friends; and are friends to their enemies, but enemies to their friends; if the beloved is a friend, and not the lover. Though it is very absurd, my friend, or rather, I think, impossible, to be an enemy to a friend, and a friend to an enemy.—You seem, said he, to speak the truth, Socrates.—If, therefore, this is impossible, the lover will be the friend of the beloved.—So it appears.—Again, therefore, he who hates will be the enemy of him who is hated.—It is necessary.—It happens, therefore, that it is necessary for us to acknowledge the same things as we assented to before, that a man is often the friend of one who is not his friend, and that he is often the friend of his enemy, when either he loves and is not beloved, or loves one by whom he is hated. It likewise often happens that a man is an enemy to one who is not his enemy, or even to one who is his friend; when any one loves him by whom he is hated, or hates him by whom he is loved.—So it appears, said he.—I replied, What then shall we say, if neither lovers, nor those that are beloved, are friends, nor yet lovers and the beloved? Shall we say that certain others besides these become friends to each other?—By Jupiter, said he, Socrates, I do not well know what to reply.—Consider, therefore, Menexenus, whether our investigation has been perfectly right.—Lysis replied, To me it appears so, Socrates; and at the same time that he said this he blushed: for he appeared to me unwilling to avoid what was said, through the very great attention which he paid to the discourse. I, therefore, being willing that Menexenus should cease from speaking, and being delighted with his philosophy, thus transferred my discourse to Lysis,

Lyfis, and said, O Lyfis, what you have asserted appears to me to be true; I mean that if we have rightly considered, we shall not in any respect have wandered from the truth. But we will proceed no further in this way: for that consideration appears to me to be difficult like a rough road. But it seems to me requisite to proceed in the path in which we have now entered, speculating the assertions of the poets: for these are, with respect to us, as the fathers and leaders of wisdom. They say, therefore, not badly, with reference to such as are friends, that divinity makes them to be friends, by conducting them to each other. But I think they thus speak:

Likeness to likeness, God for ever leads,
And makes it known.

Or have you not met with these verses?—I have, said he.—Have you, therefore, likewise met with the writings of the wisest of men, in which it is said, that the similar is always necessarily a friend to the similar? But these men are those that discourse and write about nature and the universe.—He replied, What you say is true.—Whether or no, therefore, do they speak well?—Perhaps so, said he.—I replied, Perhaps the half of this is true, and perhaps also the whole. But we do not understand them: for it seems to us, that by how much nearer a depraved man approaches to one depraved, and by how much the more frequently he converses with him, by so much the more inimical will he become: for he will act unjustly. But it is impossible that those can be friends who injure, and are injured. Is it not so?—He replied, It is.—On this account, the half of this saying will not be true, since the depraved are similar to each other.—True.—But they appear to me to say, that the good are similar and friends to each other; but that the wicked, (as it is said concerning them,) are never similar, not even to themselves, but are stupid and unstable. But he who is dissimilar to, and differs from himself, can never be similar to, or become the friend of another. Or does it not appear so to you?—To me it does, he said.—It seems to me, therefore, my friend, that those who say the similar is a friend to the similar, obscurely signify this, that he alone who is good, is a friend to the good, but that he who is wicked can never arrive at true friendship, either with the good or

the wicked. Does this also appear to you to be the case?—It does.—We now, therefore, have those that are friends: for our discourse now signifies to us, that those are friends that are worthy.—It appears entirely so to me, said he.—And to me also, I replied. But, notwithstanding this, there is something difficult in the affair. Come then, by Jupiter, and see what I suspect to be the case. He who is similar, so far as he is similar, is a friend to the similar, and such a one is useful to such a one. Or rather thus: Is any kind of the similar, of any advantage to any kind of the similar? Or is it able to do any injury to the similar, which it does not do to itself? Or to suffer any thing which it does not also suffer from itself? But how can such things as these, which are not able to afford any assistance to each other, be loved by each other?—They cannot.—But how can he who does not love be a friend?—By no means.—But perhaps the similar is not a friend to the similar; but the good is a friend to the good, so far as he is good, and not so far as he is similar.—Perhaps so.—But what? Is not he who is good, so far as he is good, sufficient to himself?—Yes.—But he who is sufficient to himself, is not indigent of any thing, so far as he possesses sufficiency.—Undoubtedly.—And he who is not indigent of any thing, will not love any thing.—He will not.—But he who does not love, will not be a friend.—Certainly not.—How then will the good be friends to the good, who neither when absent desire each other (for they are sufficient to themselves when apart), nor when present are indigent of each other? By what artifice can these possess a great esteem for each other?—By none, said he.—But those will not be friends who do not very much esteem each other.—True.—Consider then, O Lysis, in what respect we are deceived. Are we therefore deceived in a certain whole?—But how? said he.—I once heard a person assert, and I now very well remember it, that the similar was hostile to the similar, and the good to the good. And he who asserted this, produced Hesiod¹ as a witness, who says, “The potter is hostile to the potter, the singer to the singer, and the mendicant to the mendicant.” And it appeared to him that all other things necessarily subsist in this manner; and that things most similar to each other, were in the highest degree filled with envy, emulation, and hatred; but such as are most dissimilar with friendship. For he

¹ Op. et Di. v. 25.

was of opinion that the poor man was necessarily a friend to the rich, and the weak to the strong, for the sake of help: that in like manner the sick man was a friend to the physician; and that every one who was ignorant, loved and was a friend to the man endued with knowledge. He likewise added something still more magnificent, that the similar is so far from being a friend to the similar, that the very contrary to this takes place. For that which is most contrary, is especially a friend to that which is most contrary. For every thing desires a nature of this kind, but not that which is similar. Thus the dry desires the moist; the cold, the hot; the bitter, the sweet; the acute, the obtuse; the void, the full; and the full, the void; and the like takes place in other things. For the contrary is aliment to the contrary, but the similar does not in any respect enjoy the similar. And indeed, my friend, he who asserted these things appeared to be an elegant man: for he spoke well. But how does he appear to us to have spoken?—Well, Menexenus replied, as it seems on the first view.—Shall we say, therefore, that the contrary is especially a friend to the contrary?—Entirely so.—Be it so, I replied, O Menexenus: but is not this prodigious? And will not those all-wise men, who are skilled in contradicting, gladly rise up against us immediately, and ask, if friendship is not most contrary to hatred? What shall we say, in answer to them? Is it not necessary to acknowledge that their assertion is true?—It is necessary.—Will they therefore say, that an enemy is a friend to a friend, or that a friend is a friend to an enemy?—He replied, they will say neither of these things.—But is the just a friend to the unjust, or the temperate to the intemperate, or the good to the bad?—It does not appear to me that this is the case.—But, I replied, if any one is a friend to any one, according to contrariety, it is necessary that these also should be friends.—It is necessary.—Neither, therefore, is the similar a friend to the similar, nor that which is contrary to that which is contrary.—It does not appear that it is.—Further still, let us also consider this, lest we should be still more deceived; I mean that a friend in reality is none of these, but that what is neither good nor evil may sometimes become the friend of the good.—How do you say? he replied.—By Jupiter, said I, I do not know; for I am in reality staggered by the ambiguity of the discourse. And it appears, according to the ancient proverb, that a friend is a beautiful thing. It

resembles,

resemble, however, something soft, smooth, and fat; on which account perhaps it easily eludes us, and glides away, as being a thing of this kind. For I say that the good is beautiful. Do you not think so?—I do.—I say therefore, prophesying, that that which is neither good nor evil, is the friend of the beautiful and the good. But hear what it is that induces me thus to prophesy. There appear to me to be three certain genera of things, the good, the evil, and that which is neither good nor evil. But how does it appear to you?—The same, said he; and that neither the good is a friend to the good, nor the evil to the evil, nor the good to the evil; as neither did our former discourse suffer us to say.—It remains, therefore, if any thing is a friend to another, that that which is neither good nor evil, must be a friend either to the good, or to something which resembles itself. For nothing can become a friend to the evil.—True.—And we just now said, that neither is the similar a friend to the similar. Did we not?—Yes.—Hence to that which is neither good nor evil, that will not be a friend, which is itself neither good nor evil.—It does not appear that it will.—That which is neither good nor evil, therefore, alone happens to become a friend to the good alone.—It is necessary, as it seems.—Is therefore that which we have now said, I replied, O boys, well explained? If then we wish to understand, a healthy body has not any occasion for the medicinal art, nor does it require any assistance: for it possesses sufficiency. So that no healthy person is a friend to the physician through health. Or is he?—No one.—But the diseased, I think, is a friend to the physician through disease.—Undoubtedly.—But disease is an evil; and the medicinal art is useful and good.—It is.—But the body, so far as body, is neither good nor bad.—True.—But through disease, the body is compelled to embrace and love the medicinal art.—It appears so to me.—That, therefore, which is neither evil nor good, becomes a friend to the good, through the presence of evil.—So it seems.—But it is evident that it becomes a friend to the good, prior to its becoming evil through the evil which it possesses. For it does not become evil, instead of the good which it desires, and of which it is the friend. For we have said it is impossible, that the evil can be a friend to the good.—It is impossible.—But consider what I say. For I say that some things are such as that which is present to them; but that this is not the case with other things. Thus, if any one wishes to
be

be anointed with a certain colour, the inunction is after a manner present to him who is anointed.—Entirely so.—Whether therefore, after being anointed with the colour, does he remain the same as he was before?—He replied, I do not understand you.—Consider thus, then I said. If any one should besmear your hairs which are yellow with white lead, would they then be white, or only appear to be so?—He replied, They would only appear to be so.—But whiteness would be present with them.—It would.—And yet at the same time your hairs would not be in any respect more white than they were before; but though whiteness is present, they will neither be white nor black.—True.—But when, my friend, old age causes them to be of this colour, then they will become such as the colour which is present to them, viz. white through the presence of whiteness.—Undoubtedly.—This then is what I now ask, Whether that to which any thing is present, is, by possession, such as the thing which is present? Or whether this is the case, if the thing is present after a certain manner, but otherwise not?—Thus, rather, he replied.—In like manner, that which is neither evil nor good, sometimes when evil is present, is not yet evil; but there is a time when it becomes so.—Entirely so.—When, therefore, it is not yet evil, though evil is present, this very presence of evil causes it to desire good; but this presence which causes it to be evil, deprives it of the desire, and at the same time friendship of good. For it is now no longer neither evil nor good, but is evil. But it was shown that the good is not a friend to the evil.—It is not.—Hence we must say, that those who are wise must no longer philosophize¹, whether they are gods or men; nor again, those who are so ignorant, that they are vicious. For no one who is vicious and void of discipline can philosophize. Those therefore remain, who possess indeed this evil, ignorance, but are not yet stupid and void of all discipline, but who yet think they do not know those things of which they are ignorant. On which account, in a certain respect, those that are neither good, nor bad, philosophize: for such as are bad do not philosophize, nor such as are good. For it has appeared to us, that neither is the contrary a friend to the contrary, nor the similar to the similar. Or do you not remember that this

¹ For philosophy, as is shown in the speech of Diotima in the Banquet, is a medium between wisdom and ignorance.

was asserted by us above?—He replied, I perfectly remember.—Have we not therefore, O Lysis and Menexenus, more than any thing discovered what is a friend, and what is not? For we have said, that both according to the soul, and according to the body, and every where, that which is neither evil nor good, is a friend to the good through the presence of evil.—They in every respect admitted that these things were so. And I indeed was very glad, like a hunter having gladly obtained that of which I was in search. But afterwards, I know not how, a most absurd suspicion came into my mind, that the things which we had asserted to were not true. And being immediately uneasy on this account, I said, It is strange, Lysis and Menexenus, but we seem to be enriched with a dream.—Why so? said Menexenus.—I am afraid, I replied, lest we have met with false assertions, as with arrogant men, in our inquiry about friendship.—How? he replied.—To which I answered, let us consider thus. Is he who is a friend, a friend to any one or not?—Necessarily so, said he.—Whether, therefore, is he a friend for the sake of nothing, and through nothing, or for the sake of something, and through something?—The latter.—Is that thing then a friend, for the sake of which a friend is a friend to a friend, or is it neither a friend nor an enemy?—He replied, I do not perfectly apprehend you.—It is likely, I said. But thus perhaps you will follow me; and I think that I also shall better understand what I say. We have just now said that the sick is a friend to the physician. Did we not?—Yes.—Is he not therefore through disease, and for the sake of health, a friend to the physician?—Yes.—And is not disease an evil?—Undoubtedly.—But what of health? I replied. Is it good or evil, or neither?—It is good, said he.—We have therefore said, as it seems, that the body is neither good, nor bad, through disease; but that through disease it is a friend to the medicinal art. We have likewise asserted that the medicinal art is good; but that it obtains friendship for the sake of health: and that health is good. Is it not?—Yes.—But is health a friend, or not a friend?—A friend.—And is not disease an enemy?—Entirely so.—Hence that which is neither evil nor good, through evil and an enemy, is the friend of good, for the sake of good and a friend.—It appears so.—A friend therefore is a friend for the sake of a friend, through an enemy.—So it seems.—Be it so, I replied. But since, O boys, we have arrived thus far, let us diligently attend

attend lest we should be deceived. For we shall bid farewell to the assertion, that a friend becomes the friend of a friend, and that the similar is a friend to the similar; for this we have said is impossible. But at the same time, let us consider as follows, lest what is now asserted should deceive us. Do we not say, that the medicinal art is a friend for the sake of health?—Yes.—And therefore that health is a friend?—Entirely so.—If then it is a friend, it is for the sake of something.—It is.—But it is the friend of something, from what we have asserted to before.—Entirely so.—Will not therefore that again be a friend, for the sake of a friend?—Yes.—Is it not therefore necessary that thus proceeding, we should reject what we have said, and arrive at a certain principle, which is not referred to another friend, but brings us to that which is the first friend, and for the sake of which we say all other things are friends?—It is necessary.—This then is what I say, that we should be cautious lest we are deceived by all those other particulars which we assert to be friends for the sake of the first friend, and which are as it were certain images of it; while, in the mean time, this first friend is truly a friend. For we should thus consider: That which any one very much esteems, (as, for instance, a father sometimes his son,) he honours before all other things. But a man of this kind, on account of thus highly esteeming his son, will also, on his account, highly esteem something else. Thus, for instance, if he perceives that he drinks hemlock, he will very much esteem wine, because he thinks that this will save his son. Or will he not?—Undoubtedly, he replied.—Will he not therefore also highly value the vessel which contains the wine?—Entirely so.—But will he then no less esteem the earthen cup, or three cups of wine, than his son? Or is the case thus? The whole of the endeavour, in an affair of this kind, does not regard those things which are procured for the sake of something else, but that for the sake of which all such things are procured. Nor is the assertion which we frequently make true, that we very much esteem gold and silver; but in this case, that which we highly esteem, is that for the sake of which gold, and all other preparatives, are procured. Shall we not say so?—By all means.—The same thing therefore may be said respecting a friend: for such things as we say are friends to us, when they subsist for the sake of a friend, we improperly denominate. But that appears to be a friend in reality,

reality, in which all those that are called friendships end.—This, said he, seems to be the case.—Hence that which is in reality a friend, is not a friend, for the sake of a certain friend.—True.—The assertion therefore is to be rejected, that a friend is a friend, for the sake of a certain friend. But is a friend, therefore, a good thing?—It appears so to me.—Is the good then beloved though evil? And is the case thus? Since the things of which we now speak are three, good, evil, and that which is neither good nor evil, if two of these are received, but evil entirely departs, and has not any connection either with body, or soul, or any thing else, which we say is in itself neither good nor evil, in this case will good be perfectly useless to us? For if nothing any longer injures us, we shall not be indigent of any assistance whatever. And thus it will then become manifest that we have sought after, and loved good on account of evil; good being the medicine of evil; but evil being a disease. But when there is no disease, there will be no occasion for medicine. Does good thus naturally subsist, and is it thus beloved, on account of evil, by us who are situated between evil and good? And is it of no use itself, for its own sake?—He replied, It seems to subsist in this manner.—That friend, therefore, in which all other things end, which we say are friends for the sake of another friend, is not in any respect similar to these. For these are called friends for the sake of a friend; but that which is in reality a friend, appears to be naturally in every respect contrary to this: for we have seen that this is a friend for the sake of an enemy. But if an enemy should be present, it would no longer as it seems be a friend to us.—He replied, It does not appear to me that it would, as it is now said.—But, by Jupiter, said I, if evil should be extirpated, would there no longer be any hunger or thirst, or any thing else of the like kind? Or would there be hunger, but yet not noxious, since there would be men and other animals? and thirst, and other appetites, but without being evil, in consequence of evil being abolished? Or shall we say that the inquiry is ridiculous, what would then be, or would not be? For who knows? This however we know, that at present it is possible to be injured by being hungry, and it is also possible to be benefited. Or is it not?—Entirely so.—Does it not therefore follow, that when we are hungry, or desire the gratification of any other appetite, our desire may be sometimes beneficial, and sometimes noxious, and sometimes

times

times neither?—Very much so.—If, therefore, evils were destroyed, what would be the advantage, if things which are not evil, were destroyed together with such as are evil?—There would be none.—There would be appetites, therefore, which are neither good nor evil, even if evils were destroyed.—It appears so.—Is it therefore possible, that he who desires and loves any thing, should not be the friend of that which he desires and loves?—It does not appear to me that it is.—When evils therefore are destroyed, certain friendly persons, as it seems, will still remain.—They will.—But if evil were the cause of friendship, no one would be a friend to another, when evil is destroyed. For the cause being taken away, that of which it was the cause can no longer have an existence.—Right.—Was it not therefore acknowledged by us, that a friend loved something, and on account of something? And did we not then think, that through evil, that which is neither good nor evil loves good?—True.—But now, as it seems, something else appears to be the cause of loving and being beloved.—So it seems.—Is then, in reality, desire, as we said, the cause of friendship? And is that which desires, the friend of that which it desires, and then, when it desires? And is he whom we before asserted to be a friend, a mere trifle, like a very prolix poem?—It appears so, said he.—But, I replied, he who desires, desires that of which he is indigent. Or does he not?—Yes.—Is not then that which is indigent, the friend of that of which it is indigent?—It appears so to me.—But every one becomes indigent of that of which he is deprived.—Undoubtedly.—Hence, as it seems, love, friendship, and desire, respect that which is domestic and allied to them. This appears to be the case, O Menexenus and Lysis.—They admitted it was so.—You, therefore, if you were friends to each other, would be naturally mutually allied. They replied, And very much so.—And hence, I said, if any one person desires or loves another, O boys, he can never either desire, or love, or be a friend, unless he is allied to the object of his love, either according to his soul, or a certain custom of his soul, or according to manners, or according to species.—Menexenus said, Entirely so; but Lysis was silent.—But I replied, It appears to be necessary for us, to love that which is naturally allied to us.—It seems so, he said.—It is necessary therefore, that he who is a genuine, and not a pretended

pretended lover, should be beloved by the objects of his love.—To this Lysis and Menexenus scarcely assented: but Hippothales, through the pleasure which he experienced, exhibited all-various colours. And I being willing to consider the assertion, said, If that which is domestic and allied differs from that which is similar, we have declared, as it appears to me, O Lysis and Menexenus, what a friend is: but if the similar and the allied are the same, it is not easy to reject the former assertion, that the similar is not useless to the similar, according to similitude; but to acknowledge that a friend is useless, is inelegant. Are you willing therefore, I added, since we are as it were intoxicated by discourse, that we should grant and say that the allied is something different from the similar?—Entirely so.—Whether, therefore, shall we admit that good is allied, but evil foreign to every one? Or shall we say that evil is allied to evil, but good to good? and that a thing which is neither good nor evil, is allied to that which is neither good nor evil?—Each of these appeared to us to be allied to each.—Again therefore I said, O boys, we have fallen upon those assertions which we first made respecting friendship. For an unjust man will be no less a friend to the unjust, and the vicious to the vicious, than the good to the good.—So it seems, he said.—But what? if we should say the good and the allied are the same, will any thing else follow, than that the good alone is a friend to the good?—Nothing else.—But this assertion also we thought was confuted by us. Or do you not remember?—We do remember.—What further then can we employ in our discourse?—It is evident nothing further.—Like wise men, therefore, in courts of justice, we ought to repeat all that has been said: for if neither those that are beloved, nor lovers, nor the similar, nor the dissimilar, nor the good, nor the allied, nor any other such particulars as we have discussed, (for I do not remember any further, on account of their multitude),—if then no one of these is a friend, I have not any thing more to say. When I had thus said, intending afterwards to excite some one who was more advanced in years, the pædagogues of Lysis and Menexenus approaching like certain demons, together with the brothers of these two, called to them, and ordered them to return home: for it was then late. At first, therefore, both we, and those that surrounded us, drove them away: but they paid no attention to us,

but

but speaking in a barbaric manner were indignant and continued no less calling to the boys. Being vanquished therefore by their importunity, and it appearing to us, that as they had been subdued in the Mercurial feast, they would not have any thing else to offer, we dissolved the conference. At the same time, after they had departed, I said to Lyfis and Menexenus, We are become ridiculous, I who am an old man, and you who are boys. For they, now they have left us, will say, that we think ourselves to be friends to each other (for I rank myself among you), though at the same time we have not yet been able to find what a friend is.

THE END OF THE LYSIS.

THE CHARMIDES:

A DIALOGUE

ON

TEMPERANCE.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE CHARMIDES.

TWO things are to be noted in the exordium of this Dialogue, which transfer love from corporeal to incorporeal form. First, the assertion of Socrates, that nearly all young men appear to him to be beautiful; which is as if he had said that he did not stop at the form of one body, but ascended to the common beauty of the whole species. As therefore we ascend from the beauty of an individual, to that which is common to the species, and from this to that beauty which is uncoordinated with the many, and is an incorporeal form subsisting by itself; so by what is here said we are admonished to pass from the love of an individual form, to the love of that which is common, and from this to the love of ideal form, subsisting in intellect as its native seat. The second thing which deserves to be noted is, that Socrates orders the soul of Charmides to be exposed naked to the view, and that neglecting the form of the body we should behold the natural beauty of the soul, and diligently endeavour to obtain it when it is found to be wanting. Nor is it without reason that the exhortation to temperance begins from the beauty of body: for this is nothing more than a symphony and consent of the organical parts, which corresponds to temperance in the soul.

Plato in the Cratylus explains the name of temperance, as signifying a certain safety and preservation of prudence. For he considered all truth as naturally inherent in the soul; and that, in consequence of this, the soul by profoundly looking into herself will discover every truth. She is however impeded from this conversion to herself, by an immoderate love of body and corporeal natures. Hence temperance is in the first place necessary, by which the darkness of perturbations being expelled, the intellect becomes more serene, and is abundantly irradiated with the splendors of divinity.

But

But as Socrates intends to discourse about temperance, he admonishes Charmides to look into himself. For a conversion of the soul into herself is the business of this virtue. And it is said in the *Timæus* that all our affairs become prosperous, from the soul being in harmony with herself, and in *concord with respect to the body*. The Pythagoreans also assert, that if the soul prudently governs not only her own motions, but those of the body, length of life will be the portion of the latter, and perpetual health of both. To this Socrates adds, as still more wonderful, that the Magi promise by their verses immortality to bodies: and we learn from Plato, in the first Alcibiades, that the magic of Zoroaster was nothing else than the worship of divinity. Socrates however observes, that the soul and body are not only preserved from death by magical verses, but likewise by philosophic reasonings and temperance. Again, as that discourse, which is calculated to persuade its auditors to temperance, requires power imparted by divinity, and reasonings produced by philosophy, Plato calls such a discourse a magical incantation.

In the next place, Socrates often inquires what temperance is, which, neither Charmides nor Critias accurately defines. For the one adduces, that which is not properly temperance, but its attendant, and the other, that which rather belongs to prudence. Hence the latter defines temperance to be a certain science, which both knows itself and all other sciences, but is ignorant of the things themselves which are the objects of science. This however is false, because the truth of science consists in a certain congruity and contact of that, which knows with that which is known. Besides, science cannot be perfectly known, unless it is perceived what science is, and this cannot be obtained without a knowledge of its object. But as Critias brings the discourse on temperance to prudence, Socrates asserts that prudence, or the science of good and evil, obtains the highest authority with respect to beatitude, as well because it demonstrates the most excellent end, and the media which lead to it, as because all arts and pursuits, so far as they are governed by it, contribute to our advantage, but end in our detriment when it is neglected. In the last place, Socrates teaches us that nothing can with more difficulty be defined, or procured, than temperance. It is most difficult to define, because it is so intimately combined with the other virtues, of which it is a certain consonance; and it cannot be obtained
without

without great difficulty, because from our union with body we are prone to intemperance, and from our infancy drink deep of the envenomed cup of pleasure.

For the benefit of the Platonic reader, as this Dialogue is pirastic, I shall conclude this Introduction with the following admirable observations from Jamblichus¹, in which the nature of temperance is beautifully unfolded. "Every virtue despises that which is mortal, and embraces that which is immortal; but this in a very remarkable degree is the endeavour of temperance, as despising those pleasures which fasten the soul to the body as by a nail, and establishing itself, as Plato says, on holy foundations. For how is it possible that temperance should not make us perfect, since it exterminates from us the imperfect and the passive? But you may know that this is the case by attending to the fable of Bellerophon, who, contending in conjunction with *moderation*, destroyed Chimæra, and every beastly, wild, and savage tribe. For, in short, the immoderate dominion of the passions does not suffer men to be men, but draws them down to that which is irrational, beastly, and disordered. But that excellent order, which confines the pleasures within definite measures, preserves families, and preserves cities according to the assertion of Crates: and further still, it also in a certain respect approximates to the form of the gods. Perseus therefore, riding to the highest good of temperance, with Minerva for his leader, cut off the head of Gorgon, which appears to me to be desire drawing men down to matter, and turning them into stone, through a repletion of stupid passions. Continence of pleasure therefore, as Socrates says, is the foundation of virtue; and temperance appears to be the ornament of all the virtues, as Plato also asserts. And, as I say, this virtue is the fortification of the most beautiful habits. Hence, I shall with confidence strenuously assert, as a thing truly acknowledged, that the beauty of temperance extends through all the virtues, that it coharmonizes them according to one harmony, and that it inserts in them symmetry and mixture with each other. Such then being the nature of temperance, it affords an opportunity to the implanting of the other virtues, and when they are implanted, imparts to them stable security."

¹ Stobæi Eclog. p. 68.

THE CHARMIDES.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES,
CHÆREPHO,

||

CRITIAS, and
CHARMIDES,

YESTERDAY, when I came in the evening from the army, I gladly returned to my accustomed exercise, in consequence of having been for some time absent from it; and entered into the Palæstra of Taurean Neptune, which is opposite to the royal temple. Here I met with very many persons, some of whom were unknown to me, but the greater part of them I knew. And as soon as I was seen entering thus unexpectedly, some from all quarters immediately congratulated me at a distance. But Chærepho, as if he had been insane, leaping from the midst of them, ran towards me, and taking me by the hand, O Socrates, says he, how were you saved in the engagement? For a short time before we came away there was a battle at Potidæa, of which those that are here just now heard.—And I answering them, said, It is as you see.—Indeed, said he, a report was spread here, that a very sharp engagement had taken place, and that many of those that we know had perished in it.—I replied, You were told the truth.—But, said he, was you in the engagement?—I was.—Sit down here, said he, and relate the affair to us; for we have not yet clearly heard the whole. And at the same time leading me along, he seated me near Critias the son of Callæschrus. Being therefore seated, I saluted Critias, and the rest, and according as any one asked me, related the affairs of the army. But some asked me one thing, and others another. And when we had had enough of things of this kind, I again asked them respecting philosophy, how it was circumstanced
at

at present ; and whether there were any young men who were remarkable for wisdom, or beauty, or both. Critias then, looking towards the gate, and perceiving certain young men entering and reviling each other, and another crowd following behind them, said, It appears to me, Socrates, that you will immediately have an answer to your question respecting beautiful youths. For those that are now entering, are forerunners and lovers of one who seems to be the most beautiful of all of the present time. And it appears to me that he is now nearly entering.—But who is he ? I replied ; and of whom is he the son ?—Perhaps you know, said he, (but he was very young when you left this place ;) I say, perhaps you know Charmides, the son of our uncle Glauco, but my cousin.—I know him indeed, by Jupiter, I replied, for he was not then to be despised, though he was but a boy, but now I think he must be almost a young man.—You will immediately know, said he, both his age, and the qualities which he has acquired. And at the same time that he was thus speaking, Charmides entered.—No consideration therefore, my friend, is to be paid to me. For I am indeed a *white rule*¹ with respect to those that are beautiful ; since nearly all young men appear to me to be beautiful. But he then appeared to me to be wonderful, both on account of the magnitude and the beauty of his body : and all the rest seemed to me to be in love with him ; so astonished and so disturbed were they, when he entered. Many other lovers also followed among those that were behind him. And as to the men indeed, this was less wonderful : but I also paid attention to the boys, and saw that none of these beheld any one else than him, not even the smallest among them, but the eyes of all were fixed on him, as on a statue. And Chærepho calling me, said, What do you think of the youth, Socrates ? Is he not a beautiful person ?—I replied, transcendently so.—But, said he, if he were willing to show himself naked, he would appear to you to have a deformed face, his form is so very beautiful. And this assertion of Chærepho was confirmed by all the rest.—I then said, By Hercules, you speak of an unconquerable man, if only one small thing further belongs to

¹ The expression a *white rule*, says the Greek Scholiast on Plato, is applied to those who signify things immanifest, by such as are immanifest, and in so doing indicate nothing. For a white rule can indicate nothing in white stones (*with respect to whiteness*), as a rule can which is of a red colour.

him.—What is that? said Critias.—I replied, If his soul is naturally in a good condition. It is however proper, Critias, that it should be so, as being one of your family.—But, he replied, he is also very beautiful and good in this respect.—Why then, I said, do we not expose *this* naked to the view, and contemplate it prior to his form? For since he is thus inwardly beautiful, he will in every respect be willing to discourse.—Very much so, said Critias; since he is a philosopher, and (as it appears both to others and himself) very poetic.—I replied, This beauty, friend Critias, descends to you remotely, through your alliance to Solon. But why do you not call the youth hither, and present him to me? For it would not disgrace us to discourse with him, even if he were younger than he is, while you are present, who are his cousin and tutor.—You speak well, said he; and we will call him. And at the same time turning to the person that followed him; Call, says he, Charmides, and tell him that I wish to commit him to the care of a physician, on account of the infirmity of which he has lately complained.—Critias therefore said to me, Charmides lately has complained of a heaviness in his head when he rose in the morning. What then should hinder you from pretending to him, that you know a remedy for this disorder of the head?—Nothing, I replied; let him only come.—But he does come, said he. Which was indeed the case: for he came, and caused much laughter. For each of us that were seated together, through eagerness to sit near Charmides, pushed his neighbour; till of those that were seated last of all, some we forced to rise up, and others to fall on the ground. But he came and sat between me and Critias. And I then said, My friend, I am now perplexed, and the confidence which I before had, that I should easily discourse with Charmides, fails me. But when Critias had told him, that I was the person who knew a remedy for his disease, he fixed his eyes upon me as something prodigious, and drew near as if he meant to ask me a question. Then all that were in the Palæstra immediately gathered round us; and when, O generous man, I saw the beauty of his form within his garments, I was inflamed with the view, and was no longer myself. I likewise thought that Critias was most wise in amatory affairs, who said, when speaking of a beautiful boy, but employing the similitude of something else, that I should be cautious lest a fawn coming opposite to the lion, a portion of the flesh should be
taken

taken away: for he appeared to me to have been captured by an animal of this kind. But at the same time, when Charmides asked me, if I knew a remedy for the head, I scarcely knew what to answer. What is it? said he.—I replied that it was a certain leaf, but that a certain incantation must be added to the medicine, which if any one employed together with the leaf, the medicine could perfectly restore him to health; but that the leaf would be of no use without the incantation.—He then said, I will write down this incantation from you.—I replied, Will you do this, whether you are persuaded by me or not?—Upon this, he said laughing, I will, if I am persuaded by you, Socrates.—Be it so, I replied. And do you also accurately know my name?—I do, unless I am unjust, said he. For there is no small talk about you, among those of my age: and I can remember that you associated with Critias when I was a boy.—You say well, I replied. For I shall now tell you, with greater freedom of speech, what the incantation is. But, just now, I was doubtful, after what manner I should show you its power. For this incantation is such, O Charmides, that it is not able to make the head alone well; just perhaps as you have often heard good physicians assert, when any one comes to them with diseased eyes: for then they say, that they must not attempt to cure the eyes alone, but that it is necessary for them at the same time to cure the head¹, if they design to render the eyes in a good condition. And again, that it would be very stupid to think to cure the head itself without the whole body. In consequence of this reasoning, they turn their attention to the regimen of the whole body, and endeavour to cure the part in conjunction with the whole. Or have you not heard that they thus speak, and that this is the case?—Entirely so, he replied.—Does it therefore appear to you that they speak well; and do you admit this doctrine?—The most of all things, said he.—And I, on hearing him praise this method of cure, took courage, and my confidence again was a little excited and revived: and I said, Such, therefore, O Charmides, is the power of this incantation. But I learnt it there, in the army, from one of the Thracian physicians of Zamolxis², who are said to render men immortal. This Thracian

¹ Viz. Not only the head, but the whole body must be cured, when the eyes are diseased from an internal cause.

² A slave and disciple of Pythagoras,

too said, "The Grecian physicians beautifully assert the same things as I now assert. But Zamolxis, said he, our king, being a god, says, that as it is not proper to attempt to cure the eyes without the head, nor the head without the body, so neither is it proper to cure the body without the soul: and that the reason why many diseases are unknown to the Grecian physicians is, because they are ignorant of the whole, to which attention ought to be paid. For when this is not well disposed, it is impossible that a part should be well affected. For all things, said he, originate from the soul, both such as are good and such as are evil, and emanate from thence into the body, and the whole man, just as things flow from the head to the eyes. It is requisite therefore that the maladies of this should in the first place and especially be healed, in order that the head and the whole body may be well affected." But he said, O blessed youth, "that the soul was cured of its maladies by certain incantations; and that these incantations were beautiful reasons, from which temperance was generated in souls." He further added, "that when this was inserted and present, it was easy to impart health, both to the head and the rest of the body." Having therefore taught me the medicine, and the incantations, "Let none, said he, persuade you to cure the head of any one with this medicine, who has not first presented his soul to be cured by you with the incantation. For the fault, said he, of the present time, respecting men, is this, that certain persons endeavour to become physicians without a knowledge of temperance and health." And he very earnestly ordered me to take care, that neither any rich, or noble, or beautiful person, ever persuaded me to do otherwise. I therefore declared to him, with an oath, that I would not; and hence it is necessary I should obey him, which I am determined to do. And indeed, if you are willing, according to the mandate of the stranger, to present your soul first of all to be enchanted by the incantations of the Thracian, I will administer the medicine to your head; but if not, I cannot in any respect benefit you, O friend Charmides.--Critias therefore hearing me thus speak, said, This heaviness of the head, O Socrates, will be gain to the youth, if he should be compelled to become better in his dianoëtic part through his head. I can indeed assure you, that Charmides not only surpasses all his equals in the form of his
body

body, but in this very thing for which you say you have an incantation. But you say this is temperance. Or do you not?—Entirely so, I replied.—Know then, said he, that Charmides appears to be by far the most temperate of those that exist at present; and that, as far as his age permits, he is not inferior to any one in every thing else.—And I replied, It is but just, O Charmides, that you should excel all others in all such things as these. For I do not think that any one now present can easily show two families among the Athenians, from a conjunction between which by marriage, a beautiful and excellent offspring is so likely to be produced, as from those that were your progenitors. For the paternal family of Critias, here, the son of Diopis, is celebrated by Anacreon, and Solon, and many other poets, as excelling in beauty, virtue, and the rest of what is called felicity. And again, there is the same renown on his mother's side: for no one of those that dwell on the continent is said to surpass in beauty and grandeur your uncle Pyrilampes, as often as he goes in the character of ambassador to the great king, or to some other inhabitant of the continent. But the whole of his family is in nothing inferior to any other. It is likely, therefore, that, being the offspring of such characters, you should be the first in all things. Hence, O beloved son of Glauco, with respect to your visible form, you appear to me to disgrace no one of your progenitors: and, if you are naturally endued with all that is sufficient to the possession of temperance, and the other virtues, according to the assertion of Critias here, your mother, O dear Charmides, brought you forth blessed. The case, then, is this: If temperance is present with you, as Critias says it is, and if you are sufficiently temperate, you will no longer require the incantations, either of Zamolxis, or the Hyperborean Abaris¹, but the medicine for the head should be immediately administered you. But if you are in any respect indigent of this, the incantation must precede the medicine. Inform me therefore, whether you assent to Critias, and affirm that you sufficiently participate of temperance, or whether you are deficient in this respect.—Charmides therefore blushing, in the first place appeared to be still more beautiful (for bashfulness becomes his age); and in the next place he

¹ A Scythian in the time of the Trojan war, who is fabled to have received a flying arrow from Apollo, with which he gave oracles, and transported himself wherever he pleased.

answered:

answered me not ignobly. For he said, It is not easy either to admit or reject the subjects of the present investigation: for, said he, if I should affirm that I am not temperate, it would be absurd that I should assert such a thing of myself, and at the same time I should evince that Critias has spoken falsely, and many others to whom I appear to be temperate. But again, if I should affirm that I am temperate, by thus praising myself, I shall perhaps give offence: so that I do not know how to answer you.—To this I replied, You appear to me, O Charmides, to speak well: and I think we should consider in common whether you possess that which I inquire after, or not; that you may neither be compelled to speak contrary to your will, nor I may again inconsiderately turn myself to the medicinal art. If, therefore, it is agreeable to you, I wish to consider this affair together with you; but if it is not, to dismiss it.—But it is, said he, the most agreeable to me of all things. Pursue therefore the inquiry, in whatever manner appears to you to be best.—This, I replied, seems to me to be the best mode of considering the subject: for it is evident, if temperance is present with you, that you have some opinion about it; for it is necessary, if it is really inherent in you, that it must produce some sensation of itself, from which you will possess an opinion respecting it, what it is, and what are the qualities with which it is endued. Or do you not think so?—He replied, I do think so.—And do you not also, I said, think this, since you know how to speak the Greek tongue, that you can likewise inform me what temperance appears to you to be?—Perhaps so, said he.—That we may therefore conjecture whether it is inherent in you or not, tell me, I said, what temperance is, according to your opinion? And at first, indeed, he was tardy, and was not altogether willing to answer; but afterwards he said, that temperance appeared to consist in doing all things in an orderly manner, in walking and discoursing quietly in the public ways, and acting similarly in every thing else. And, in short, said he, that which is the object of your inquiry appears to me to be a certain quietness¹.—I replied, You speak well; for they say, O Charmides, that quiet are temperate persons. But let us see if they say any thing to the purpose: for, tell me, is not temperance something beautiful?—He replied, Entirely so.—Whether, therefore, in

¹ *ἡσυχία*, *quietness*, signifies, in this place, a leisurely mode of acting in every thing.

the grammatic art, is it most beautiful to write similar letters swiftly or slowly?—Swiftly.—But what with respect to reading? Is it most beautiful to read swiftly or slowly?—Swiftly.—And is it also by far more beautiful to play on the harp rapidly, and to wrestle with celerity, than quietly and slowly?—Yes.—And does not the like take place in pugilistic and pancratiatic contests?—Entirely so.—And with respect to running and leaping, and all other works of the body, are they not beautiful when performed with vigour and rapidity; but when performed slowly, with difficulty, and quietly, are they not base?—It appears so.—It appears to us, therefore, I replied, that with respect to the body, not the quiet, but the most rapid, and the most vigorous, are the most beautiful. Is it not so?—Entirely so.—But did we not say that temperance is something beautiful?—Yes.—Not quietness, therefore, but celerity will be the more temperate with respect to the body; since temperance is beautiful.—It seems so, said he.—What then, I replied, is docility more beautiful than dulness?—It is.—But docility, I said, is to learn swiftly; and dulness to learn quietly and slowly.—It is.—And is it not more beautiful to teach another swiftly and vehemently, than quietly and slowly.—Yes.—And which is the more beautiful to recollect and commit things to memory quietly and slowly, or vehemently and rapidly?—He replied, Vehemently and rapidly.—And with respect to sagacity, is it not a certain acute energy, and not a quietness of the soul?—True.—Does it not therefore follow, that it is most beautiful in the grammatic art, in the art of playing on the harp, and in every thing else, to understand what is said, in the most rapid, and not in the most quiet manner?—Yes.—And again, in the investigations and consultations of the soul, it does not appear to me that he who consults and discovers in the most quiet manner, and with difficulty, is worthy of praise, but he who does this easily and rapidly.—To this also he assented.—Hence, I replied, in all things, both pertaining to the soul and the body, such as are performed with celerity and vigour appear to be more beautiful than such as are performed slowly and quietly.—It appears so, said he.—Temperance, therefore, will not be quietness, nor will a temperate be a quiet life, from this reasoning: since that which is temperate ought to be beautiful: for one of two things must take place, viz. quiet actions in life must either never, or very rarely, appear to be more beautiful than such as are swift and strenuous. If then, my friend, it were even found that not fewer quiet actions are beautiful than such as are vehement and rapid,

neither would it follow from hence that temperance consisted rather in acting quietly, than in vehement and rapid energy, either in walking or in reading, or any thing else; nor would a quiet and orderly life be more temperate than one which is not orderly, since it has been admitted in our discourse, that temperance is something beautiful. But things swift have appeared to be no less beautiful than such as are quiet.—What you have said, Socrates, he replied, appears to me to be right.—Again, therefore, said I, O Charmides, be still more attentive, and looking to yourself, consider what kind of a person temperance, when present, causes you to be, and what sort of a thing it is itself while it accomplishes this: reasoning, therefore, on all these particulars, inform me well, and in a virile manner, what appears to you to be the truth.—But then Charmides, collecting and looking into himself, in a very manly manner said, Temperance seems to me to make a man blush and be ashamed; and I, therefore, conclude that temperance is shame.—Be it so, I replied: but did we not just now acknowledge that temperance is something beautiful?—Entirely so, said he.—Are not therefore temperate, good men?—Yes.—Will therefore that be good, which does not render men good?—It will not.—Temperance, therefore, is not only beautiful but good.—It appears so to me.—What then, I replied, will you not believe that Homer¹ speaks well, when he says,

“Shame ill accompanies a man in need?”

I do, he replied.—Shame, therefore, as it seems, is both not good, and good.—It appears so.—But temperance is good; since it makes those good, to whom it is present, but by no means evil.—The case appears to me to be as you say.—Temperance, therefore, will not be shame; since temperance is good, but shame is not in any respect more good than evil.—It appears to me, Socrates, said he, that this is rightly asserted. But attend to what I shall adduce respecting temperance. For just now I recollected what I had heard a certain person assert, viz. that temperance is to manage our own affairs. Consider, therefore, whether what I say appears to you to be well said.—I replied, O vile youth! you have heard this from Critias, or from some other of the wise.—It seems, said Critias, he must have heard it from some other person, for he did not hear it from me.—But of what

¹ Odyss. lib. 17.

consequence is it, Socrates, Charmides replied, from whom I heard it?—None at all, said I. For we are not to consider who said it, but whether he has spoken the truth or not.—Now you speak as you ought, he replied.—By Jupiter, I do, said I. But if we discover how this thing subsists, I shall wonder: for it is similar to a certain enigma.—On what account, said he.—Because, I replied, his meaning is not such as the words seem to imply, when he says that temperance is to manage our own affairs. Or do you think that a grammarian does nothing when he writes or reads?—I think he does something, said he.—Does a grammarian, therefore, appear to you to write and read his own name only, or to instruct you boys? And do you in consequence of his instructions no less write the names of your enemies than the names of your friends?—No less, said he.—When, therefore, you do this, are you too busily employed, and intemperate?—By no means.—And besides this, you do not perform things pertaining to yourself, if to write, and also to read, is to do something. But it certainly is. And besides, my friend, to be healed, to build, to weave, and to accomplish the work of any art, is certainly to do something. Is it not?—Entirely so.—What then, I replied, does that city appear to you to be well instituted in which there is a law commanding every one to weave and wash his own garment, to make his own shoes, oil-cruise, curry-comb, and every other necessary article, but not to touch things belonging to others, but to attend to his own affairs?—He replied, It does not appear to me that such a city is well instituted.—But, said I, if a city is temperately, it is well instituted.—Undoubtedly, he replied.—For a man, therefore, to do such things as these, and to manage his own affairs, will not be temperance.—It does not appear that it will.—He, therefore, who said, that for a man to do things pertaining to himself is temperance, spoke, as I just now observed, obscurely: for he was not so stupid, as to mean that his words should be taken in the literal sense. Or did you hear some stupid person assert this, O Charmides?—By no means, said he; since to me he appeared to be very wise.—More than any thing, therefore, as it seems to me, he proposed this enigma, because it is difficult to know what it is for a man to transact his own affairs.—Perhaps so, said he.—Can you therefore tell me what it is to transact one's own affairs?—He replied, by Jupiter, I do not know. But perhaps nothing hinders, but that he who said this did not know the meaning

of the assertion. And at the same time that he thus spoke, he laughed, and looked at Critias. But it was evident that Critias, who had formerly contended with, and was stimulated by ambition against Charmides, and those that were present, and who could then scarcely contain himself, was now no longer able to do so. And it appeared to me that my former suspicion was more than any thing true, that Charmides had heard this definition of temperance from Critias. Charmides, therefore, not being willing to support the definition himself, but being desirous that this province should fall to the lot of Critias, shewed as if he thought him confuted. This Critias could not endure, but appeared to me to be as much enraged with Charmides, as a poet with a player who acts his poems badly. So that, looking at him, he said, Do you therefore think, O Charmides, that if you do not understand his meaning who said, that temperance is for a man to transact his own affairs, neither does he know what he asserted?—But, I replied, O Critias, best of men, it is nothing wonderful that Charmides, who is but a youth, should not understand this assertion; but it is fit that you should understand it, both on account of your age and employment. If therefore you affirm that this is a true definition of temperance, I shall very gladly consider with you, whether it is so or not.—But I entirely assent to it, said he.—You do well then, I replied. But inform me whether you admit what I just now asked: I mean, if all artists do something?—I do.—Do they therefore appear to you to do things belonging to themselves only, or things also belonging to others?—Things also belonging to others.—Do they act temperately, therefore, who only do things belonging to themselves?—What should hinder? said he.—Nothing, so far as respects myself, I replied; but see whether there may not be a hindrance with respect to him who, defining temperance to be the transacting one's own affairs, afterwards says that nothing hinders but that those who transact the affairs of others may also be temperate.—I indeed, he replied, have confessed that those that *transact* the affairs of others may be temperate. But have I also acknowledged that this is the case with respect to those that *make* things pertaining to others?—But inform me, said I, do you not affirm that to *make* a thing is the same as to do it?—I do not indeed, said he. Nor do I say that to *operate* is the same as to *make*. For I have learned to make this distinction from Hesiod¹,

¹ In his Works and Days.

who

who says, "No *work* is a disgrace." Do you therefore think that if he had called by the names of *to operate* and *to do*, such works as you now speak of, he would have said that no work is a disgrace, whether it is that of the shoemaker, or of a falter of fish, or of one who sits in a shop?—It is not proper to think he would, Socrates: but I think that he considered making as something different from action and operation; and that a thing made sometimes becomes a disgrace, when it is not produced in conjunction with the beautiful; but that no work is ever a disgrace. For things which are made beautifully and with utility he calls works, and denominates operations and actions certain makings of this kind. It is likewise proper to assert that he considered such things as these, as alone domestic and allied, but every thing noxious as foreign. Hence, it is requisite to think that Hesiod, and every other prudent person, calls him who transacts his own affairs temperate.—O Critias, I replied, as soon as you began to speak, I almost immediately perceived, that you called things allied to a man, and which are his own good, and that you denominated the making of things good, actions. For I have ten thousand times heard Prodicus dividing names: and I will allow you to use every name as you please, if you only evince what you mean to signify by any particular name. Now therefore again, from the beginning, define more clearly, whether you say that temperance is the doing, or the making, (or in whatever manner you may wish to denominate it,) of good things.—I do, said he.—He therefore is not temperate who acts badly, but he who acts well.—He replied, Does it not, O best of men, appear so to you?—Dismiss this question, I said: for we do not consider what appears to me to be the case, but what you now say.—But indeed, said he, I do not assert that he is temperate, who does not do good but evil. For I clearly define to you, that temperance is the practice of things good. And perhaps nothing hinders but that you speak the truth. But nevertheless I should wonder if you thought that men who conduct themselves temperately were ignorant that they are temperate.—But I do not think so, said he.—To this I replied, Did you not say a little before, that nothing hindered but that artists who made things pertaining to others might be temperate?—It was asserted by me, said he. But what then?—Nothing. But inform me whether he appears to you to be a physician, who, in making any one well, does that which is advantageous both to himself, and to him whom he cures?—To me he does.—Does not he, therefore, who acts in this manner,

manner, act well?—Yes.—And is not he temperate who acts well?—He is temperate.—Is it not therefore necessary that a physician should know when he cures with advantage, and when not? And likewise that every artist should know when he will be benefited by the work which he does, and when not?—Perhaps not, said he.—Sometimes, therefore, I replied, when a physician acts profitably, or noxiously, he will not know that he acts in this manner; though, according to your doctrine, when he acts profitably, he acts temperately. Or do you not say so?—I do.—Does it not therefore seem, I replied, that sometimes, when he acts profitably, he acts temperately, and is temperate, but is himself ignorant that he is temperate? But this, said he, Socrates, can never take place. If you think that this necessarily follows from what I have admitted above, I will readily grant it you. For I shall not be ashamed to confess, that something has been improperly asserted, rather than admit that the man who is ignorant of himself is temperate. For I nearly say, that to know ourselves, is temperance; and I agree with him who inscribed this precept in the temple of Apollo at Delphi. For this precept appears to me to have been inscribed as a salutation of Divinity, to be used by those that enter the temple, instead of *hail*! So that this inscription does not directly signify joy, or imply that we should exhort each other to rejoice, but rather, to be temperate. For thus the God speaks to those that enter the temple; and addresses us otherwise than men are wont to do, as he also conceived, in my opinion, who placed this inscription. It likewise says nothing else to those that enter, than that they should live temperately. But as speaking prophetically, it says this in a more enigmatic manner. For “Know thyself,” is the same as “Be temperate,” as both the writings and I assert. But perhaps some one may think it has a different meaning, which appears to me to have been the case with those who placed those posterior inscriptions, “Nothing too much¹,” and “A surety is near to sorrow².” For they thought that “Know thyself,” was advice, and not an address of the Divinity to those that enter the temple. Afterwards, that they might suspend advice in no respect inferior to this, they placed these inscriptions. Hence, Socrates, that for the sake of which I assert all these things is this, that I may grant you all that has been said above. For perhaps you may have said something more right respecting them, and perhaps this may be the

¹ The saying of Solon.

² The saying of Pittacus.

case with myself; but we have not advanced any thing clear. However, I now wish to give you the reason of this, if you do not grant that temperance is to know one's self. But, I replied, O Critias, you act by me as if I acknowledged that I knew that which is the subject of your inquiry. But this is not the case. For I always inquire in conjunction with you, respecting that which is proposed to be considered, in consequence of being myself ignorant. I am considering, therefore, whether I shall assent or not. But stop till I have considered.—Consider then, he replied.—I answered, I do. For if to know a certain thing is temperance, it is evident that temperance will be a certain science, and a science of something. Or will it not?—It is, he replied, and of itself.—Is not therefore, I said, medicine the science of that which is healthy?—Entirely so.—If then, I said, you should ask, since medicine is the science of that which is healthy, of what advantage it is to us, and what it accomplishes, I should reply that it is of no small advantage, because it procures us health, the effecting of which is beautiful; if you admit this.—I do admit it.—If therefore you should again ask me, what architecture effects, which is the science of building, I should say, houses; and I should reply in a similar manner with respect to other arts: it is requisite therefore, Critias, since you say that temperance is the science of itself, that you should be able to answer him who asks you, what beautiful work temperance effects, and which deserves to be named. Tell me therefore what it is?—But Socrates, said he, you do not interrogate rightly. For temperance is not naturally similar to other sciences, nor are other sciences similar to other. But you make your inquiry as if they were similar. For tell me, said he, what work is there in the logistic¹, or geometric art, which is of the like nature with a house, the work of the architectural art, or with that of a garment, which is the work of the weaving art; and so in many other such particulars belonging to the several arts. Can you in these exhibit to me any such work? But you cannot.—I replied, You speak the truth. But this I can show you, of what each of these sciences is the science, and which is something different from that science. Thus, for in-

¹ Logistic is the contemplation of things numbered, but is not conversant with pure numbers. Hence it considers any one sensible *particular* as the monad, and that which is *numbered* as *number*; as for instance three things as the triad, and ten things as the decad. It is nothing else than vulgar practical arithmetic.

stance, the logistic science is the science of even and odd multitude, how they subsist with respect to themselves and to each other. Is it not?—Entirely so, he replied.—Are not, therefore, the even and the odd different from the logistic science?—Undoubtedly.—Statics also is the science of the weight of a heavier and lighter body. And the heavy and the light are different from statics itself. Do you admit this?—I do.—Tell me then, what that is of which temperance is the science, and which is different from temperance itself?—This very thing, Socrates, said he, which you are now seeking, is that by which temperance differs from all other sciences: but you inquire after a certain similitude of it to other sciences. This however is not the case: for all other sciences are sciences of something different from themselves; but this alone is both the science of other sciences and of itself. And of these things you ought by no means to be ignorant. But I think that you do the very thing which you just now *denied* that you did¹ for you attempt to confute me, and dismiss that which is the subject of our discourse.—What are you doing, I replied? Do you think that if I should endeavour to confute you, I should do it on any other account, than that I might discover the meaning of what I assert, as I am fearful, lest whilst I think myself knowing, when at the same time I *am* not, I should be unconscious of my ignorance? And now I say that I do this, viz. consider the discourse, principally indeed for my own sake, but, perhaps also for the sake of my other friends. Or do you not think *it* is a common good, for the condition of every thing to become apparent *early* to all men?—Very much so, he replied, Socrates.—Boldly therefore, said I, O blessed man, give your opinion in answer to the question, dismissing the consideration whether it is Critias or Socrates who is confuted; but attend to the discourse itself, considering what will be the consequence when either of us is confuted.—I shall do so, he replied; for you appear to me to speak well.—Inform me therefore, said I, what you say respecting temperance.—I say then, he replied, that this alone, of all other sciences, is both the science of itself and of other sciences. Will it therefore, said I, be the science of ignorance¹, since it is of science?—Entirely so.—The temperate man therefore alone

¹ Socrates asks this, because there is one and the same science of contraries. Thus the medicinal science, which knows health, knows also disease.

will know himself, and will be able to explore what it is he knows, and what it is he does not know. In a similar manner likewise he will be able to consider respecting others, what it is which any one knows, and thinks he knows; and what it is which he himself thinks he knows, but does not know. But no other person will be able to accomplish this. Likewise this is to be temperate, and is temperance, and the knowledge of ourselves, to know what we know, and what we do not know. Are these the things which you assert?—They are, he replied.—Again therefore, said I, the third¹ to the Saviour, let us consider as it were from the beginning. In the first place, whether this is possible or not, that with respect to what a man knows, and does not know, he may know that he knows and does not know. And, in the next place, if this is possible, what will be the utility of it to us who know it.—It is requisite, said he, to consider this.—Come then, said I, Critias, consider whether you have any clear conceptions respecting these things. For I am dubious, and I will tell you in what.—By all means, said he.—The following consequence then, I replied, will ensue (if that is true which you just now asserted), that there is one science which is not the science of any thing else than of itself and other sciences, and of ignorance. Will not this be the case?—Entirely so.—See then, my friend, how absurdly we have endeavoured to speak. For if you consider this same thing in other things, it will, I think, appear to you to be impossible.—How and where?—In the following particulars. For consider, whether it appears to you that there is a certain sight, which is not the vision of those things which are the objects of other visions, but is the vision of itself and other visions, and is likewise the vision of that which is not vision: and again, in a similar manner, which does not see any colour, though it is sight, but sees itself and other visions. Does it appear to you that there is such a sight as this?—By Jupiter, it does not.—What then? Can there be an auditory sense, which does not hear any sound, but hears itself, and other hearings, together with a privation of hearing?—Nor yet this.—In short, therefore, consider with respect to all the senses, whether it appears to you that there is any sense, which perceives other senses and itself, but perceives none of those things which are the objects of the other senses.—This does not appear to me to

¹ See this explained in the Notes on the Philebus.

be the case.—But does it appear to you that there is any desire, which is the desire of no pleasure, but is the desire of itself and of other desires?—It does not.—Nor, as I think, is there any will which wills no good, but alone wills itself and other wills.—There is not.—But will you say that there is a love of such a kind, as to be the love of nothing beautiful, but which is the love of itself and other loves?—Not I, said he.—Do you conceive then, that there is any fear which fears itself and other fears, but fears nothing dreadful?—I do not, said he.—But is there any opinion which opines opinions and itself, but which forms no opinion respecting those things which are the subjects of other opinions?—By no means.—But we say, as it seems, that there is a science of such a kind, as to be the science of no discipline, but which is the science of itself and of other sciences.—We do say so.—Must it not therefore be wonderful if there is such a science? For we do not as yet strenuously contend that there is not, but consider if there is.—Right.—Come then, is this science the science of something? And does it possess a certain power, by which it is enabled to be the science of something?—Entirely so.—And must we not also say that the greater possesses a certain power, by which it is greater than something?—We must.—Must it not therefore be greater than something lesser, if it is greater?—It is necessary.—If therefore we should find something greater, which is greater than things greater, and than itself, but which is not greater than any of those things than which other things are greater, would it not follow that a thing of this kind, since it is greater than itself, is also less than itself?—This is perfectly necessary, Socrates, said he.—If therefore there is any thing which is double of other doubles, and of itself, it will be double of other doubles, and of itself, in consequence of being half. For nothing can be double of any thing else than of half.—True.—But being more than itself, will it not also be less than itself? And will not a thing which is heavier than, be also lighter than, itself? And that which is older than, be also younger than, itself? And in every thing else, in a familiar manner, will it not follow, that whatever has a power of its own with respect to itself, will also possess that essence to which this power is related? But my meaning is this: Do we not say, that hearing is nothing else than a hearing of sound?—We do?—If therefore it could hear
itself,

itself, would it not hear in consequence of itself possessing a voice? For otherwise it would not hear.—It is perfectly necessary this should be the case.—Sight likewise, O best of men, if it could itself see itself, must necessarily possess a certain colour. For without colour, sight would never be able to perceive any thing.—It would not.—You see therefore, O Critias, that the particulars which we have discussed, appear to us to be partly altogether impossible, and partly dubious in the extreme, whether they possess a power of their own with respect to themselves. For it is perfectly impossible that this can be the case with magnitude, multitude, and other things of this kind. Or is it not?—Entirely so.—Again, that hearing hears itself, and sight sees itself, and that motion moves itself, and heat burns itself, and all other such like assertions, may be not credited by some, but may perhaps be believed by others. But there is occasion, my friend, for some great man, who may be able to show sufficiently, by a division through all things, whether nothing except science naturally possesses a power of its own with respect to itself, and not a power only over something else; or whether this is the case with some things, and not with others: and again, if there are certain things which possess a power with respect to themselves, whether the science which we say is temperance, ranks in the number of these. For I do not believe myself sufficient for the discussion of these particulars: on which account I am not able strenuously to affirm, whether it is possible there can be a science of science. Nor if there is, could I admit that temperance is this science, till I had considered whether, being such, it would be of any advantage to us, or not. For I prophesy that temperance is something advantageous and good. Do you therefore, O son of Callæsebrus, (since you assert that temperance is this science of science, and likewise of ignorance,) in the first place evince this, that it is possible for you to prove that which I have just now mentioned; and in the next place, in addition to its being possible, show that it is profitable: and thus perhaps you will satisfy me that what you have said respecting temperance is right.—But, Critias, when he had heard these things, and saw that I was dubious, in the same manner as those that look directly at others who are gaping, gape themselves, so he appeared to me to be involved in doubt, in consequence of my doubting. However, being very much celebrated,

celebrated, he was ashamed of those that were present; and was neither willing to grant me that he was incapable of deciding the question which I proposed to him, nor yet did he assert any thing perspicuous, but concealed his perplexity. But I, that the discourse might proceed, said, If it is agreeable to you, Critias, we will now grant this, that it is possible there may be a science of science. But again, let us consider whether it is so or not. If therefore this is in the highest degree possible, why is it more possible to know what any one knows, and what he does not know? For we say that this is for a man to know himself, and to be temperate. Or do we not?—Entirely so, he replied, and this happens in a certain respect to be the case, Socrates. For if any one possesses that science which knows itself, he will be such as that is which he possesses. Just as when any one possesses swiftness, he is swift; when he possesses beauty, is beautiful; and when knowledge, is knowing. But when any one possesses a knowledge of himself, he will then become himself knowing himself.—To this I replied, I was not dubious, that when any one possesses the knowledge of himself, he then knows himself; but I was doubtful, what necessity compels the man who possesses this knowledge to know what he knows, and what he does not know.—Because, Socrates, this is the same with that.—Perhaps so, I replied; but I seem to be always similarly affected. For again, I do not understand how it is the same thing for a man to know what he knows, and to know what he does not know.—How do you mean? said he.—Thus, I replied. Since there is a science of science, will this science be able to divide any further than this, that of these things this is science, and that is ignorance?—It will not; but thus far alone.—Is the science therefore, and ignorance of that which is healthful, the same with the science and ignorance of the just?—By no means.—But I think that the one is a medicinal, and the other a political science; and that the science of science is nothing else than science.—Undoubtedly.—He therefore who has not a scientific knowledge of the healthy and the just, but alone knows science, as alone possessing science of this, such a one will know that he knows, and that he possesses a certain science, both with respect to himself and other things. Or will he not?—Yes.—But how will he know that he knows through this science? For he knows the healthful through the medicinal science, and not through temperance; the
harmonic

harmonic through the musical science, and not through temperance; and that which pertains to building through the architectural science, and not through temperance; and so in every thing else. Is it not so?—So it appears.—But how can temperance, if it is the science of sciences, know that it knows the salubrious, or that which pertains to building?—It cannot by any means.—Being therefore ignorant of this, it will not know that which it knows, but will alone know that it knows.—So it seems.—To know therefore that which we know, and that of which we are ignorant, will not be to be temperate, nor yet will be temperance, but as it seems this will consist alone in knowing that we know, and that we do not know.—It appears so.—Hence, he who possesses this science of sciences, will not be able to examine another, who professes to have a scientific knowledge, whether he knows scientifically or not that which he says he knows; but as it seems he will alone know this, that he possesses a certain science, but temperance will not enable him to know the object of this science.—It does not appear that it will.—Neither therefore will he be able to distinguish one who pretends to be a physician, but is not, from one who is a true physician, nor any other who is from one who is not endued with scientific knowledge. But let us thus consider; if a temperate man, or any other person, intends to discover a true and a false physician, will he not act as follows? He will not discourse with him respecting the medicinal science: for, as we have said, a physician attends to nothing else than the healthy and the diseased, the salubrious and the noxious. Is it not so?—It is.—But he knows nothing respecting science; for this we have attributed to temperance alone.—We have.—The physician therefore will not know any thing about medicine, since medicine is a science.—True.—And the temperate man will know that he possesses a certain science; but it is necessary that of this science the physician should make trial; and to know what this science is must be the province of some other person. Or is not every science defined by this, not only that it is a science, but by ascertaining what science it is, and what are its objects?—Yes.—The medicinal science, therefore, is defined to be different from other sciences in this, that it is the science of the salubrious and the noxious.—It is.—Is it not therefore necessary, that he who wishes to consider the medicinal science, should consider the subjects with which it is con-
versant?

verfant? For it is not proper to contemplate it in things external, with which it is not converfant.—Certainly not.—He therefore who contemplates rightly, will contemplate a physician, so far as he is a physician, in things falubrious and noxious.—So it seems.—In words and actions therefore, will not such a one consider whether what is asserted is true, and whether what is done is done rightly?—It is necessary.—But can any one accomplish this without the medicinal science?—Certainly not.—Nor yet can any other, as it seems, except the physician; nor can this be accomplished by the temperate man. For, besides being temperate, he would be a physician.—True.—More than any thing therefore will it follow, if temperance is alone the science of science, and the science of ignorance, that neither can he who knows the medical art, nor he who does not, be able to distinguish the real or pretended physician, or one who thinks he is a physician, nor can any other person who is knowing in any thing whatever, be able to accomplish this, except him who professes the same art, as is the case with other artists.—It appears so, said he.—What further utility then, Critias, shall we derive from temperance, if it is such as we have asserted it to be? For if, as we supposed in the beginning, the temperate man knows that which he knows, and that of which he is ignorant, knowing with respect to the former *that* he knows, and with respect to the latter that he does not know, and is able to contemplate another person who is affected in the very same manner,—if this be the case, we must say that we derive a great advantage from being temperate. For both we who possess temperance, and all such as are governed by us, shall pass through life without guilt; since we shall neither ourselves endeavour to do any thing which we do not know, but finding out skilful persons, commit it to their care, nor shall we allow those that are in subjection to us to do any thing else than what they will do well, but this will be that of which they possess a scientific knowledge. And thus through temperance we shall govern our families in a proper manner, well administer the affairs of cities, and every thing else which is under the dominion of temperance. For erroneous conduct being taken away, and rectitude being the leader in every action, it is necessary that men with these qualifications should act beautifully and well; and that those that act well should be happy. Should we not, O Critias, speak in this manner respecting temperance;

temperance ; asserting, how great a good it is to know what any one knows, and what he does not know ?—Entirely so, he replied.—But now, said I, you see that no such science has appeared to us any where.—I do see it, he replied.—Has not therefore, said I, temperance, which we have now found to be that which knows both science and the privation of science, this good, that he who possesses it will easily learn whatever else he may attempt to learn, and all things will appear to him in a clearer point of view ? Will not this likewise follow from his looking to science in whatever he learns ? And will he not examine others better, respecting things which he has learned ? And must not those who examine others without this, do it in a more imbecile and unbecoming manner ? Are these the privileges, my friend, which we enjoy through the possession of temperance ? But at the same time, do we look to something greater, and require temperance to be greater than it really is ?—Perhaps, said he, this is the case.—Perhaps so, I replied. And perhaps too we have investigated nothing profitable. But I conjecture this from hence, that certain absurd consequences appear to me to ensue respecting temperance, if it is such as we have defined it to be. For let us see, if you please admitting that it is possible to have a scientific knowledge of science ; and let us not deprive temperance of the power of knowing what it knows, and what it does not know, which we ascribed to it at first, but let us confer upon it this power. And, admitting all these particulars, let us still more diligently consider, if being such it will benefit us at present. For what we just now said, I mean that temperance would be a great good, if it were of such a nature as to govern families and cities, does not appear to me, O Critias, to have been properly granted.—How so, he replied.—Because, said I, we easily admitted, that it would be a great good to mankind, if each of us performed those things which we knew, and committed to others endued with knowledge the management of things of which we are ignorant.—Did we not then, said he, do right in assenting to these things ?—It appears to me, I replied, that we did not.—You really speak absurdly, said he, Socrates.—By the dog, said I, thus it appears to me. And just now looking at these things, I said, that they seemed to me to be absurd, and that I was afraid we had not rightly considered them. For in reality, if temperance is such as we have described it, it does not appear evident to me

me, what good it will produce for us.—Inform me, said he, how this is, that we also may know what you say.—I think, I replied, that I am trifling; but at the same time, it is necessary to consider that which presents itself to our view, and not rashly omit it, if any one pays to it the smallest degree of attention.—You speak well, said he.—Hear then, I replied, my dream, whether it has passed through the gate of horn¹, or through that of ivory. For if temperance should govern us, being such as we have now defined it to be, it would indeed act scientifically; nor would he who asserts himself to be a pilot, when he is not, deceive us; nor would a physician, nor a general of an army, nor any other who pretends to know that which he does not know, elude our penetration. But from these things thus subsisting, something else would happen to us; for our bodies would be more healthful than they are at present, and we should be preserved in the perils of the sea and war. We should likewise possess all our vessels and instruments, together with our garments, shoes, and all the conveniences and necessities of life, more artificially constructed than at present, because we should employ true artists. If also you are willing we should grant that prophecy is the science of that which is future, and that temperance presiding over it, avoids arrogant diviners, but chooses true prophets for the prediction of future events, I should affirm that the human race, furnished with this, would act and live scientifically. For temperance being our guard, it will not suffer ignorance interfering to cooperate with us. But that we shall act well and be happy, in consequence of acting scientifically, this, friend Critias, I am not yet able to understand.—But indeed, he replied, you will not easily find any other end of acting well, if you despise acting scientifically.—In-

¹ Socrates here alludes to Homer's well-known description of the two gates of dreams, of which the following explanation is given by Porphyry, as preserved by Macrobius in *Somn. Scip.* cap. 3. "All truth, says he, is latent; but this the soul sometimes beholds, when she is a little liberated by sleep from the employments of the body. And sometimes she extends her sight, but never perfectly reaches the object of her vision. Hence when she beholds, she does not see it with a free and direct light, but through an intervening veil, which the folds of darkening nature draw over her eye. This veil, when in sleep it admits the sight to extend as far as to truth, is said to be of horn, whose nature is such, from its tenuity, that it is pervious to the sight. But when it dulls the sight and repels it from the vision of truth, it is said to be of ivory, which is a body so naturally dense, that, however thin it may be scraped, it cannot be penetrated by the visual rays."

struck me therefore more particularly, I said, what kind of scientific action you mean. Is it that of cutting leather?—It is not, by Jupiter.—Is it that of a brazier?—By no means.—Is it that of a wool-worker, or a turner, or any such like artists?—It is not.—We must therefore, I replied, no longer persist in the assertion, that he is happy who lives scientifically. For these artists, though they live scientifically, are not acknowledged by you to be happy; but it appears to me that the happy man should be ranked among *certain* persons that live scientifically. And perhaps you will assert the happy man to be him whom I just now mentioned, I mean the diviner, who knows all future events. Do you speak of this, or of any other character?—Of this, said he, and another.—What other? I replied. Do you speak of the man who, besides knowing future events, knows every thing past and present, and is not ignorant of any thing? For let us admit that there is such a man: for I think you will not say that any one lives more scientifically than this man.—Certainly not.—But this also should be added, Which of the sciences makes him happy? Or do all the sciences similarly produce this effect?—By no means, said he.—But which most eminently accomplishes this? Is it that by which a man knows things past, present, and to come? And will it therefore be the science of chefs?—But why of chefs? he replied.—Will it then be the logistic science?—By no means.—Shall we say it is the science by which health is procured.—Rather so, said he.—But is it, I replied, especially that science by which we know some particular thing?—It is that, said he, by which we know good and evil.—O vile man, I replied, some time since you drew me round in a circle, concealing from me that to act well, and be happy, did not consist in living scientifically, and were not produced by the possession of all the other sciences, but are effected by one science alone, which enables us to know good and evil. And if, O Critias, you were willing to take away this science from the other sciences, would the medicinal science no less produce health, that of the leather-worker shoes, that of the weaver garments? And would the pilot's art no less prevent us from perishing in the sea, and the military science from being killed in battle?—No less, said he.—But, friend Critias, this science, by which we know good and evil, being taken away, each of these other sciences will no longer operate beneficially.—True.—But this science, as it seems, is not temperance, but that, the employment of which is to benefit us: for it is not

the science of sciences, and their privations, but it is the science of good and evil. So that if temperance is beneficial, it will be useful to us in some other respect.—But, he replied, is not temperance then beneficial? For if temperance is the science of sciences, and presides over other sciences, it will also benefit us by ruling over this science which is conversant with the good.—But will temperance, I replied, give us health, and not the medicinal science? And will this effect all that the other arts effect, so that each of these will no longer accomplish its proper work? Or did we not some time since testify that temperance is the science of science, and ignorance alone, but of nothing else? Is it not so?—So it appears.—It is not therefore the artificer of health.—Clearly not.—For health is the production of another art. Is it not?—It is.—Hence, my friend, temperance is not the artificer of utility: for we attributed this effect to another art. Did we not?—Entirely so.—How therefore will temperance be beneficial, since it is the artificer of no utility.—By no means, Socrates, as it seems.—Do you not see, therefore, Critias, that I was very properly afraid some time since, and that I justly accused myself, because I beheld nothing useful respecting temperance? For that which is acknowledged to be the most beautiful of all things, would not have appeared to us to be useless, if I were myself in any respect useful for the purpose of proper investigation. But now we are every way vanquished, and by no means able to discover with what design the legislator instituted this name temperance; although we have granted many things which by no means followed from our discourse. For we admitted, that there is a science of science, though our discourse neither suffers nor affirms this. We likewise granted that the works of other sciences were known by this science, though neither did our discourse suffer this, in order that we might define a temperate man to be one who knows that he knows the things which he knows, and who likewise knows that he does not know the things of which he is ignorant. This indeed we granted in a manner perfectly magnificent, not considering that it is impossible, after a manner, for a man to know that which he in no respect knows. For we agreed that he who is ignorant of any thing may know¹ that he is ignorant of that thing,

¹ He who is passing from twofold ignorance, or the being ignorant that he is ignorant, to knowledge, subsists in a middle condition between ignorance and knowledge. Accurately speaking,

thing, though in my opinion there is nothing which appears more irrational than this assertion. But at the same time, so silly were we, though not obstinate in the pursuit of this inquiry, that we were not rendered in any respect more able to discover the truth. Indeed, so ridiculous was our investigation, that what we had formerly acknowledged, and mutually devised to be temperance, this in a very insolent manner has appeared to us to be useless. On my own account, therefore, I am less indignant; but for your sake I replied, O Charmides, I am very indignant, if you who are so beautiful in your body, and most temperate with respect to your soul, derive no advantage from this temperance, and are not in any respect benefited in life by its presence. But I am still more indignant for the sake of the incantation, which I learned from a Thracian, if being a thing of no worth, I have bestowed so much labour in learning it to no purpose. I do not, therefore, by any means think that this is the case, but I am of opinion that I am a bad investigator. For I consider temperance as a certain mighty good; and I am persuaded, that if you possess it, you are *blest*. But see if you do possess it, and do not in any respect require the incantation. For if you possess it, I shall rather advise you to consider me as a trifler, and one who is incapable of investigating by discourse; but I shall advise you to consider yourself happy in proportion to the degree of temperance which you possess. And, O Charmides—— But, by Jupiter, Socrates, said he, I do not know whether I possess it, or not. For how can I know that, the nature of which you, as you say, are unable to discover? I, indeed, am not very much persuaded by you, and I consider myself, Socrates, to be greatly in want of the incantation. I likewise am of opinion, so far as pertains to myself, that nothing hinders me from being daily enchanted by you, as long as you shall think it necessary.— Be it so, said Critias: but, O Charmides, if you act in this manner, it will be to me as an argument that you are temperate, because you will present yourself to Socrates to be enchanted, and will not desert him for any occasion, whether great or small.—I shall follow, said he, and not desert him. For I should act in a dire manner, if I were not persuaded by you who are my tutor,

ing, therefore, he does not *know* that he is ignorant, but may be said to have a confused consciousness, or a dreaming perception, that he is so. This is the key to the profound meaning of Socrates when he said that he *knew* that he knew nothing, which I have explained in a note on the Apology, and elsewhere.

and did not do what you order.—But, said Critias, I do order you.—I shall, therefore, act in this manner, Charmides replied, beginning from this very day.—But what are these, I replied, deliberating about?—Nothing, said Charmides: but we have determined to act in this manner.—You have employed violence, therefore, said I, and do not permit me to interrogate.—Consider me as having used force, said he, since Critias commands me to adopt this mode of conduct. Besides this, do you also consult what you are to do.—But, I replied, there is no place left for consultation: for no man is able to oppose you, when you are endeavouring and compelling to do any thing.—Do not you, therefore, resist, said he.—I shall not indeed, said I, oppose you.

THE END OF THE CHARMIDES.

THE

THE
LESSER HIPPIAS:

A DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY ERROR.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE LESSER HIPPIAS.

IN this Dialogue Hippias the sophist bears the highest of the two subordinate parts or characters: from him therefore it derives its name¹; and the brevity of it, in comparison with the other between Socrates and the same sophist, has occasioned it to be called The Lesser Hippias.—The title prefixed to it in all the editions of Plato, which is this, *περὶ ψεύδους*, Concerning Lying, or untruth, is apparently defective; because it expresses only part of the subject: unless the word lying be there taken in the sense put upon it by a late writer², so as to relate to every part of human conduct. But this being not the proper sense of the word, we have ventured to change the title; and to assign such a one as, we think, comprehends the whole of the subject; and, in as few words as are requisite to some degree of clearness, shows the nature of it. For in this Dialogue is argued a point which has been long

¹ See the latter part of the Prologue.—S.

² Mr. Wollaston in his Religion of Nature delineated: where that very ingenious and learned man makes error, or deviation from rectitude in moral actions, to consist in acting a lie; that is, in acting as if the nature of that person or thing, whom or which our action concerns, were different from what it is: which in plain English, and agreeably to the language of the Platonists, is the same thing as acting with incongruity and impropriety; or, as the Stoics love to express themselves, acting contrary to nature, our own, and that of other things.—S.

the

the subject of much controversy, "whether error in the will depends on error in judgment." Socrates takes the affirmative side of the question: and his end in so doing is to prove the necessity of informing the understanding in moral truths, that is, of acquiring moral science; together with the necessity of maintaining the governing part within us in full power over that which is inferior, that is, of acquiring habits of virtue: through want of which science, and of which power or virtue, the philosopher insinuates, that man is either led blindly or impelled inevitably into evil. This design is executed in three parts. The first is concerning words: in which it appears, from inductive reasoning, that all untruth is owing either to some ignorance in the mind, that is, want of knowledge in those things which are the subjects of our affirmation or negation, or to some passion of the soul, desire of glory, for instance, prompting us to speak either deliberately and with design, like Hippias, or inadvertently and rashly, like Achilles, untruths or lies. The second part is concerning actions; and proceeds in the same way of reasoning by induction, to prove that all error in acting arises either from ignorance or weakness: seeing that in every action, merely corporeal, and also in the energies or works of every art, when faults are committed, such as are blamable, the cause of this is either defect of skill to design well, or defect of ability to execute. In the last part, by much the shortest, but for which the other two are intended by Plato, according to his usual manner, merely to prepare us, the reasoning is analytical; and proves, that in dishonest or bad men the understanding is either unenlightened by science, or overpowered and blinded by passion, or else suffers in both ways; and therefore that, with the ignorance or impotence of mind under which they labour, they labour at the same time under a necessity of doing ill: from which necessity they can be freed only by inward light and strength, that is, by science and virtue. Here we find the *Sapiens sibi que Imperiosus* of Horace, in a beautiful passage of his seventh Satire, the second book: so much of which as relates immediately to our purpose we have thus paraphrased;

Thy master does, himself, some master serve;
 Some impulse sets in action every nerve.
 Think not the puppet in his own command;
 His strings are guided by another's hand.

Who

Who then is free?—who not by passion fool'd,
 In every motion is by reason rul'd.
 To all but reason he, superior, still
 Moves but as bids him his own better will.

Agreeably to this is that doctrine of the Stoics, derived immediately, it should seem, from this dialogue of Plato, “that only the wise man is free¹,” upon which maxim the fifth Satire of Persius is a lively comment. But this being a philosophical paradox, Plato employs great address, in the insinuating into the mind a truth which our own consciousness seems to contradict: for who is there, not under outward restraint, and only influenced by inward motives, who does not think himself free? Our subtle philosopher therefore argues upon the supposition of the freedom of will in bad men; and by thus arguing, proves an absurdity, “that such as do evil wilfully are better men than those who do evil without intending it.” The consequence of which is this, that the argument proceeded upon a false supposition; for that none do evil with a clear-sighted and distinct view, and that in bad men the will is not free. Thus much only seems necessary for opening the concealed manner, design, and method of this dialogue. A more explicit and

¹ Plotinus also, the most antient Platonist of any whose writings are now remaining, proves that only mind or intellect is truly free; and that, therefore, liberty of will in man, or his having his actions in his own power, *το αὐτεξουσιν*, resides only in a soul whose inward operations follow the leading of intellect or mind, *εν ψυχῇ κατὰ νοῦν ενεργουση*. And at the end of his argument he thus concludes, The soul, therefore, becomes free through the government of the mind; pursuing thus, without impediment or hindrance, her way to good: *Γίνεται οὖν ψυχὴ ἐλευθερά διὰ νοῦ, πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν σπευδούσα ἀνεμπόδιστως*. Plotin. Enn. vi. l. viii. c. 5, 6, and 7. Alexander Aphrodis. also, the oldest interpreter of Aristotle extant, makes the essence of man's freedom to consist in his being governed *κατὰ λόγον τε καὶ κρίσιν*, by the judgment of his own reason; and in acting *κατὰ λογικὴν ὁρμήν*, from rational motives, or as he is prompted and excited by reason. See his treatise *Περὶ ἐμπερισταμένων*, §. 14, and 23. ed. Lond. and Aristotle himself, *Metaphysic.* l. ix. c. 5. Epicurus seems to have been the first who imagined human liberty to consist in acting without any motives at all, or at least independently of any. To account for which wild way of acting, he supposes that uncertain and unaccountable declination of atoms, or their deviation from the ordinary course of nature, for which he is justly reprehended by Cicero in many parts of his philosophical works. Yet this notion, or fancy, of Epicurus, concerning the liberty of the will, absurd as it is, hath been espoused by some modern writers of great name; though without his, or indeed any other ingenious contrivance to obviate the absurdity.—S.

particular account of them will appear in the process of our notes. The Introduction is too natural and easy to want any explication. The outward form of the Dialogue is simply dramatic: and as to its genius, it may perhaps not improperly be said to be of the confuting kind; for we would not, unless obliged by the necessity of reason, choose to differ from other writers, or depart from antient authority, by which it is pronounced anatreptic. What ground there is, however, for referring it to some other kind, will easily appear to the readers of our synopsis.—S.

THE LESSER HIPPIAS.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

EUDICUS, SOCRATES, HIPPIAS.

* SCENE.—*The SCHOOL of PHIDOSTRATUS.*

EUDICUS.

WHENCE comes it, Socrates, that you are so silent; when Hippias here has been exhibiting so finely and so copiously? Why do you not join the rest of the audience in praising his dissertation; or, at least, make some objections to it, if there was any thing in it which you disapproved?—All the company too are now departed, and we left by ourselves; we, who would claim an especial right to share in all philosophic exercises.

Soc. It would give me pleasure, Eudicus, I assure you, to ask Hippias a question

* The conversation, here related, was held presently after Hippias had finished the exhibiting or public reading of that dissertation of his, so highly celebrated by himself in the larger Dialogue of his name, and upon the same spot of ground, which had been the scene of his lecture. This is evident from many circumstances. In the first place, Eudicus, who is there mentioned as the patron of Hippias, and promoter of that exhibition in particular, sustains the same character in this Dialogue. He opens it with an air of triumph upon the success of Hippias, which appeared in the applause paid him by his audience: and whenever he speaks afterwards, he takes the air and style of a patron, one of that kind who are humble and ignorant admirers.—It is probable that he stayed behind, one of the last of the assembly, on purpose to have an opportunity of inviting and leading the orator to his house; to feast there together, upon his coming off so triumphantly; as the custom is in modern times upon similar occasions.—Further, it appears from that passage of the Greater Hippias before cited, that Socrates, with such of his philosophic friends as himself should choose, was, at the particular request of Hippias, to make part of the audience at his intended exhibition. It is reasonable therefore to suppose them to be admitted without paying their quota of the contribution money. Now this circumstance exactly tallies with what we

question or two, relating to a subject, which he has just now been treating of, taken out of Homer. For I have heard your father Apemantes say, that the Iliad of Homer was a finer poem than his Odyssey; and as far surpassed it in excellence, as the virtue of Achilles surpassed the virtue of Ulysses. For those two poems, he said, were purposely composed in honour of those two heroes: the Odyssey, to shew the virtues of Ulysses; the Iliad, those of Achilles. Concerning this very point then, I should be glad, if it pleases Hippias, to ask his opinion; what he thinks of those two persons, and whether of them in his judgment was the better man. For his exhibition, besides containing a great variety of other matters, displayed much learning in the poets, and particularly in Homer.

EUD. There is no doubt but Hippias, if you propose a question to him, will condescend to give an answer.—Will you not, Hippias, answer to any question which Socrates shall propose to you? or what other course will you take in the affair?

HIP. ¹ I should take a shameful course indeed, Eudicus, should I decline

find in this Dialogue. For, not to insist on the improbability that Socrates should have been present without such special invitation; it accounts for the tarrying behind of Socrates and his friends, out of civility to Hippias, who probably had conducted and introduced them to the place appointed for the exhibition.—That Socrates was at this time accompanied by some of his followers in philosophy, is plain from the first speech of Eudicus; at the conclusion of which he addresses Socrates in the plural number, meaning him and his friends.—One argument more, to prove that the exhibition of Hippias, which gave occasion to this Dialogue, was the same with that promised in the Greater Hippias, arises from the nature of the dissertation itself. For the characters of the heroes in Homer's Iliad were drawn in this which he had been exhibiting, as we learn from the following Dialogue; and it appears from the subject, the title, and introduction of the dissertation promised, that a description of those very characters made a considerable part of it.—Remarkable instances, all these, of Plato's exact fidelity in the dramatic circumstances of his Dialogues, if true; or of his accuracy and exquisite judgment in adapting them one to another and to probability, if they are feigned.—S.

¹ The usual manner of Plato, in his Dialogues, is to open the character of each person, in the beginning or first speeches of his part; a manner worthy the imitation of all dramatic poets. The most striking feature in the character of Hippias is vanity, or the desire of false and vain applause: accordingly, it is here, in the very outset of the Dialogue, shown in a strong light. But there is, besides, a peculiar reason for displaying it in the beginning of this particular Dialogue, because the display of Hippias's vanity, and of the influence that vanity had upon his conduct, makes a material part of the subject and design.—S.

answering

answering to any question put by Socrates ; I, who never fail my attendance at the Olympic games ; and, quitting the privacy of home, constantly present myself in the temple there, to dissert, before the general assembly of the Grecians, upon any of the subjects which I have then ready for exhibition, such as shall be chosen by the audience ; and to answer to any question which any man shall think fit to ask.

Soc. Happy is the situation of your mind, Hippias, that, as often as the Olympic festival returns, you can ¹ proceed to the temple with a soul so full of alacrity and hope, through consciousness of wisdom. I should much wonder, if any one of the athletic combatants, on that occasion, marched to the engagement with half that security and confidence in the powers of his body, which you, according to your own account, have in the abilities of your mind.

Hip. I have reason, Socrates, to entertain such confidence. For, since the time when I first contended for a prize in the trials of skill at the Olympics, I have never met with a man my superior in any which I engaged in.

Soc. The reputation of your wisdom, Hippias, will be a fair monument of glory to your family and country.—But what say you to our question concerning Achilles and Ulysses ? Whether of the two, think you, was the better man ; and in what respects ? For, amidst the multitude of people, who were within, thronging about you at your exhibition, I missed hearing some part of what you said ; and, though desirous of asking you to repeat it over again, I suppressed that desire, on account of the greatness of the crowd, and because I would not interrupt your dissertation. But since we are reduced

¹ That is, when he was going to engage in those voluntary combats or contentions between the sophists, to prove which of them could make the finest exhibition. The decision of these seems to have been left to that judicious audience of theirs, the multitude ; who promulgated their sentence, we presume, in their usual way, by bestowing a more or less loud roar of applause, in proportion as they were more or less pleased with each of the combatants in these bye-battles. For, as it is certain that these made no part of those solemn combats or competitions at the Olympic festival, according to its original institution ; so neither do we suppose them in the number of those added afterwards, those in the liberal arts and sciences. It is more probable that the sophists, with a view of spreading their fame wider, exhibited on these occasions, gratis, to the public, the most approved of their dissertations made for private exhibition.—S.

to so small a number, and since Eudicus here encourages me to ask you, give me a precise and clear account of what you then said of those two heroes, and what distinction you made between their characters.

HIP. Well, Socrates; I am willing to inform you, more precisely and distinctly than I did in my exhibition, what my sentiments are concerning those heroes, and others beside,—I say then, that Homer has made Achilles superior in virtue to all the Grecians who were at the siege of Troy, Nestor superior in wisdom, and Ulysses in cunning.

SOC. Ah, Hippias! Will you grant me one favour more? and that is, not to laugh at me, if I am slow in apprehending what you say, and importune you with frequent and repeated questions. Will you endeavour, on the contrary, to give me mild and gentle answers?

HIP. Since I profess the instructing others in the knowledge of those very things which are the subjects of your inquiry, and think that knowledge so rare, as to deserve the being well paid for, it would be unfair and dishonourable in me, Socrates, not to pardon your ignorance, and give a mild answer to your questions.

SOC. Very fairly and honourably spoken.—You must know then, that when you said Achilles was made by Homer superior in virtue, I seemed to apprehend your meaning: as I also did, when you told me that his Nestor was made superior in wisdom. But when you further said, that the poet had made Ulysses superior in cunning, what you mean by this, to confess to you the truth, I am entirely ignorant of.—Possibly I may apprehend your meaning better by your answer to this question: Is not cunning part of the character of Achilles, as drawn by Homer?

HIP. Nothing like it; but the height of simplicity. For in the ninth book of the Iliad, where Achilles and Ulysses are introduced in conversation together, Achilles, addressing himself to Ulysses, speaks thus:

Son of Laertes, progeny of Jove!
Subtle thy wit, Ulysses, and thy brain

¹ It must be remembered, that we have professed to translate the passages, taken out of Homer, not immediately from the poet, but from Plato. Now in these verses, as here cited, besides other various readings, there is one whole line omitted; which, though of importance in the poem, is insignificant to the design of Hippias in citing the passage.—S.

Full

Full of devices various : but to me
 Plain speech belongs ; and bluntly to declare
 My mind, my meaning, and my fix'd resolve.
 Not the black gates of hades are to me
 More hostile or more hateful, than the man
 Whose tongue holds no communion with his heart.
 Thus then the secret purpose of my soul
 I tell thee—in no fruitless words ; the deed
 Shall follow.—

In these verses we see the character of each of those heroes : we see Achilles sincere and simple, Ulysses false and cunning. For Achilles is made the speaker of these verses, and to Ulysses are they spoken.

Soc. Now, Hippias, I am in some hopes of understanding what you mean. False you call cunning, it seems ; and a cunning man, with you, I find, is a man of falsehood.

Hip. Exactly so, Socrates. And Homer accordingly has made Ulysses a man of that very character, in many places both of the Iliad and of the Odyssey.

Soc. Homer then, it seems, was of opinion, that the man of truth was a man of different character from the man of falsehood.

Hip. Certainly, Socrates. How should it be otherwise ?

Soc. And are you of the same opinion then yourself, Hippias ?

Hip. Most certainly. For it would be of sad consequence to have those two opposite characters confounded.

Soc. Homer then let us leave out of the question : it being impossible for us to ask him, what he had in his mind when he wrote those verses. But, since you appear to second and support his cause, and to entertain the same sentiments with those which you attribute to him, do you answer at the same time for both, for the poet and yourself.

Hip. So it shall be. Ask any question then, whatever you think fit ;— only let it be brief.

Soc. ¹ By men of falsehood, do you mean men who are under some such kind

¹ Plato, in this and the questions which follow, informs us what are the sources of vice and moral

kind of inability to certain actions, as men who are sick labour under ? or do you mean men of abilities and powers for some or other performance ?

HIP. I mean men, who have powers, and those very strong ones too, for many purposes, but particularly to deceive others.

SOC. The cunning then, it seems, according to your account, are men of strong powers and abilities. Are they not ?

HIP. They are.

SOC. Is it through folly, and want of understanding, that they are cunning and deceitful ? or is it through artfulness and understanding—of a certain kind ?

HIP. Through artfulness in the highest degree, and depth of understanding.

SOC. They are men of good understanding then, it seems.

HIP. They are in no want of understanding, by Jupiter.

SOC. Since they have understanding then, are they ignorant of what they are about ? or do they know it ?

HIP. They know well enough what they do. And through this very knowledge it is that they are so wicked.

SOC. With this knowledge then, which they are masters of, can they want discipline or skill ? or do they abound in it ?

HIP. They have discipline and skill very sufficient for their purpose, that is, to deceive.

SOC. Hold now : let me recollect all that you have said. You assert, that men of falsehood are men of abilities, understanding, knowledge, and skill ;—that is, in those subjects, in which they deceive.

HIP. I do.

SOC. And that men of sincerity and men of falsehood are different kinds of men, and of quite opposite characters one to the other.

HIP. I own this assertion also.

moral evil. The first is some disorder in the body, obscuring the light of the mind, or obstructing the operation of its faculties. Another is some defect in the natural powers of the understanding. A third is want of science : and the fourth, want of virtuous habit and practice.—S.

SOC.

Soc. Well then; amongst the men of abilities and skill, some, it seems, are men of falsehood, according to your account.

HIP. Most true.

Soc. When you say now, that men of falsehood are men of abilities and skill in certain respects, do you mean that they are able to deceive, if they are willing so to do? or think you that they want abilities for the purpose of deceiving?

HIP. I think they have abilities for that purpose.

Soc. To sum up the whole then; men of falsehood are men who have skill and ability to deceive.

HIP. Right.

Soc. The man therefore, who has no ability or skill to deceive, cannot be a man of falsehood, or a deceiver.

HIP. Very right.

Soc. ¹ Whether is that man able to do what he wills, who can exercise his ability at whatever time he chooses? that is, supposing him not hindered by some disease or ² other thing of that kind: but in the same manner, I mean, as you are able, whenever you choose it, to write my name. Say you not, that every such man is able, who has the like power in other cases?

HIP. I do.

Soc. Tell me now, Hippias; are not you well versed in numbers and accounts?

HIP. Perfectly well, Socrates.

Soc. Were a man to ask you then, "How many are thrice seven hundred," would you not answer that question, if you chose so to do, perfectly well, and with the utmost readiness?

HIP. I certainly should.

Soc. And that, because your ability and skill are excellent in subjects of that kind.

HIP. True.

¹ This sentence is evidently intended by Plato as a question, not as a positive consequence from any thing before said. Yet all the editors have given it this wrong turn, by falsely printing ἀγα instead of ἀρα. And all the translators were in this, as in most other places, misled by the erroneous printing of the Greek text.—S.

² That is, any outward impediment. In the vulgar use of the words, power and liberty, the absence of outward obstacles and impediments only is considered.—S.

Soc. Do you excel in ability and skill only? or is your virtue¹ equal to your ability and skill—with respect to the same subject; that is, numbers and accounts?

HIP. It is, Socrates.

Soc. You are perfectly well able, then, upon these subjects, to speak the truth: are you not?

HIP. So I imagine.

Soc. But what; are you not equally able to speak untruths upon the same subject? Answer me now, Hippias, as you did before, with a generous freedom and openness. Were a man to ask you, then, "How many are thrice seven hundred?" would not you be the best able to impose on others, and always to give answers alike untrue upon that subject, if you had a constant inclination to impose falsehood for truth, and never at any time to give a right answer? Or would the unskilled in computations be better able to deceive than you are, if they were so inclined? Might² not the ignorant, however desirous of persisting in false answers, frequently happen to stumble on such as were true, out of mere ignorance? But you, who have skill, should you also have an inclination to deceive, would you not always invariably answer wrong?

HIP. Certainly; the case is as you represent it.

Soc. Now the man of thorough falsehood, is he a deceiver in other cases only, but not so in numbering and computing?—Would he not deceive others, when numbers and computations were the points in question?

HIP. By Jupiter, would he³.

Soc. Let us suppose, then, Hippias, some certain person to be a false man, or a deceiver, upon the subject of numbers and computations.

HIP. Well.

Soc. What kind of person must he be? In order to be a deceiver, must he not, as you yourself just now acknowledged, have abilities to deceive?—

¹ Socrates here means justice, particularly that part of it which is called veracity.—S.

² In the original here we certainly ought to read *ἢ ὁ μὲν ἀμαθὴς*, and not *ἢ* (or) as it has been hitherto printed, and accordingly translated.—S.

³ Numbers and accounts being the chief articles in which bad men are guilty of fraud and falsehood.—S.

for,

for, as to any other man, who wanted those abilities, you admitted, if you remember, that such a one would never be a good deceiver.

HIP. I remember, we agreed in this.

SOC. Was it not proved just now, that you yourself was in the highest degree capable of deceiving others, by false information, upon the subject of numbers and accounts?

HIP. In this too we agreed.

SOC. And are you not in the highest degree capable of giving true information upon the same subject?

HIP. Certainly.

SOC. One and the same person therefore has abilities beyond other men to give either false or true information upon the subject of numbers and accounts: and a good arithmetician is this person.

HIP. Without doubt.

SOC. Who appears, then, Hippias, to be the man of falsehood¹, and the deceiver, with regard to numbers and accounts? Is it any other than the good arithmetician? for he it is who is the most able. And the same man is also the true accountant.

HIP. So it appears.

SOC.² You see then that it belongs to the same man to be a man of falsehood

¹ Both members of this sentence, in the original, are by all the editors erroneously, as we apprehend, made interrogative; and are so translated by Serranus and Bembo. The other versions, in this place, concur with ours.—S.

² Aristotle observes, that Plato here makes use of a paralogism, or sophistical way of arguing: for by ψευδης, or, a man of falsehood, Plato, says he, means a man δυναμενος ψευδισθαι, capable of speaking untruths; whereas the word properly signifies a man ευχερης και προαιρετικος των τοιoutων [sc. ψευδων] λογων, μη δι' ιτερον τι, αλλα δι' αυτο, και ο αλλοις εμποητικος των τοιoutων λογων, apt to speak falsities through choice, and with intention to deceive, and to beget in others false notions of things. Aristot. Metaphysic. l. v. c. 29. And such a man, it is true, is the subject of the present dispute between Socrates and Hippias; but it is an innocent piece of sophistry; since it is not employed for the purpose of deceiving any, but for that only of discovering truth; and turns into just reasoning, when the inference comes afterwards to be drawn from all the instances enumerated. Aristotle does not condemn Plato as guilty of arguing unfairly, or of putting off one sense of the word for another; but as he treats, in that chapter of his Metaphysics, concerning the various meanings of the words false and falsity, he produces from this passage of Plato a singular instance of an improper use of the term ψευδης, false, when applied to man.—S.

³ In this sentence Socrates makes the application of his first instance, to prove the truth of his general

falsehood and a man of truth on such subjects ; and that the man of truth is not a better man in this respect, than the man of falsehood : for indeed he is the same person ; so far is he from being one of opposite character, as you just now imagined.

HIP. It appears so in this case, I own.

Soc. Shall we try how it appears in other cases ?

HIP. With all my heart ; if you choose to go on to others.

Soc. Have not you great skill in geometry ?

HIP. I have.

Soc. Well then ; is it not so in geometry ? Is not one and the same person capable of giving either true or false information concerning diagrams ?

HIP. I admit he is.

Soc. Is any other person beside good at diagrams ?

HIP. No other.

Soc. A good and skilful geometrician, then, is equally capable, in either way, above other persons : and, if there be any excellent deceiver upon the subject of diagrams, it must be such a man : for he has abilities to deceive ; whereas the bad geometrician is wanting in those abilities : so that neither in this case can the man who has no abilities to deceive ever be a deceiver or man of falsehood, as you before admitted.

HIP. You are right.

Soc. Further now, let us consider a third case, that of astronomy ; in which science you have a still deeper knowledge than you have in those mentioned before. Is it not true, Hippias ?

HIP. It is.

Soc. Does not the same thing then hold good in astronomy ?

HIP. It is probable that it does, Socrates.

Soc. In this case, therefore, it is the good astronomer who is, above all others, the man of falsehood ; he who is able and well qualified to deceive : for it cannot be the man who is ignorant in astronomy ; because such a one is unable and unqualified for that purpose.

general position : we have, therefore, with all the translators, except Serranus, given it the air of an absolute assertion ; contrary to the printed editions of the Greek, in which it is turned into a question.—S.

HIP.

HIP. It appears so.

SOC. One and the same man therefore, in astronomy also, is the man of truth and the man of falsehood.

HIP. So it seems to be, I confess.

SOC. Now, Hippias, let us proceed to consider, in general and at large, through all the arts and sciences, if there be any case in which that position fails of being true. You must be a competent judge of this, because your knowledge is universal, and you are master of more arts than any man living : ¹ as I have heard you yourself declare, at some of the tables in the assembly-

¹ Whenever Plato brings instances from the mathematical sciences, in order to prove or to illustrate any truth running through them all, he does it always with a view of leading the mind upward from them to that master-science*, that from which they receive their principles, the science of mind ; or at least to its immediate and noblest offspring, that of morals. See particularly his Theætetus, Republic, and Epinomis. We make this observation here, to show the scope of the argument now used by Socrates. The small company about him, all of them, except Hippias and Eudicus, were his own disciples, and of his intimate acquaintance : consequently they were used to this method of reasoning in the discourses of their master. It was easy for them therefore to apply the instances, which he brought from the lower sciences, agreeably to his intention ; and to infer from thence, that, if his present argument were just, it would hold good in those higher sciences. But the absurdity of this must have been clearly apparent to them : for they knew that the truly wise and good man was, with a full and free choice, attached to truth ; and consequently, where veracity was concerned, was indeed *μη διαίμενος ψευδισθαι*, incapable of uttering falsities, or untruths, in a moral sense ; and that in such cases, *ψευδης*, a man of falsehood, in Plato's sense of the word, was the same with *ψευδης* in Aristotle's sense of it, or *ψευδολος*, a man given to speak falsities, and was the reverse therefore of the man of truth. Hence they saw, it followed, that, contrary to the account given by Hippias, the false man, or deceiver in words, was under some natural inability either of body or of mind, or was ignorant and void of the best science, or wanted skill and experience in the art of human life, that is, practical virtue. Aristotle rightly observes, that Plato produces these instances of falsehood, in the way of induction, to prove the same thing universally to be true of all moral evil. The inference, therefore, is, that no man is a wicked or bad man *ικων*, with a clear-sighted and free choice, but *ακων*, through the power of some evil necessity.—S.

* Socrates, to put his meaning beyond all doubt with the intelligent part of his audience, presents to their view next, in a very strong light, the character of Hippias himself, as full of false boasting and vain pretensions, which in him were clearly the effects of a total ignorance in moral science. He had been, it seems, though probably but for a short time, a disciple of Hegesidamus, or, as he is called by Jamblichus, (in Vit. Pythag. cap. ult.) Agesidamus, a Pythagorean philosopher of Metapontum in Lucania ; who taught, that the perfection, end, and happiness of man

* This master-science is by Plato called *dialectic*, and by Aristotle metaphysics. For an account of which see the Introduction to the Parmenides.—T.

assembly-hall¹; where you were setting forth in ample detail, and glorying in, the variety of your valuable and rare knowledge. You there told us that you went once to the Olympic festival, with your attire, and every thing which you had about you; all the making of your own hands: in the first place, that the seal-ring which you wore on your finger, for you began with that, was your own work, proving thus your skill in cutting intaglios. Beside that,

consisted in *αὐτάρκεια*, self-sufficiency: but Hippias was so blind, it seems, to the true meaning of that sublime doctrine, and so stupid with regard to truth, whether metaphysical or moral, as to imagine, that the being able to furnish himself from himself with all the conveniences and even ornaments of life, and not to be indebted to any other artists for such as their respective arts afford, was the self-sufficiency recommended by the philosopher. See Quintilian. *Inst. Orat.* l. xii. c. 11. where that most judicious writer seems to have accounted for the conduct of Hippias from this ridiculous error of his: for, in order to attain self-sufficiency, Hippias aimed at acquiring skill in all the several arts requisite for that purpose; and, falling far short of an acquisition which is beyond the powers of any one man, he yet arrogantly pretended to it, through a desire of being admired by the multitude, and for want of that true self-sufficiency taught by Hegesidamus: to understand which it may be necessary in this place to observe, that in the days of Thales the Ionian arose Pythagoras; who in the southern parts of Italy, where Grecian colonies had settled, founded a sect of philosophers, from their country called Italic. The chief object of their philosophy was the knowledge of mind; which they considered as the first-moving principle in nature, and the fountain of all action; moving the soul to act with a view always to some end, which end always is some good. They held, that, as the universe was perfect and complete, actuated by soul under the direction of mind, this universal mind was *αὐτοτελής*, that is, had in himself his own end, the possession of all good, and was sufficient to his own perfect happiness: the universal soul, therefore, acted only for the sake of producing good to particular beings, as many as was possible, and of communicating to particular minds the happiness of its own. Now this arising from its self-sufficiency, independence, and the contemplation of all being and beauty within itself, the great points of the Pythagorean moral were to free man from his dependance on things out of himself, to purge his soul from those passions by which he is attached to them, and to remove his life from those incumbering pursuits which hinder the contemplation of truth, and hide the view of archetypal and true beauty. Accordingly these philosophers taught, that the end of man was *ὁμοιωσις τῷ Θεῷ*, a resembling of God: which Hegesidamus explained by *αὐτάρκεια*, self-sufficiency: and his explication is confirmed by what Socrates in Xenophon teaches, (*Mem.* l. i. p. 79. ed. Simpfon.) that “to want nothing is peculiar to the divine nature; and to have the fewest wants is approaching to it the nearest.” This self-sufficiency, by which a man becomes independent; and is free, like God himself, to do good to all; is the same thing also with that freedom of the soul, the desire of which to raise in his disciples is the ultimate end of Plato in this Dialogue.—S.

¹ The *αγορά*, or place where the people met, and voted in their general assemblies, was the place likewise of exchange: for at certain hours of the day mercantile business was here transacted: and at certain other hours the shops within it all around were opened, and tables were brought out, on which

that, you had another seal of your own engraving : a strigil too¹, and an unguent-box, of your own workmanship. Your father said, that the slippers, which you then had on your feet, were of your own cutting out and making ; and that the garments which you then wore, the upper and the under both, were of your own weaving. But, what seemed the strangest thing of all, and a proof of your ingenuity and skill the most surprising, you told us, that the belt or girdle, which you wore round your vest, (and it was of that rare and costly sort, such as they make in Persia,) was entirely your own manufacture. Beside all this, you carried with you thither, on that occasion, poems, you said, of your own composing, epic, tragic, and dithyrambic ; together with a great number of your compositions in prose upon various subjects. You assured us, that in the sciences, those we have just now been speaking of, you was superior to every person then at the Olympics ; as you also was in the science of rhythm and harmony, and that of grammar. You enumerated, as well as I remember, a multitude of other branches of knowledge which you excelled in. But, I think, I had like to have forgotten your art of memory, for which you are so famous. Many other arts I presume you have, which I cannot recollect at present. But what I mean is this ; to put you upon considering those arts and sciences, which you are master of, (and I have mentioned a sufficient number of them,) and all those beside, which are severally professed by others ; and then to ask you, if you can think of any, where the man of truth and the

which all kinds of shop-commodities were exposed to sale, each kind severally in a peculiar part of this vast edifice ; that every person who came to purchase might know where to meet directly with what he wanted. At some of these shops and tables much time was spent by the talkative, the inquisitive, and the idle.—S.

¹ This was an instrument used by the old Greeks and Romans to clean the skin ; and serving them, besides, for the same purposes with our flesh-brush : for the antient politer nations took a much better care of their persons than is customary amongst the modern Europeans. Whenever their bodies were fouled, as after travelling, or walking in dusty roads, after wrestling, or other exercises, which they used almost naked in rooms strewed deep with a soft sand, (to procure them, when they fell, an easy fall,) they rubbed themselves gently with these strigils ; bathing at the same time in warm baths, which were very numerous, and to be met with in all great towns and cities. At other times a more vehement rubbing served in the room of exercise itself. After using the strigil, they anointed themselves all over, especially about their joints, with some perfumed oil or unguent. Thus the skin was cleansed, the blood was equally circulated, the muscles were strengthened, and the joints made supple and pliant.—S.

man

man of falsehood, as we have described them, are distinct persons; and where the same man is not equally fitted for speaking truth and falsehood. Consider the matter in any art you please, in any kind of wisdom, skill, or cunning, or whatever else you choose to name it, and you will never find it so to be; since it is not there to be found. For if you know any, which affords such an instance, tell me what it is.

HIP. I am not able, Socrates, thus on the sudden.

SOC. Nor ever, as I imagine, will you be able. If I am in the right then, remember, Hippias, what conclusion follows from my reasoning.

HIP. It does not readily occur to me, Socrates, what conclusion it is you mean.

SOC. You do not perhaps at present exercise your art of memory. No doubt, you think there is at present no occasion for it. I will assist you therefore in recollecting. Do you not remember that you said, Achilles was a man of truth, and Ulysses a man of cunning and falsehood?

HIP. I do.

SOC. But now you perceive, that the man of truth and the man of falsehood have proved to be the same person. So that, if Ulysses was a man of falsehood, it appears that he was no less a man of truth; and if Achilles was a man of truth, we find he must also have been a man of falsehood. These two characters then are not heterogeneous, one from the other; much less are they opposite, as you imagined; but are similar, and meet in the same man.

HIP. Socrates, you are always twisting and winding arguments in this sort of way. In every matter of debate, you always pick out that point in which most difficulty lies; you stick close to that, and handle it with a most minute exactness: but you never meddle with the ¹ whole of the subject, considered in one view. For I can produce you now a multitude of proofs,

¹ Hippias himself is here made to expose his own loose, vague, and declamatory way of talking; so opposite to that close, precise, and truly logical manner of Socrates in his discourses, by which alone truth can be discovered, and the disputes arising in conversation be brought to any rational or fair conclusion. But this not being now or ever the intention of Hippias, he expresses in this speech his uneasiness at the present method of managing the debate, and his desire of returning to his usual long harangues; showing himself in this respect also the *ψευδης*, or man of falsehood; according to the old maxim, "*Dolus versatur in generalibus*," The man, who means to deceive, deals only in generals, and avoids coming to particulars.—S.

if you are disposed to hear them, sufficient to convince you, that Homer has made Achilles a man of sincerity, and of greater virtue than Ulysses ; whom he has made crafty, false, and deceitful, in fine, a worse man than Achilles. And to oppose my proofs, do you, if you have a mind to it, bring others on your side of the question, to prove Ulysses the better man : by which means our little audience here may be the better enabled to judge which of us speaks the best.

Soc. ' I have no doubt, Hippias, but that your wisdom is superior to mine. But it is a constant rule with me, at the time when any man is speaking, to give him my attention ; especially, if I think him a wise man : and, as I am desirous of comprehending perfectly all he means, afterwards I interrogate, and sift him thoroughly concerning all he has said ; I consider it over again, and compare it with the account he gives me in his answers, in order to my own better information. But if I think the speaker insignificant, and not worth regarding, after he has done speaking, I ask him no questions, nor give myself any trouble about what he has been talking of. You may know by this, what persons I account wise. You may also find, that I am studious and solicitous about the sayings of ² such a man ; that I am busy and restless in putting questions to him, with a view of being improved by the acquisition of some piece of knowledge. Accordingly, I took particular notice, in my own mind, of something ³ which seemed to me very strange in that passage of Homer, if your interpretation of it be true, that which you repeated just now, to prove that Achilles treated Ulysses as a deceiver. This to me, I say, seemed strange ; because Ulysses, your cunning Ulysses, no where appears to have spoken untruths : but it is Achilles, whom we find cunning, according to your account, as being a teller of falsties and deceiving others. For having premised that fair profession, which you just now repeated,

² Socrates here intimates, that the source of that habit, which Hippias had, of lying and deceiving, was a fondness for unmerited or false praise, with an affectation of being thought wise.

³ The word in the original here is printed *ταυτα*, but we presume ought to be either *ταυτων*, agreeably to the translations of Ficinus and Gryneus, or as we have supposed it in ours, *τοιυτου*.—S.

³ From the sense it is evident, that we ought here to read in the Greek *δ*, *τι—ατομων*, κ. τ. λ. not *ατι δ* [*ivot*,] an error frequent throughout the printed text. Stephens has frequently indeed corrected it ; but has passed it over in this and many other places.—S.

Not the black gates of hades are to me
 More hostile or more hateful, than the man
 Whose tongue holds no communion with his heart.

A little afterwards he declares, that he would not be dissuaded from his purpose, not by Ulysses and Agamemnon together; nor would he be by any means prevailed on to stay in the Trojan territories; but, says he,

¹ To-morrow, after sacrifice to Jove
 And all that next in nature is divine,
 My well-mann'd galleys launch I from the shore
 Into the briny waves: and thou shalt see,
 (If curious of the sight, or thy concern
 Thou mak'st it,) with the dawning hour of day,
 My fleet spread o'er the fishy Hellespont;
 With many an eager stroke of the brisk oars
 Short'ning the passage: and if Neptune grant
 Prosperous voyage, the third returning light
 Shall view me on rich Pthia's fertile plains.

Besides, long before this, with an air of insult he had said thus to Agamemnon,

² And now with my full galleys I depart,
 Steering my course for Pthia:—my best course
 Is homeward,—here dishonour'd.—Nor shalt thou
 Meet better fare, I ween:—no more expect
 Spoils and rich plunder shall attend thine arms.

Now though he had made this declaration, first in the face of the whole army, and afterwards to such as were intimate with him, it no where appears, that he made any preparations for his voyage, or any attempts toward the launching of his ships, in order to his departure homeward; but, on the contrary,

¹ We meet with this passage in the ninth book of the Iliad, v. 357, &c. a little after the former; and both of them exactly as they are cited by Plato.—S.

² The verses, here cited, occur in the first book of the Iliad, with a difference only in one word. For instead of *αἰών*, which we read in Plato, we find in Homer *ἐπίτερον*: a difference not taken notice of by Barnes in his Var. Lect. Perhaps he thought it not of importance enough to mention. But, in editions of the finest writers of antiquity, too minute an accuracy, we think, never can be used.—S.

with a noble indifference, he disregarded the keeping of his word and the speaking truth. It was for this reason, Hippias, that I proposed my first question to you; because I was at a loss to know, which of those two heroes the poet had made the better man: but I presumed that both were excellent; and that it was difficult to determine whether was the superior, as well with respect to speaking truth and¹ falsehood, as every other kind of virtue; for in that point, no less than in others, they seemed nearly on a par.

HIP. You view not the matter in its true light, Socrates. For, though Achilles breaks his word, it is plain that he had no intention to deceive, nor any dissembled meaning: but, against his inclination, he is obliged, by the distresses of the army, to stay and give them his assistance. But when Ulysses speaks falsely, it is with design, and his falsehood is voluntary.

SOC. My dear friend Hippias, you deceive me; and are guilty, yourself, of doing as you say Ulysses did.

HIP. Far from it, Socrates. How mean you? and in what respect?

SOC. By telling me, that Achilles had no intention to deceive, nor any dissembled meaning: whereas Achilles, in saying through arrogance what he had no serious intention of doing, was so² artful an impostor, as Homer has represented him, that he appears confident of outwitting Ulysses, and concealing from him the emptiness of his arrogance; nay, to that degree confident, as to dare in his presence to contradict himself. Accordingly we find Ulysses actually imposed upon: for, as we see from his silence on that head, he discovered not that Achilles had told him any untruth.

HIP. Where is all this to be found, Socrates?

¹ Socrates here mentions falsehood as well as truth, in order to preserve consistence in his argumentation; having proved to Hippias, that the speaking falsehood well was the effect of some kind of knowledge and virtue.—S.

² In the Greek, Γῶς, or cunning juggler. By Achilles here, we suppose, is meant that very passion of arrogance in him, which is the most distinguished part of his character. For all the great actions and events of Homer's *Iliad* turn upon the desire of Achilles to show to the Grecians the importance of his presence and his aid. By the same name, Γῶς, is the passion of love called in Plato's *Banquet*, and in the same metaphorical sense; because both these passions impose upon a man's own understanding, and force him to say and do things, to which his reason is by no means privy; putting him, as in this case of Achilles, upon contradictory promises and assertions; and by their bold assurance, making him believe them all, by turns, himself.—S.

SOC. Do you not remember, that ¹ after he had declared (as he did to Ulysses), that he would set sail early the next day; to Ajax on the other hand he says no such thing, but tells him a quite different story.

HIP. In what passage?

Soc. In this,

* No more in bloody field shall I engage,
I nor my forces; till great Ilium's son,
The godlike Hector, worthy of his fire,
Through heaps of slaughter'd Greeks, victorious reach
My myrmidons; or till his hostile flames,
Spreading from ship to ship, approach my own.
Then,—near my vessel, or my tent, I trust,
Shall Hector's fury, though impetuous, meet
A bound impassable.——

Now can you imagine, Hippias, that he was so forgetful, this son of the goddess Thetis, this pupil of the sage Chiron, as that, after throwing out the bitterest reproaches upon such as speak what they mean not, he should first tell Ulysses that he would sail away, and then, through forgetfulness, assure Ajax that he would continue where he was? Do you not think that he must have talked in this manner with design, and from a supposal that Ulysses was a plain simple man, and that he should get the better of him that very way, by artifice and lying?

¹ In the Greek this passage is read thus; Οὐκ οἶσθ', ὅτι λεγων, ὑστερον, ἢ ὡς πρὸς τον Ὀδυσσεα εἶπεν ἅμα τῇ ἡοι ἀποπλε σειςθαι, κ. τ. λ. Stephens saw, that this was a corrupt reading; but an emendation of it not readily occurring to his mind, he supposed that many words were wanting. A slight alteration only will, as we imagine, correct the sentence thus; Οὐκ οἶσθ', ὅτι λεγων, τῇ ὑστερια (ὡς πρὸς τον Ὀδυσσεα εἶπεν) ἅμα τῇ ηοι ἀποπλευσισθαι, κ. τ. λ. agreeably to which we have made our translation.—S.

² Achilles speaks of Hector thus highly on this occasion, purposely to raise the higher, in those who heard him, the idea of his own valour; none but himself, he tells them, being able to stop the progress of so mighty and formidable an enemy. Mr. Pope therefore, in omitting those high terms in which Achilles here mentions Hector, has omitted an essential beauty in this passage, and particularly material to that purpose, for which it is cited by Socrates,—to show, that the inconsistent fancies, uttered by Achilles, were owing to his arrogance and his thirst of glory. See the Introduction to this Dialogue. The verses are taken from the ninth book of the Iliad, v. 646, &c. But there is evidently a false reading in them, as cited by Plato, μῆθοσμαι instead of μέθοσμαι, observed by Barnes, in his notes on Homer.—S.

HIP.

HIP. I think quite otherwise, Socrates: I think that he was imposed upon, himself, by his own simplicity and undefigning heart: and that want of reflection made him talk to Ajax in a strain different from that in which he had been talking to Ulysses. But Ulysses, whenever he speaks truth, has always an intention to deceive, no less than when he speaks a falsehood.

SOC. Ulysses then is a better man, it seems, than Achilles.

HIP. By no means, Socrates, clearly.

SOC. Why, was it not proved just now, that the speakers of falsehoods, knowing them so to be, and with intention to deceive, were ¹ better men than those, who spoke what was false merely through ignorance, and against their intention?

HIP. But how is it possible, Socrates, that such as are guilty of injustice knowingly, such as are deceitful, and insidious, and wilfully do mischief, should be better men than those, who, not knowing what they do, lead others into mischiefs or mistakes? To such is due free pardon, should any injustice be done by their means, or if any man be deceived by them, or suffer injury. The laws ² accordingly are more severe to designing cheats, and to the wilfully injurious, than to such as deceive or injure without intention of so doing.

SOC. You see, Hippias, that I spoke truth, when I told you, how busy

¹ This is another instance, similar to that, taken notice of by Aristotle, which we mentioned before, of a sophistical way of arguing used by Plato against the sophists. For the truth of the position, contended for, has indeed been proved; and is apparent enough, in every inferior art or science; but Plato applies it in this place to morals, of which it has not been proved, but the direct contrary insinuated. There is the same ambiguity of expression in our own language; for we use the term, good man, with reference not only to moral goodness, but even ability or skill in any way whatever. Such a one, we say, is a good man, when we only mean, as to some particular kind of work or action which he performs well.—S.

² Demosthenes in *Orat. c. Midiam*, § 11. p. 35 and 36 of Dr. Taylor's edition in 8vo. gives an account of these laws somewhat more at large, too long to be here inserted, but so like this of Plato's, and so much in the same words, that it seems highly probable he had an eye towards it when he composed that part of his oration. For that incomparable orator was always a great admirer of Plato, and had been one of his favourite disciples; as we are told by the writer of the lives of the ten orators, vulgarly ascribed to Plutarch.—S.

and restless I was in putting questions to the wife ¹. I fear, indeed, that I have no other valuable quality belonging to me ; the rest which I have being inconsiderable and mean. For I am apt to be mistaken in the natures of things, and ignorant of what they truly are. A sufficient evidence of which appears, whenever I am in company with any of you celebrated wise men, whose wisdom is acknowledged by the united voices of all the Grecians. It then appears that I know nothing : for scarcely in any point am I of the same opinion with you. And what greater evidence can there be of a man's want of knowledge, than his differing in opinion from the wife. I have this one admirable quality, however, which saves me from the fatal consequences of ignorance and error ; this, that I am not ashamed to learn ; but am given to inquiry, and to asking questions. I am very thankful also to the person who vouchsafes me an answer : nor ever neglected I to pay him my due acknowledgments. For whenever I had acquired a piece of knowledge, I never denied my having learnt it ; nor ever pretended, that it was of my own finding out. On the contrary, I celebrate the wisdom of my teacher, whenever I produce the doctrine which he taught me. Thus at present, for instance, I agree not with you in that position, which you have laid down for truth ; but am strongly of a different opinion. And this, I am convinced, arises from something in me, and must be attributed to my being such a one as I am ; to avoid using any term or epithet too high in speaking of myself. To me, Hippias, the truth appears directly contrary to what you say. I think, that those who injure others, who are guilty of injustice, who vent falsehoods, and deceive, or commit any other fault, knowingly and wilfully, are better men than such as do the same evils ignorantly and without free choice. Sometimes, however, I am in the opposite way of thinking. In short, my sentiments are ever varying upon this subject, and driven backward and forward continually : the cause of which unsteadiness is clearly want of knowledge. But I now find in myself a fresh accession of my old malady : for the opinion, which prevails in me at present, is

¹ This and such other sayings, frequent in the mouth of Socrates, passed with the people even of his own time for mere ironies. Whence he was commonly called *ὁ ἀγαν*, the dissembler of his knowledge, or pretender to ignorance.—S.

this ;

this;—that such as commit wilful errors in any action whatever, are better men, with respect to actions in that way, than those who err in the same way against their will or intention. This present turn of mind in me is owing, as I imagine, to the preceding part of our conversation: for our reasoning upon the point, then debated, will, in all appearance at present, hold good through all things; and will prove, that the involuntary actors of ill, in any of those instances we have mentioned, are more wicked than those who are guilty of the same bad actions wilfully. Be so good therefore as to set my mind right: for in healing the disease of this, and freeing it from ignorance, you will do me a much greater piece of service, than you would in healing any distemper incident to my body. But now, should you have any intention to go through a long harangue, I can assure you beforehand, that you will never that way succeed in the affair: for my thoughts never will be able to keep even pace with you. But if you are disposed to answer to my questions, as you did before, you will highly^r profit and improve me; and, I presume, receive no detriment yourself. I have a right, Eudicus, to beg your interest with Hippias on this occasion; for you it was who engaged me in this dispute with him. If he therefore is averse to continuing the conversation in the way which I desire, do you intercede with him to favour my request.

EUD. There will be no occasion, Socrates, I imagine, for my intercession. That is made unnecessary by what Hippias himself said at first,—that he never declined answering to any man's questions. Did you not say so, Hippias?

HIP. I own it, Eudicus. But Socrates is always entangling the argument with cunning fallacies; and behaves like a fly deceiver.

SOC. My good Hippias! I do it not wilfully, I assure you, nor with any intention to deceive: for, if that were the case, I should be a man of great wisdom and abilities, according to your account. But, if I have that fault which you accuse me of, it is wholly involuntary in me. I pray you therefore pardon me: for pardon, you say, is due to involuntary and ignorant deceivers.

^r See the last sentence but one in the Greater Hippias.—S.

EUD.

EUD. Do so, Hippias; forgive Socrates; and be not angry with him: but for my sake, and out of regard to your own word, answer to whatever questions he shall propose to you.

HIP. Well, at your entreaty, I will answer to his questions.—Come then; propose any, which you desire to have an answer to.

SOC. Truly, Hippias, I am greatly desirous to have a thorough discussion of that very point just now mentioned;—Which are the better sort of men; those who commit errors knowingly, wilfully, and purposely; or those others, who are guilty of the very same without knowing what they do, and without any will or purpose to err¹. Now the best way we can take, to have this point well examined, is, in my opinion, by setting out thus;—but observe, and make your answers duly²;—Are there not men, who are good at a foot-race?

¹ Every universal truth will hold good in all particular cases, to which it is applicable. In the way of reasoning therefore by induction, the enumerating of many particulars, however chosen, in which the hypothesis to be proved is found true, serves to induce a probability at least of its being true universally. And if the hypothesis fails in no instance that can be thought of, the certainty of it is then sufficiently established.—It should seem, therefore, that Plato might have been indifferent what instances he produced to prove a doctrine which, if true, might fairly be inferred from a multitude of any pitched upon at random. And indeed, had this been all he had in view, indifferent he would certainly have been to which he gave the preference. But his design, in selecting from all the several kinds of action the particular instances that follow, to the end of this second part of the Dialogue, is to show, what weaknesses or disorders in the human frame are the natural causes of ignorance and vice; and what natural disposition of body and mind is favourable to knowledge and virtue. In the choice and arrangement of these instances will appear admirable art and contrivance: for the discovery of which he prepares us in this sentence, by professing to take a certain method and way of beginning, such as is the most proper.—S.

² Plato begins, and takes his four first instances from such actions as fundamentally depend on the structure of the body and the conformation of its parts; in particular, running, wrestling, dancing, and singing. For the well-performing of these exercises, so far as the body is concerned, severally depends on agility, strength, gracefulness, and a musical voice: and these severally arise from elasticity of the fibres, firmness in the fabric of the bones, pliancy in the joints, and a perfect power of dilatation and contraction in the lungs and larynx. When all these concur, the natural consequences will be an animated, free, and easy flow of the blood and humours, sprightliness and vigour in the soul, and at the same time (if no obstacle hinder) firmness in the mind.—S.

HIP.

HIP. There are.

Soc. And others in the same exercise who are bad?

HIP. Certainly.

Soc. Are not the good, those who run well? and the bad, those who run ill?

HIP. They are.

Soc. Do not the slow runners run ill? the swift runners, well?

HIP. They do.

Soc. In the race therefore, and in running, swiftness is a good thing; slowness, a bad thing.

HIP. Without dispute.

Soc. Whether of these two then is the better man in the race? One, who runs slow wilfully and on purpose; or one, whose slowness in running is involuntary and undesigned?

HIP. The first; he, who runs slow on purpose.

Soc. Is not running the doing something?

HIP. It is.

Soc. And if so, is not some action performed in running?

HIP. Certainly.

Soc. The man, therefore, who runs ill, performs an action which is bad and unseemly in the race.

HIP. Undoubtedly so.

Soc. And the man runs ill, you say, who runs slowly.

HIP. True.

Soc. He therefore is the good man in the race, who wilfully and purposely commits this bad and unseemly action: and he is the bad man, who does it against his will and his intention.

HIP. So it seems to be.

Soc. In the race therefore, the man, who is guilty of bad actions against his will and his intention, is a worse man than the other, in whom those bad actions are voluntary and intended.

HIP. In the race, I grant you, that it is so.

Soc. And how is it in wrestling? Whether of the two is the better wrestler? the man who, when he falls, falls designedly, or the man whose falls are involuntary and undesigned?

HIP. Probably, the man who falls designedly.

SOC. And which is the worse and more unseemly action in wrestling? for a man to fall himself, or to give his antagonist a fall?

HIP. To fall himself.

SOC. In wrestling then also, the man, who is guilty of bad and unseemly actions with design, is a better man than the other, who is guilty of the same without designing them.

HIP. It is probable that he is.

SOC. And how does the rule hold with respect to all other actions of the body? Is not the man, whose body is well-framed and fitly disposed, equally able for actions either strong or weak, either seemly and becoming, or unbecoming and awkward? So that the man who has a better habit of body, when he performs any bodily exercise or action ill, does it out of choice; but the man, whose body is in a worse state, performs ill against his inclination.

HIP. In actions which depend on strength of body, I admit the truth of your hypothesis.

SOC. And what say you as to those, which depend on gracefulness of the body, Hippias? Does it not belong to that body, which is well formed and well habituated, to exhibit unseemly and bad motions, gestures, and attitudes, only when the mind so wills and directs; but to a body of worse make and worse habits, to behave, move, and carry itself awkwardly without such will and direction? or how think you?

HIP. That it is, as you say.

SOC. Ungracefulness therefore also, when voluntary, belongs to the body in its better plight; when involuntary, is owing to an ill or depraved state of body.

HIP. So indeed it appears.

SOC. And how think you as to the voice? Which voice do you suppose the better and more excellent? That which sings out of tune wilfully and designedly; or that which does so because it cannot do otherwise?

HIP. That which does so designedly.

SOC. And that you call a viler voice, which errs from the harmony, and cannot help it.

HIP.

HIP. I do.

Soc. Further¹;—the things which are yours, whether would you choose to have them in good condition and order, or to have them bad, depraved, and out of order?

HIP. To have them good, and such as they ought to be.

Soc. Whether then would you choose to have your feet go lame at your own pleasure, or to have them limp and stumble against your will?

HIP. To go lame at my own pleasure.

Soc. Is not lameness in the feet a depravity of the feet; and the going lame an ungraceful way of walking?

HIP. Certainly.

Soc. And is not squinting a depravity of the eyes?

HIP. It is.

Soc. Which sort of eyes now would you choose to have, and to see with? Such as would look askint only when you pleased, or such as could not avoid squinting?

HIP. Such as squinted only when I pleased.

Soc. Of the things then which are your own, you deem those, whose wrong and depraved actions are voluntary, better than those, the pravity of whose actions is involuntary.

HIP. In things of that kind, I admit it to be true.

Soc. All such therefore, ears, and nose, and mouth, and all other parts administering to sensation, are to be comprehended in the following general

¹ His five next instances he takes from those parts of the body which are the more immediate servants of the mind: 1. The outward instruments of motion (particularizing in the feet), by which the will of the mind is executed: 2. The outward organs of sensation (enumerating them all), through which the mind perceives outward things: 3. That immediate source of motion and sensation, the brain; to signify which he uses the metaphor of a rudder, steering the body as the mind pleases: 4. Those inward instruments of motion, and vehicles of sensation, the nerves; which he compares to the strings of musical instruments, braced up or relaxed by the different passions of the soul, and vibrating just as they are touched from without, or played on by the musician's hand within: 5. and lastly, The organs of speech, signified by wind-instruments of music, through which the mind expresses her meaning, or declares her will. How much the acquisition of knowledge, the state of the soul, and power of the mind to do what she wills, depend on having all these organs in perfection, is by no means difficult to conceive.—S.

rule ;—those, in which the bad performance of their functions is involuntary, a man would be glad not to have, feeling that such are evil ; but those, whose wrong action or operation is wilful, and according to the intention, are desirable, such being good.

HIP. I agree.

SOC. Well ; and what sort of instruments is it best to have to do with ? those, with which a man may execute his work ill through choice and design ; or those, with which he cannot work otherwise than ill ? For instance : Whether of the two is the best rudder ; that, with which the steering ill is unavoidable ; or that, with which the pilot, if he steers ill, does it wilfully and on purpose ?

HIP. The latter sort.

SOC. Is it not so with the bow and lyre ; so with the flute ¹ ; so with every other kind of tools and instruments ?

HIP. It is true.

SOC. Well ² ; and of which horse is it best to be the owner ? Whether of a horse with such a kind of temper and spirit, as may serve his rider in riding

¹ To the instances already given, which are of more especial moment, the other parts and members of the body are subjoined, in general ; the regular frame and sound condition of them all being, in the opinion of Plato, of some importance to the soul, to its affections and passions ; more or less, in proportion to the more immediate or more remote action, or influence, of the one upon the other. This will open much of Plato's secret meaning in the latter part of his *Timæus*.—S.

² From the just frame of the body, and the right formation of every member of it, the philosopher proceeds, in the same metaphorical manner, to describe the other part of that *εὐφροία*, or good natural disposition, which he holds to be the necessary foundation of virtue. This other part is the right frame or constitution of the soul herself. He begins with the passions ; agreeably to that climax which he uses through all these instances. The passions are, in the Platonic system, all comprehended under two kinds, *ἐπιθυμία* and *θυμός*, the emotions of desire and anger. The first of these kinds is characterized under the emblem of a horse, the latter under that of a dog ; and both with great propriety. For one of these animals is remarkably subject to vehement emotions of the former kind in pursuit of glory or pleasure ; the other to emotions of the latter kind no less violent, when the seizing of his prey or the destruction of an enemy is the end in view. Now both these animals, though irrational, are by nature formed to be manageable by man ; and are highly servicable to him, when their passions are directed to their proper objects, and restrained within due bounds.—S.

ill purposely and through choice only; or of a horse ¹, upon which his rider must of necessity ride ill?

HIP. Of the horse, upon which a man may ride ill only through choice.

Soc. This horse then is of a better spirit and temper than the other.

HIP. True.

Soc. With this better-tempered horse then a man may ², if he has an evil intention, perform such mischievous and evil tricks as this animal is capable of; but with the bad-tempered horse he cannot avoid doing mischief.

HIP. Perfectly true.

Soc. And is it not equally true with respect to the spirit and temper of a dog? and so of every other species of animals?

HIP. I admit it to hold true in the case of every brute animal.

Soc. Well now; and how is it in our own species, and with respect to the human soul? Whether is it better to have in our service a bowman, who, if he ever misses the mark, misses wilfully ³; or one who is apt to do, contrary to his intention and his aim?

HIP. One who misses wilfully.

Soc. Such a one then is a better man at shooting.

HIP. Right.

¹ The emendation of this sentence must be attributed to Cornarius: for he has been beforehand with us, in reading *αμείνων, ἢ ἢ ἀκων*, instead of *αμείνων ἢ ἀκων*, as in all the editions of the Greek it is printed.—S.

² Thus in the Greek; *Τὴ ἀμείνων ἀρετῇ ψυχῇ ἵππου τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐργὰ ταύτης τὰ πονηρὰ ἐκούσιως ἀνποιοί, τὰ δὲ τῆς πανηρίας, ἀκούσιως*. It is evident, that this reading is faulty. We have always imagined, that the fault lay in the transposition of some of the words, with the corruption of only one in consequence of that transposition; and that the right reading was this; *Τ. α. α. ψ. ι. τ. τ. ψ. ε. τ. τ. α. τῆς πονηρίας, ἐκούσιως ἀνποιοί, τῇ δὲ πονηρίᾳ, ἀκούσιως*. But Cornarius is of opinion, that the sentence may be amended by altering only *τὰ δὲ τῆς πονηρίας* into *τῇ δὲ τ. π.* which he is pleased to say, signifies the same with *τῇ δὲ πονηροτέρᾳ*.—S.

³ In the editions of the Greek text, the sentence stands thus; *Τὶ δὲ δὴ; ἀνθρώπων ψυχὴν κεντησθαι τοσοῦτον ἀμείνωνος εἶναι, ἥτις ἐκούσιως ἀμαρτάνει τὴ σκοπῇ, ἢ ἥτις ἀκούσιως*; but we should be glad to read it as follows; *Τὶ δὲ δὴ ἀνθρώπων; ψυχὴν κεντησθαι τοσοῦτον ἀμείνωνος εἶναι, κ. τ. λ.* transferring the first point of interrogation to the word *ἀνθρώπων*, and altering the word *αμείνωνος* into *αμείνων*, which latter emendation was made before us by Cornarius. Both together will render this sentence much more agreeable to the turn of those which precede, than the alteration of it proposed by Stephens.—S.

Soc.

Soc. In our own species therefore, and with respect to the human soul^f, the man, who misses aim or errs without intending so to do, is a worse man than the other, whose missing of the mark is undesigned, or whose error is involuntary.

Hip. In the bowman's art I grant you that it is so.

Soc. And how is it in the art of medicine? Is not he the better physician, who, if he hurts or brings any disorder on the bodily frame, does it knowingly and purposely?

Hip. He is.

Soc. In this art also then, such a one is a better man than one who hurts when he would heal.

Hip. True.

Soc. And how is it in music, whether of the string or of the wind-kind? how, in all other arts and sciences? Is not he the better man, who purposely performs ill, and commits voluntary errors? and is not he the bad man, who blunders and errs, without designing it?

Hip. Probably so.

Soc. And we certainly should choose to have under our command such slaves as committed voluntary faults, and were guilty of bad actions purposely, rather than such as could not help blundering, doing wrong, and acting perversely; the former sort being better for our service.

Hip. In that also we agree.

Soc. Well then; do we not wish to be as good and excellent as possible ourselves?

Hip. To be sure.

Soc. Would not our own mind, spirit, and temper, be better, if we did evil and committed faults wilfully and freely, than if we could not avoid those faults and evil actions?

Hip. It would be a strange thing, Socrates, if the wilfully unjust and dishonest were better men than those who unwittingly or unwillingly did a base action.

^f The original, as printed, runs thus; *Και ψυχή ἀρὰ ἀνεσις ἀμαρτανία*, κ. τ. λ. But the reasoning requires the word *ἀνθρώπου* to be inserted after the word *ἀρὰ*. It was easily dropped in transcribing some manuscript, on account of the similitude of the letters which follow it: the ancient manner of writing it being this; *Και ψυχή ἀρὰ ἀν ἀνεσις*, κ. τ. λ.—S.

Soc.

Soc. And yet this appears to be the just conclusion from those premises ¹, in which we are agreed.

Hip. It appears not so to me.

Soc. To you yourself, I imagined, it must so appear. Let me put to you then a question or two more.—Is not honesty either some certain power in the mind, or some certain knowledge, or both together? Is it not necessary that true inward honesty should be one or other of these?

Hip. It is.

Soc. If honesty then be some power in the mind, does not honesty inhabit that mind most which is possessed of the most power? And this corresponds with what appeared true to us before, if you remember,—that the man who had the most abilities and powers within him was the best man in every case that we considered.

Hip. It did so appear.

Soc. And if honesty be some knowledge in the mind, does not honesty reside most in that mind, which hath the most knowledge, and is the wisest? and is not, in such case, that mind the most dishonest which is the most undisciplined and ignorant?—But if honesty should arise from knowledge and power, meeting both together in the same mind, is not that mind which is the best furnished with both, with knowledge and power, the most filled with honesty? and are not the greatest degrees of ignorance ² and impotence

¹ That is, upon the absurd supposition, that there are any such men. But if still the question should be asked, Whence is it, that a man may err wilfully in executing any work or energy of art, or in performing any action merely natural (for so is it with great truth supposed throughout the Dialogue), and that power and will may in all such cases be separated; yet that it is otherwise with respect to moral actions; that no error here is truly voluntary, and no bad man is free? The reason is this; that in all other cases the workman, or performer, may aim at some other end than the excellence of his work, or the rectitude of his performance: but that in every action, where morality is concerned, that is, in every action morally good or evil, the attainment of what a man thinks his good is the only end for which he acts: and that no man can possibly pursue, will, or aim at his own evil, fully and clearly knowing it to be what it is; nor help aiming at, willing, and pursuing what upon the whole he determines to be for himself the best. The will therefore in all these cases must of necessity follow, or rather accompany, the judgment.—S.

² That, in the Greek text, after the words *ἡ δὲ ἀμαθεύς τε*, the words *καὶ ἀδυνάτε τε* ought to be inserted, will be evident to every one who knows how to reason, and in what part an argument is defective.—S.

in the mind parents of the greatest villany?—Must not these things through necessity be so?

HIP. So indeed they appear.

SOC. Did it not appear before, that a man of the most knowledge and wisdom, as well as of the most abilities and powers, was the best man, and the most capable of performing either well or ill, at his own pleasure, in every operation?

HIP. It did.

SOC. Such a man therefore, whenever he performs any thing ill, does it with design; does it through his powers and his knowledge. Now it is evident, that on these honesty depends, either on both of them, or at least on one or other.

HIP. Probably it does.

SOC. It is further evident, that acting dishonestly is doing ill; and that acting honestly is doing well.

HIP. Clearly so.

SOC. Will not that man then, whose mind is the most filled with honesty and virtue, whenever he shall do any dishonest or base action, do it through choice and with design? but the man whose mind is evil and dishonest, will no he be guilty of villanous and base actions through unavoidable necessity?

HIP. So it appears.

SOC. Is not a good man, one whose mind is good and honest? and is not he a bad man, whose mind is evil and dishonest?

HIP. Without doubt.

SOC. It belongs to the good man, therefore, to act dishonestly through free choice; to the bad man without free choice, and through unavoidable necessity; if it be true that the mind of a good man is good.

HIP. And that certainly is true.

SOC. The man, therefore, who does wrong, and is guilty of villanous and base actions wilfully and out of free choice, if such a man there be¹, Hippias, he can be no other than the good man.

HIP.

¹ Meaning, that the supposition was absurd. See the Introduction. Plato here presents us with a key to this Dialogue, opening it so easily, and letting us into the secret of it so freely, that every unprejudiced mind may well wonder how it came to be so greatly misunderstood, as it will appear to have generally been, if any of our readers will take the pains to examine the annotations and comments on it, written by the moderns. But the wonder will cease, on reflecting what

HIP. I know not, Socrates, how I can grant you this.

SOC. Nor can I easily grant it to myself, Hippias. It must however, of necessity, appear true to us both at present, having been proved by the force of our present argument. But, as I said before, with regard to this point¹,
my

what unphilosophical and vulgar notions concerning the freedom of the will have generally prevailed in Europe ever since the extinction of those ancient schools of philosophy which once enlightened it. Hence it has come to pass, that learned men, involved in the common prejudices, have understood all the passages of ancient authors, relating to this point, in a sense favourable to their own notions. For error, that disease of the mind, resembles in this respect certain diseases in the humours of the body; it imparts somewhat of its own flavour, and gives a tinge of its own colour, to every object of the taste or sight which is so diseased. Those prejudices on the point in question, and the consequences of them, here complained of, are evidently seen in the late Mr. Jackson's Defence, as he is pleased to term it, of Human Liberty. For that learned man appears to have had a heart purer and clearer than his head; and therefore cannot be supposed to have misrepresented the sense of those ancient authors, whom he cites, knowingly and wilfully. The truth seems to be, that over much zeal, though in a good cause, that of theism, so far blinded him, as well as some greater men before him, that he thought he saw a similitude between two hypotheses, quite different and even opposite; the one, that of a material or mechanical necessity, maintained by Mr. Hobbes and by the author of Cato's letters, an hypothesis utterly inconsistent with the doctrine of an all-directing mind in nature; the other, that of a rational or moral necessity, no less inconsistent with atheism, and necessarily connected with the idea of a governor of the universe, ruling as well the rational part of it, as the rest, not by mere will, but wisdom. For if the appearances of good are not cogent to man, and he is not of necessity obliged to follow those only rational motives, but is by nature referred afterwards to some other power within him called will, distinct from reason, and able to control it, then is mere will in man, and, for aught we can tell, in nature too, a principle higher and more divine than intellect.—S.

¹ Should there be any man now, after all, who is inclined to think that Socrates, through this whole conversation, was but in jest, and meant nothing serious; or that, like the sophists, he used fallacious arguments, with a villanous intent to impose on the understandings of the company, by confounding truth and falsehood, right and wrong; or should any imagine, with Serranus, that the philosopher had no other end in view than merely to confuse or puzzle Hippias, and expose him to ridicule; or should there possibly be some other who follows Ficinus in fancying, that his secret meaning was the very reverse of that which we have represented it to be in the Introduction, and contended for in the notes; for that the will was independent of the judgment or understanding; and vice was owing neither to impotence, nor ignorance, nor both together, but to malice only or perverseness in the will; and that Socrates himself embraced, as truly philosophical, this distinction of the forum, received in after-ages by the pretended followers of Aristotle; but that he left it forsooth for Hippias to distinguish thus nicely, on purpose to show the ignorance of that sophist if he did it not; should any of our readers be apt to entertain any of these notions, on account of the strangeness of the paradox advanced or insinuated in this Dialogue, we shall content ourselves with observing that, strange as it may seem, it is entirely

my mind is driven backward and forward continually, and never remains long in the same opinion. Indeed, there is nothing wonderful in the case that I should wander in uncertainty; or that any other man should, who is only one of the multitude. But if you wise men should run in the same perplexed mazes, this must be to us a heavy misfortune; since we could never in this case, even though we applied to you, be freed from our perplexities.

consonant with the doctrine of Socrates, as delivered to us by Plato in many other of his writings. This was so notorious to the ancients, that Arrian, in his *Dissertations of Epictetus*, l. i. c. 28. and l. ii. c. 22. and Marcus Antoninus, l. vii. § 63. cite the authority of Plato to confirm the truth of this doctrine. The principal passages in our author, where he inculcates it expressly and openly, have been collected by Gataker in his *Annotations on Antoninus*, p. 286 and 399. and by our late learned friend Mr. Upton, in his *Notes on Arrian*, p. 91. Above all, see Alcinous, *Introduct.* c. 23. where his account of the Platonic doctrine upon this subject seems to be chiefly extracted from this Dialogue, and shows that he understood it exactly in the same sense with us.—S.

THE END OF THE LESSER HIPPIAS.

THE EUTHYDEMUS:

A DIALOGUE

EXPOSING

THE VAIN TRIFLING OF THE SOPHISTS.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE EUTHYDEMUS.

PLATO, in the following Dialogue, has given an illustrious specimen of that philanthropy, which he often displays in his other dialogues. For he here studies to avert the reader from the vain trifles of the sophists, by showing that these men, even when they discuss the most weighty subjects, jest and delude the expectation of the hearers. Both in this Dialogue, however, and elsewhere, he describes these men to be curious and vain disputants in verbal altercation, and prompt to refute whatever may be said, whether it be true or false. And, in the first place, indeed, he shows how avaricious the genius of the sophists is, since the brother sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, are prepared to teach for money the military art, in which they boast, and which no one ever sold. In the next place, how ambitious, since they at the same time profess judicial together with military skill, and together with both the sophistic art, though all these widely differ from each other. In the third place, how vain; since, though now old men, they betake themselves from things to words, and from the study of truth to falsehood. And, in the fourth place, how despicable; since, in a short time, any one may become a proficient in this cavilling art.

In the course of this Dialogue, Socrates, with a most facetious irony, beseeches the sophists, that after jesting they would come to serious concerns; and he proposes a certain formula, conformable to which, as a pattern, he hopes to receive from them an exhortation to philosophy. In this formula he first defines felicity, by a common conception, to be *living well*. Afterwards

wards he proves that this living well consists either in obtaining things agreeable to the will, or in the right use of the things themselves. And he concludes that wisdom alone renders its possessors blessed, since it alone obtains what is agreeable to the will, and rightly uses what it obtains. In the course of the argument an illustrious dogma presents itself to the view, and which afterwards became the foundation of the Stoic philosophy, viz. that things external and corporeal ought rather to be called indifferent and common, than good or evil; and that wisdom is properly good, and folly properly evil: since through the former we partake of every good, and through the latter of every evil. But that all the power of felicity consists in wisdom, the three appellations of felicity, instituted by the antient authors of the Greek language, sufficiently evince, viz. *ευδαιμονια, ευτυχια, ευπραγια*, *eudaimonia, eutuchia, eupragia*. For the first of these appellations signifies the knowledge of good; the second, the attainment of it; and the third, the use of it; all which are accomplished for us by wisdom.

Near the conclusion of this Dialogue, the artificial, polite, facetious, and elegant irony of Socrates collects the reprehension of sophistic cavilling into three heads. First, that the most worthy men despise trifles of this kind. Secondly, that the sophisms confute themselves. And thirdly, that even boys might acquire this most trifling artifice in the space of two days. Soon after this, he descends from the sophist to the rhetorician, for each of these falsely professes political virtue, as we learn from the *Gorgias*. And he shows that rhetoricians, while they profess themselves to be both politicians and philosophers, are perfectly useless for the purposes of either.

I only add, that this Dialogue appears to have been justly ranked by the antients among those of the *anatreptic*, or *subversive* character, and that it belongs to that energy of Plato's dialectic, which, as we have already observed in the Introduction to the *Parmenides*, consists in confuting false opinions.

THE EUTHYDEMUS.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

CRITO,		DIONYSODORUS,
SOCRATES,		CLINIAS,
[EUTHYDEMUS,		CTESIPPUS ¹ .]

CRITO.

WITH whom, Socrates, did you yesterday converse in the Lyceum? For you were surrounded with so great a crowd, that though I approached, desirous to hear, yet I could not hear any thing clearly. I raised myself indeed on my feet that I might see more distinctly, and it appeared to me that it was a certain stranger with whom you were conversing. Who was this stranger?

Soc. You must ask, Crito, which of them it was; for not one only, but two were present.

CRITO. He, of whom I speak, sat the third from your right hand; but in the middle of you was a lad², the son of Axiochus, who appeared to me, Socrates, to have made a great proficiency in learning, and who does not

¹ I have followed Dr. Routh, in his excellent edition of this Dialogue, in including the names of Euthydemus, Dionysodorus, Clinias, and Ctesippus, in brackets, because, as he justly observes, these persons do not speak, but the disputation is delivered, as if the thing were narrated, and not acted.

² The name of this youth was Clinias, at whose request Socrates, together with Axiochus, in a dialogue of that name, which is generally ascribed to Æschines, disputes against the fear of death.

much

much differ in age from our Critobulus¹; though he indeed is very slender; but this lad looks older than he is, and is of a fair and engaging aspect.

Soc. It is Euthydemus, Socrates, of whom you inquire; but he who sat with me, on my left hand, was his brother Dionysodorus, who also partook of the discourse.

CRITO. I know neither of them, Socrates.

Soc. They are recent sophists, as it appears.

CRITO. Whence do they come; and what is the wisdom which they profess?

Soc. They are, I think, natives of Chius, but they migrated to the Thurians², and flying³ from thence, dwelt for many years about these places. But in answer to your inquiry respecting their wisdom, they are indeed very wise, Crito; but I have been hitherto ignorant that they were pancratiasts: for they are skilled in every kind of contest, not after the manner of those brother pancratiasts of Acarnania; since they are only able to contend with the body; but these, in the first place, are most powerful in body, and excel in that contest which consists in vanquishing all men⁴. For they are very skilful in contending with arms, and they know how to impart this skill to another who gives them a reward for it. In the next place, they are most powerful in judicial contests, and are able both to contend themselves, and instruct others, to deliver and compose forensic orations. At first, therefore, they were only skilled in these things, but now they have carried the pancratiastic art to its utmost perfection: for they are now so skilled in that kind of contest, which it remained for them to acquire; that no one is able to resist them; so skilful are they become in verbal contention, and in always confuting whatever is said, whether it be true or false. I therefore, Crito,

¹ Xenophon often makes mention of this person, and sometimes Plato. He was the friend of Clinias, and was a youth of admirable beauty. Vid. Xen. Sympof. p. 882. ed. Leunclav. See also more concerning this son of Crito near the end of the Dialogue.

² Thuri, or Thurium, was a town of Magna Græcia, situated between the rivers Sybaris and Crathis.

³ Others of the antient sophists also were banished from Grecian cities, as we learn from Philostratus and others who have written their lives.

⁴ These sophists were not in reality skilled in the *pancratium*; but Socrates says this ironically of them, because they pretended to possess *universal skill in confutation*.

intend to deliver myself to these men: for they say that, in a short time, they can render another person skilled in the same things.

CRITO. But are you not afraid, Socrates, that you are too old for this purpose?

SOC. By no means, Crito, as I have a sufficient argument and remedy against fear: for these very men, as I may say, who are now old, have entered on the study of this wisdom, which I desire, viz. the art of contending. For last year, or the year before last, they were not in the least skilled in this art. But I am only afraid of one thing, lest I should be a disgrace to these strangers, in the same manner as I am to Connus the harper, the son of Metrobius, who even now teaches me to play on the harp. The boys, therefore, who are my fellow disciples, on seeing me, laugh, and call Connus the preceptor of old men. Lest therefore some one should reproach these strangers with the same thing, and they dreading this should be unwilling to receive me, I have, Crito, persuaded other elderly men to attend me thither as my fellow disciples, and here also I am persuading others to accompany me. Do you also join us. Perhaps too, as an allurements, we may bring your sons to them: for, in consequence of desiring to have them as their pupils, I know that they will also instruct us.

CRITO. Nothing hinders, Socrates, if you are so disposed. But, in the first place, tell me what this wisdom of these men is, that I may also know what it is which we shall learn.

SOC. You will be disappointed, if you think that I am not able to tell you as if I did not attend to them. For I paid great attention, and very well remember what they said: and I will endeavour to relate the whole to you from the beginning. For, by a certain divine allotment, I had seated myself where you saw me, alone, in the Apodyterium¹: and I then intended to have risen; but as I was about to rise, the dæmon gave me the accustomed signal. I again therefore sat down, and soon after Euthydemus and Dionysodorus entered, and, together with these, many others, who appeared to me to be their disciples; and having entered, they walked in the covered porch² of the Gymnasium. But they had not yet walked twice or thrice round this place, when Clinias entered, who you say has made a great proficiency, and

¹ That part of the Gymnasium, in which those who washed or exercised put off their clothes.

² In this place the *athletæ* were exercised in the winter.

in so saying you speak the truth. Behind him there were many lovers and others, and besides these Ctesippus², a Pæanean youth, very beautiful and naturally very worthy, but wanton in consequence of his youth. Clinias, therefore, as soon as he entered, seeing me sitting alone, came towards me, and sat down on my right hand, as you say. Dionysodorus and Euthydemus perceiving him, at first stopped and conversed with each other, occasionally looking at us: for I beheld them very attentively. Afterwards approaching nearer, they sat down, Euthydemus indeed by the lad, but Dionysodorus by me, on my left hand. The rest seated themselves just as it happened. These therefore I saluted, because I had not seen them for some time. After this, I said to Clinias, These men, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, O Clinias, are not wise in small, but in great things. For they are skilled in every thing pertaining to war, in all that a good general ought to know, and in the arrangement and management of an army. They likewise know how to render a man able to defend himself in courts of justice, when he is injured by any one. For thus speaking however they despised me, and both of them laughed, looking at each other. And Euthydemus indeed said, We no longer engage in these matters seriously, Socrates, but incidentally. And I being surprised said, Your pursuit must indeed be beautiful, if such great affairs are with you incidental. And, by the gods, inform me, what this beautiful study is.—We are of opinion, said he, Socrates, that we are able to teach virtue in the best manner, and with the greatest celerity of all men.—O Jupiter! I replied, what a mighty thing do you announce. Whence was this gain derived? I indeed had hitherto conceived respecting you, as I just now said, that you were very skilful in military contests; and this I had asserted to others. For when you first came hither, I remember that you announced this. But now, if in reality you possess this science, be propitious. For indeed I invoke you, as if you were gods, entreating you to pardon what I have before said. But see, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, if you have spoken the truth: for it is by no means wonderful if the magnitude of the promise should occasion disbelief.—Be assured, Socrates, that it is so, was the answer.—I therefore consider you as much more blessed through this possession, than the great king through his dominion. Thus

² He was one of those that were present at the death of Socrates. See the *Phædo*.

much however inform me, whether you intend to exhibit this wisdom, or how have you determined to act.—We came hither, Socrates, for this very purpose, to demonstrate and to teach, if any one is willing to learn.—But that all men who do not possess wisdom are willing to learn, I readily admit : for, in the first place, I myself am willing, and, in the next place, Clinias here ; and besides these Ctesippus, and all the rest that you see, pointing out to him the lovers of Clinias, by whom we were then surrounded : for Ctesippus at that time happened to be sitting at a considerable distance from Clinias. And as it appeared to me, Euthydemus, while he was discoursing with me, prevented, by the inclination of his body, Ctesippus from seeing Clinias, who was seated in the middle of us. Ctesippus therefore wishing to see his familiars, and at the same time being anxious to hear what was said, was the first that rose, and stood opposite to me. Afterwards the rest seeing him, stood round us, viz. the lovers of Clinias, and the companions of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. I therefore introducing these to Euthydemus, informed him that they were all ready to learn. And Ctesippus indeed, and the rest, very readily assented ; and all of them in common exhorted him to exhibit the power of his wisdom. I therefore said, O Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, these persons must by all means be gratified, and you must exhibit your wisdom to them for my sake. And it is evident indeed, that to demonstrate most things pertaining to this subject will be no small labour ; but inform me whether you are able to make him alone a good man, who is already persuaded that he ought to be instructed by you, or him also, who is not yet persuaded in consequence of not believing that virtue is a thing to be taught, or that you are the teachers of it : for, it is the business of the same art, to persuade a man thus affected, that virtue may be taught, and that you are capable of teaching it in the best manner. Or is it not?—It is the business, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, of the same art.—You therefore, I replied, O Dionysodorus, can in the best manner, of all the men that now exist, exhort to philosophy and the study of virtue. Is it not so?—We think we can, Socrates.—Of other things, therefore, I said, you will afterwards give us the demonstration, but of this now : and you will persuade this youth that he ought to philosophize, and study virtue ; and in so doing you will oblige me, and all that are present : for it so happens that both I, and all these, are desirous that this lad may become the best of men. He is the son

of Axiochus, who descended from the antient Alcibiades, and the cousin of the now-existing Alcibiades; and his name is Clinias. But he is young, and we are fearful, as it is likely we should be concerning one of his age, lest some one previous to our endeavours should turn his dianoëtic part to another study, and thus corrupt it. You therefore are very opportunely come: and if it is the same thing to you, make trial of the lad, and discourse with him before us.—When I had thus nearly said these things, Euthydemus boldly, and at the same time confidently, replied, It makes no difference, Socrates, if the lad is but willing to answer.—But indeed, I replied, he is accustomed to do this. For these frequently meeting together ask many questions, and discourse much with each other; so that it is likely that he will answer with confidence.

But how, O Crito, shall I disclose to you, in a proper manner, what follows? For it is no trifling labour to narrate such immense wisdom. So that I, after the manner of the poets, in beginning this narration, find it necessary to invoke the Muses and Mnemosyne. Euthydemus, therefore, as I think, began after this manner.—Whether, O Clinias, are those men that learn, wise or unwise?—And the lad through the magnitude of the question blushed, and being dubious, looked at me. But I, perceiving his perturbation, said, Be confident, Clinias, and boldly answer what appears to you to be the truth: for perhaps the greatest advantage will thence ensue. Upon this Dionysodorus whispering in my ear, and smiling, Indeed, Socrates, said he, I predict that in whatever manner the lad may answer he will be confuted. However, while he was thus speaking, Clinias happened to answer, so that it was not possible for me to admonish the lad any further. But he answered, that those that learnt were wise men. Euthydemus, therefore, said, Do you admit that there are certain teachers, or not?—He admitted that there are.—Are not therefore preceptors the preceptors of those that learn? As, for instance, a harper and a grammarian, were the preceptors of you and other boys, but you were their disciples.—He assented to this.—When you learned, therefore, were you not ignorant of these things which you learned?—Yes.—Were you, therefore, wise, when you were ignorant of these things?—By no means.—If, therefore, you were not wise, were you not ignorant?—Entirely so.—You therefore, when learning things of which you had no knowledge, learned them being ignorant?—The lad assented

assented to this.—The ignorant therefore learn, O Clinias, and not the wife, as you thought.—On his speaking in this manner, just like a choir, on a signal given by the master, the followers of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus loudly applauded what was said and laughed. And before the lad could well take breath, Dionysodorus said to him, But what, Clinias, when the grammarian recites, whether are the boys who learn what he recites, wife, or unwise?—They are wise, said Clinias.—The wise therefore learn, and not the ignorant; and consequently you did not rightly just now answer Euthydemus.—But on this, the lovers of these men more loudly laughed and applauded, admiring the wisdom of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus; but the rest of us being astonished were silent. Euthydemus, therefore, perceiving our astonishment, that we might yet still more admire him, did not dismiss the lad, but further interrogated him; and, after the manner of skilful dancers, turned twofold inquiries about the same thing. For, said he, whether do those who learn, learn the things which they know, or things which they do not know? And again Dionysodorus said to me whispering, This also, Socrates, is just such another question as the former.—By Jupiter, said I, the former question appeared to me to be beautiful.—We always ask, said he, Socrates, such like inevitable questions.—You appear therefore to me, said I, to possess a great reputation among your disciples. In the mean time Clinias answered Euthydemus, that those who learn, learn that of which they are ignorant. And Euthydemus interrogated him as before—Do you not, said he, know your letters?—I do.—Do you not, therefore, know all of them?—He acknowledged that he did.—When therefore any one recites, does he not recite letters?—He confessed it.—Hence, said he, he recites things which you know, since you know all the letters.—This also he acknowledged.—What then? he replied, Do you not learn that which some one recites?—Yes.—But do you learn, not knowing your letters?—I do not, he replied, but I learn in consequence of knowing them.—Do you not therefore learn the things which you know, since you know all the letters?—He acknowledged that he did.—Hence, said he, you have not answered rightly.—Euthydemus had scarcely thus spoken, when Dionysodorus, taking up the discourse as if it had been a ball, again aimed at the lad as a mark, and said, Euthydemus deceives you, O Clinias. For tell me, is not to learn, to receive the science of that which any one learns?—Clinias assented.—But, he replied, is to know.

know scientifically any thing else than to possess science when thus knowing?—He granted it was nothing else.—Not to know scientifically, therefore, is not yet to possess science.—He assented to this.—Whether, therefore, are those that receive any thing, those who now possess it, or those who do not possess it?—Those who do not possess it.—Have you not then confessed that those who have not scientific knowledge, are among the number of those who do not possess?—He acknowledged that he had.—Those that learn, therefore, belong to those that receive, and not to those that possess.—He granted it.—Those therefore, said he, Clinias, learn who have not a scientific knowledge, and not those who have. After this, again wrestling as it were the third time, Euthydemus attacked the youth. But I, seeing the merged condition of the lad, and wishing to give him some respite, lest he should be afraid of us, said, in order to console him, Do not wonder, Clinias, if these discourses appear to you to be unusual; for perhaps you do not perceive the intention of these strangers. They act however in the same manner as those in the mysteries of the Corybantes, when they place him whom they are about to initiate on a throne¹: for there also there are dancing and sports, as you know, if you have been initiated in these mysteries. And now they do nothing else than dance, and as it were sportively leap round, as if after this they would initiate you. Now therefore think that you have heard the first part of sophistical sacred rites. For, in the first place, as Prodicus says, it is necessary to learn the proper signification of names; which these strangers also have indicated to you, because you have not perceived that men employ the verb *to learn* in a thing of this kind, when any one, at first possessing no science concerning a certain thing, afterwards receives the science of that thing. They also employ this verb, when any one now possessing science, considers this very thing by this same science, either while the thing is effected or while it is enunciated. Or they rather call this *to apprehend* than *to learn*,

¹ The *Curetes* are gods of an unpolluted guardian characteristic, and first subsist in that order of gods which is called by the Chaldaean theologists *noëros*, intellectual. The *Corybantes*, who form the guardian triad of *supermundane* gods, are analogous to these. Those that were initiated in the mysteries of the Corybantes were *insanely* and *enthusiastically moved*, as we learn from the *Lexicon* of Timæus. When he who was about to be initiated in the mysteries of these, or any other gods, was invested with a sacred and mystic dress, he was placed in a solemn manner on a throne, while in the mean time the other mystics danced round him. This ceremony was called *θρονισμός*.

though

though sometimes they call it *to learn*. But of this, as they indicate, you are ignorant, viz. that the same name pertains to men affected in a contrary manner, viz. with respect to him who knows, and him who is ignorant. Similar to this is that which took place in the second question, in which they asked you, whether men learn things which they know, or things of which they are ignorant. These indeed are the sports of disciplines: on which account I say that these men play with you. But I use the word *play* on this account, because, though some one should learn many, or all such particulars as these, yet he would not be in any respect wiser with respect to the manner in which things subsist. However, he may sport with men, by supplanting and subverting what they assert, through the difference of names; just as they who draw away the seats from those that are going to sit down rejoice and laugh when they see him whom they have overturned supine. Consider therefore what has happened to you from these men as sport; but what follows will be exhibited to you by them as serious concerns: and I will show them the way that they may fulfil their promise to me. For they promise to exhibit their exhortatory wisdom: but now, as it appears to me, they have thought it was requisite first to sport with you.

Thus far therefore, O Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, you have sported, and perhaps sufficiently: but in the next place show, exhorting the lad, in what manner it is requisite to pay attention to wisdom and virtue. First of all, however, I will indicate to you my conceptions on this affair, and what I desire to hear concerning it. If, therefore, I shall appear to you to do this, in a foolish and ridiculous manner, do not deride me: for, through a desire of hearing your wisdom, I will venture for a time to speak before you. Endure therefore to hear me, both you and your disciples, without laughing: but do you, O son of Axiochus, answer me.—Do we not all then wish to do well? Or is this question, of which we were just now afraid, one among those that are ridiculous? For indeed, it is stupid to ask questions of this kind. For who is there that does not wish to do well?—No one, said Clinias.—Be it so, said I.—But in the next place, since we wish to do well, in what manner shall we be able to accomplish this? Shall we say, by having many good things? Or is this answer still more stupid than the former? For it is evident that this also must be the case.—He assented.—But come, what are the things which are good to us? Or does it appear to
be

be a thing neither difficult, nor the province of a venerable man, to discover this? For every one will tell us that it is good to be rich. Will they not?—Certainly, said he.—And is it not also good to be in health, to be beautiful, and to be sufficiently furnished with other things pertaining to the body?—So it appeared to him.—But nobility also, power, and honours, in one's own city, are also good.—He granted that they were.—What then, said I, yet remains for us among things good? What is it to be temperate, just, and brave? Whether, by Jupiter, Clinias, do you think that, if we consider these things as good, we shall consider them properly? Or that this will be the case if we consider them not as good? For perhaps this may be disputed by some one. But how does it appear to you?—That these things are good, said Clinias.—Be it so, said I; but in what choir shall we place wisdom? Among things good? Or how do you say?—Among things good.—But consider, lest among things good, we should omit any one which is worthy to be related.—But, said Clinias, it appears to me that we have not omitted any one.—However, I then recollecting, said, But, by Jupiter, we appear to have omitted the greatest of goods.—What is that? said he.—Felicity, O Clinias, which all men, and even those that are perfectly depraved, assert to be the greatest of goods.—What you say is true, said he.—And I again, correcting myself, said, We have nearly, O son of Axiochus, rendered ourselves ridiculous to these strangers.—Why so? said he.—Because, having placed felicity in the things which we before enumerated, we now again speak concerning it.—But why is this improper?—Because it is certainly ridiculous again to adduce that which was formerly proposed, and to say the same things twice.—How do you mean? said he.—Wisdom, I replied, is certainly felicity: this even a boy knows.—He indeed wondered, so young and simple was he. And I perceiving his admiration, said, Do you not know, Clinias, that in performing well on the pipe, pipers¹ are most happy?—He granted that they were.—Are not therefore, said I, grammarians also most happy in the writing and reading of letters?—Entirely so.—But what? In dangers of the sea, do you think that any in short are more happy than wise pilots?—Certainly not.—Again: In battle,

¹ Felicity is the *proper perfection* of a vital being. An artist therefore is happy, so far as pertains to his being an artist, when he arrives at *perfection* in his art.

with which will you more pleasantly partake of danger and fortune? with a wife, or with an ignorant general?—With a wife general.—And when you are dangerously ill, with which will you be more pleasantly circumstanced? with a wife, or with an ignorant physician?—With a wife physician.—Is it not therefore, said I, because you think that you will act more prosperously, by acting with one wife, than with one unwife?—He granted it.—Wisdom, therefore, every where, renders men happy. For certainly no one can ever err through wisdom; but it is necessary that through this he should act rightly, and obtain his end: for otherwise it would not be wisdom.—At length, but I do not know how, we summarily agreed that this was the case; viz. that when wisdom is present, nothing of felicity is wanting.

After we had agreed in this particular, I again asked him how we should be affected with relation to the things which we had formerly granted. For, said I, we granted that if many good things were present with us we should be happy, and act well.—He assented to this.—Whether, therefore, should we be happy through present good, if it were of no advantage to us, or if it benefited us?—If it benefited us, said he.—Would then any thing benefit us, if we alone possessed it, but did not use it? As, for instance, if we possessed much food, but did not eat it, or drink, but did not drink it, should we in any respect be benefited by this?—Certainly not, said he.—But what? If all artificers had every thing requisite prepared for them, each for his own work, but did not use them when thus procured, would they act well through the possession of these, viz. merely because they possessed every thing which an artificer ought to possess? Thus, for instance, if a carpenter had all kinds of instruments and wood prepared for him sufficient for his purpose, but yet should fashion nothing, would he derive any advantage from this possession?—By no means, said he.—But what? If any one should possess riches, and all such things as we now denominate good, but should not use them, would he be happy through the possession of these goods?—He certainly would not, Socrates.—It is necessary therefore, said I, as it seems, that he who intends to be happy should not only possess good things of this kind, but should likewise use them.—What you say is true.—Is not therefore, O Clinias, the possession and the use of good, sufficient to make any one happy?—It appears so to me.—Whether, I replied, if any one uses good things properly, or if he does not?—If he uses them properly.—You speak

well, said I. For I think that the improper use of a thing is worse than the neglect of it. For the former is vicious, but the latter is neither good nor bad. Or do we not say so?—He assented.—What then? In the operation and use pertaining to wood, is there any thing else which produces a right use than the tectonic science?—Certainly not, said he.—Perhaps also, in producing proper apparatus, it is science which produces with rectitude.—He granted that it was.—Whether therefore, said I, with respect to the use of those goods which we first mentioned, viz. riches, health, and beauty, is it science, leading and properly directing the practice, which enables us to use every thing of this kind properly, or is it any thing else?—It is science, said he.—Science, therefore, imparts to men in every possession and action, not only felicity, as it seems, but likewise success.—He confessed that it was so.

Is there then, said I, by Jupiter, any advantage to be derived from other possessions, without prudence and wisdom? Or will a man be benefited who possesses many things, and performs many actions, but without intellect? Or rather will not this be the case, if he possesses and performs but a few things, but is endued with intellect? However, consider thus. Will he not by doing less, err less? And erring less, will he not act less improperly? And acting less improperly, will he not be less miserable?—Entirely so, said he.—Whether, therefore, will he rather perform fewer things being poor, than being rich?—Being poor, said he.—But whether if he is weak or strong?—If he is weak.—Whether also, if he is honoured, or dishonoured?—If dishonoured.—But whether, if he is brave and temperate, will he do less, or if he is timid?—If he is timid.—Will not this then also be the case, if he is indolent rather than if he is active?—He granted that it would.—And if he is slow rather than if he is quick? And if his sight and hearing are blunt rather than if they are sharp?—In every thing of this kind we agreed with each other.—But in short, said I, O Clinias, it appears that, with respect to all those things which we first asserted to be good, the discourse about them is not that they are naturally essentially good, but, as it seems, that they subsist in the following manner; viz. that if they are under the guidance of ignorance, they are greater evils than their contraries, by how much the more capable they are of becoming subservient to that evil leader; but that if they are led by prudence and wisdom, they are greater goods; but that neither of them, when they are considered by themselves, is of any worth.—It appears, said he,

to

to be as you say.—What then happens to us, from what has been said? Is it any thing else than this, that no one of other things is either good or evil? But these being two, that wisdom is good, and ignorance evil?—He assented.

Further still then, said I, let us consider what remains. Since we all of us strive to be happy, and we appear to become such from using things, and from using them rightly, but science affords rectitude and success, it is requisite, as it seems, that every man should by all possible means endeavour to become most wise. Is it not so?—It is, said he.—And he should think that he ought to receive this from his father, his tutors, his friends, and from others who profess themselves to be his lovers, much more than wealth, and should request and suppliantly implore strangers and his fellow citizens to impart wisdom. Nor is it in any respect base or reprehensible, O Clinias, for the sake of this, to be obsequious and subservient both to a lover and to every man, willingly obeying him in worthy services, through an ardent desire of becoming wise. Or does it not appear so to you? said I.—You entirely, said he, appear to me to speak well.—If, said I, Clinias, wisdom can but be taught, and does not casually subsist among men. For this is yet to be considered by us, and has not yet been assented to by me and you.—But to me, said he, Socrates, it appears that it can be taught.—And I, being delighted, said, You speak beautifully, O best of men, and you have done well in liberating me from a long speculation about this very thing, whether wisdom can, or cannot be taught. Now, therefore, since it appears to you that it can be taught, and that it is the only thing which can make a man happy and prosperous, do you say any thing else than that it is necessary to philosophize? And is it your intention to do this?—Entirely so, said he, Socrates, as much as possible.—And I, rejoicing to hear these things, said, My example, O Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, of exhortatory discourses, such as I desired it to be, is of this kind; vulgar perhaps and scarcely unfolded by a multitude of words: but let whichever of you is willing, considering this very thing according to art, render it apparent to us. But if you are unwilling to do this, point out to the lad what follows, from that part in which my discourse ended, viz. whether he ought to procure for himself every science, or whether there is one particular science which, when he receives, he will necessarily be happy and a good man; and what that science is. For, as I said

in the beginning, it is of great consequence to us that this youth should become wife and good.

I therefore, Crito, said these things; but I paid very great attention to what followed, and considered after what manner they would discourse, and whence they would begin, while they were exhorting the youth to the study of wisdom and virtue. Dionysodorus then, who was the elder of them, first began the conference. And all of us beheld him, as those who were immediately to hear certain very wonderful discourses; which indeed was the case. For the man, O Crito, began a certain admirable discourse, which it is proper you should hear, because it exhorted to virtue.—Tell me, Socrates, said he, and the rest of you who express a desire that this youth should become wife, whether you are jesting when you make this assertion, or truly and seriously desire this?—Then I perceived that they were of opinion that we had, prior to this, been jesting, when we exhorted them to converse with the youth, and that on this account they also jested and had not discoursed seriously with him. Perceiving this therefore to be the case, I further said, that we were serious in a wonderful degree. And Dionysodorus said, See, Socrates, that you do not hereafter deny what you now assert.—I have considered this, said I: for I shall never deny what I have asserted.—What is it then, said he, that you assert? Do you wish that he should become wife?—Entirely so.—But now, said he, whether is Clinias wife or not?—Not yet, according to his own confession: and he does not, said I, speak idly.—But do you, said he, wish that he should become wife, and not be unlearned?—We acknowledged that we did.—Do you not therefore wish him to become that which he is not; and no longer to be that which he now is?—And I, on hearing this, was disturbed. But he, taking advantage of my perturbation, Since, said he, you wish him to be no longer that which he now is, you wish, as it seems, that he may perish; though those friends and lovers would certainly be but of little worth, who should be desirous above all things that the objects of their love may be destroyed. Ctesippus on hearing this was indignant, on account of his attachment to the youth, and said, O Thurian stranger, if it were not more rustic than is becoming, I should call you to an account for this assertion, and should ask you why you falsely ascribe to me and the rest a thing of this kind, which I think it is not holy to assert, viz. that I should wish that this youth might perish.

But

But what? O Ctesippus, said Euthydemus, does it appear to you, that it is possible to speak falsely?—By Jupiter, said he, it does, unless I were insane.—But whether will this be the case, when asserting a thing which is the subject of discourse, or when not asserting it.—When asserting it.—When, therefore, he asserts that thing, is it not true, that he does not speak of any thing else than that which he asserts?—For how should he do otherwise, said Ctesippus?—But that is one of the things which exist, of which he speaks, separate from others.—Entirely so.—Does he not therefore, when he speaks of that thing, speak of that which has a being?—Yes.—But he who speaks of that which is, and of beings, speaks of things which are true. So that if Dionysodorus speaks of beings, he speaks of things which are true, and according to you utters nothing false.—He does so, said he.—But he who says these things, said Ctesippus, does not speak, O Euthydemus, of beings.—To this Euthydemus replied, Are non-beings any thing else than things which are not?—They are not.—By no means, therefore, are non-beings, beings.—By no means.—Can therefore any one perform any action about these non-beings, so as to make things which in no respect are?—It does not appear to me, said Ctesippus, that he can.—What then? Do rhetoricians, when they speak to the people, perform nothing?—They do something, he replied.—If, therefore, they do something, do they not also make something? To speak then is to do and to make.—He assented.—No one therefore, said he, speaks of non-entities: for if he did, he would make something. But you acknowledge that no one can make non-entities. So that, according to you, no one can assert things which are false; but if Dionysodorus speaks, he speaks things which are true, and he speaks of beings.—By Jupiter, said Ctesippus, it is so, Euthydemus: yet he speaks of beings after a certain manner, though not as they subsist.—How do you say, Ctesippus, said Dionysodorus? Are there some who speak of things as they are?—There are indeed, said he; and these are men worthy and good, and who assert things which are true.—What then? said he. Are not things good, well, and things evil, ill-conditioned?—He granted that they were.—And do you not acknowledge that the worthy and the good speak of things as they are?—I do.—The good therefore, said he, O Ctesippus, speak of evil things evilly, if they speak of them as they are.—Truly, said he, by Jupiter, they do very much so of bad men, among which, if you are persuaded

persuaded by me, you will be careful that you may not be numbered, lest the good should speak evilly of you; because you well know that the good speak evilly of the bad.—Do they not also, said Euthydemus, speak magnificently of great men, and warmly of those that are fervent?—Very much so indeed, said Ctesippus.—Of cold men, therefore, they speak coldly, and assert that they speak frigidly.—You revile, O Ctesippus, said Dionysodorus, you revile.—Not I, by Jupiter, said he, Dionysodorus, for I love you; but I admonish you as my companion, and I endeavour to persuade you, that you should never in my presence make such a rustic assertion, as that I wish the destruction of those whom I very much esteem.

I therefore, as they appeared to me to conduct themselves in a rustic manner towards each other, jested with Ctesippus, and said, it appears to me, Ctesippus, that we ought to receive what is asserted by the strangers, if we wish to impart it to others, and not contend about words. For if they know how to destroy men in such a manner as to make them, from being depraved and unwife, worthy and wise, whether they have discovered this themselves, or have learnt from some other, a corruption and destruction of this kind, so that having destroyed him who is depraved, they afterwards render him worthy; if they know how to effect this (but it is evident that they do possess this knowledge; for they affirm that the art of making men worthy that were depraved, is an art which they have recently invented;) we must therefore permit them to destroy the lad, and to make him and all the rest of us wise. But if you young men are afraid of me, make trial of me, as if, according to the proverb, in Car¹, since, though an elderly man, I am prepared for danger: and I deliver myself to this Dionysodorus, as to Medea the Colchian. Let him destroy me, and, if he will, boil me, or do whatever else he pleases with me, if he does but render me worthy. And Ctesippus said, I also, Socrates, am prepared to deliver myself to these strangers, though they should be willing to excoriate more than they do at present, provided my skin does not end in a bladder like that of Marsyas, but in virtue. Indeed Dionysodorus, here, thinks that I am angry with him: I am not however angry, but I contradict those things which, in my opinion, he has not well advanced

¹ That is to say, make trial of me as if I were some vile man or thing, in which, if the event is not fortunate, not much loss will be sustained. See Erasmus in *Chiliad*. p. 227.

against me. But do not, said he, O Dionysodorus, call contradiction reviling ; for reviling is a different thing.

To this Dionysodorus replied, Do not you, Ctesippus, discourse as if you contradicted ?—Entirely, and very much so, said he.—Or do not you think that I speak as if I contradicted ? You cannot therefore at any time demonstrate that, if you have heard no one contradicting another.—True, said he : but let us now hear whether I can demonstrate to you that Ctesippus contradicts Dionysodorus. Or can you bear a discourse of this kind ?—By all means, said he.—What then ? he replied ; are there definitions of every thing which exists ?—Entirely so, said he.—Whether, therefore, is there a definition of every thing, as it is, or as it is not ?—As it is. For if you remember, said Ctesippus, we have just now shown that no one speaks of a thing as it is not. For no one appears to speak of that which is not. But why this ? said Ctesippus. Shall you and I, on this account, contradict the less ?—Whether therefore, he replied, shall we contradict, if we both of us know the definition of the same thing, or shall we indeed thus say the same things ?—He granted that we should.—But, said he, when neither of us gives the definition of that thing, shall we not then contradict ? Or, indeed, will it not follow, that thus no mention whatever of that thing will be made by either of us ?—He granted this also.—When therefore, said he, I give the definition of that thing, but you of something else, do we then contradict each other ? Or do I then speak of that thing, but you do not speak of it in any respect whatever ? But how can he who does not speak of a thing contradict him who does ?

Ctesippus indeed was then silent ; but I, wondering at the discourse, said, How do you say, Dionysodorus ? For, though I have heard this assertion often, and from many, yet I always wondered at it. For it was much used by Protagoras and his followers, and by others more antient than these ; but to me he always appears to be a wonderful person, who both subverts others and himself. I think, however, that I shall especially learn the truth of this assertion from you. Is the assertion then any other than this, that it is not possible to assert things which are false ? For this is the force of the argument. Is it not ? And that he who speaks, asserts things which are true, or otherwise does not speak ?—He granted that it was so.—Whether, therefore, is it not possible to assert things which are false, but to form an opinion
of

of them is possible?—It is not even possible, said he, to form an opinion of them.—Neither therefore, said I, is there any such thing as false opinion.—There is not, said he.—Neither therefore is there ignorance, nor are there unlearned men. Or would not this be ignorance, if there were any such thing, viz. to speak falsely of things?—Entirely so, said he.—But, I replied, this is not possible.—It is not, said he.—Do you make this assertion, O Dionysodorus, for the sake of discourse, that you may speak that which is wonderful; or does it truly appear to you that no man is unlearned?—Confute, said he, the assertion. Or, according to your assertion, can confutation take place, while no one speaks falsely?—It cannot, said Euthydemus.—Neither therefore do I, said Dionysodorus, order you to confute. For how can any one order that to be done which is not?—O Euthydemus, said I, I do not well understand these wise and excellent assertions, but I hastily as it were conceive them. Perhaps, therefore, I shall ask something which will be troublesome; but you will pardon me. See then. For if it is neither possible to speak falsely, nor to entertain false opinions, nor to be unlearned, neither is it possible for any one to err when he does any thing. For he who acts cannot err in that which he does. Do you not say so?—Entirely so, said he.—This, said I, is the troublesome question which I just now mentioned. For if we do not err, neither acting nor speaking, nor thinking, if this be the case, of what, by Jupiter, do you come as the teachers? Or did you not just now say, that you could teach him virtue who was willing to learn it, the best of all men?—Are you so dull, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, taking up the discourse, as that you now remember what we first said, and would even now remember any thing which I may have said last year, yet do not know how to use what has been said at present?—I replied, The things which have been now asserted are difficult: and this very properly; for they have been asserted by wise men. And likewise this last thing which you said cannot be used without extreme difficulty: for what will you say, Dionysodorus, is the meaning of this assertion, There is something which I do not know how to use? Does it not mean this, that I do not know how to confute it? Or tell me, what other conception you form of these words, I do not know how to use these assertions?—Do you affirm, said he, that they mean any thing else than this, that it is very difficult to use them? Answer me.—Before you have answered, said I, Dionysodorus?

dorus?—Will you not answer, said he.—Is it just that I should?—It is certainly just, said he.—After what manner? I replied. Is it because you, being a person very wise, have now entered into a discussion with us respecting discourse, and because you know when it is proper to answer, and when not; and now will not give any answer, because you know that it is not requisite?—You babble, said he, neglecting when it is proper to answer, and when not. But, good man, be obedient and answer; since you acknowledge that I am a wise man.

We must obey, said I, and as it seems it is necessary: for you are the ruler. Ask, then.—Whether therefore do those that understand, understand having a soul? or do inanimate natures also understand?—They understand having a soul.—Do you know, therefore, said he, any assertion which has a soul?—Not I, by Jupiter.—Why, then, did you just now ask me what was the meaning of my assertion?—For what other reason, I replied, than that I have erred through indolence: or shall I say, that I have not erred, but that I have also said this rightly, when I asserted that my words understood? Whether will you say that I erred, or not? For if I have not erred, neither do you confute though you are a wise man, nor have you any thing to reply to my assertion: but if I have erred, neither thus do you speak rightly, in saying that it is not possible to err. And I say these things, not in opposition to what you have asserted last year. But this discourse, said I, O Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, seems to remain in the same condition, and even now as formerly, having thrown down others, to fall itself; nor has your art discovered a method of preventing this, though it is so wonderful with respect to accuracy of arguments.—Ctesippus then said, You certainly speak wonderful things, O Thurian or Chian men, or by whatever other name it may delight you to be called, as you are not in the least concerned whether you are delirious or not.—And I, fearing lest defamation should take place, again appeased Ctesippus, and said, O Ctesippus; and now indeed, O Ctesippus, what I have said to Clinias, I also say to you, that you do not know that the wisdom of these strangers is admirable. They

¹ In the original δ , τι μοι νοει το φημι, which is literally "what my assertion *understands* for me." The words of Socrates, therefore, are perverted by the sophist from their natural meaning, in order that he might play on the word *understand*.

are however, unwilling to exhibit it to us seriously, but imitate Proteus the Egyptian sophist, and deceive us by enchantments. Let us, therefore, imitate Menelaus, and not suffer the men to leave us, till they have unfolded to us what it is in which they are serious: for I think that something pertaining to them very beautiful will appear, when they begin to act seriously; but we request, we exhort, and we beseech them to unfold themselves.

I therefore again appear to myself to be about to relate in what manner I beseech them to unfold themselves to me: for I will endeavour to the best of my ability to discuss what I formerly left unfinished, if I can in a certain respect allure them, and induce them to pity and commiserate me thus strenuously and seriously acting, and to act seriously themselves. But do you, Clinias, said I, enable me to recollect whence we at that time discontinued our discourse: for I think we ended there, whence we acknowledged we should philosophize: did we not?—We did, he replied.—But philosophy is the possession of science: is it not so? said I.—It is, said he.—By the possession therefore, of what science shall we rightly possess? is not this indeed obvious, that it must be by the possession of that science which will benefit us?—Entirely so, said he.—Should we therefore be in any respect benefited, if we scientifically knew, while travelling, in what part of the earth much gold is buried?—Perhaps so, said he.—But formerly, I replied, this was our decision, that we should gain nothing, even though without labour, and without digging the earth, all the gold that exists should be ours. So that neither if we knew how to make golden stones would this science be of any worth: for if we knew not how to use gold, no advantage would be apparent from the possession of it. Or do you not remember? said I.—I do very well remember it, he replied.—Nor, as it seems, will any advantage be derived from any other science, neither from that which is employed in the negotiation of money, nor from the medicinal science, nor from any other, which knows how to make any thing, but does not know how to use that which it makes. Is it not so?—He granted that it was.—Nor even, if there were a science by which men could be made immortal, but without knowing how to use immortality, neither from this does it appear that there would be any advantage, if it is proper to argue from what has been previously granted.—To all these particulars we mutually assented.

A certain science, therefore, is requisite for us, O beautiful boy, of such a kind,

kind, in which both to make, and to know how to use that which is made, may concur.—It appears so, said he.—It is of much consequence therefore, as it seems, whether we are skilful makers of the lyre, or in possession of a certain science of that kind: for here the art which makes is separated from the art which uses, about the same thing. For the lyre-making and the harp-making arts differ very much from each other. Is it not so?—He granted that it was.—Nor shall we indeed require the pipe-making art: for this is another such-like art.—He granted that it was.—But, by the gods, said I, if we should learn the art of composing orations, is this the art from the possession of which we should be happy?—I do not think it is, said Clinias.—What argument, said I, do you employ in thinking thus?—I see, he replied, certain framers of orations, who do not know how to use the very orations which they themselves have composed: just as the makers of lyres are unskilled in the use of the lyre; but here others are able to use the orations which these have framed, though they are incapable of framing orations themselves. It is evident, therefore, with respect to orations, that the art of making is separate from the art of using them.—You appear to me, said I, to adduce a sufficient argument that the art of composing orations is not that art by the acquisition of which any one will be happy; though I thought that here that science would be apparent which we some time since investigated: for to me those very men who compose orations appear, O Clinias, to be transcendently wise, when I am conversant with them; and this very art of theirs also appears to be something divine and elevated. This indeed is by no means wonderful: for it is a portion of the art of enchantments, to which it is but a little inferior; for the art of enchantments is that art by which vipers, spiders called phalangii, and scorpions, are allured; but this allures and soothes judges, those that frequent assemblies, and other tumultuous associations. Or are you of a different opinion?—I am not, said he; but it appears to me as you say.—Where then shall we yet further turn ourselves? and to what art?—I do not well know, said he.—But I think, said I, that I have discovered this art.—What is it? said Clinias.—The art of commanding an army, said I, appears to me, more than any other art, to be that which will confer felicity on its possessor.—It does not appear so to me.—Why not? said I.—This is certainly an art of hunting men.—What

then? said I.—No part, said he, of the hunting art extends beyond hunting and subjugating; but when they have subjugated that which they have hunted, they are not able to use it. But hunters and fishermen assign this to cocks; while, on the contrary, geometricians, astronomers, and those skilled in the logistic art (for these also are hunters) do not make diagrams, but investigate things themselves. As therefore they do not know how to use these, but are alone skilled in hunting, they deliver their inventions to be used by those who are expert in dialectic; I mean that this is done by such among these as are not entirely stupid.—Be it so, I replied, O most beautiful and wife Clinias.—After the same manner, said he, the commanders of armies also, when they have hunted any city or camp, deliver it to the care of politicians; for they know not how to use those things which they have hunted: just, I think, as the hunters of quails deliver them to those by whom quails are nurtured. If, therefore, he replied, we are in want of that art which its possessor, whether he makes or hunts it, will know how to use, and an art of this kind will render us blessed, some other art, said he, must be investigated instead of that of commanding an army.

CRITO. What do you say, Socrates? Did that lad assert things of this kind?

Soc. Do you not think he did, Crito?

CRITO. By Jupiter, I do not indeed. For I think if he had said these things, that he would not have required the assistance either of Euthydemus, or any other man, with respect to erudition.

Soc. But, by Jupiter, was it Ctesippus then that said these things? for I do not remember.

CRITO. What, Ctesippus?

Soc. This, indeed, I well know, that neither Euthydemus nor Dionysodorus said these things. But, O divine Crito, was it not some one of the beings more excellent than man, who being present said these things? For I well know that I heard them.

CRITO. It is so, by Jupiter, Socrates; and it appears to me, and indeed very much so, to have been some one of the more excellent order of beings. But after this, what art have you still investigated? And have you discovered that art for the sake of which you engaged in this investigation?

Soc. Whence, blessed man, should we have discovered it? But we were perfectly

perfectly ridiculous, just like boys that pursue larks; for we continually thought that we should immediately apprehend each of the sciences, but they always fled from our view. Why therefore should I speak to you concerning many sciences? But when we came to the royal art, and considered whether it is that art which imparts and produces felicity, here falling as it were into a labyrinth, when we thought that we had now arrived at the end, we again proceeded in a winding course, as if we appeared to be in the beginning of our inquiry, and were as much distant from the object of our search as when we began the investigation.

CRITO. But how has this happened to you, Socrates?

SOC. I will tell you. For the political and the royal art appear to us to be the same.

CRITO. But what then?

SOC. The art of commanding an army, and the other arts, appear to impart dominion over those works of which they are the artificers, as alone knowing how to use them. Hence it clearly appeared to us to be the art which we were investigating, and the cause of good conduct in a city, and, in short, according to the Iambic of Æschylus, that it alone is seated in the stern of the city, governing and ruling over all things, and rendering all things useful.

CRITO. Does not this therefore appear to you to be well said respecting this art?

SOC. You shall judge, Crito, if you are willing to hear what after these things will happen to us. For again, let us nearly consider as follows. What work will that royal art which rules over all things produce for us? Shall we say none? But we have said to each other that it certainly will produce some work. For did not you assert this, Crito?

CRITO. I did.

SOC. What then will you say is the work of it? Just as if I should ask you what work the medicinal art produces in all those things over which it rules? Would you not say it is health?

CRITO. I should.

SOC. But what? With respect to your art, agriculture, what does it effect in all those things over which it rules? Would you not say that it affords us food from the earth?

CRITO.

CRITO. I should.

SOC. But what does the royal art effect while it governs every thing over which it has dominion? Perhaps you do not clearly perceive this.

CRITO. I do not, by Jupiter, Socrates.

SOC. Nor do we, Crito. But thus much indeed you know, that if it is that art which we investigate, it ought to be useful.

CRITO. Entirely so.

SOC. Ought it not, therefore, to impart to us a certain good?

CRITO. Necessarily so, Socrates.

SOC. But we have acknowledged to each other, I and Clinias, that good is nothing else than a certain science.

CRITO. You did indeed say so.

SOC. Do not therefore other works, which may be said to belong to the political art, (but these will be many, such as to render the citizens rich, free, and without sedition,) do not all these appear to be neither evil nor good? But it is necessary that this art should make men wise, and impart wisdom, if it is to be that art which will benefit and render men happy.

CRITO. It is so: and thus you accord with each other conformably to your narration.

SOC. Does therefore the royal art make men wise and good?

CRITO. What should hinder, Socrates?

SOC. Does it therefore make all men to be so, and to be entirely good? And is it that art which imparts every science, that of the shoemaker, of the smith, and of all other artificers?

CRITO. I do not think it is, Socrates.

SOC. But what science is it? Or to what purpose do we employ it? For it is requisite that it should not be the artificer of any work which is neither good nor evil, and that it should impart no other science than itself. Let us therefore say what it is, or to what purpose we should use it. Are you willing, Crito, we should say it is that by which we make others good?

CRITO. Entirely so.

SOC. But in what will these be good, and to what purpose will they be useful? Or shall we also say that they will make others good, and that those others will make others to be so? However, it will no where appear to us in what they are good, because we have rejected the works which are said

to

to belong to the political science. But in reality, according to the proverb¹, Corinthian Jupiter is present; and as I have said, we are still equally, or more than equally, remote from knowing what that science is which will make us happy.

CRITO. By Jupiter, Socrates, you have arrived as it seems at abundant doubting.

SOC. I myself, therefore, Crito, since I was fallen into this doubt, with every possible exertion of voice entreated the strangers, and called upon them as if they had been the Dioscuri² to save us, viz. me and the lad from the overwhelming billows of this discourse, to be by all means serious, and seriously to show us what that science is, by the possession of which we may pass through life in a becoming manner.

CRITO. What then? was Euthydemus willing to unfold any thing to you?

SOC. How could he do otherwise? And he began, my friend, the discourse very magnificently thus: Whether, said he, Socrates, shall I teach you this science about which you formerly doubted, or evince that you possess it?—O blessed man, I replied, are you able to effect this?—Entirely so, said he.—Show me, therefore, by Jupiter, said I, that I possess it: for this will be much easier than to instruct a man so far advanced in years.—Come then, said he, answer me. Is there any thing which you know?—Certainly, said I, there are many things which I know, and these of small importance.—It is sufficient, said he. Does it therefore appear to you to be possible, that any thing which exists should not be that thing which it is?—It does not, by Jupiter.—Do you not therefore, said he, know something?—I do.—Are you not therefore knowing, if you know?—Entirely so, in this very thing which I know.—It is of no consequence. Is it not then necessary that you should know all things, in consequence of possessing knowledge?—It is not, by Jupiter, said I, since there are many things which I do not know.—Will it not therefore follow, if there is any thing which you do not know, that you are not knowing?—

¹ A weariness from words repeated in vain, is signified by this adage. Concerning the origin of this proverb, which is obscure, see the Greek Scholia on Plato, p. 96. and Erasmus in *Chiliad*. p. 678.

² The Dioscuri are Castor and Pollux, the sons of Jupiter from Leda. These brother deities were invoked by sailors when in danger of shipwreck.

It will follow that I am not knowing in that thing, my friend, I replied.—Will you then, said he, be less destitute of knowledge? For you just now said, that you were knowing: and thus you will be the same person, and again not the same person, according to the same, and at the same time.—Be it so, I replied, Euthydemus: for, according to the proverb, you say all things well. How then do I know that science which we investigate? Since it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be: if knowing one thing, I know all things. For I cannot possess, and at the same time be destitute of knowledge. But if I know all things, I also possess that knowledge. Is this then what you say? And is this that wise thing?—You yourself, said he, Socrates, confute yourself.

But what? said I, O Euthydemus, does not the very same thing happen to you? For I, whatever I may suffer with you and this Dionysodorus, the beloved head, shall not be very indignant. Tell me, do you not know some things, and are you not ignorant of others?—By no means, Socrates, said Dionysodorus.—How do you say? I replied. Do you therefore know nothing?—Very far from it, said he.—Do you then know all things, said I, since you also know any thing?—All things, he replied. And you likewise, if you know one thing, know all things.—O Jupiter! I replied, what a wonderful thing you speak of: and a mighty good becomes apparent. But do all other men likewise know all things, or nothing?—They certainly, said he, do not know some things, but are ignorant of others; and are not at the same time scientifically knowing, and deprived of science.—But how is this? said I.—All men, he replied, know all things, if they know one thing.—O, by the gods! said I, Dionysodorus, (for it is now manifest to me that you are serious, though I with difficulty incited you to be so,) do you in reality know all things, such as the carpenter's and the shoemaker's art?—Entirely so, said he.—And are you also able to sew shoes, in the same manner as shoemakers?—I am, by Jupiter, said he, and also to mend them.—Do you also know such things as these, viz. the number of the stars and the sands?—Perfectly so, he replied. Do you not think, we should confess that we do?—And Ctesippus then taking up the discourse, By Jupiter, said he, O Dionysodorus, exhibit to me such a proof of these things, that I may know that you speak the truth.—What shall I exhibit, said he.—Do you know how many teeth Euthydemus has, and does Euthydemus know how many you have?

have?—Is it not sufficient for you, said he, to have heard that we know all things?—By no means, said he; but only tell us this one thing more, and show that you speak the truth. And if you tell how many teeth each of you have, and you shall appear to know this on our counting them, we shall then also believe you in other things. Conceiving, therefore, that they were derided, they were unwilling to comply, but they acknowledged that they knew all things, while they were severally interrogated by Ctesippus. For there was not any thing at length, which Ctesippus did not ask them without any hesitation, and even asked them, if they knew the most indecent things. They however most bravely advanced to the interrogations, confessing that they knew, like wild boars rushing on the blow; so that I also myself, Crito, was at length compelled, through my incredulity, to ask Euthydemus, whether Dionysodorus knew also how to dance? But he replied, Perfectly so.—However, said I, he certainly does not know how to precipitate himself upon swords, and to be whirled on a wheel, being so much advanced in years as he is. Or is he master of this piece of wisdom also?—There is nothing, said he, which he does not know.—But whether, said I, do you now only know all things, or has this always been the case?—Always, said he.—And when you were boys, and as soon as you were born, did you know all things?—All things, said both of them together.—And to us, indeed, the thing appeared to be incredible. But Euthydemus said, You do not believe, Socrates.—Except this one thing, I replied, that it is likely you are wise men.—But, said he, if you are willing to answer me, I will also show you, giving your assent to these wonderful things.—I replied, I shall most gladly be confuted in these things. For if it is concealed from me that I am wise, and you demonstrate that I know all things, and that I have always possessed this knowledge, what greater gain than this shall I be able to discover through the whole of life?—Answer then, said he.—Ask me as one that will answer.

Whether, therefore, Socrates, said he, do you know any thing or not?—I do.—Do you then know by that thing through which you are knowing, or by any thing else?—By that by which I am knowing: for I think that you speak of the soul. Or do you not speak of this?—Are you not ashamed, said he, Socrates, to interrogate when you are interrogated?—Be it so, said I; but what shall I do? Shall I do as you bid me, when I know not what it

is you ask me, though at the same time you order me to answer and not to interrogate?—You, doubtless, said he, apprehend what I say.—I do, I replied.—Now therefore answer to that which you apprehend.—What then? said I, if you indeed ask conceiving one thing, but I apprehend another, and afterwards I should answer to this, would it be sufficient for you if I answered nothing to the purpose?—To me it would, he replied, but not to you, as I think.—I will not therefore, by Jupiter, said I, answer, till I understand.—You will not answer, said he, to the things which you always apprehend, because you trifle, and are more simple than is becoming.—And I perceived that he was indignant with me for disputing what was said, he being desirous to catch me by enclosing me with words. I recollected, therefore, that Connus was always indignant with me, when I did not yield to him, and that afterwards he paid less attention to me, as one that was ignorant. As, therefore, I had formed the design of becoming instructed by these men, I thought it was necessary to submit to them, lest, considering me as an illiterate person, they should reject me. Hence I said, If you are disposed to act in this manner, Euthydemus, let it be done: for you, in every respect, better know how to discourse than I do, you who possess art, than I who am a rude unlettered man. Again, therefore, interrogate from the beginning.—Answer then again, said he, whether you know those things which you know, by something or not.—I do, said I; for I know them, by my soul.—Again, said he, in his answer, he adds to what he is asked. For I did not ask by what you know, but if you know by any thing.—Again, said I, I have answered more than is sufficient, through my want of erudition; but pardon me. For I will now answer simply that I always know by a certain thing what I know.—But whether, said he, do you always know by this very same thing? Or do you at one time know by this, and at another by something else?—Always by this, said I, when I know.—Again, said he, you will not cease to speak superfluously.—But I am afraid lest this certain something always should deceive us.—It will not deceive us, said he; but if at all, it will deceive you. Answer me, however, whether you always know by this.—Always, I replied; since it is necessary to take away the when.—Do you therefore always know by this? And always knowing, whether do you know some things by this by which you know, but other things by something else? Or do you know all things by this?—All things by this, said I, which I do know.—This latter part of your answer,

answer, said he, is again superfluous.—But I take away, said I, the words which I do know.—You should not, however, said he, take away even one word; for I want none of your assistance. But answer me; would you be able to know all things unless you could know all things?—This would be a prodigy, I replied.—And he said, Add now whatever you please: for you confess that you know all things.—I appear to have done so, said I, since the words, the things which I know, possess no power whatever; but I know all things.—Have you not therefore also confessed that you always know by this thing by which you know? whether it be when you know, or in whatever way you please: for you have acknowledged that you always know, and at the same time, that you know all things. It is evident therefore that you knew when you was a boy, and when you was begot, and when you was born. Hence, before you was born, and before heaven and earth were produced, you knew all things, if you always possessed knowledge. And by Jupiter, said he, you always will know, and will always know all things, if I am willing that you should.—But be willing, I replied, O much-honoured Euthydemus, if you speak the truth in reality. But I cannot entirely believe that you are sufficient to accomplish this, unless this your brother Dionysodorus assists you with his counsel: and thus perhaps what you say may be accomplished.

But tell me, I said; for in other things I cannot contend with you, who are endued with such portentous wisdom, nor deny that I know all things, since you say that I do;—how shall I say that I know such things as the following, O Euthydemus, viz. that good men are unjust? Come, inform me, do I know this, or do I not know it?—You certainly know it, said he.—What, I replied, do I know?—That good men are not unjust.—This, said I, I perfectly knew a long time ago. But I do not ask this; but where did I learn that good men are unjust?—No where, said Dionysodorus.—I do not therefore, said I, know this.—Euthydemus then said to Dionysodorus, You destroy the conversation; and he will appear to be not knowing, and to possess, and at the same time to be deprived of knowledge. And Dionysodorus blushed. But you, Euthydemus, said I, how do you say? Does not your brother appear to you to speak rightly, who knows all things?—But am I the brother of Euthydemus? said Dionysodorus, hastily replying.—And I said, Excuse me from answering you, O good man, till Euthydemus has taught me

that I know that good men are unjust, and do not envy me the discipline.—You fly, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, and are not willing to answer.—It is reasonable that I should, said I: for I am inferior to either of you, so that there is an abundant necessity that I should fly from two. For I am much more imbecile than Hercules, who was not able to contend with the hydra (a sophist who, by her wisdom, if one head of the discourse was cut off, presented many instead of one), and at the same time with the crab, a certain other sophist, who, as it appears to me, recently drove on shore from the sea); and when Hercules had in a similar manner tormented the crab) by speaking to and biting him on the left-hand side, he called upon Iolaus, the son of his brother, to assist him: and he gave him sufficient aid. But my Iolaus Patrocles, if he should come, would rather effect the very contrary.

Answer then, said Dionysodorus, since these things are celebrated by you, whether Iolaus was more the nephew of Hercules than of you.—It is therefore best for me, O Dionysodorus, said I, to answer you. For you will not desist from interrogating, nearly envying (for this I well know), and hindering Euthydemus from teaching me that wise thing.—Answer, however, said he.—But I will answer, I said, that Iolaus was the son of the brother of Hercules, but, as it appears to me, is by no means my nephew. For Patrocles, who is my brother, was not his father; but Iphicles, who resembles him in name, was the brother of Hercules.—But is Patrocles, said he, your brother?—Certainly, said I; for he had the same mother, though not the same father with me.—He is your brother therefore, and not your brother.—I said, He was not from the same father, O best of men: for his father was Chæredemus, but mine Sophroniscus.—But the father, said he, was Sophroniscus and Chæredemus. Was he not?—Certainly, said I; the former was my, and the latter his father.—Was not therefore, said he, Chæredemus different from the father?—From my father, said I.—Was he therefore a father, being different from a father? Or are you the same thing as a stone?—I am afraid, said I, lest through you I should appear to be the same; but I do not appear to myself to be the same.—Are you not therefore, said he, different from a stone?—Different certainly.—Being different from a stone, therefore, you are something else, and not a stone: and being different from gold, you are not gold.—Granted.—Will not Chæredemus therefore, since he is different from father, not be a father?—It seems, said I, he is not a father.—For certainly,

said Euthydemus, taking up the discourse, if Chæredemus is a father, again Sophroniscus, on the contrary, being different from father, is not a father; so that you, O Socrates, are without a father.—And then Ctesippus, taking up the discourse, said, Does not your father suffer these very same things? for he is different from my father.—Very far from it, said Euthydemus.—Is he then the same? he replied.—The same, indeed.—I should not consent to this. But whether, O Euthydemus, is he alone my father, or is he the father also of other men?—Of other men also, said he.—Or do you think that the same person being father, is not father?—I should indeed think so, said Ctesippus.—But what? said he. A thing being gold, is it not gold? Or being man, is it not man?—You do not, said Ctesippus, according to the proverb, connect, O Euthydemus, thread with thread¹. For you speak of a dire thing, if your father is the father of all men.—But he is, said he.—Whether is he the father of men, said Ctesippus, or also of horses? Or likewise of all other animals?—Of all others animals, said he.—Is a mother also the mother of all animals?—And a mother likewise.—Your mother therefore, said he, is also the mother of marine hedge-hogs.—And yours too, said he.—Hence then you are the brother of gudgeons, whelps, and pigs.—For you also are, said he.—And besides this, your father also is a dog.—For your father is likewise, said he.—But, said Dionysodorus, if you answer me, you will in a short time acknowledge these things. For tell me, have you a dog?—And a very bad one, said Ctesippus.—Has he therefore whelps?—He has indeed, said he, others very much like himself.—Is not the dog then the father of them?—I, said he, saw him having connection with a bitch.—What then? Is he not your dog?—Certainly, said he.—Being a father therefore, is he not yours? So that the dog becomes your father, and you are the brother of whelps.—And again, Dionysodorus hastily took up the discourse, that Ctesippus might not say any thing in reply prior to him; and still further, said he, answer me a trifling particular. Do you strike this dog?—And Ctesippus laughing, By the gods, said he, I do; for I cannot strike you.—Do you not therefore, said he, strike your father?—I should much more

¹ This proverb, according to the Greek Scholiast on Plato, is applied to those who say or do the same things through the same, or who connect similars into friendship. This proverb is also mentioned by Aristotle in the third book of his *Physics*.

justly,

justly, said he, strike your father, and ask him what he meant, by begetting such wise sons. But certainly, O Euthydemus, said Ctesippus, your father and the father of the whelps has obtained the possession of many good things from this your wisdom.

But he is not in want of many good things, O Ctesippus, neither he, nor you.—Nor are you, O Euthydemus, said he, in want of them.—Neither I nor any other man am in want of them. For tell me, O Ctesippus, whether you think it good for a sick man to drink a medicine, or does it appear to you to be not good, when it is requisite he should drink it; or when any one is going to a battle, ought he rather to go armed, or without arms?—To me, said he, it appears to be better to do the former of these; though I think that you are about to say something beautiful.—You understand most excellently, said he; but answer me. For since you acknowledge that it is good for a man to drink a medicine when it is requisite, it is also necessary to drink abundantly of this good, and it will in this case be well, if some one bruising it, should mingle with it a cart load of hellebore.—And Ctesippus said, This would be very proper indeed, O Euthydemus, if he who drank it were as large as the statue in Delphi.—As therefore, said he, it is also good to have arms in battle, is it not necessary to have a great number of shields and spears, since it is a good thing?—Very much so, said Ctesippus. But you are not of this opinion, O Euthydemus; for you think that one shield and one spear are sufficient. Or do you not?—I do.—Would you also, said he, arm Gorgon and Briareus after this manner? But I think that you are more skilful than to act in this manner, as being one who fights with military weapons, as is also the case with this your associate.—And Euthydemus indeed was silent; but Dionysodorus said, in reply to those things which had been before answered by Ctesippus, Does it not therefore also appear to you to be good to possess gold?—Certainly, said Ctesippus, and also to have a great quantity of it.—What then? Does it not appear to you to be a good thing always to possess riches, and every where?—Very much so, said he.—Do you not therefore also acknowledge gold to be a good thing?—We have acknowledged it, said he.—Is it not then necessary always to possess it, and every where, and especially in one's self? And would not a man be most happy, if he had three talents of gold in his belly, a talent in his skull, and a stater of gold in each of his eyes?—They say indeed, O Euthydemus, said

Ctesippus, that those among the Scythians are the most happy and the best men, who have much gold in their skulls, just as you lately said, that a dog was your father : and, what is still more wonderful, they say, that they drink out of their own golden skulls, and view the gold within them, having their own head in their hands.

But whether, said Euthydemus, do the Scythians and other men see things which may be seen, or things which cannot be seen ?—Things which can be seen, certainly.—Is this, therefore, also the case with you ? said he.—It is.—Do you therefore see our garments ?—Yes.—Are these then things which may be seen ?—Transcendently so, said Ctesippus.—But what ? said he.—Nothing. But you perhaps do not think that they are seen ; so pleasant are you. To me however, Euthydemus, you appear, not sleeping to be asleep, and if it were possible for a man when speaking to say nothing, that you also do this.—Is it not therefore possible, said Dionysodorus, for him who is silent to speak ?—By no means, said Ctesippus.—Is it also impossible for him who speaks to be silent ?—This is still less possible, said he.—When therefore you speak of stones, and pieces of wood and iron, do you not speak of things silent ?—I do not, said he, if I walk in braziers' shops ; but the pieces of iron are called things which sound, and make the greatest noise, if any one meddles with them. So that in this particular, it is concealed from you through your wisdom, that you have said nothing. But further still, explain to me the other assertion, how it is possible for one who speaks to be silent.—And Ctesippus appeared to me to contend in a transcendent manner, on account of the youth, the object of his love.—When you are silent, said Euthydemus, are you not silent as to all things ?—I am, said he.—Are you not therefore silent, as to things which are said, if things which are said are among the number of all things ?—But what ? said Ctesippus, are not all things silent ?—Certainly not, said Euthydemus.—Do therefore, O best of men, all things speak ?—Those things certainly do, which do speak.—But, said he, I do not ask this ; but I ask whether all things are silent, or speak ?—They do neither, and they do both, said Dionysodorus, hastily taking up the discourse. For I well know that you have not any thing to say to this answer.—And Ctesippus, as was usual with him, laughing very loudly, O Euthydemus, said he, your brother has lost his position in both cases, and his assertion perishes and is vanquished. And Clinias was very much delighted and
laughed ;

laughed; so that Ctesippus became ten times greater than he was. But Ctesippus, as being very crafty, appeared to me to have stolen these things from these very men. For a wisdom of this kind is not now possessed by any other persons.

And I said, Why do you laugh, O Clinias, at things so serious and beautiful?—Why have you now, Socrates, ever seen a beautiful thing? said Dionysodorus.—I have, said I, and many such, O Dionysodorus.—Were they therefore, said he, things different from the beautiful, or the same with the beautiful?—And I then became perfectly involved in doubt, and thought I had suffered justly for having granted. At the same time, however, I replied, They are different from the beautiful; but a certain beauty is present to each of them.—If, therefore, said he, an ox is present with you, you are an ox; and because I now am present with you, you are Dionysodorus.—Predict better things, said I.—But after what manner, said he; when one thing is present with another, will that which is different be different?—Are you then, said I, dubious respecting this? But I will now endeavour to imitate the wisdom of men, as being one who is desirous of it.—How should I not doubt, said he, both I and all other men, respecting that which is not?—What do you say? said I, O Dionysodorus. Is not the beautiful, beautiful, and the base, base?—If, said he, it appears to be so to me.—Does it not therefore appear to be so to you?—Entirely so, said he.—Is not therefore also the same, same? and is not the different, different? For certainly the different is not the same. But I should not think that even a boy would doubt this, that the different is not different. But, O Dionysodorus, this indeed you willingly pass by; since in other things you appear to me to resemble artists on whom it is incumbent to accomplish certain particulars; for it is proper that you should accomplish the business of discourse in an all-beautiful manner.—Do you know therefore, said he, what is proper to each of the artists? And, in the first place, do you know to whom it belongs to work in brass?—I know that this belongs to copper-smiths.—But to whom does it belong to fashion things from clay?—To a potter.—And whose business is it to cut throats, to excoriate, and cutting off small pieces of flesh to boil and roast them?—It is the business of a cook, said I.—If then, said he, a man does things which are proper, does he not act rightly?—Especially so.—But it is proper, as you say, that a cook should cut and excoriate. Have you

you assented to these things or not?—I have assented, I said; but pardon me.—It is evident, therefore, said he, that if any one, cutting the throat of a cook and chopping him into small pieces, should boil and roast him, he would do what is proper; and that if any one should work on a copper-smith himself after the manner of braziers, and on a potter after the manner of potters, he also would do what is proper.—O Neptune, said I, now you place a summit¹ on your wisdom. Will it therefore ever be present with me, so as to become familiar to me?—You will know it, Socrates, said he, when it becomes familiar to you.—That is to say, said I, if you are willing that it should.

But what? said he, Do you think you know the things pertaining to yourself?—Unless you say any thing to the contrary. For it is necessary to begin from you, but to end in Euthydemus here.—Whether therefore, said he, do you think these things to be yours, over which you have dominion, and which you can use as you please? As, for instance, with respect to oxen and sheep, do you think that such among these are yours as it is lawful for you to sell and give, and sacrifice to whatever god you please? And that those of them over which you have not this power, are not yours?—And I (for I knew that from those questions something beautiful would emerge, and at the same time being desirous to hear very quickly) said, it is perfectly so: things of this kind are alone mine.—But what? said he. Do you not call these things animals, which possess a soul?—Yes, I said.—Do you acknowledge then, that these alone among animals are yours respecting which you have the liberty of doing all these things which I have just now mentioned?—I acknowledge it.—And he pausing, very ironically, as if considering something of great consequence, Tell me, said he, Socrates, is Jupiter with you *Patrius*?—And I, suspecting that the discourse would come to that place, in which it would end, fled with a certain ambiguous craftiness, and now turned myself as if I had been caught in a net. And I said, He is not, O Dionysodorus.—You therefore are a miserable man; nor are you an Athenian, since you have neither gods called *Patrii*, nor sacred rights, nor any thing else beautiful and good.—Spare me, said I, O Dionysodorus, predict better things, and do not instruct me with severity. For

¹ This was usually said when the last hand was put to any thing, or when that was added without which a business could not be finished. See Erasmus in *Chiliad*, p. 570.

I have altars, and domestic sacred concerns, and such as belong to my country, and whatever other things of this kind are possessed by the rest of the Athenians.—In the next place, said he, is not Jupiter Patrius to the rest of the Athenians?—That appellation, said I, does not belong to any one of the Ionians, nor to such as are colonized from this city, nor to us. But Apollo is Patrius ¹, through the nativity of Ion. Jupiter, however, is not called by us Patrius, but Herceus ² and Phratrius; and Minerva also is called Phratia. —This is sufficient, said Dionysodorus; for you have, as it seems, Apollo, Jupiter, and Minerva.—Entirely so, said I.—Will not these therefore, said he, be your gods?—My progenitors, said I, and masters.—They will be so then to you, said he. Or have you not confessed that they are yours?—I have confessed it, said I. For what can I do?—Are not therefore, said he, those gods also animals? For you have acknowledged that such things as have a soul are animals. Or have not those gods a soul?—They have ³, said I.—Are they not therefore also animals?—Animals, said I.—But of animals, said he, you have acknowledged these to be yours, which you can give and sell, and sacrifice to any god you please.—I have acknowledged it, said I. For I do not recant, O Euthydemus.—Come then, said he, tell me immediately, since you acknowledge that Jupiter is yours and the other gods, are you therefore permitted to sell them, or give them, or to use them in any other way you please, in the same manner as other animals?—I therefore, O Crito, as if struck by what he said, lay speechless; but Ctesippus coming as it were to my assistance, Pypax ⁴, O Herules, said he, a beautiful discourse!—And then Dionysodorus, Whether, said he, is Hercules Pypax, or Pypax Hercules?—And Ctesippus, O Neptune, said he, what weighty questions! I yield; the men are unconquerable.

¹ Some, says the Greek scholiast on Plato, p. 98, say that the Greeks were indigenous, and that their parents were the earth and the sun who is the same with Apollo. But others assert that Apollo having connexion with Creusa, the daughter of Erechtheus, begot Ion, from whom the Athenians were at one time called Ionians, and that on this account they have Apollo Patrius.

² The Athenians called houses *ερα* *erke*; and hence Jupiter is with them Herceus, whom they establish in them for the sake of a guard. But Phratia is the third part of every tribe; and Minerva Phratia is the inspective guardian of these. Schol. in Plat. p. 98.

³ This passage, among numberless others that might be adduced, must convince the most careless reader that the gods of the ancients were not considered by those that worshipped them to be nothing but flocks and fables, as some have stupidly pretended they were.

⁴ The Greek Scholiast on Plato informs us, that this word expresses both indignation and pride.

Here indeed, my dear Crito, there was not any one present, who did not in the highest degree praise what was said; and the men were almost ready to die with laughing, applauding, and exulting. For before this, the lovers alone of Euthydemus applauded every thing that was said in a very beautiful manner; but here, not far from the pillars in the Lyceum, they applauded the men, and were delighted with what they said. As to myself, my feelings were such, that I was forced to acknowledge that I had never at any time seen men so wise; and being perfectly enslaved by their wisdom, I applied myself to the praising and passing encomiums on them; and I said, O blessed ye for your admirable genius, who have so rapidly, and in a short time, accomplished a thing of such magnitude! Your arguments indeed, O Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, contain many other beautiful things; but this is the most magnificent thing in them, that you pay no attention to the multitude of mankind, nor to things venerable, and which appear to be of some consequence, but only to those who are like yourselves. For I well know, that very few men, and those such as are similar to you, delight in these arguments; but others are so ignorant of them, that I well know, they would be more ashamed to confute others with such like arguments, than to be themselves confuted. This too again is another popular and mild thing in your arguments, that when you say there is nothing either beautiful, or good, or white, or any thing else of this kind, and, in short, that one thing is not different from another, you in reality sew up the mouths of men, as you also acknowledge that you do; but that you not only sew up the mouths of others, but appear also to sew up your own, this is very polite, and removes that which is oppressive in your arguments. The greatest thing however is, that these arguments subsist in such a manner, and are so artificially invented by you, that any one may learn them in a very short time. This I have perceived, and I have noticed how rapidly, and indeed immediately, Ctesippus has been able to imitate you. This wisdom therefore of yours, with respect to its being rapidly imparted to another, is beautiful, but is not adapted to be discussed before men. But if you will be persuaded by me, be careful that you do not speak before many, lest rapidly learning, they should not thank you for your instruction. But especially discourse together by yourselves alone: if not, if you discourse before another, let it be before him alone, who gives you silver for what you say. These same things too if you are wise you will also admire.

nish your disciples, viz. That they never discourse with any man, unless with you and themselves. For that which is rare, O Euthydemus, is honourable; but water may be bought for a vile price, being the best of things, as Pindar says. But come, said I, make Clinias and me partakers of your discipline.

Having said these things, O Crito, and a few others, we departed. Consider therefore now, how you will accompany me to these men. For they say that they are able to teach any one who is willing to give them money; and that they do not exclude any genius or age. They likewise assert that which it is especially proper for you to hear, that an attention to gain does not hinder any one from easily receiving their wisdom.

CRITO. And indeed, Socrates, I am desirous of hearing them, and would willingly learn something from them; though indeed I also appear to be among the number of those who do not resemble Euthydemus, but those whom, as you said, would more willingly be confuted by such like arguments, than confute them. It seems however to me to be ridiculous to admonish you, at the same time I wish to relate to you what I have heard. Do you not know, that among those that left you, a certain person came to me as I was walking, a man who thought himself to be very wise, and one of those who are skilful in forensic harangues, and that he said to me, O Crito, have you heard nothing of these wise men?—By Jupiter, I have, not said I. For I could not stand before others, so as to hear, on account of the crowd.—But, said he, it was worth while to have heard them.—Why? said I.—Because you would have heard men discoursing, who are the wisest of all those who at present engage in such like arguments.—And I said, What then do you think of their arguments?—What else, said he, than that they are such as you will always hear from such like triflers, who bestow vile attention on things of no worth. For these were his very words.—And I said, But certainly philosophy is an elegant thing.—How, elegant, said he, O blessed man! It is indeed a thing of no worth. But if you had been present just now, I think that you would have been very much ashamed on account of your associate, who was so absurd as willingly to put himself in the power of men, who pay no attention to what they say, but adhere to every word. And these men, as I just now said, are among the best of those that exist at present. But indeed, Crito, said he, both the thing itself, and the men who are conversant with it, are very vile and ridiculous.—But to me, Socrates,

tes, neither he appears rightly to blame the thing, nor any other who blames it. To be willing, however, to discourse with these men before many appears to me to be rightly blamed.

SOC. O Crito, men of this kind are wonderful. But I do not yet know what I am about to say. To what class of men did he belong who came to you, and blamed philosophy? Was he among the number of those who are skilful in contending in courts of justice, a certain orator; or was he one of those who introduce men of this description, a composer of the orations with which orators contend?

CRITO. The least of all, by Jupiter, was he an orator; nor do I think that he ever went into a court of justice; but they say that he is knowing in the thing itself, by Jupiter, and likewise that he is skilful, and that he composes skilful orations.

SOC. I now understand: for I myself was just now about to speak concerning these men. For these are they, O Crito, whom Prodicus says exist in the confines of a philosopher and politician. But they think themselves to be the wisest of men; and besides being such *in their own opinion*, they also entirely appear to be so among the many. Hence, as they are celebrated by all men, no others are an impediment to them, than those who are conversant with philosophy. They think therefore, if they can establish an opinion, that philosophers are of no worth, they shall obtain the palm of wisdom without contention in the opinion of all men. For they consider themselves to be in reality most wise; but think that their authority is lessened by the followers of Euthydemus, when they are intercepted in their private discourses. But they are very reasonably thought to be wise men: for moderately to possess philosophy, and moderately to engage in political concerns, is very convenient; since this is to partake of both, as much as is requisite, and to enjoy the fruits of wisdom, secure from dangers and contests.

CRITO. What then? Do they appear to you, O Socrates, to say any thing of consequence?

SOC. They do not, indeed.

CRITO. But the discourse of the men possesses a certain gracefulness.

SOC. For it has in reality, O Crito, gracefulness rather than truth. For it is not easy to persuade them, that men and all other things which subsist
between

between two certain things, and participate of both, viz. such particulars as consist from good and evil, become better than the one, and worse than the other; but that such things as consist from two goods, not tending to the same, are worse than both with respect to that for which each of the things is useful from which they are composed; and that such things as are composed from two evils, not tending to the same, and which are in the middle, are alone better than each of those things, a part of both of which they participate. If, therefore, philosophy and political action are good, but each tends to that which is different, and these men, while they participate of both, are situated in the middle, they say nothing to the purpose; for they are viler than both. But if philosophy and political action are both good and bad, these men are better than some and worse than others. And if both are bad, thus they will assert something which is true, but by no means otherwise. I do not therefore think they will acknowledge, either that both these are bad, or that the one is bad, and the other good; but they in reality partaking of both, are inferior to both with respect to the performing of either, with a view to which both the political science and philosophy are worthy of regard; and though in reality they rank as the third, they endeavour to appear to be the first. It is requisite, therefore, to pardon their desire, and not to be indignant with them. We should however consider them to be such as they are: for it is requisite to embrace every man who says any thing which adheres to intellect, and who valiantly labours in endeavouring to do so.

CRITO. And indeed, Socrates, I also (as I always say to you) am dubious with respect to the management of my own children. For the youngest is yet but a little one; but Critobulus is now an adult, and requires the assistance of some one. I therefore, when I converse with you, am led to think that it is madness to be so much concerned about other things for the sake of children, such as about marriage, that they may be born from the most generous mother, and about riches, that they may become most wealthy, and yet neglect their education. But when I look at any one of those who profess to instruct men, I am struck with astonishment; and, to tell you the truth, every one of them appears to me to be unfit for the purpose; so that I cannot exhort the lad to philosophy.

Soc. O, my dear Crito, do you not know that in every pursuit, the many are vile, and of no worth, and that the few are worthy of all regard? For
do

do not the gymnastic art, the art of acquiring money, rhetoric, and the art of commanding an army, appear to you to be beautiful?

CRITO. To me they certainly do, in every respect.

Soc. What then? In each of these do you not see that the multitude are ridiculous with respect to the several employments of these arts?

CRITO. Yes, by Jupiter; and you speak most truly.

Soc. Would you, therefore, on this account avoid all pursuits, and not suffer your son to engage in them?

CRITO. This indeed, Socrates, would not be just.

Soc. You must not, therefore, O Crito, do that which ought not to be done; but bidding farewell to those who study philosophy, whether they are good or bad, explore the thing itself, well and properly; and if it should then appear to you to be a vile thing, dissuade every man from it, and not your sons only; but if it should appear to you such as I think it is, confidently pursue and cultivate it, as it is said, both you and your children.

THE END OF THE EUTHYDEMUS.

THE

THE HIPPARCHUS:

A DIALOGUE

ON

THE LOVE OF GAIN.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE HIPPARCHUS.

THE design of the Hipparchus is to show that all men naturally desire good, since even those who wander from it through avarice, wander through a desire of obtaining it; but they err in consequence of mistaking good, which is a mean, for ultimate good. For good is two-fold, one being the end, the other subsisting for the sake of the end. Hence the possession of the former is called *beatitude*, and of the latter *gain*. Hence too, gain is the acquisition of that good, which contributes to the possession of ultimate good. But that which does not contribute to this, is neither useful, nor is the acquisition of it gain. The desire therefore of gain thus defined, and which is naturally inherent in all men, is laudable; but the false opinion is to be reprobated, which, while it is ignorant of the truly useful and lucrative, distorts to things adverse the natural appetite of man. Plato latently teaches this, while he confutes the false definitions which are introduced in this Dialogue, concerning the desire of gain. But he employs this proposition, *that all men desire good* as manifest, in order to conclude that all men naturally desire gain, and that this *natural* desire is laudable. And this is the conclusion which Socrates after a manner directly introduces by three modes of arguing, viz. by example, by induction, and by reasoning. But from the whole Dialogue we collect, that all men desire good; and this is its ultimate end. For its first end is to show that all men are desirous of gain, and that

this desire is not to be blamed when directed to gain according to its true definition.

It appears from Ælian (Var. Hist. viii. 2.) that it was dubious with some of the ancients, whether this Dialogue was in reality composed by Plato. If I may be allowed to give my own opinion, I do not find any thing, either in its manner or matter, for which its authenticity deserves to be called in question.

THE HIPPARCHUS.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND HIPPARCHUS.

SOCRATES.

WHAT is the love, and who are the lovers of gain?

HIP. It appears to me that those are lovers of gain, who think it worth while to acquire wealth from things of no worth.

SOC. Whether therefore do they appear to you to do this in consequence of knowing, or being ignorant that these are things of no worth? For if they do this through ignorance, you call the lovers of gain stupid.

HIP. But I do not call them stupid, but perfectly crafty and base; men who are vanquished by gain, who know that the things from which they have the boldness to acquire wealth, are of no worth, and yet at the same time, through their impudence, dare to love gain.

SOC. Do you, therefore, call a character of the following kind a lover of gain? I mean, as if a husbandman, planting a tree or herb, and knowing that it is of no worth, should nevertheless think it worth while to enrich himself from the cultivation of such a plant? Do you call such a one as this a lover of gain?

HIP. A lover of gain, Socrates, thinks he ought to enrich himself from every thing.

SOC. Do not thus rashly answer me, like a man who has been injured by some one; but, attending to what I say, answer me as if I should again interrogate you from the beginning. Do you agree with me, that a lover of
gain

gain knows the value of that thing whence he thinks it worth while to enrich himself?

HIP. I do.

SOC. Who then is he that has a knowledge of the worth of plants, and who likewise knows in what region, and at what time of the year it is worth while to plant them? that we also may adopt something from those words of the wife, which lawyers employ for the sake of elegance.

HIP. A husbandman, I think.

SOC. Do you, therefore, say that the term, It is worth while to acquire wealth, is any thing else than to think that it is requisite to acquire wealth?

HIP. I say it is this very thing.

SOC. Do not therefore you, who are so young, endeavour to deceive me, who am now an elderly man, by answering, as you do at present, what you by no means think; but answer me truly, whether you think that the man who is a husbandman, and who knows that it is not worth while to set a certain plant, will yet expect to be enriched by such a plant?

HIP. By Jupiter, not I.

SOC. What then? Will a jockey who knows that the food which he gives a horse is of no worth, be ignorant that by such food he will destroy the horse?

HIP. I do not think he will.

SOC. He will not, therefore, think that from such aliment as this, which is of no worth, he shall be enriched.

HIP. He will not.

SOC. What then? Do you think that a pilot who furnishes a ship with a rudder and sails, which are of no value, can be ignorant that he shall sustain an injury, be himself in danger of perishing, and both destroy the ship and all it contains?

HIP. I do not.

SOC. He will not therefore think that he shall be enriched by furniture of no value.

HIP. He will not.

SOC. Will the general of an army, likewise, when he knows that his soldiers have arms which are of no value, think that he shall acquire wealth, or that it is worth while to be enriched by these?

HIP. By no means.

SOC. In like manner, if a piper possesses a pipe of no value, a lyrist a lyre, an archer a bow, or in short if any other artist or skilful person possesses instruments, or any other apparatus of no value, will he think that he shall be enriched by these?

HIP. It appears he will not.

SOC. Who then do you call lovers of gain? For they are certainly not those whom we have already mentioned, who expect to be enriched from things which they know are of no value. And thus, O wonderful man, according to what you say, no one is a lover of gain.

HIP. But I, Socrates, wish to say, that those are lovers of gain, who, through insatiable avidity, transcendently aspire after things very small and trifling, and which are of no value, and this for the sake of gain.

SOC. But certainly, O best of men, they do not act in this manner, knowing that they are things of no worth; for we have granted that this is impossible.

HIP. So it appears to me.

SOC. If, therefore, they do not act in this manner knowingly, it is evident that their conduct must be the effect of ignorance; the consequence of thinking that things which are of no worth are highly valuable.

HIP. It appears so.

SOC. Do the lovers of gain, love any thing else than gain?

HIP. Nothing else.

SOC. But do you say that gain is contrary to loss?

HIP. I do.

SOC. Is it therefore good to any one to suffer a loss?

HIP. To no one.

SOC. Is it then an evil?

HIP. Yes.

SOC. Are men, therefore, injured by loss?

HIP. They are injured.

SOC. Is then loss an evil?

HIP. It is.

SOC. And is gain contrary to loss?

HIP. Contrary.

Soc.

Soc. Is gain therefore good ?

Hip. It is.

Soc. Do you, therefore, call those that love good, lovers of gain ?

Hip. So it seems.

Soc. You do not then, my friend, call the lovers of gain insane persons. But with respect to yourself, whether do you love that which is good, or do not love it ?

Hip. I love it.

Soc. Is there a certain good which you do not love, but a certain evil which you do ?

Hip. By Jupiter, there is not.

Soc. But you love all good things equally.

Hip. I do.

Soc. Ask me, if I also do not. For I also shall acknowledge to you, that I love things good. But besides I and you, do not all other men appear to you to love things good, and hate such as are evil ?

Hip. To me it appears so.

Soc. But have we not acknowledged that gain is good ?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. After this manner, therefore, all lovers of gain appear ; but according to that mode which we before mentioned, no one was a lover of gain. By employing which of these two, then, shall we not err ?

Hip. If any one, Socrates, rightly apprehends what a lover of gain is, I think he will rightly consider him to be a character of this kind, who earnestly applies himself to the acquisition of wealth, and thinks it worth while to enrich himself from those things from which good men never dare to enrich themselves.

Soc. But do you not see, O sweetest of men, that we just now acknowledged that to be enriched is to be benefited ?

Hip. But what then ?

Soc. Because this also we previously admitted, that all men always aspired after things good.

Hip. We did.

Soc. Will not, therefore, good men wish to possess every thing lucrative, since every thing lucrative is good ?

HIP

HIP. But they will not, Socrates, desire things lucrative, by which they may be injured.

Soc. Do you say that to be injured, is to suffer a loss, or that it is something else?

HIP. I say it is no other than to suffer a loss.

Soc. Do men, therefore, suffer a loss through gain, or through loss?

HIP. Through both. For they suffer a loss through loss, and through base gain.

Soc. Does it therefore appear to you that any thing useful and good is base?

HIP. It does not.

Soc. Did we not then, a little before this, acknowledge that gain is contrary to loss, which is an evil?

HIP. We did.

Soc. And that being contrary to evil, it is good?

HIP. We granted this.

Soc. You see therefore that you endeavour to deceive me, and that you designedly assert the contrary to that which we just now granted.

HIP. I do not, by Jupiter, Socrates: but, on the contrary, you deceive me; and I do not know how it is, but in your discourse you turn all things upwards and downwards.

Soc. Good words, I beseech you. For indeed I should not act well, if I were not persuaded by a good and wise man.

HIP. Who is he? and to what purpose is this?

Soc. My fellow citizen, and likewise yours, Hipparchus the son of the Philædonic Pisistratus, and the eldest and wisest of the sons of Pisistratus. This man, besides exhibiting many other illustrious works of wisdom, was the first that introduced into this land the writings of Homer, and compelled the rhapsodists to recite them in the Panathenaia, alternately, and in order, just as you know they do at present. He likewise brought back Anacreon, who was sent to Teium, in a ship of fifty oars: and always had about him Simonides of Chius; persuading him to reside with him, by great rewards and gifts. He did these things, wishing to persuade his citizens, that thus he might rule over the best of men; thinking, that it was not proper to

envy any man the possession of wisdom, and this because he himself was a worthy and good man. As, therefore, his fellow citizens were well educated men, and admired him for his wisdom, he likewise endeavoured to instruct the husbandmen, and in order to this, placed Hermæ for them in the roads, in the middle of the city, and in each of the towns. Afterwards, from this wisdom of his, which he partly learned, and partly himself discovered, selecting such things as he thought were the wisest, he inserted them in an elegy, and inscribed this work, HIS POEMS, and SPECIMENS OF WISDOM. This he did, in the first place, that his citizens might not admire those wise inscriptions in the temple of Delphi, "Know thyself," "Nothing too much," and the rest of this kind, but that they might think the words of Hipparchus were to be preferred for wisdom to these: and, in the next place, that by every where reading and receiving a taste of his wisdom, they might come from the fields, and be instructed in the other branches of learning. But there are two epigrams, one on the left hand part of each of the Hermæ, in which, according to the inscription, Hermes says, that the column should stand in the middle of the city, and the people; and the other on the right hand part; which was thus inscribed: "This monument was raised by Hipparchus—Persist in paying attention to justice." There are also many other beautiful inscriptions, on other Hermæ; and the following is to be seen in the Stiriæ road: "This monument was raised by Hipparchus—Do not deceive your friend." I therefore, being your friend, dare not deceive you, and oppose the mandate of so great a man; after whose death, the Athenians were under tyrannic subjection to his brother Hippias. And you must have heard from all old men, that there never was a tyranny in Athens till these three years past, and that during every other time, the Athenians lived somewhat nearly after the same manner, as when Saturn reigned. But it is said by more elegant men, that he did not die in the way which the multitude report, viz. through the ignominy of his sister Canephoria; (for it is absurd to suppose that this was the case;) but that Harmodius was beloved and instructed by Aristogiton, who valued himself very highly on this account, and thought that Hipparchus would be his antagonist. But at that time it happened that Harmodius was the lover of a certain noble and beautiful youth, whose name I have heard, but do not at present remember. This
young

young man then at first admired Harmodius and Aristogiton, as wise men, but afterwards associating with Hipparchus, he despised them; and they being very much afflicted with the disgrace, slew Hipparchus.

HIP. You appear, therefore, Socrates, either not to consider me as a friend; or, if you do think me a friend, not to be persuaded by Hipparchus: for I do not know how to persuade myself that you have not deceived me in the preceding discourse.

SOC. But indeed, just as in the game of chess, I am willing to retract whatever you please, that you may not think I have deceived you. Whether therefore shall I retract this assertion for you, that all men desire good?

HIP. Not for me.

SOC. Shall I retract this then, that neither to sustain a loss, nor a loss itself, is an evil?

HIP. Not for me.

SOC. Shall it be this then, that gain, and to acquire gain, are contrary to loss, and to suffer a loss?

HIP. Nor this neither.

SOC. Shall I retract this assertion, that to acquire gain, as being contrary to evil, is good?

HIP. You shall not retract any thing of this.

SOC. It appears to you, therefore, as it seems, that of gain one part is good, and another part evil.

HIP. To me it does appear so.

SOC. I will therefore retract this for you. For let it be that one kind of gain is good, and another kind evil: but gain itself is not more good than evil. For is it?

HIP. Why do you ask me?

SOC. I will tell you. Is there good, and is there likewise bad, food?

HIP. Yes.

SOC. Is therefore one of them more food than the other? or are both of them similarly food? and does the one in no respect differ from the other, so far as each is food, but so far as one is good, and the other bad?

HIP. Yes.

SOC. And does it not likewise follow with respect to drink, and all other things which participate of the good and the bad, that they differ in no

respect from each other, in that in which they are the same? Just as with respect to our own species, one man is good, and another bad.

HIP. Yes.

SOC. But with respect to men, I think that one man is neither more nor less a man than another, neither the good than the bad, nor the bad than the good.

HIP. True.

SOC. Must we not therefore think in the same manner respecting gain, that both the good and the bad are similarly gain?

HIP. It is necessary.

SOC. He, therefore, who possesses good gain, is not in any respect more enriched than he who possesses bad gain: for we have granted that neither of these appears to be more gain than the other.

HIP. True.

SOC. For neither the more nor the less is present to either of these.

HIP. It is not.

SOC. But how can any one do, or suffer, more or less with respect to a thing to which neither of these pertains?

HIP. It is impossible.

SOC. Since, therefore, both are similarly gain and lucrative, it is requisite that we should still further consider this; on what account you call both of them gain, and what it is that you discover to be in both the same. Just as if you should ask me why I just now called both good and bad food similarly food, I should say, It is because each is a dry aliment of the body. And this you will also grant. Or will you not?

HIP. Yes.

SOC. And there will be the same mode of answering respecting drink, that we give this appellation to the moist aliment of the body, whether it is good or bad: and the reply in other things will be similar. Do you, therefore, endeavour to imitate me, by answering as follows. You say with respect to good and bad gain, that each of them is gain. What same thing is it then which, perceiving in these, you denominate gain? But if you are not able to answer me this question, attend to what I am now going to say. Do you then call every possession which any one obtains gain, when he either spends nothing, or receives more than he spends?

HIP.

HIP. It appears to me that this should be called gain.

SOC. Do you, therefore, thus denominate such things as follow: If any one at a feast should spend nothing, but when satiated should become diseased?

HIP. Not I, by Jupiter.

SOC. But if he should obtain health from feasting, would he acquire gain, or suffer a loss?

HIP. He would acquire gain.

SOC. This, therefore, is not gain, to acquire any kind of possession whatever.

HIP. It is not.

SOC. Does it therefore follow that gain is not to be acquired from every kind of possession, whether it be good or bad?

HIP. It appears so.

SOC. And does it likewise follow that loss will not be sustained from every thing, whether it be good or bad?

HIP. To me it appears so.

SOC. Do you, therefore, perceive how you again revolve to the same thing? For gain appears to be good, but loss evil.

HIP. I am dubious what to say.

SOC. And this not unjustly. But still further, answer me this: If any one obtains more than he spends, do you say that this is gain?

HIP. I do, if his gain is not base, but he receives more than he spends, either of gold or silver.

SOC. And I shall also ask you this: If any one, spending half a pound of gold, should receive double this weight of silver, would he be a gainer, or a loser?

HIP. A loser, certainly, Socrates: for he would only receive half the value of what he spent.

SOC. But yet he would receive more. Or is not double more than half?

HIP. But silver is not of the same value as gold.

SOC. It is requisite therefore, as it seems, to add value to gain: for in this case, though the silver is more than the gold, yet you say it is not of equal value.

HIP.

HIP. And very much so : for thus it is.

SOC. Value, therefore, is lucrative, whether it is small or great : but that which is without value is without gain.

HIP. It is.

SOC. Do you say that value is any other value than that which deserves to be acquired ?

HIP. I do not.

SOC. But what do you call that which deserves to be acquired ? The useless, or the useful.

HIP. The useful, certainly.

SOC. The useful, therefore, is good.

HIP. Yes.

SOC. Hence, O most virile of all men, have we not a third or a fourth time granted that the lucrative is good ?

HIP. So it seems.

SOC. Do you remember, therefore, whence this discourse of ours originated ?

HIP. I think I do.

SOC. If you do not, I will remind you. It originated from your denying that good men would be willing to acquire every kind of gain, but that they would wish to possess good, and not base gain.

HIP. It did originate from this.

SOC. But did not our discourse compel us to acknowledge, that all kinds of gain, both small and great, are good ?

HIP. It did compel, Socrates, rather than persuade me.

SOC. But perhaps, after this, it will also persuade you. Now, however, whether you are persuaded, or in whatever manner you may be affected, do you agree with us, that all gain is good, both small and great ?

HIP. I do.

SOC. And do you agree with me, or not, that all good men aspire after all things that are good ?

HIP. I do.

SOC. But you said that bad men love gain of every kind, both small and great.

HIP.

HIP. I did say so.

SOC. According to your assertion, therefore, all men will be lovers of gain, both good and bad men.

HIP. It appears so.

SOC. No one, therefore, who blames the love of gain will blame rightly, since he who does so is himself also a lover of gain.

THE END OF THE HIPPARCHUS.

THE RIVALS:

A DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

PHILOSOPHY.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE RIVALS.

THE general subject of this short Dialogue is so evident, that it is no wonder all the copies agree in the entitling it “Concerning Philosophy.” But in the naming it there is some difference. For this is one of those few Dialogues of Plato, which take not their names from any one of the speakers: the reason of which in this is much the same with that in *The Banquet*; it is because the two subordinate speakers are placed on an equal footing of importance in the Dialogue; where we see their characters contrasted, one to the other. They are presented to our view, at their first appearance, contending together for the honour of their respective studies or ways of life, which are of quite opposite kinds, and jealous of each other in the gaining of partisans or followers. It was necessary, therefore, that the Dialogue should have such a name, as might comprise both these persons. The name, usually prefixed to the copies of it, and confirmed by Olympiodorus, is *Ερωται*, signifying all those persons, mentioned in the beginning of the Dialogue, an account of whom is given in note 4. The other name, found in some copies, and authorized by Diogenes Laertius and Proclus, is *Αντιστοιχει*. We have given the preference to this latter; which, we think, will appear to be the genuine name, and the former to be spurious, from the following observations. In the first place, the former name is too general, and ¹ comprehends many other persons present at the conversation,

¹ Much the same reason with this our first is assigned by Dr. Forster in the notes to his edition, for the preference which he also gives to this name of the Dialogue.—S.

who are mute, and merely auditors: whereas the latter peculiarly characterizes the two subordinate speakers, exclusive of the rest of the company. Another reason, which alone seems sufficient to prove the authenticity of the name we have chosen, is this, that the contention or rivalry between these two, besides forming the most entertaining part of the Introduction, gives occasion to the subject of the Dialogue, and is the very foundation on which the structure of it is built. Our last reason is, that where the Man of Learning makes his first appearance, he is ¹ by Plato himself called Rival to the Man of Exercise; a name, which could not properly be attributed to either, till they were both brought upon the stage: however, it is soon afterwards repeated, and applied to the Man of Exercise; which needed not to have been done, but for the sake of marking them the more strongly with this name, common to them both; because terms of reciprocal relation, as well as other correlatives, always suppose and imply one another. In other parts of the Dialogue they are denoted, each by his proper and peculiar epithets; ἐξέρωμενος, ἀμαθής, σοφώτερος, σοφός ². Thus much concerning the name of the Dialogue, the Introduction to it, and the general subject which gives the title.—The particular subject is the peculiar nature and essence of true philosophy. That by which it is distinguished from all those other kinds of knowledge, that falsely assumes its name, the study of which has in all ages pretended to be, and been set up for, the study of wisdom, or philosophy. For the design of this Dialogue is to show³, that the completely just and good man, who is such upon the principles of science, is alone the wise man or true philosopher. In order to this end, first is detected and exposed that appearance or show of wisdom, which consists in polymathy⁴ in gene-

¹ Part of this third reason is agreeable likewise to an observation of Menage in favour of the name *Αντιρροπται*. See Menagii Observat. in Laertium, p. 137.—S.

² Besides Menage and Forster, Stanley also and Fabricius approve of the name *Αντιρροπται*. It is probable, that the *wrong* name owed its origin merely to an accidental omission of the first syllable in the *right* name, and prevailed with the after-copiers the more easily, as they were so much used to the word *ερασται* in transcribing other Dialogues of Plato; and especially as it occurred in the very first sentence of this.—S.

³ From considering, as it seems, this design of the Dialogue, the antients agree in referring it to the ethic kind.—S.

⁴ It was beautifully said therefore, by Heraclitus, that “polymathy does not teach intellect:” πολυμαθὴ ἢ κεν οὐ διδάσκει.—T.

ral, or much learning and knowledge of various kinds. Next, are disproved and disallowed those pretensions, claimed by the mathematical sciences or by any of the liberal arts, which in the Platonic discipline do but smooth and pave the way to true philosophy. The false species being thus rejected, lastly is exhibited this wisdom in her genuine form, as the knowledge of ourselves; the science of that divine principle in man, his mind; the science of justice and goodness, therein included; and the science of government thence immediately derived.—This short bill of fare presents to our readers all they are to expect in the following repast; small in quantity; but great in value, as being a just sample of those rich and plentiful entertainments provided for them by Plato in his longer Dialogues.—The outward form of this piece is purely narrative. But the conversation, recited in it, is peculiarly dramatic. For, besides the other excellencies of the drama, common to it with the rest of Plato's Dialogues, it has this singular beauty, that the figures of the two Rivals are described in as exact and lively a manner, as painting itself could draw them: a circumstance that well may recommend the scene to some ingenious professor of that art, to design after and delineate.—The inward form or genius of the Dialogue corresponds to what has been before said of the conduct of it: for it is partly disputative, of that species where the adverse party is confuted; and partly, to do particular honour to an adversary far superior to the sophists, it is demonstrative, of that species where the proof is by induction.—S.

THE RIVALS.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, ¹ MAN OF LEARNING, MAN OF EXERCISE.

SCENE.—*The SCHOOL of DIONYSIUS.*

SOCRATES.

I WENT into the School of Dionysius ² the grammarian; and I there saw the comeliest and finest of our young gentry, accompanied by such
as

¹ Proclus, if that passage, cited from him in note 1, p. 376, be not corrupted, must have supposed this Man of Learning to be Theodorus of Cyrene, the mathematician. It must be confessed, that the character of Theodorus the Cyrenean, given us by Plato in his *Theætetus*, tallies well enough with that of the Man of Learning, or universal scholar, in this Dialogue. But we presume, the note referred to makes it appear highly probable, at least, that the passage there cited is grossly corrupt; and that Proclus could not entertain any such supposition. We therefore embrace the opinion of Thrasyllus, who, as Diogenes Laertius informs us, pronounced him to be Democritus. To this opinion Laertius himself subscribes, and Dr. Forster seems to agree with them. The reasons, by which it may be supported, together with answers to some objections, to which it may be liable, will be given in our notes to the Dialogue.—S.

² The narration is made in the person of Socrates: who is here feigned by Plato to relate to some of his friends a certain conversation, in which he had been engaged; but how long before this narration is left undetermined.—Now we know, it is usual and natural for all men to begin their relation of any thing past, whether it consisted of facts or words, with an account of the time when those facts happened or those words were spoken; unless the relation immediately succeeds the thing related.—Accordingly Plato, in every one of his narrative Dialogues, points out the precise time of the conversation there related, except in this, and in *The Lyfis*: but the words, with which he begins *The Lyfis*, manifestly, we think, imply the time to have been the morning of the same day. The Rivals therefore, remaining a single exception to the general rule, it seems
necessary

as courted their esteem and friendship ⁴. Two of these youths happened at that time to be disputing: but what was the subject of their dispute I did

necessary to suppose, that Plato in this Dialogue, agreeably to the usage of all men, dictated to them by nature and common sense, and agreeably to his usual dramatic manner, intended to represent Socrates, immediately on his quitting the school of Dionysius, meeting with some of his friends, who happened not to have attended him thither, and relating to them a conversation, to which they had not been witnesses. For Socrates appears never to have used the didactic manner, in the instructing his disciples: but to have taught them his divine doctrine in the more engaging way of familiar conversation. If then he be supposed to have made them this narration in answer to these questions of theirs,—Where have you been, and what have you been doing since you left us?—the time, Just now, is evidently implied in the very first sentence. Or if he be supposed to have given them the recital from his own motion, as being yet warm from the discourse recited, and having his head still full of the argument,—in this case, the abrupt manner of beginning, without mention of the time, is more animated, and shows the mind pregnant with the matter to be delivered.—Dacier, in his translation of this Dialogue, has here thrust in, without any warrant from the original, the words “*l'autre jour*,” which give an air of coldness to the whole narration. But it must be observed, that he is every where more attentive to make his translation of Plato agreeable to modern readers, than to preserve those seemingly slight and trivial dramatic circumstances, which would have cost him the trouble of many a note to illustrate and explain.—S.

³ Γραμματικου. Thus all the editions of Plato, and consequently those manuscript copies, from which the four first were printed. But Dr. Forster, in his late excellent edition of this and other Dialogues of Plato, prefers the reading of Γραμματιστου, that is, *teacher of the elements of grammar*, which has the authority of only one manuscript to support it. It appears indeed, from the very passage now before us, that teaching the elements of grammar was the profession of this Dionysius; and we learn, from several ancient writers, that he had taught Plato. But if it be true, what Olympiodorus supposes, and the supposition seems very natural and just, that Plato introduces the mention of his master in this passage, on purpose to record his memory, and to give his name what place he could in his writings, it is probable that, in pursuance of the same solicitude for his master's honour, he would mention him in the most respectful manner, and though Dionysius was Γραμματιστης, a grammar-schoolmaster by profession, yet that his grateful scholar would give him here the more honourable title of Γραμματικο;—. It is further to be observed, that Olympiodorus, when he calls him Γραμματιστης, speaks of him historically, and not citing the words of Plato in this passage, as Dr. Windet in his notes on Olympiodorus, and Dr. Forster after him, erroneously seem to think.—S.

⁴ There was a law or custom in Sparta, instituted by Lycurgus, that young gentlemen, who had gone through the whole course of their studies, and were become perfect in the practice of those virtues they had learnt, should take under their own immediate eye the younger sort, who were then training up in the same discipline. The intention of which law was this; that the continual presence and example of those adepts might animate the learners, and fire them with emulation and an ardour to arrive at the same excellence. To further this end, particular friendships

were

did not perfectly apprehend. There was reason however to suppose it related either to Anaxagoras or to Oenopides¹: for they appeared to be describing

were highly encouraged, and grew into great fashion, between two such persons. They were contracted in this manner: the elder chose out from among the youth one, whose genius he thought similar to his own, and whom he had conceived the best hopes of being able to improve; attached himself to him, and accompanied him in all his studies, his performances in music, and his gymnastic exercises, the two principal parts of a Spartan education; encouraging and applauding him, endeavouring to acquire his confidence, and engage him to a reciprocal esteem and friendship. In imitation of this custom amongst the Spartans, Solon either introduced or authorized friendships of this kind amongst the Athenians; laying them under the same restrictions as in Sparta; and prohibiting slaves, though frequently employed as schoolmasters and pedagogues to their youth, from aspiring to be their private tutors, guides, and constant companions, in this way of intimacy and friendship. This was all the caution deemed requisite, in those antient and virtuous times, to preserve their youth from the contagion of base sentiments and bad manners. But when afterwards the riches of Asia flowed into Athens, and thence into the rest of Greece, through the channels of trade and commerce; and when luxury and effeminacy, which always come with the tide of riches, had corrupted the Grecians, and debauched their manners; friendship, which only can subsist amongst the virtuous, no longer flourished in its purity, but degenerated into a commerce of lewdness; entered into and managed, at first, under the mask of friendship, and those laudable motives before mentioned; but at length, especially amongst the rich and great, carried on more openly, and with little or no disguise. Instances in both ways we meet with frequently in Plato; in the way of virtuous friendship, Socrates in particular, every where seeking out the best disposed amongst the youth, attracting their regards and cultivating their esteem, with a view to communicate to them his wisdom, to avert them from the parties of bad men, and to engage them on his own side, the side of virtue. The Man of Learning in this Dialogue is plainly enough, from his whole description, another instance of like kind. Of which sort were the other persons, mentioned in the passage here before us, is uncertain: and examples of the vicious kinds in some other Dialogues need not to be pointed out. The speech of Alcibiades in The Banquet is too flagrant a proof, that the profligacy of that young nobleman was no very astonishing or singular thing at Athens. When any other such passages occur in Plato, it will be sufficient to refer our readers to this note.—S.

¹ Proclus, in giving a short history of the rise and progress of geometry, refers to this place in the following words: *Ἀναξαγόρας ὁ Κλαζομένηος πολλὰν ἐρηψάτο κατὰ γεωμετρίας, καὶ Οἰνοπίδης ὁ Χίος, ὁ τοῦ του μνησίου τετραγωνίσμεν εὐρίαν, καὶ Θεόδωρος ὁ Κυρηναίος, οὐλοῦν νεώτερος ἀνὰ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου· ὃν καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τῇς ἀπὸ τῶν αἰρετικῶν ἐκχρησίστην, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῖς μαθηματικῇ δοξάζοντων.* “Anaxagoras the Clazomenian touched on many points in geometry; as also did Oenopides the Chian, he who found out the squaring of the Meniscus; and Theodorus the Cyrenean, somewhat junior to Anaxagoras; who are recorded by Plato in The Rivals, as men of reputation for mathematical science.” Procl. Comment. in Euclid. I. ii. p. 19. But we find no where in this Dialogue any mention made of Theodorus by name. It should seem, therefore, that Proclus imagined, one of the two
nameless

describing circles; and by holding their hands in an inclining and oblique position, seemed to be representing, not in play, but with much seriousness, certain inclinations of the pole. Upon which, as I had seated myself next to an admirer of one of the young disputants, I moved him with my elbow to turn his face to me, and then asked him what point it was which engaged

nameless Rivals, the Man of Learning, to be this very Theodorus. But indeed the sentence, here cited from Proclus, appears to us erroneously copied by some old transcriber. For it is immediately followed by this other sentence; *ἐφ' οἷς Ἱπποκράτης ὁ Χίος, ὁ τὸν τοῦ μηνίσκου τετραγωνισμὸν εὑρων, καὶ Θεόδωρος ὁ Κυρηναιὸς, ἐγένοντο περὶ γεωμετρίας ἐπιφανεῖς.* "After whom Hippocrates the Chian, he who found out the squaring of the Meniscus, and Theodorus the Cyrenean, became illustrious for their skill in geometry." Now these two sentences, taken together, evidently contain two egregious blunders; one is, that the [first] discovery of squaring the Meniscus, is attributed to two different persons; the other is, that one and the same person, Theodorus, is introduced as posterior in point of time to himself. We have therefore no doubt but that the whole passage in Proclus ought to be read as follows: *Ἀναξαγόρας ὁ Κλαζομενίος πολλὰν ἐφηψάτο κατὰ γεωμετρίας, καὶ Οἰνοπίδης ὁ Χίος, ὃν καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τοῖς ἀντεράσταις ἐμνημονεύσεν, ὥς ἐπὶ τοῖς μαθημασὶ δόξαν λαβόντων. ἐφ' οἷς Ἱπποκράτης ὁ Χίος, ὁ τὸν τοῦ μηνίσκου τετραγωνισμὸν εὑρων, καὶ Θεόδωρος ὁ Κυρηναιὸς, οὐκ ὡς νεώτερος ὢν τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου, ἐγένοντο περὶ γεωμετρίας ἐπιφανεῖς.* "Anaxagoras the Clazomenian touched on many points in geometry; as also did Oenopides the Chian; who are [both of them] recorded by Plato in The Rivals, as men of reputation for mathematical science. After whom, Hippocrates the Chian, he who found out the squaring of the Meniscus, and Theodorus the Cyrenean, who was somewhat junior to Anaxagoras, became illustrious for their skill in geometry." The mistake of the transcriber of this passage is easy to be accounted for by such as are used to ancient manuscripts, in the following manner. The transcriber, we presume, had no other person to read to him; as those had, who copied books, for which there was always a great demand, such as Homer, for instance; in which case there was one reader to many scribes. But the writings of Proclus were the purchase only of a few. The transcriber, therefore, being alone, his eye must have been often changing from his own writing to that which he wrote after. We suppose, that the words *Ἱπποκράτης ὁ Χίος* occurred in the next line to, and immediately under, the words *Οἰνοπίδης ὁ Χίος*. We suppose that the transcriber having written so far as *Οἰνοπίδης ὁ Χίος*, and looking into his original, had his eye caught by *ὁ Χίος* in the next line; from which words there he went on transcribing, with the omission of a whole line: and that afterwards on a review finding his mistake, transcribed in the margin the words omitted (a large margin being always left for such purposes); and added a few words which followed, to point out where the omission was made. But when this very transcript came afterwards to be copied, we suppose that the latter transcriber inserted the marginal words into the body of his copy, in a wrong place, after the words *τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου*. But the matter is put out of dispute by Simplicius, who, in his learned Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, fol. 12. has shown us mathematically how to square the Meniscus; the invention, as he expressly tells us, of Hippocrates the Chian, as a step to the discovery of squaring the Circle.—S.

those two youths so earnestly in debate ; adding, It must certainly be something of great importance, and a matter of fine speculation, that, on which they bestowed so serious an attention.—What call you great and fine? said he. They are² prating³ about things up in the sky, and trifle away their time

¹ The Greek is thus printed ; 'Ο δ' εἶπε, Ποιον, εἶη, μέγα καὶ καλόν : “ And he replied, What mean you, said he, by great and fine?” If this reading be right, Dr. Forster rightly says, there is a pleonasm here in the words εἶπε and εἶη. But, perhaps, instead of εἶη, we should read φησ. Grammarians, in explaining ancient authors, love all opportunities of having recourse to figures of speech ; and verbal critics take as much delight in all occasions to amend the text. But as this makes only a small part of the office we have undertaken, we hope we are moderate in the execution of it. We therefore contend not in this place, but leave it to the determination of our learned readers.—S.

² In the Greek, ἀδολοσχόνσι περὶ τῶν μετεώρων. Ἀδολοσχεῖν is to talk idly and impertinently, and in the Phædo is opposed to περὶ προσήκοντων λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, “ the speaking about what concerns a man.” But by the multitude, by the men of business, and all other the enemies of philosophy, it was specially used to signify those who held much conversation together on philosophical subjects. Thus Strepsiades in Aristophanes at first calls the house, where men addicted to such studies used to assemble, ψυχῶν σοφῶν φροντιστήριον, “ the considering place of wise souls :” and when afterwards he is made to change his mind, he calls it τὴν οἰκίαν τῶν ἀδολετχῶν, “ the house of the philosophic praters.” The sense of this passage is expressed in The Phædrus by one word, μετεωρολετχεῖν.—S.

³ Περὶ τοῦ μετεώρου. Aristotle restrained the meaning of the word μετεώρα to signify the phenomena in the air or lower sky, with their influences on the water ; and those only in the upper sky which seem mutable or transient, such as comets ; or indistinct, as the milky way ; exclusively of those which appear distinct in their forms, and are constant and invariable in their motions, called the heavenly bodies. But Plato by the word μετεώρα always means principally, if not solely, these last, as the word commonly signified. Thus in The Clouds of Aristophanes, where Socrates is called one of the μετεωροσφιστῆται, he is made to say, Αἰροῦμαι, καὶ περισκοπῶ τὸν ἥλιον ; “ I walk in air, and contemplate the sun.” And presently after,

— — — — — Οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε
Ἐξευρον ὀρθῶς τὰ μετεώρα πραγμάτων,
Εἰ μὴ, κ. τ. λ.

For the real nature of these things on high
Ne'er had I found out rightly, if, &c.—

And near the end of the comedy, where Strepsiades, in mimicry, repeats the former of these two passages, Αἰροῦμαι, κ. τ. λ. he adds, speaking to Socrates in scoff,

Καὶ τῆς σελήνης εὐσκοπεῖσθε τὴν ἰδραί ;

The dwellings of the moon too have ye spy'd?

ridiculing

in philosophizing.—This answer of his seemed to me a strange one; and I said, Young man, do you then think it mean and dishonourable for a man to philosophize? or for what other reason do you speak so harshly of what they are employed about?—On my putting this question to him, another person¹, who happened to be a rival of his for the esteem of the youths I mentioned,

ridiculing in this the doctrine of Anaxagoras and his followers, that the moon was inhabited, like the earth, which the poets called

———ἔδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰετ.

———the firm and ever-fix'd abode

Of gods and mortals.

¹ It will soon appear probable, that Socrates knew who this person was; for he tells us what kind of life he led; which resembled rather that of a philosopher than that of a sophist. It is probable that he was a stranger at Athens, and chose to be concealed. It was polite, therefore, in Socrates to suppress the mention of his name. Had he been an Athenian, it would have been natural for Socrates to speak of him by name, as he was speaking to his fellow-citizens. And had he been a sophist, we could not fail to have been told his name, because Socrates never spared the sophists. He appears then to have been some foreign philosopher, whom Socrates had discovered notwithstanding his affected privacy. Now none of the philosophers of that age lived a life so retired, or so obscure, as did Democritus. He sought not fame: speculative knowledge for its own sake seemed to be his only end. For he despised, not only the multitude, but all men. He concerned not himself with any human affairs; but laughed at all human pursuits, and even at all social engagements. Quite opposite in this respect was the character of Socrates. For he always lived the most social life, in the midst of the most populous city at that time in the known world. He conversed familiarly with all sorts of men, with a simple and constant view to make them better men in private life, and better citizens, whether as governors or as subjects. His peculiar philosophy was wholly of the practical kind. He was indeed the first who investigated the principles of morals and of politics, and thus raised them into sciences: whereas before his time political and even moral precepts lay unconnected, loose, and scattered; and were consequently vague and uncertain. He first discovered them to be founded in the stable and eternal essence of mind, and in the government of mind, by nature, over all things inferior to itself. Thus the philosophy of Socrates is like the ladder in the patriarch Jacob's dream: his metaphysics ascend gradually up to the first cause of things; from which depend, and from whence come down to earth, the sciences of ethics and of politics, to bless mankind. Such being the sum of the Socratic doctrine; and the drift of this Dialogue in particular being to show, that no other doctrine than this deserves the name of philosophy; none of the philosophers, so called, was so proper to be opposed here to Socrates, as Democritus; not only for the reasons already given, but because also, like most modern philosophers, he was merely a naturalist; making body the sole subject of his philosophical researches; attributing to body a natural and necessary motion; and in the nature

mentioned, and was therefore seated near us, having heard my questions, with his answers to them, interposed, and said to me, It is unworthy of you, Socrates, to ask the opinion of this man, whether he thinks it mean and dishonourable to philosophize. Know you not him, that he has spent all his time in wrestling, cramming himself, and sleeping? What other answer then can you expect from him than this, that the study of philosophy is dishonourable and base.—Now the person, who thus spake to me, ye are to understand, employed his whole time in the improvement of his mind, and in the study of the arts^a and sciences: the other, whom he had vilified,

of body seeking for the cause of all things. There seems to be another propriety too in introducing Democritus in this Dialogue, as attentive to the astronomical dispute between the two youths. For we have some reason to think, that he favoured the Pythagorean, or at least the Semi-Tychonic, system of the world. His master in natural philosophy we know was Leucippus: and by all writers of philosophic history he is accounted of the same sect, the Eleatic. Now Leucippus, as we are informed by Diogenes Laertius, held *την γην οχεσθαι περί το μέσον διουμένην*, “that the earth was carried wheeling round the middle.” If the middle here means a central body at some distance from the earth, (and it is certain, that *οχεσθαι* every where else signifies to ride, or to be carried aloft,) it follows, that Leucippus held the Pythagorean system of the world. But if it means only the axis of the earth’s motion, then the doctrine of Leucippus is agreeable to that hypothesis, since called the Semi-Tychonic.—S.

^a In the Greek, *τραχηλιζόμενος*. Most of the interpreters agree in the general meaning of the word in this place, that it relates to wrestling. But as they all differ in the manner how, we beg leave to differ from them all, and to suppose it means, “held by the neck,” as is usual in the action of wrestling. The word, thus understood, presents to the imagination the most ridiculous image, and is therefore the most proper in a description intended to be ridiculous. Agreeably to this, Lucian, in several places of his *Anacharxis*, represents these wrestlers as throttling and half strangling each other. As to the rest of the description, it agrees with the account, given us by Plutarch, of the life of the athletics, *ὑπὸν τε πολλῶν, καὶ πλησμοναῖς ἐνδελχεῖσι, καὶ κινήσει τεταγμέναις καὶ ἡσυχίαις, αὐξάντων τε καὶ διαφυλαττόντων τὴν ἑξίν*. “By much sleep and continual full feeding, by regulated motions, and stated times of rest, improving and preserving in its improvement the habit of their bodies.” Plutarch, in his *Life of Philopœmen*.—The main of the description is justly applicable to the life of every man, who makes the exercise of his body in general his sole business, or is addicted to the violent exercise of it in any one way. Galen, with this very description apparently in his mind, has improved and heightened the colouring of it, in a passage cited by Dr. Forster, to which we refer our learned readers.—S.

^a In the Greek, *περί μουσικῆν*. See Dr. Forster’s note on this place, to which nothing needs to be here added.—S.

spent

spent his in the care and improvement of his body by the gymn¹ exercises. I therefore thought it proper to desist from putting my questions to him, ²this robust body of a man; seeing that he professed not to be well-practised in the arts of reasoning and discoursing, but in feats only of activity and strength: and I chose rather to interrogate and sift the other, who pretended to be the wiser man; ³in hopes that, if it were possible for me, I might receive from him some improvement in knowledge. Addressing myself therefore to him, I told him that I had proposed my question before all who heard me; ⁴and if you think yourself, said

¹ These exercises were, running, leaping, casting of quoits, throwing of javelins, wrestling, and boxing: but wrestling was the principal. They were called *γυμνικοί*, gymn^{ic}, because they were all of them usually, and wrestling was always, performed with the limbs and the upper part of the body quite naked. They were taught according to rules of art: masters were appointed to teach them; and schools were built, and places set apart, proper for the exercise of them. Skill in them, particularly in wrestling, and the exercise according to art, was called *γυμναστική*, the word here used by Plato.—S.

² In all editions of the Greek we read, *τον ερμηνον*, a word justly suspected by every learned and careful reader not to have been written in this place by Plato. Dr. Forster, in his edition of this Dialogue, proposes an emendation, made by a very ingenious and learned man, Mr. Mudge, formerly of Exeter College in Oxford; it is *τον ερρωμενον*: in favour of which we heartily resign two former conjectures of our own;—one was *τον εραμενον*, in the same sense, in which Plato had just before said *ουτος τον ερσταν*:—the other was *τον εραμενον*, a word which we imagined might distinguish this man's regard for the youth from that of the other, the *μουσικος*. We embrace Mr. Mudge's emendation the more readily, because the description, given of the Man of Exercise in the word *ερρωμενον*, is well opposed to the description of the Man of Learning, given us by Plato presently afterwards.—S.

³ One of the most striking features in the character of Socrates was the ironical manner which he used in conversing with the sophists, complimenting them on their pretended wisdom, and dissembling his own real knowledge. For before them he affected ignorance even in those subjects, which he had studied the most and knew the best of any man; and was always asking them questions on those very points, seemingly for the sake of information. By this conduct he engaged them to expose their own ignorance, and by that means undeceived their followers and admirers, who by them were misled and had their minds corrupted. But the sentence now before us, where Socrates is speaking, not to the Man of Learning himself, but of him to his own friends and disciples, we presume, cannot be ironical: it is one of those many passages in Plato, where appears another, equally strong, but more amiable feature, in the character of that wise and good man; his unassuming modesty, and truly polite regard to others, according to their rank or merit.—S.

⁴ In the original here is a transition from the narrative or historical style to the dramatic or that

said I, capable of giving me a better answer than that man, I repeat the same question to you, Whether you think it honourable, or not, to philosophize?—About the time we had proceeded thus far in our conversation, the two youths, overhearing what we said, became silent; and breaking off the dispute between themselves, gave their attention to us. Now, what were the sentiments of their professed friends and admirers on this occasion I know not; but, for my own part, I was struck with admiration at the scene; as I always am, when I see such a disposition in the young and handsome. One of them, however, the person to whom I had proposed my question last, seemed to me no less charmed with it than myself: not but that he answered with a free and open air, as if ambitious only of having the preference and the praise given to his own studies.—¹ Should I ever, Socrates, said he, come to think meanly of philosophy, I should no longer deem myself a human being; as I deem not any person, who entertains such a sentiment worthy of that character;—hinting at his Rival, and raising his voice, that he might be heard by the youths, of whose esteem both of them were emulous.—You then, said I, think highly of philosophy.—Most highly, replied he.—But what? said I: do you suppose it possible for a man to know the true dignity of any thing, to know whether it be base or honourable, unless he first knows what the nature of that thing is?—

that of dialogue. But as we use no such figure or mode of speech in our language, the translator has inserted the words, “said I,” to make his sentence good English.—S.

¹ Those, called sophists, were not only proud of this very title, which signifies men who knew things wise, that is, things above the knowledge of the vulgar, but they also affected to be thought and called σοφοί, wise men. The Pythagoreans, after their master, only assumed the title of philosophers, lovers of wisdom, or students in it. Thus, in the beginning of this Dialogue, philosophizing means, applying the mind to the study of wisdom. We are told by Laertius, that Democritus admired Pythagoras, and emulated the Pythagoreans. Now it is certain, that he was no follower of their doctrines, or way of teaching; it must be meant therefore of their manners, their modesty, and their other virtues. We find our Man of Learning here professing nothing more than a high esteem for philosophy. The sentiment, here attributed to him, is the very same with that of Democritus, in Stobæus, Sermon. I. Ἄνθρωποις ἀεμῶδιον, ψυχῆς πολλὸν ἢ σώματος ποιεῖσθαι λόγον. “It is a thing befitting human beings, to make more account of the soul, than of the body. For the soul, improved in the highest degree, rectifies what is amiss in its tabernacle,” meaning the body; “whereas strength of this, without the exercise of reason, betters not a whit the condition of the soul.” Ψυχὴ μὲν γὰρ τελεωτάτη σκηνὴς μοχθῶν: ἵαν ἐξέει' σκηνὴς γὰρ ἰσχυρὴ ἀνευ λογισμοῦ ψυχὴν οὐδὲν τι ἀμείνω τίθησι.—S.

I do

I do not, answered he.—Know you then, said I, what it is to philosophize?—Perfectly well, said he.—What is it then? said I.—What other thing, answered he, than that described by Solon¹ in these verses,

To various knowledge, I had gain'd before,
I add each year variety of more;
And thus old age increases still my store.

Agreeably to this is my opinion, said he, that the man, who would philosophize, ought to be always, in his old age as well as in his youth, still adding to his stock of knowledge by some new acquisition; making use of life to learn as many things as possible.—Now this account of his² seemed to me,
at

¹ Γηρασκω δ', αiei πολλὰ διδασκομενος. In these words is this celebrated verse of Solon's cited here by Plato. And we have given a paraphrase of it according to this reading, and answering the purpose for which it is introduced. A more literal translation would be this: "Old as I grow, I still learn many things." But the verse, as cited by other ancient writers, is this,

Αiei γηρασκω, πολλὰ μαθησομενος.

to be translated thus:

Older and older every day I grow,
Yet have to learn much more than yet I know.

Or, if the word *μαθησομενος*, in the future tense, has here the force of a verb desiderative or meditative, and signifies resolved, or ready, or about to learn, it may then be thus translated:

I still grow older; yet I still aspire
In many things more knowledge to acquire.

The verse, we see, whichever be the true reading, and whichever the precise sense of it, is evidently in praise of polymathy; and consequently is agreeable to the mind and taste of our Man of Learning: but the meaning of it, last given, seems to be so the most; the second has indeed a greater appearance of modesty; and the first perhaps favours too much of vanity and ostentation.—S.

² For indeed at first sight it looks very like to that, which Socrates in Xenophon gives of himself and his own studies, where he says; *εξ ουτου περ ξυνιεναι τα λεγομενα ηξεαμι, ου πωποτε διελιπον και ζητων και μαθανων ο τι εδυναμην αγαθον*. Xen. in Soc. Apolog. "Ever since I began to understand the subjects of discourse, I have never ceased inquiring into and learning every GOOD thing I was able." But on nearer inspection, the same difference will be found between them, that appears in this Dialogue between philosophy, as described at first by the Man of Learning, and that which at the conclusion proves to be genuine philosophy, that knowledge which is eminently good and useful

at first appearance, to have some weight in it : but after reviewing it a little within myself, I asked him, whether philosophy in his judgment consisted in multiplicity of knowledge.—That, replied he, is entirely my opinion.—And is it your opinion too, said I, that philosophy is only a becoming and an honourable study? or do you deem it also good and beneficial?—Good and beneficial, replied he, in the highest degree.—Does this appear to you the peculiar property of philosophy? or think you that other studies partake of the same advantage? For instance, love of the gymnastic exercises, do you deem it not only honourable and becoming a man, but good for him also? or think you otherwise?—To this question, he facetiously replied, I have two answers to give. To this man here I would say, It is neither : but to you, Socrates, I acknowledge it to be both, to be good for a man, as well as becoming him.—Then I asked him, whether in these exercises he thought the undergoing much toil to be the same thing with love of exercise.—By all means, said he ; just as in philosophizing, I take the acquisition of much knowledge to be the same thing with philosophy.—Do you think then, said I, that the lovers of those exercises have any other view than to acquire a good habit of body?—No other, replied he.—Is a good habit of body then, said I, acquired by using much exercise, and under-

useful to man, that which our elegant philosophic poet terms, the only science of mankind.—One cannot but wonder, that Wower, in his treatise de Polymathia, c. ii. § 7. could so much mistake Plato's meaning, as to cite him asserting in this very Dialogue that philosophy is polymathy. We cannot suppose Wower to have meant, that such an account of philosophy was given us somewhere in this Dialogue, that is, by the Man of Learning : for to confirm what he tell us as the opinion of Plato himself, he immediately adds the following quotation, as out of Plato's Republic, *τογε πολυμαθες και φιλοσοφον ταυτον*. Unhappily for his argument, the word in this last passage is not *πολυμαθες*, but *φιλομαθες*, and means a love of that knowledge which by nature is familiar to the mind of man ; which is indeed the same thing with the love of wisdom, or philosophy. It is not at all surprising, that Wower should elevate above measure the charms of his own mistress ; for such sentiments inseparably attend the passion of love : but to imagine that every other man must see her in the same light, can proceed only from being in love to a degree of madness. Besides ; men, who aspire to the fame of vast erudition, are apt to read in too hasty and cursory a manner.—S.

Την πολυμθειαν.—Agreeably to this, Clemens of Alexandria, citing a passage out of Democritus, where this philosopher boasts of his much travelling through various countries, of the accurate researches which he made in them all, of his long abode in Egypt, and of his skill superior to that of all men every where in geometrical demonstrations, observes, that the philosopher wrote thus, *επι τη πολυμαθια σεμνυνόμενος*, “glorying in his polymathy.” *Stromat.* l. i.—S.

going

going much toil and labour in it?—Certainly, said he: for how should a man, who labours little, or uses little exercise, acquire a good habit of body. —Here I thought it most advisable to call in to my assistance our champion for the gymnastic art, on account of his experience. I therefore said to him, How can you sit silent, my friend, and hear this man talk so strangely? Are you of opinion too, that a good habit of body is acquired through great toil, labour, and exercise, and not rather by means of such as are moderate?—For my part, Socrates, said he, I was thinking that I had an evident proof before my eyes, at this very time, to confirm the truth of that well-known saying, that moderate labour is best for the body.—How so? said I.—Do I not see ¹ him there, said he, in want of sleep and good nourishment, ² scarce able to turn his head, and worn away to a shadow with much study and hard labour of the brain?—At this sarcasm, the youths, who heard him, were pleased, and could not refrain from laughing; a circumstance which put our great student a little out of countenance.—I then said to him, Well; do you now agree with us, that a good habit of body is procured neither by much nor by little labour, but by that only which is moderate? or will you dispute the point with us, one against two?—Against him, replied he, I would enter the lists with much pleasure, well assured that I should be able to support my side of the argument, ³ even though it were worse and weaker than it is: for in such combats, he is a mere nothing. But against you, Socrates, I would not choose to contend for

¹ This description of our Man of Learning, in his person and appearance, agrees exactly with the description given of Democritus by Hippocrates, in that epistle of his cited before;—that he was *μικρικῶς πανυ καὶ λειποσαρκός*, “extremely pale in his visage and wasted in his flesh;”—that he found him with a book,” *βιβλίον ἐπὶ τοῖν γονατοῖν*, “which lay [open] on his knees;” *ἑτέρα δὲ τινα εἰς ἀμφοῖν τοῖν μεροῖν αὐτοῦ περιβέβλητο*, “and that other books lay by him, some on each side;”—*ὅτε μὲν συντόμως ἐγχαρὲν ἐγκειμενός*, that “by turns he wrote, poring over his writing with earnest attention;” *ὅτε δὲ ᾗρειμει, πᾶμπόλυ—ἐν αὐτῷ μερμηρίζων*, “and by turns rested, pondering very much within himself.”—S.

² This must ever be the case of such a man as Democritus, who was always poring on his books, his experiments, and his dissections. From hence it was, and from extreme attention to his studies, that he did not at first, as Laetius relates, know his own father, when he came to visit him.—S.

³ These athletic gentlemen were remarkable for their slowness, heaviness, and want of adroitness, in all exercises of the mind. See the third book of the Republic.—S.

any kind of paradox : and therefore I admit, that 'not violent but moderate exercise procures men a good habit of body.—And how is it with respect to food ? said I. Is it much or moderate, which contributes to the same end ?—¹ With respect to food also he acknowledged moderation to be best. And thus I led him on through all other things which had relation to the body ; urging him to own, that it was best to be moderate in the use of them all, and neither to exceed, nor to be deficient : and all this he granted me.—Well ; and how is it with respect to the soul ? said I. Is this benefited most by a moderate or by an immoderate quantity of those things which it receives ?—By a moderate quantity, said he.—Is not learning one of the things administered to the soul ?—It was admitted.—Most beneficial therefore to the soul is moderate learning, and not an immense heap.—He granted it.—Who now is the proper person for us to advise with concerning the body ; would we know, what kinds and degrees of exercise are moderate, and what is a moderate quantity of food ? We must all three of us agree, that it is either a physician or ²a master of exercise. And concerning corn,

what

¹ We understand the following passage of Xenophon, as having a view to the vehement lovers of bodily exercise, a character common amongst the young men of that age : το μεν ουν υπερειθιοντα υπερπονειν αποδοκιμαζει (c. Σωκρατης,) το δε οσα ηδεις η ψυχη δεχεται, ταυτα ικανως εκπονειν εδοκιμαζει. Memorab. l. i. c. ii. § 4.—S.

² In the Greek, Και τα σιτια ωμολογει. In this sentence the word ομοιος, or ωσαυτως, or other word of like import, seems wanting, and must be understood. But we suspect that, instead of τα σιτια, we should read τα μετ' αυτου. This concession of the Man of Learning thus agrees exactly, and in the same terms, with his two subsequent concessions on the same point. We have, however, given such a turn to our translation of this sentence, as to adapt it to either way of reading it.—See a passage, parallel to this, in Aristotle's Nicomach. Ethics. l. ii. c. ii.—S.

³ παιδοτριβην. This properly signifies the master, appointed to teach the youth their exercises, and direct every motion to be used in them. But Plato here, and in other places, uses the word to signify a person whose knowledge was of the same kind with that of the γυμναστης, or gymnastic physician ; to know the power of each particular exercise in the cure of each particular disease ; and how much of it was to be used in each particular case ; a science, which has for many ages been too much neglected. Perhaps, from the time of Herodicus, (who as Plato tells us in his 3d book de Republicâ, παιδοτριβης αν εμειζ γυμναστικην ιατρικην,) for a few ages, the offices of παιδοτριβης and γυμναστης belonged to men versed in the same kinds of knowledge ; though in process of time they came to be very different, and were assigned to men of very different abilities. It is certain, that in the time of Galen, the παιδοτρικης, "the master of the exercises," was subordinate to the γυμναστης, "the physician" who prescribed the proper exercise ; and that he was under his direction. Such an

alteration

what is a moderate and due quantity for sowing, we must agree, that the husbandman is the fittest person to be consulted. But concerning the soul, and the discipline or learning to be there sown and planted, of whom ought we to inquire, what measure and what share is to be accounted moderate?—We were here all of us at a stand. Upon which, in a jocular way, I said, Since we are at a loss, ourselves, what to answer, will you consent to ask the opinion of these youths here on the point in question? But perhaps we are above that; ¹ like the wooers of Penelope, of whom Homer says, that they

alteration in the practice was very natural: for when any art is considerably improved, and the principles of it come to be established on science, the inferior branches of it, those which require manual operations, or any labour of the body, of course devolve to inferior persons.—What confirms our supposition is, that Æschines the Socratic, Plato's fellow-disciple, in his Dialogue *περι αρετης, η διδακτων*, attributes to the *παιδοτριβαι* knowledge and judgment in the constitution and habit of men's bodies. The same writer, in his Dialogue named *Axiochus*, mentions the *παιδοτριβαι* and *γυμνασται* together, as persons equal in authority over the youth committed to their care and teaching. Neither Mercurialis nor Peter Faber cite these last-mentioned Dialogues: they seem indeed to have overlooked them, as being in their days numbered amongst the supposititious Dialogues of Plato; for otherwise they would not so hastily have concluded, nor so rashly have asserted, that by *παιδοτριβης* Plato means *γυμναστης*. See the former of these writers in his treatise *de Arte Gymnasticâ*, lib. i. c. xii. and the latter, in *Agonisticôn*, lib. ii. c. vi.—In the next age after that of Plato, very little alteration seems to have been made. For Aristotle, in the beginning of the 4th book of his *Politics*, having mentioned this kind of general knowledge, the knowing what sort of exercise is agreeable to each particular habit of body, attributes this knowledge to the *παιδοτριβης*, as well as to the *γυμναστης*, which last word we beg leave to read in that passage, instead of *γυμναστικος*; for we know of no master or teacher of the exercises, or any subordinate officer or minister in the teaching them, who was ever called by the name of *γυμναστικος*. The corruption of the text of Aristotle in this passage arose perhaps from comparing it with another passage in the same work, at the end of the 3d chapter of the 8th book, where the arts *γυμναστικη και παιδοτριβικη* are mentioned together; and where (by the way) the exact distinction is made between them, as they were practised at that time; and the latter, the art of the *παιδοτριβης*, is shown to be instrumental to the former, the art of the *γυμναστης*, though knowledge of the same kind still belonged to both.—S.

¹ Socrates speaks here jocosely, as if he thought the Man of Learning might possibly be affronted, and piqued in point of honour, if the question were referred to the two youths, persons who seemed so much less able to answer it: in like manner as the wooers of Penelope pretended, that the offer of the seeming beggar to try his strength with them was an affront to their superior rank. Monf. Dacier, in his note on this passage, seems to insinuate, that Plato has given a turn to the passage in Homer here alluded to, different from the intention of the poet. For he says that Penelope's wooers openly avowed their fear of the superior strength of the concealed Ulysses, and

they disdained to suffer any to draw the bow beside themselves.—¹ When they now seemed to be giving up the argument, in despair of coming to a conclusion; I bethought myself how to put the inquiry on another footing. And accordingly I proposed this question, What sorts of learning, to the best of our conjecture, does it become a philosopher to acquire principally? since

their apprehensions of his doing that to which they found themselves unequal. But this criticism of his shows that he entered not thoroughly into the sense either of Plato or of Homer in this place: for, in the lines to which he refers us, Homer says, that when Ulysses had offered to try his strength in drawing the bow, they (his rivals) were beyond measure offended, and overflowed with indignation and resentment; being afraid lest Ulysses should succeed in the attempt, if they permitted it; that is, they were at the same time secretly afraid of his success: for we are to observe, that Homer writes this as inspired by the Muse, who was supposed not only cognizant of all the past actions and speeches of those who were the subjects of his poem, but also privy to the secret motives of the actors, and to the minds of the speakers. But the avowed motives of Antinous and Eurymachus, in rejecting the offer made by Ulysses, were indignation at his presumption, and a sense of honour, not suffering them to enter the lists with an antagonist deemed so much their inferior. In refusing therefore to admit of his proposal, they pleaded, not the danger they were in of his prevailing, but the shame that would arise to them in case he should happen to prevail. Thus, under the pretence of the superiority of their rank to his, they concealed the sense they had of their own deficiency, and their opinion of his real superior excellence. Affecting haughtiness and contemptuousness is the usual mask of conscious meanness. In this light Plato saw the behaviour of Antinous and his assuming companions, described in the twenty-first book of the *Odyssey*; and in that slyly jocular manner, which he every where attributes to Socrates, he insinuates that his Man of Learning on the present occasion might naturally have his mind possessed with the same sentiments. When Socrates proposed a reference to the two youths, it should seem, from what he immediately adds, that a smile of disdain appeared in the countenance of the professed philosopher. But the likening his case to that of Penelope's suitors contains a hint that he was under secret apprehensions of having his ignorance exposed. The proper answer to the question of Socrates he knew was obvious; but his very profession of philosophy would not admit him to speak it openly himself: he was conscious of not possessing any such science as that of mind, and of not having studied any such art as that of medicine for the soul. Therefore, though Socrates at the end of their conversation drives him to shame, and exposes his ignorance in the nature and ends of philosophy, he endeavoured to conceal this ignorance as long as he could, and was unwilling to have the answer given by any. At the same time it is suggested to our thoughts by Plato, that nothing more than common sense and a candid mind, chiefly to be found in youths of good dispositions, was requisite to make that answer; and that fair reasoning, joined to these, was sufficient to lead a man to true philosophy.—S.

¹ This knot, or rather break, in the thread of the argument, forewarns us of new matter to be now brought upon the carpet. But there is, besides, a peculiar reason for the pause in this place; and therefore

since we have already found, that it is not all sorts, nor even many.—To this my learned companion answered, That the finest sorts of learning, and the most becoming to the philosophic character, were those which give a man the highest reputation as a philosopher: and this reputation, said he, that man would gain, who should appear conversant ¹ in all the arts and sciences, at least in as many as possible, especially in those which are held in esteem the most, and are the most deserving of it;—the man, who having studied these arts, as far as is requisite to a liberal education, hath acquired so much knowledge in them, as depends on taste and judgment, not on the mechanical exercise of any, or on the labour of the hands.—Do you mean in the same way, said I, as it is in building? For in that affair, if you have occasion for artificers and artists, a bricklayer or a carpenter you may hire for five or six minas ²,

therefore it has here a peculiar beauty. It seems to be contrived on purpose to give every reader an opportunity of consulting his own mind, and of finding there the proper answer to the last question put by Socrates: it prepares him, therefore, for what is to follow, where he will see his inward conjecture explicitly confirmed, and the conceptions of his own mind from the precedent part of the argument produced to light, in a plain and full description of what is justly to be called the study of wisdom or philosophy.—S.

¹ Dr. Forster very justly observes that the character which the Man of Learning here gives of a philosopher exactly agrees with the character of Democritus himself, as given us by Diogenes Laertius; that, besides his being a great naturalist and moralist, besides his being versed in mathematical learning, and in all the popular erudition, he had a thorough experience in the arts, *περι τεχνων πάντων εἶχεν ἐμπειρίαν*. If the right reading of this sentence in Laertius be, as we suspect, *παντός* or *πασῶν*, instead of *πάντων*, the agreement with the words of Plato in this place is still more exact. However, though Laertius in this passage plainly uses the word *τεχνων* in the philosophical and proper sense, to signify arts as distinct from sciences; yet Plato, in the passage to which this annotation belongs, seems to include in the word *τεχνων* all the particular sciences: and if it be so, then the whole account which Laertius gives of the knowledge of Democritus, answers in every part to the philosophic character, as here drawn by our Man of Learning. It is certain, that every particular science has some art immediately derived from it, and particularly dependent on it. In mathematics, the art of numbering and computing depends on the science of arithmetic; the art of measuring on the science of geometry; the art of music on the science of the same name; and the art of calculating eclipses, &c. on the science of astronomy. In the arts and sciences of higher order it is the same: the art of government thus immediately depends on the science of mankind; the art of leading a good and happy life, on the knowledge of ourselves; and the art of reasoning, on the science of mind. We the rather produce these latter instances, for that they have a near relation to, and serve to illustrate, the last part of this Dialogue.—S.

² Less than twenty pounds of our money. For the attic *μνα* was equal to 3*l.* 4*s.* 7*d.* English.—S.

but

but an architect will cost you above ten thousand drachmas ¹, so few of these are to be found in all Greece. Do you mean to distinguish in some such way as this?—He admitted such to be his meaning.—On this, I asked him, if it was not impossible for one man to be a perfect master of any two arts, much more to attain a mastership in any considerable number, especially of such as are great and excellent.—Do not imagine, Socrates, said he, that I mean, it is requisite for a philosopher to have so thorough a knowledge of any art, as the man who makes it his profession; but to be able, as becomes a gentleman of a liberal education, to understand what the artist says, when he is speaking of his work, better than any of the bystanders; and to interpose judiciously his own advice about the workmanship: so as always to appear, in every conversation relating to the arts, and in criticising on every performance of the artists, to have a finer taste, and more knowledge, than any other person present.—Then I, for I was not yet quite certain what he meant, said to him thus; Do I conceive rightly, what kind of man you call a philosopher? You seem to me to have described such a man, as the ² general combatants are in the Olympic games, compared with the racers ³ or

¹ Equal to 322l. 18s. 4d. The *μυρ* was worth 100 *δραχμαί*. Plato therefore, in this place, might have said one hundred minas instead of ten thousand drachmas: but he chose to express the sum according to its value in the smaller coin, to give it at first sight the greater appearance: as the French choose to compute by livres rather than by pounds sterling.—Architect seems here to mean no other artist than the master-builder.—S.

² The particular combatants in these games were such as had devoted themselves wholly to one particular sort of exercise, and therefore had attained to excel in it beyond all other men. The general combatants were such as had divided their studies, and had been exercised in them all, and consequently could not be supposed equal in any one to those who had made it their peculiar study. They engaged in all the combats at these games, but contended only with such as themselves. They were called *πενταθλοι*, the term here used by Plato, Combatants in the five Exercises, because the sixth, that is, boxing, or fighting with fists, was not introduced till the 23d Olympic, having been thought till then too mean and ignoble. And after it was introduced, the general combatants still retained the name of *πενταθλοι*. All the learning on this subject has been collected by Peter Faber in his *Agonistica*. But an English reader, curious to be further informed, may find full satisfaction in an excellent dissertation, written by Mr. West.

³ By an unaccountable error, all the editions of Plato read here *πείλαστας*. But according to a most certain emendation of Mr. Le Clerc's, with which Dr. Forster is highly pleased, we ought to read *παλαιστας*. Which reading we have not scrupled to follow in our translation; as Dacier has had the judgment to do in his.—S.

the

the wrestlers. For in each kind of competition, those universalists fall short of the respective excellencies of the particular professors, and are but the next best men to them in their own way, but at the same time are superior to the professors of the other kind, and easily get the better of these, whose excellence lies only in the other way. Such a degree of skill as this, you may perhaps mean, that the study of philosophy begets in those who are addicted to it; a degree, by which they fail of supreme excellence in knowledge of the arts, but attaining an excellence which is next to the supreme, they excel all men except the artists: so that he, who has studied philosophy, is, in every employment or business of life, a second-rate man, and below the pitch of perfection. Some such man, I think, as this you point out to us for a philosopher.—You seem, Socrates, replied he, to have a just conception of what belongs to a philosopher, in likening him to ¹ a general combatant in the public games. For he is absolutely such a man, as not to be a slave to any thing; nor has he studied any branch of knowledge so accurately and minutely, as, through entire attention to that one, to be deficient in all the rest, like vulgar artists, and the professors of one only science; but he has bestowed a competent measure of application on them all.—After he had made me this answer, I, desirous he should explain himself more fully and clearly, asked him, whether he thought the good, in any way of life, to be useful men, or useless.—Useful, without doubt, Socrates, said he.—If then the good are useful, are not the bad useless?—He agreed.—Well then, said I; do

¹ The whole passage of Laertius, referred to in note 1 to p. 319, and also in note to persons of the Dialogue, is this, as amended;—ἐπεὶ οἱ Ἀνταρταὶ Πλάτωνος εἰσι, φησι Θρασύλλος, οὗτος ἀν εἰν ὁ παραγινόμενος ἀνωνυμος, τῶν περὶ Οἰνοπίδην καὶ Ἀναξαγόραν ἑταίρος, ὅς [instead of ἑτερος, as it is printed] ἐν τῇ πρὸς Σωκράτην ὁμιλίᾳ διαλεγόμενος περὶ φιλοσοφίας [here we omit the ὅς] φησιν, ὡς πεντάθλῳ εοικεν ὁ φιλοσοφός· καὶ ἡν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ πεντάθλος. Τα γὰρ φυσικὰ ἡσκητο [as If. Casaubon rightly reads from Suidas] καὶ τὰ ἠθικά, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ μαθηματικά, καὶ τοὺς ἐγκυκλίους λόγους, καὶ περὶ τεχνῶν πᾶσιν [instead of πᾶσαν] εἶχεν ἐμπειρίαν. D. Laert. l. ix. §. 37. “If the Rivals be a dialogue of Plato’s, says Thrasyllus, the anonymous person there introduced, as the friend of those who were disputing about Oenopides and Anaxagoras, must be this Democritus; who in the conversation he had with Socrates concerning philosophy, there related, says, that a philosopher is like a general combatant in the games. And he himself was in fact a general combatant in philosophy. For he had cultivated physics, and ethics; moreover, mathematics, and all the common learning of those times: and in all the arts he was experienced.”—S.

you take philosophers to be useful men, or not?—He acknowledged they were useful : and not only so, said he, but I account them the most useful of all men.—Come now, said I ; let us examine whether this be true. How can they be even of any use at all, these second-rate men ? For it is plain, that your philosopher is inferior in every art or science to the man who is a perfect master of it.—This he acknowledged.—Well ; suppose now, said I, that you yourself, or any friend of yours, for whom you have a great regard, should happen to fall sick, I ask you, whether, with a view to the recovery of health, you would send for that second-rate man, the philosopher ; or whether you would send for a physician.—For both of them, said he.—I ask you not that, said I ; but which of the two you would send for in the first place, or in preference to the other.—No man, said he, would doubt, in such a case, to give the preference to the physician.—And how in the case of a storm at sea, said I ? to whom rather would you choose to intrust yourself and your concerns ; to a pilot, or to a philosopher ?—To a pilot, said he, I for my part.—And thus it is in every other affair, said I ; so long as a man, professing skill in it, is to be found, a philosopher is of no use.—Thus it appears, said he.—A philosopher therefore, said I, we have discovered to be a man entirely useless ; since it is clear, that in every affair of life, men, who profess skill therein, are to be found. And we agreed before, that the good in any way were the useful men, and the bad were the useless.—He was forced to own it.—But now, said I, that we have carried our reasoning to this length, may I go on with my questions ? or would it not be rather unpolite and rude to push the point further ?—Ask any questions that you please, said he.—Nay, said I ; I desire nothing else, than to recapitulate what has been already said. The present state of the argument then is this : We acknowledged, that philosophy was an honourable study, and professed to be philosophers ourselves : we acknowledged that philosophers were, in their way, good as well as honourable ; that the good, in any way, were useful men, and the bad useless. On the other hand, we acknowledged that philosophers were useless, whenever we could find good workmen and men of skill of every kind ; and that good workmen of every kind, professors of the several sciences, and practisers of the several arts, were always to be found. For was not all this granted ?—It was, said he.—We grant therefore, agreeably
to

to those our own concessions, that, if philosophy be, what you say it is, knowledge in the arts and sciences, the spending our time in philosophizing is then a bad and useless way of life, and philosophers are useless men, and good for nothing. But what, my friend, if their case be otherwise? what, if the philosophic life consist not in studying the arts; nor in busying a man's self about a multitude of experiments, and continually poring over them; nor in acquiring a multiplicity of knowledge; but in something else? For I thought, that such employments were accounted dishonourable and base, and that those who followed them were called, by way of reproach, dirty mechanics and bellows-blowers². Whether my suspicions are just or

¹ Πολυπραγμονουντα. Concerning this kind of πολυπραγμοσυνη, our learned readers may consult Wower de Polymathia, cap. ii. §. 3. or Suidas in voce Ασκληπιοδοτος. Democritus not only took the pains to dissect the bodies of animals, in order to investigate the animal œconomy, but also expressed the juices of every plant and herb he met with, to make experiments of their several virtues. *Omnium herbarum succos Democritus expressit*, says Petronius; *et ne lapidum virgultorumque vis lateret, atatem inter experimenta consumpsit*. We have some instances of his knowledge of this kind recorded in Pliny's Natural History.—S.

² In the greek, βαναυσους. By this name were called all artists, who operated by means of fire; but properly speaking, they were such only as used furnaces in their operations. For so Hefychius,—Βαναυσια, πασα τεχνη δια πυρος, κυριως δε η περι τας καμινους. In using this word, Plato seems to allude to the metallurgic and the chymical experiments of Democritus. Concerning this very fact indeed, whether Democritus made any such experiments, or not, much controversy has arisen, particularly between Olaus Borrichius and Conringius, in contending, the first of them for the high antiquity of chymistry, the other for the novel invention of that useful art. Each of them perhaps has pushed his point further than the truth will bear him out. The treatise which Democritus wrote περι της λιθου, was certainly not concerning the philosopher's stone, as Borrichius and the alchymists pretend; but concerning the magnet, or loadstone, which, perhaps, for its peculiar and celebrated virtues, was by the antients eminently styled *the stone*. Yet we do not see how it can with reason be denied, that the great man in question was *philosophus per ignem*; because he could not, but through fusion by fire, have done what ancient writers agree he did, converted common stones into precious; nor could he well have found out the virtues of herbs and plants without the help of chymical experiments. However, we would not lay too much stress on the interpretation of the word βαναυσια, given by Hefychius, though it agrees with the etymology. It seems too confined. The word, as used by many of the antients, particularly by Aristotle in the 8th book of his Politics, and by Plutarch in many places, seems to comprise all those arts we call mechanical: Plato's argumentation requires that we should understand it to be used here with the same latitude; and this larger meaning best confirms the supposition, that our Man of Learning and Knowledge in this Dialogue was Democritus. To express therefore the whole meaning of Plato in this place, we have used in our translation both those terms of contempt, which may answer to the full sense of the word βαναυσος.—S.

not, will evidently appear, if you but answer ¹ to the following questions—
What ² men are those who understand how to give proper chastisement to
vicious

¹ We are now come to the third and last part of the Dialogue. In the two former we have seen what philosophy, truly so called, is not; in this latter, Plato will show us what it is; for which he here briefly prepares his readers, by informing them, that Socrates will now open a new scene, and begin a new series of questions.—S.

² Plato lays the foundation of true philosophy in the knowledge of ourselves, that is, of our own souls. He begins with the inferior part of the soul; the seat of the passions and animal affections. These he characterizes, as is usual with him, under the allegorical names of brute animals, horse and dog; to which soon afterwards he adds that of ox. The horse is a proper emblem of the love of glory; because of all brute animals the horse is the only one which appears to be delighted with fine trappings, to be ostentatious, to be emulous of glory, and fond of proving his superiority over his rivals. No less properly does the dog represent the passion of anger; because of all animals he is the most subject to it, has it roused in him on the slightest occasions, entertains it the longest, and is the most vindictive. And the ox is the fittest representative of sensuality, because that animal, when not employed by man in laborious offices, is always either eating or chewing the cud, that is, eating over again what he had eat before: as sensual men, after they have feasted, are apt to feast it over again in reflection; as well as before they feast, to feast in imagination. Plato makes a distinction at the same time between the good, and the bad or vicious, amongst these animals. Of the latter sort are the perverse and refractory; horses, that are almost unmanageable by their riders; dogs, that hardly can be broken, or made to obey their master's will; oxen, that are stubborn, that refuse to quit the stall, and to labour. These are the emblems of bad men; whose passions, such as correspond to the tempers of those several animals, are immoderate or inordinate, and not to be governed, or restrained within their due bounds, without much difficulty. Good horses, dogs, and oxen, he calls those, whose natural temper is gentle, and pliant, and easily made obedient. And by such he signifies to us men naturally good, that is, men, whose brutal passions of each kind are by nature moderate, and easily obey the government of reason, that superior part of the soul, whose whole office and government he delineates or sketches out in the following manner.—If any of our passions are wild and irregular, if our horse, for instance, would throw off and trample on his rider, if our dog barks at his master or his master's friends, or if our ox knows not his owner and his feeder, they are to be chastised and reduced to order. If our passions are all tame and gentle, it is the business of reason to employ them in her own service, to apply them each to its proper use, and thus to make them highly beneficial to the whole man. But neither of these offices can be well performed, unless it be known what is moderate and regular in the passions, and what the contrary; that is, unless the boundaries between good and evil be well settled, so that the one may be distinguished from the other. The making this distinction, therefore, is the inward operation of knowledge in the mind; as the application of it to practice, in the discharge of those offices, is an exertion of the mind's power over the inferior man. The former is the theory of morals; the latter is practice virtue. This properly is art; that, science. But Plato in this place

vicious horses? are they those very men who can give a horse all the improvement he is capable of; or are they a different sort of men?—The very same men, he answered.—And those, said I, who are able to improve the useful qualities of a dog, do not the same men know how properly to chastise dogs which are vicious?—They do, said he.—By one and the same art then, said I, are those animals improved and properly chastised.—I agree, said he.—Well; but, said I, is it also the same art, through which a man distinguishes amongst those animals the good from the vicious? or is this an art different from that, through which they receive improvement and due correction?—It is still, said he, the same art.—Will you admit then, said I, that this holds true with regard to the human species in like manner; that the art, whatever it be, by which men are made to excel in virtue, is the same art with that through which bad men are properly chastised, and the same also with that through which the good and the bad are known and distinguished one sort from the other?—By all means, said he.—¹ Now the art, which

uses the term art to express both; as he frequently does elsewhere, when he means any art which is founded on science, and without science cannot be exercised. For this note thus much suffices.—S.

¹ Plato proceeds in the next place to the knowledge of mankind; that is, to the knowledge of the same passions and affections in the souls of other men that we feel in our own. He shows it to be consequently one and the same kind of knowledge with the knowledge of ourselves, differing only in the objects of it; as it is applied either to many men, or to a single one; for of men every one is a man. He therefore, who thoroughly knows himself, who knows what is right and good in his own soul, and what is there wrong and evil, must know at the same time all men in general, must know what is good and what is evil in the whole human nature: and he who thus knows others, must also thus know himself. The subject of all this knowledge is the superior part of the soul of man, mind and reason: the object is itself, and also that part which is inferior, with the passions and animal affections there seated. The knowledge of itself implies the knowledge of its power over the inferior part. Now as no man can help following known good, nor can help avoiding known evil; the true knowledge of good and evil must be attended with an exercise of that power over the inferior part, improving what is there found right and good, and rectifying what is wrong and evil. And since all men partake of the same nature, the same knowledge, through which a man manages himself rightly, betters what in himself is good, and corrects what in himself is evil, must qualify him as well to dispense justice to other men, to encourage the good and to correct the bad. Now this is the office of the judge and of the magistrate; and the science, which enables him to execute his office well is the judicial science, which is no other than the science of justice. It follows, therefore, that the wise and good man, he who is master of this science, and employs it in the proper management of himself, is qualified for the office of a judge and of a magistrate.—S.

gives this power and this knowledge with respect to one man, has it the same efficacy with respect to many men? And the art of thus managing and judging of many, has it the same abilities with respect to one?—Certainly, said he.—Is it so in the case of horses too, said I, and in all other cases after the same manner?—Beyond a doubt, said he.—Now what science, said I, is that, through which proper chastisement is given to the licentious and the lawless in civil states? Is it not the judicial science, that of judges and other magistrates?—It is, said he.—Is the science of justice, said I, any other than this science?—No other, answered he.—And is it not through the same science that the good and the bad are both known?—He replied, it was through the same science.—And the science, said I, through which one man is known, will give equal skill to know many men.—True, said he.—And whoever, said I, through want of this science, hath not the skill to know many, will be equally deficient in the knowledge of one.—Right, said he.—If a horse therefore, said I, as being but a horse, be incapable of knowing and distinguishing between good and bad horses, must he not be ignorant of which sort he himself is?—Certainly, said he.—And if an ox, said I, being but an ox, knows not how to distinguish and judge of good and bad oxen, is it possible that he can know of which sort he is himself?—Certainly not, said he.—And is not the same thing certain, said I, with respect to the ignorance of dogs?—It is, said he.—And how is it in the case of men? said I. When a man knows not who are the good men and who the bad, is he not at the same time ignorant of himself, and unable to tell whether he is good or bad, in as much as he also is a man?—He allowed it to be true.—Now to be ignorant of oneself, said I, is it ¹ to be found of mind, or to be insane?—To be insane, he replied.—To know oneself therefore, said I, is to be found of mind.—I agree, said he.—This then, said

¹ Σωφροειν, ἢ οὐ σωφροειν. No words have more puzzled us, in the translating of Plato than the words σωφροειν, σωφρον, and σωφροσυνη. The difficulty arises from this,—that in different places they are used in different senses; and we could find no words in the English language answering to them every where. At length, therefore, we found ourselves obliged, if we would every where express their precise meaning, to use different words in different places. Our labours, however, on this point have enabled us to give a kind of history of those words, and of the several alterations they have undergone in their meaning. Homer, the most antient Greek writer extant, by the word σωφροσυνη evidently means prudence, or discretion. See his *Odyssey*,

said I, should seem to be the precept contained in the *Delphic inscription; it is to exercise wisdom and justice.—It should seem so, replied he.—And through the same science we know how to correct others duly and rightly.—
True,

Odyssey, book xxiii. ver. 30. from which we conclude, that the true etymology of the word is from *συνα φρον*, a sound mind. To which agrees this of Porphyry,—*και γαρ σωφροσυνη σωφροσυνη τις*. Apud Stobæum, Serm. 19.—In the time of Homer, and for a long time after, the doctrine of morals was far from being improved to such a degree of perfection as to become a science. It was delivered in loose and unconnected precepts, agreeing to the experience of wise men, without any known principles for their foundation. The first, who attempted to raise it into a science, and to treat of it with order and method, were the Pythagoreans. These philosophers, having considered that the soul of man was the subject of virtue and of vice, considered next the constitution and œconomy of this soul: they saw it distinguishable into two parts, the rational and the irrational, and the irrational part again into irascible and concupiscible. Now as every thing in nature has a peculiar virtue of its own belonging to it, the defect of which is its imperfection, and the contrary quality its vice, the Pythagoreans made their primary distinction of the virtues of man, according to their distinction of the parts of his soul. The virtue of the rational part they termed *φρονησις*, *prudence*; the virtue of the irascible part, *ανδρεια*, *fortitude*; that of the concupiscible, *σωφροσυνη*, *temperance*; and the virtue of the whole soul, or the habit produced therein by the harmony of all its parts, they called *δικαιοσυνη*, *justice*.—Thus far did these philosophers advance in the science of morals; deducing all the other, the particular virtues, which are exercised but occasionally, from these four, which in every good man are in constant practice: but they ascended no higher. It was left for a Socrates and a Plato to put a head to this beautiful body of moral philosophy, to trace all the virtues up to one principle, and thus represent them to our view united. Yet thus only can the doctrine of morals be properly termed a science. This principle is mind; for mind, being measure itself, and being also the governor of all things, contains the measures of rectitude in all things, and governs all things aright and for the best. The principle of virtue therefore being mind, on the soundness of mind is all sincere and uncorrupt virtue established; for the soundness of every thing depends on the soundness of its principle. And thus also, as morals are founded on mind, and as no true science of any thing, according to Plato, can be without the science of its principle, the science of morals either is the same thing with the science of mind, or is immediately thereon dependent. Accordingly, Plato, in the *Charmides*, uses the word *σωφροσυνη* in its original signification, as it means soundness of mind. In the same sense is the word *σωφροσυνη* used by Xenophon, in *Απομνημ.* l. i. c. i. § 16: where it is opposed to *μανια*. See Dr. Simpson's annotation to that passage. So it is again used by Plato, and opposed to *μανια*, in his first book de Republicâ, p. 16. ed. Cantab. Most commonly, however, Plato used this word in the Pythagorean sense, to signify one of the four cardinal virtues: in which sense it is used by Aristotle in all his moral treatises. Yet even in this particular sense, the peculiar relation which it has to prudence, the proper virtue of the rational part of the soul, is well observed by the very learned author of *Hermes*, in his notes (for his they are) to Aristotle's treatise, *περι Αρετων και Κακων*, lately published by Mr. Fawconer, p. 116. Zeno like-
wise,

True, said he.—Now that, through which we have this knowledge, is the science of justice; and that, through which a man has the knowledge of himself, and of other men, is soundness of mind, or wisdom.—It appears so to be, said he.—The science therefore of justice, said I, and the science belonging to every sound mind, wisdom, are one and the same science.—It appears, said he, to be so proved.—³ Again, said I, by the same means are civil states well governed; that is, when the doers of injustice are duly punished.

wife, who followed the same distinction of the cardinal virtues, defined every one of them by science of one kind or other; as appears from Stobæus, *Eclog.* l. ii. p. 167. And one science, the science of mind, includes them all.—S.

² The inscription here meant, is that most antient one, in the temple of Apollo at Delphi, ΓΝΩΘΙ ΣΕΑΥΤΟΝ, KNOW THYSELF. This was generally supposed to be the dictate or response of the Pythian oracle to the question asked of it;—What was man's greatest good. See Menag. Annotat. in Laertium, p. 22 and 23, and Dr. Simpson's note on Xenophon's Memorab. l. iv. c. ii. §. 24. In what sense Plato understood this truly divine precept, is evident from his brief definition of it in this sentence, as explained by the preceding argumentation. From which it appears, that by the knowledge of one's self he means the knowledge of the whole soul, or the knowledge of what is good and what is evil. For the superior part of the soul contains in itself the seeds of all moral good; the inferior, the seeds of all moral evil. But the subject of all this knowledge, of both kinds, is only the superior part of the soul, the rational. For, as the Stoics well express themselves on this point, no other faculty in man contemplates and knows itself, besides the faculty of reason. This alone also knows and judges of all other things, whether without or within the soul: for in itself it hath the rule and standard of right, according to which it judges, and distinguishes between right and wrong; approving the one, which is agreeable to its own nature, and disapproving the other, which is disagreeable and contrary to it. Truly and properly speaking, mind itself is rule and measure, being the measure and the rule of all things. The science of mind, therefore, which is wisdom, is the science of right and wrong, gives the discernment of good and evil in ourselves, and enables us at the same time to distinguish rightly between good and bad men; and thus is it the science of justice, and the judicial science, belonging to the magistrate and to the judge. After what has been said, we presume it needless to make any apology, or to give any further reason for translating *σωφροσυνή* in this place *wisdom*.—But concerning this wisdom, or knowledge of self, see more at large in Plato's First Alcibiades, where it makes the principal subject.—S.

³ From the science of ethics, and that of law, truly so called, (for, in a philosophical sense, right only is law, law eternal and divine,) Plato makes a short and easy step to the science of politics and the art of government. The art of government is founded on knowledge of the different tempers and humours, minds and characters of men. For none can have the skill to manage them, but those who know them, and who know by what methods to lead the good and gentle to obedience, and to prevent the disobedience of the perverse and evil. This knowledge of man-kind

punished.—Right, said he.—The same science therefore, said I, is the science of politics.—He assented.—And when a civil state is thus well governed by one man, is not that man called ¹ either a tyrant ², or a king?—He is, said he.

kind supposes the knowledge of who are the good and who the evil; which supposes also the knowledge of what is good and what is evil; the same, which is the knowledge of ourselves.—S.

¹ In the Greek, *τυραννος τε και βασιλευς*, translated literally, “both a tyrant and a king.” But Plato does not mean, that tyrant and king are synonymous terms: so far from that is his meaning, that in his Dialogue called *Πολιτικός*, “The Politician,” he says, that “a tyrant and a king are *απομιμνησται*, most unlike one to the other:” and in his 9th book de Republica, that “the best of all governments is the kingly, and that the worst of all is the tyrannic.” What he means by a king, and what by a tyrant, will be explained in the very next note. But in this they agree, that government by a king and government by a tyrant are both of them governments by one man: which is the whole of his meaning in the place now before us. However, to prevent his meaning from being misunderstood, we have taken the liberty of using the conjunctions disjunctive in translating this sentence. Monf. Dacier, as well here as in what follows, has entirely omitted the words tyrant and tyrannic, through excessive caution we imagine: but for such caution in England we have no occasion. A king of England, while the English constitution lasts, and the fundamental laws of English government subsist, can never be suspected of being, what it is impossible for him to be, a tyrant.—S.

² The word in the original here is *τυραννος*. The meaning of which word, as it is always used by Plato, and fully explained by Aristotle in Politic. l. iii. answers to our idea of an arbitrary monarch, governing his people, not according to established laws, but according to his own will and pleasure; whether such his will and pleasure be agreeable to natural law, to justice and equity, or not. On the other hand, by the word *βασιλευς*, or king, was understood a person who made the laws established in his country, whether written or customary, the rules of his government. The regal office was to put these laws into execution, and to administer the government; which, properly speaking, was a government of the laws. Such were the most antient kings in Greece, where kingly government at first universally prevailed, long before any laws were written for the rule of conduct both to prince and people. And, whatever some men pretend concerning the high antiquity of arbitrary or despotic governments; or others fancy concerning governments originally vested in the people; the most antient records of history in all nations prove, that kingly government took place the first every where upon earth. It is natural to suppose that general customs in all countries were founded originally on reason, one universal reason adapting itself to the genius of each country, that is, to the peculiar situation and other relative circumstances of each, and to the peculiar temper of the inhabitants naturally thence arising: so that, although in some instances, what was reasonable and right to practise in one country was unreasonable and wrong in another, yet one universal reason, the natural law of all men, was the dictator and legislator to them all. And, whereas all true authority is founded in the opinion of superior wisdom, it is natural also to suppose, that in the infancy of every state, the little multitude should look up to a person deemed the wisest amongst them; that they should hear,
attend

he.—Does he not thus govern, said I, through the kingly art, or the tyrannic?
 —He does, said he.—These arts therefore, said I, the kingly and the tyrannic,

attend to, and obey him, as the best conservator and guardian of their unwritten laws or general customs, acknowledged by them all to be right. It is further, as natural to suppose that these petty princes, having established their authority with the people by wisdom and good government, should derive a particular regard in that people towards their families; and that their sons, trained up in obedience to the laws, and being presumed to have learnt, from the examples and private instructions of their fathers, the art of government, should easily, by the tacit consent of all the people, succeed to their fathers in their authority and dignity; unless they were apparently unfit, through nonage, known want of understanding or of prudence, or other incapacity for government. The first regal families, being thus for many generations well settled in the throne or seat of royalty, claimed a kind of legal right, the right of custom, to their kingly thrones: and in that claim the people acquiesced for the sake of peace and order. And thus arose hereditary kingdoms. In process of time, as the people increased in number, and many private persons increased in riches, and in power thence arising, neither the rich nor the poor were any longer to be governed by the mere authority of one man: the multitude grew seditious, and the powerful grew factious. It became necessary to rule by force and compulsion, if the regal establishment was still to be preserved. The person of the king was to be defended by a guard, and the people were to be kept in awe and obedience by a standing army. Then was the king possessed of power to change the laws and customs of his country at his own pleasure, and to make all his people submissive to his will. Such was the origin and rise of tyranny, the natural degeneracy of kingly government in a great and powerful kingdom. Now it is well known that unlimited power in man is every moment liable to be abused. To wise men indeed right reason is law; and in the government of themselves and of others they follow the dictates of wisdom. But men unwise are in the principal part of their conduct, in that which is the most important to themselves and others, governed by their passions: and the evil consequences of human passions under no restraint, either from within the soul or from without, are infinite. Few men, therefore, being wise, what evil is not to be expected from tyrants, that is, arbitrary monarchs? In fact, the tyrants of old were, most of them, guilty of numberless and flagrant acts of injustice, in open violation of the ancient unwritten laws. But things could not remain long in this situation, wherever common sense remained in men, a sense of their natural and just rights. Among such people then were found patriots, men of true fortitude, despising all danger in the public cause; and these undertook to free their country from so insupportable a yoke. Their undertakings were successful. The tyrants and their families were either expelled or murdered. New civil establishments were formed; but not on the ancient plan: that was the work of nature; and began naturally in the infant state of civil societies. Government was now to be the work of art and reason. And what proved very favourable to this work, was the cultivation of true philosophy about the same time, and the great advances consequently made in moral and political science. Accordingly it is to be observed, to the honour of philosophy, that wherever this favourable conjuncture happened not, in all countries whither philosophy never travelled, when the people could no longer bear their tyrants,

tyrannic, are the same with that art and science just before mentioned.—So they appear, said he.—Well, said I, and when a family¹ is in like manner well governed by one man, what is this man called? Either the steward² of the household, or else the master³ of the family; is he not?—He is, said

tyrants, they only changed them for others; the tyranny still continued. For wisdom was wanting to frame good constitutions of government: so that, if ever they had the spirit to emerge from slavery, and rise to freedom, immediately they sunk again. But wherever true philosophers were found, they undertook on such occasions the office of legislators. New laws were made, written and promulged, obligatory alike to all. By these laws was the power of princes and of magistrates limited and ascertained; and by their known functions the general obedience of the people was secured. And thus were legal governments first established, of different forms in different countries, monarchies, aristocracies, democracies, or mixed governments, as best suited the numbers and the genius of each people. The antient kingly governments, however, still remained in some places in the time of Plato; and the few tyrants, subsisting amongst a people enlightened by philosophy, now ruled with some degree of equity and mildness, through fear of their intelligent subjects, ready to be succoured and protected, on occasion, by their free and therefore brave neighbours. This short history of civil governments, from their beginning down to the age when Plato lived, we thought necessary to show the distinction then made between the kingly and the tyrannic; giving an account of the rise of each; of the former built upon authority and esteem, and by them alone supported; of the latter, acquired often by false pretences, and intriguing practices at home, and sometimes by conquests from abroad made in war; but always maintained by military force. A tyrant, therefore, according to the foregoing explanation of the word, may, as well as a king, be a wise and good governor, if he has wisdom and the science of justice; though the ways and means, by which he governs, must be very different from those of a king.—S.

¹ We are now arrived at the science of œconomics. This indeed in the order of things precedes the science of politics. For a civil state is composed of many families; and arises from the agreement of their minds, in perceiving the necessity of civil or kingly government for their common good. But Plato here speaks of it the last, probably for this reason, that the government of a family is *βασιλική τε και τυραννική*, partly authoritative and kingly, partly compulsive and tyrannical: the paternal part of it is kingly; and thus a king is as the father of all his people, and governs them as through paternal authority and filial awe: the despotic part is tyrannical; and thus a tyrant is the lord and master of the whole people, ruling them by compulsion, as a master rules his slaves, and such were all domestic servants in the age and country of Plato.—S.

² *Οικονομος*. It was usual in antient times, as well as it is in modern, for princes, and other rich and great men, who kept a multitude of domestics, to depute the care and management of them all, and the dispensation of justice among them, to one man, whom they called *οικονομος*, and we call major-domo, maitre d'hôtel, or, in the English term we choose to make use of in an English translation, steward of the household.—S.

³ *Δεσποτής*, that is, the lord and master himself, governing in his own right, with authority and power undivided.—S.

he.—Whether is it the science of justice now, said I, which enables this man also to govern well his family? or is it any other art or science?—The science of justice only, said he.—The same kind of person, it seems then, said I, is a king, a tyrant, a politician¹ a steward of a household, a lord and master of a family, a man of wisdom, and a just and good man. And one and the same art is the kingly, the tyrannic, the political, the despotic, and the œconomical, the same with the science of justice, and the same with wisdom.—So, said he, it appears.—Well then, said I: is it a shame for a philosopher not to understand what the physician says, when speaking of his patient's malady; nor to be able to give a judicious opinion, himself, upon the case? and so with regard to other artists and their arts, is it a shame for him to be ignorant? and yet, when a magistrate, or a king, or any of the others, just now enumerated, is speaking of the affairs or functions of his office, is it not shameful in a philosopher not to understand perfectly what any of these persons say, nor to be able to give good counsel himself in such cases?—How, Socrates, said he, can it be otherwise than shameful to him, to have nothing pertinent to say on subjects so important?—Are we of opinion then, said I, that in these cases it becomes a philosopher to be like a general combatant, a second-rate man, to come next behind all who have these offices, and to be useless, so long as any such are to be found? or do we hold quite the contrary, that he ought, in the first place, not to commit the management of his domestic affairs to another man, nor to come next behind some other in his own house; but that he ought himself to be the ruler, corrector, and impartial judge, if he would have right order and good government at home?—This he granted me.—And besides this, said I, if his friends should submit their differences to his arbitration, or if the state should refer to his judgment the decision of any controverted point, is it not a shame that he should appear in such cases

¹ Πολιτικός. This word, as used by Plato, and the other ancient writers on politics, is of a very large and extensive import, including all those statesmen or politicians in aristocracies and democracies, who were, either for life, or for a certain time, invested with the whole or a part of kingly authority, and the power thereto belonging: and such are here particularly meant by Plato. Agreeably to this passage, he tells us in his Politicus, that the science of a politician differs only in name from the kingly science. For the proof of which position we refer our readers to that Dialogue, where the nature of the kingly office is so admirably well elucidated and explained.—S.

to be but a second or a third rate man, and not to have the lead?—I must own myself of that opinion, said he¹.—Philosophizing, therefore, my friend, is a thing quite different, we find, from the acquiring a multiplicity of various knowledge, or the being buſied in the circle of arts and ſciences.—When I had ſaid this, the Man of Learning, aſhamed of what he had before aſſerted, was ſilent: the man without learning ſaid, I had made it a clear caſe: and the reſt of our audience gave their aſſent and approbation.

¹ It equally follows from the foregoing reaſoning, that a king ought himſelf, in the firſt place, truly to philoſophize: in the next place, that he ought to chooſe a true philoſopher, *if ſuch a man can be found*, to be of his council: and laſtly, it follows that a true philoſopher, when duty to his prince or to his country, or other good occaſion, ſent to him from above, calls him forth to light, and places him in his proper ſphere of action, muſt always be found adequate to any part of the kingly office. Theſe concluſions may ſeem to favour a little of what is called philoſophic arrogance; and for this very reaſon perhaps it is, that Plato has declined the making them, eſpecially as from the mouth of his great maſter, a man ſo remarkable for his rare modeſty.—S.

THE END OF THE RIVALS.

THE MENEXENUS:

OR,

AN ORATION

IN PRAISE OF THOSE ATHENIANS WHO DIED IN THE SERVICE OF THEIR
COUNTRY.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE MENEXENUS'.

THIS piece of Plato, though entitled a Dialogue, consists chiefly of an Oration, to which the Dialogue was intended to serve only for an introduction or vehicle ; and is accordingly very short. The subject of this Oration is the commemoration of all those Athenians, who, from the beginning of the commonwealth to the time of Plato, had died in the service of their country ; a subject that takes in so considerable a portion of the history of Athens, that I rather choose to refer the reader to those authors who have treated at large of the transactions of that state, than to set down the several events here alluded to in notes, which would soon swell to a bulk much larger than the Oration itself. It may not, however, be improper to premise a short account of the custom, which gave birth to this and many other orations, spoken by some of the greatest orators of Athens ; as such an account may tend to put the reader into a proper situation of mind to judge of the beauties of this famous panegyric, by leading him as it were to Athens, and making him one of the audience. Take it, therefore, in the words of Thucydides, thus translated.

“ In the same winter (namely, in the first year of the Peloponnesian war) the Athenians, in obedience to the laws of their country, performed, at the public expense, the obsequies of those citizens who first lost their lives in

’ This Introduction is extracted from the Argument of Mr. West to this Dialogue, by whom also it was translated into English. I have adopted his version of it wherever I found it to be sufficiently faithful, and given my own translation where it was otherwise.—T.

this

this war: the manner of which is as follows. Three days before that appointed for the funeral, they erect a pavilion, underneath which they lay out the bones of the deceased, allowing to their respective friends and relations the liberty of bringing whatever they judge proper to add, by way of showing their particular concern or regard for those who belonged to them. On the day of the interment there are brought in waggons (or hearses) so many chests (or coffins) made of cypress, one for every tribe, in which are put the bones of the deceased, each man according to his tribe. Besides these there is an empty bier, properly covered in honour of those whose bodies could not be found and brought away in order for their interment. In the funeral procession, whoever is disposed, whether he be a citizen or foreigner, has leave to march, together with the female kindred of the deceased, who assist at the sepulchre, making great lamentations. After this they deposite the bones in the public cœmety, which is situated in the most beautiful suburb of the city; and here they have always been accustomed to bury all who fall in battle, those only excepted who were slain at Marathon, to whom, as to men of distinguished and uncommon virtue, they performed their obsequies in the very place where they lost their lives. As soon as the remains are buried in the ground, some Athenian, eminent as well for his wisdom as his dignity, is appointed by the state to pronounce a suitable oration in honour of the dead: after which the whole company depart. This is the manner in which the Athenians perform the funerals of those who are slain in battle, and this custom they constantly observe in every war, as often as the case happens, in conformity to a law enacted for that purpose."

From this account, and some other particulars mentioned in the ensuing Oration, it is evident that these public funerals were performed with great pomp and solemnity by the whole body of the Athenian people; to whom therefore, considered upon this occasion under two heads, namely, as citizens of Athens and as relations and friends of the deceased, the orator was in reason obliged to accommodate his discourse: which from hence he was under a necessity of dividing likewise into two heads. Under the first he was to apply himself to the citizens of Athens in general; under the second, to the parents, children, and kindred of the deceased in particular. For the topics proper to be insisted upon under these two heads, he was left at liberty to

to select such as he judged most suitable to the occasion on which he was to speak. The occasion was solemn and mournful. Consolatories, therefore, were to be administered as well to the public as to individuals, who were there come together to perform the last offices to their fellow-citizens and relations. To the public, no topic of consolation could be so effectual as that which, by setting before them the glory and advantages accruing to the commonwealth from the actions of those brave citizens who had lost their lives in the service of their country, tended to call off their attention from the calamity which they were then assembled to commemorate. And this topic was very naturally suggested to the orator by the many public monuments erected in honour of those who had fallen in battle, and scattered up and down the place where he was to pronounce his oration. Plato accordingly made choice of this topic; and hath dwelt upon it with equal judgment and eloquence through the greater part of the following panegyric.

The remaining part of this first division contains an artful and noble panegyric in honour of the state and people of Athens; which evidently proves, what indeed will appear to any one who attentively examines the Grecian history, that the Athenians were unquestionably the first and greatest people of Greece.

The second part, in which the orator addresses himself to the relations of the deceased, is as beautiful a piece of oratory as is to be met with in all antiquity. I shall not here forestall the reader's judgment or pleasure, by pointing out the particular passages worthy of admiration. They are so striking that he cannot fail taking notice of them; and the more they surprise, the more they will please.

THE MENEXENUS.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND MENEXENUS.

SOCRATES.

FROM the Forum, Menexenus? Or whence come you?

MEN. From the Forum, Socrates, and from the Senate-house.

Soc. What particular business called you to the Senate-house? Is it that you think yourself, O wonderful young man, arrived at the summit of learning and philosophy, and as being every way sufficiently qualified, you are purposing to turn yourself to affairs of greater importance; and that we may never want a supply of magistrates out of your family, you yourself are thinking, young as you are, of governing us old fellows.

MEN. Indeed, Socrates, I should most readily entertain such an ambition, encouraged by your permission and advice; but otherwise, I would by no means think of it. The occasion of my going to the Senate-house to-day was the having heard that they intended to make choice of the orator who is to speak the funeral oration in praise of the dead. For you know they are now preparing to celebrate their obsequies.

Soc. Entirely so. But whom have they chosen?

MEN. No one as yet. They have deferred that consideration till to-morrow: but I think that either Dion or Archinus will be appointed.

Soc. Sure, Menexenus, it must needs be a fine thing for a man to die in battle; for he he ever so poor and inconsiderable, he will have the good fortune at least to be buried with splendour and magnificence, and to have his praises set forth by wise and ingenious men; not in crude and extempore

rare

rary panegyrics, but in discourses well considered and prepared for a long time before. And indeed so magnificent, so copious, and even exuberant upon every topic, and so beautifully variegated with fine names and words are the panegyrics which our orators give us upon these occasions, that they as it were bewitch our souls; and what with the encomiums which they so plentifully pour out upon the city, upon those who have at any time died in battle, upon the whole series of our ancestors, even to the remotest ages, and what with those which they bestow upon the audience, I myself, Menexenus, have often been very generously disposed; and, listening to their panegyrics, have for the time been charmed into an opinion that I was grown greater, more noble, and more illustrious, and have fancied that not only I myself appeared more considerable in the eyes of those strangers, who at any time accompanied me upon those occasions, but that they also were affected in the same manner, and persuaded by the orator to look upon me and Athens with more admiration than before. And this veneration of myself has often remained upon me for more than three days. Nay, with so powerful a charm has the discourse and even the voice of the speaker sunk into my ears, that for four or five days I have scarcely been able to recollect myself, or perceive in what part of the earth I was; but imagined myself sometimes an inhabitant of the Fortunate Islands. So dexterous are our orators!

MEN. You are always, Socrates, rallying the orators. However, I am afraid the person they shall now appoint will not perform his part very well; for, as he will be chosen on a sudden, he will be obliged to speak without any preparation.

SOC. How so, my good friend? Each of these has orations ready prepared. Besides, it is no difficult matter to speak extempore upon such topics. For if it were requisite to celebrate the praises of the Athenians, in an assembly of Peloponnesians, or of the Peloponnesians in an assembly of Athenians, a man must be an excellent orator indeed to gain the assent and approbation of his auditory. But when a man is to perform before an audience, whose praises are the subject of his discourse, it seems to be no great affair to make a good speech.

MEN. Is that your opinion, Socrates?

SOC. It is, by Jupiter.

MEN. Do you think that you should be able to make a speech if it were requisite, and the senate should appoint you?

Soc. If I should, O Menexenus, it would not be wonderful, considering I have been instructed by a mistress, who is by no means contemptible in rhetoric, but who has made many good orators, one in particular who excelled all the Greeks, Pericles, the son of Xanthippus.

MEN. Who is she? I suppose you mean Aspasia¹.

Soc. I mean her, and Connus, the son of Metrobius, also. For these
two

¹Aspasia, the lady to whom Socrates gives the honour of the ensuing Oration, as well as of that spoken formerly by Pericles on the like occasion, was born at Miletus, and was indeed in great favour with Pericles, as may be seen in Plutarch. What is here said of her having instructed Pericles, and many other good orators besides Socrates, in rhetoric, whether strictly true or not, shows at least that she had as great a reputation for wit as for beauty. But it appears from this passage that rhetoric, which is the art of composition, was not, in the opinion of the Athenians, alone sufficient to make a complete orator: music, which, as far as it relates to oratory, and whenever it is put in contradistinction to rhetoric (as in this passage) can only mean an harmonious pronunciation, or a melodious modulation of the voice; music, I say, in the sense now mentioned, was likewise deemed a science necessary to be learnt by all who intended to speak in public. And hence I am confirmed in an opinion, which I have entertained many years, and in which I find I am not single, viz. that accents were originally musical notes set over words to direct the several tones and inflections of the voice requisite to give the whole sentence its proper harmony and cadence. The names of the Greek accents, *ὀξύς*, *βαρύς*, *περισπωμενός*, *acute*, *grave*, and *circumflex*, speak their musical origin, and correspond exactly to three terms made use of in our modern music, namely, *sharp*, *flat*, and a *grave*, called the *turn*, consisting, like the *circumflex*, of a *sharp* and a *flat* note. I shall not here enter into the question concerning the antiquity of accents, which many learned men take to be of modern invention; though if they were used for musical marks, as I am persuaded they were, they were probably as antient as the application of that science, from whence they were borrowed to form a right pronunciation and harmonious cadence, which was as antient at least as the time of Plato. It is no wonder, however, that many old manuscripts and inscriptions are found without accents: as they were intended solely for the instruction of those who were desirous of reading and speaking properly, they were in all likelihood made use of only by masters of music in the lessons which they gave their scholars upon pronunciation. Neither is it surprising that the antient Greeks should descend to such minute niceties in forming their orators, when it is considered that oratory, from its great use and importance in their public assemblies, was in the highest esteem among them, and carried by them to its utmost perfection.

From what has been said I am induced to beg leave to observe, that from not understanding, or not attending to the original and right use of accents in the Greek, however transmitted down to these times, has arisen one of the grossest perversions and abuses that ignorance or barbarism itself could possibly have introduced into any language; and that is, reading by accent, as it is called, and practised in most of the schools (Eton excepted), and in the universities of this kingdom, not to
say

two are my masters: he in music, she in rhetoric. That a man thus educated should be a skilful speaker is nothing wonderful, since, even one who has been worse educated than I have, and who has indeed learnt music from Lamprius, but rhetoric from Antiphon the Rhamnusian;—I say, it is not impossible even for such a one to gain the good opinion of the Athenians when he makes their praises the theme of his oration.

MEN. And what would you have to say were you to speak?

Soc. From myself perhaps nothing. But yesterday I heard Aspasia pronounce a funeral oration concerning these very persons; for she had heard what you tell me, that the Athenians were going to choose an orator for the occasion: upon which she immediately ran over to me such things as it would be proper to say; and what she had formerly made use of, when

say of all Europe. For by this method of reading, in which no regard is paid to the long or short vowels or diphthongs, the natural quantity of the words is overturned; and the poets, who never wrote, and indeed are never read, and can never be read by accent, must be supposed to have measured the language by a rule different from that followed by the writers and speakers in prose, that is, all the rest of their countrymen; which indeed is an absurdity too great to be supposed; and therefore I imagine it will not be pretended that the antient Greeks spoke by accent. If this therefore be an absurdity too great to be charged upon the antient Greeks, why should it be imposed upon those who now study that language, and who, by this method, are obliged, when they read poetry, to neglect the accent, and when they read prose to disregard the quantity; which is to make two languages of one? Much more might be said against this preposterous usage of accents, which seems to me to have arisen at first from the ignorance and idleness of school-masters, who not knowing the true quantity of the words, and not caring to acquaint themselves with it, took the short and easy way of directing themselves and their scholars by those marks which they saw placed over certain syllables. These they took for their guides in reading prose, though in poetry, as has been said, they were necessitated to observe a different rule, viz. the measure of the verse where known, as that of hexameters, iambics, anapæsts, &c.; but in the great variety of measures made use of by Pindar, and the dramatic writers, they were still at a loss, and therefore in reading those odes, were obliged to have recourse to accents, to the utter subversion of all quantity and harmony. If it should be thought worth the while to correct this illiterate abuse in our schools and seminaries of learning, it may be proper either to print such books as are put into the hands of young beginners without accents, or to substitute in their stead such marks as may serve to show the quantity of the several syllables: to which end I would recommend to all future compilers of lexicons and grammars, to mark, after the example of many Latin lexicographers, the quantities of all the syllables: many of which are reducible to general rules, and others may be discovered and ascertained by carefully comparing the correspondent measures of the strophé, antistrophé, epode, &c. in the Greek ode.—W.

she

she composed the funeral oration spoken by Pericles; out of the scraps of which she patched up this discourse.

MEN. Can you remember what she said?

Soc. Else I should be unjust; for I learnt it from her, and there wanted but little of my being beaten for forgetfulness.

MEN. Why then do you not repeat it?

Soc. My mistress may be offended, if I make her discourses public.

MEN. By no means, Socrates: however, speak and oblige me; whether you are willing to speak what Aspasia said, or any thing else, it is of no consequence if you will but speak.

Soc. But you will perhaps laugh at me, if I, being an elderly man, should appear to you still to jest.

MEN. Not at all, Socrates: speak, I entreat you, by all means.

Soc. Well, I find I must gratify you, though you should even order me to fall a dancing. Besides, we are alone. Attend then. She began her oration, I think, with mentioning the deceased in the following manner:

Whatever was requisite to be done for these brave men, has been performed on our part. They have received their dues, and are now proceeding on their fated journey, dismissed with these public honours, paid them as well by the whole state as by their own families and friends. But to make these honours complete, something remains to be said; which not only the laws require to be rendered to them, but reason also. For an eloquent and well-spoken oration impresses on the mind of the audience a lasting admiration of great and virtuous actions. But the present occasion demands an oration of a particular kind; an oration that may at one and the same time do justice to the dead; benevolently admonish the living; excite the children and brethren of the deceased to an imitation of their virtues; and administer comfort to the fathers and the mothers, and whoever of their remoter ancestors are yet alive. Where then shall we find such an oration as this? Or whence shall we rightly begin the praises of those brave men, who when living made their friends happy by their virtues, and by their deaths procured the safety of those who survive.

As they were naturally good, it is in my opinion necessary to begin their panegyric with an account of their original: for that they were virtuous was
owing

owing to their being descended from virtuous ancestors. Let us then celebrate, in the first place, their noble birth; in the second, their nurture and education; and afterwards, by exhibiting their actions to view, make it appear that *these* also were virtuous, and such as corresponded to all those advantages. First, then, as to the nobility of their descent: they are sprung from a race of ancestors, not adventitious, not transplanted from I know not where, but natives of the *soil*, dwelling and living really and properly in their own country; nursed, not like other nations, by a step-mother, but a parent, the very land which they inhabited, in which they now lie buried; the soil which bred, which nursed them, and which, as her own, has again received them into her bosom. It is most just, therefore, to bestow some encomiums, in the first place, on this mother; for thus the nobility of these her children will at the same time be adorned. This country, indeed, deserves to be celebrated by all mankind, not only by us, and that upon many accounts; but principally because she is dear to divinity, of which the strife of the gods, who contended for her, and the decision that followed thereupon, is a clear evidence. And how is it possible that it should not be just for all men to celebrate that which the gods have praised? Another topic of deserved praise is this, that at the very time when the earth bred and produced animals of all kinds, both wild and tame, this country of ours preserved her purity; was unprolific of savage beasts; and among all animals chose to produce man only, who surpasses the rest in understanding, and who alone legally cultivates justice and the gods. As a great argument in confirmation of what I here advance, that this earth is the genuine parent of our forefathers, I must observe that every thing that brings forth is provided with nourishment adapted to what it has produced; and that a woman is proved to be really and in fact a mother, from her being supplied with native fountains of nourishment for the sustenance of the child. In like manner our country and mother affords a sufficient argument of her having procreated men; for she alone at that time and first produced the grain of wheat and barley, the proper and the best food of man; as being in reality the parent of this species of animals; and to her these proofs apply more strongly than to a woman. For the earth did not in breeding and producing imitate woman, but woman imitated earth: neither did she enviously withhold these her fruits, but distributed them to others. For her
offspring,

offspring, in the next place, she produced the olive, the support of toil; and after she had thus nourished and reared them up to manhood, she introduced to them gods for their governors and instructors, whose names it is unnecessary to mention in this place. We all know who furnished us with the necessaries and securities of life; who instructed us in the arts requisite for our daily support; who gave us and who taught us the use of arms for the defence of our country. Our ancestors, thus born, and thus brought up, framed a polity of which it may not be improper to speak a few words. For a polity is the nurse of men; a good one of virtuous men, a bad one of wicked men. That those who went before us, therefore, were educated under a good polity, it is necessary to show; for indeed it was owing to this that both they and their descendants, the fathers of the deceased, became virtuous. The polity then was, as it now is, an aristocracy. Under this form of government we still live, and for the most part have done so from that time to this. Let others call it a democracy, or by what name they please: it is in truth an aristocracy accompanied with renown. We have always had magistrates invested with kingly power, some of whom were hereditary, others elective: but the people were generally the most powerful; and they always bestowed the authority and power of the state upon those whom they judged most worthy. No man was excluded for the meanness, the obscurity, or the poverty of his family; nor advanced for the contrary qualifications of his ancestors, as is practised in other cities. Their choice was confined by one boundary. Whoever was esteemed to be wise and good, he had the authority, and he the power. The cause of this our polity was the equality of our original. For other states are composed of men of every country, and of different extractions; whence their governments are unequal, tyrannies, or oligarchies; in which one part of the people consider the other as their slaves, and those who are considered as slaves look upon the other part as their masters. But we, who are all brethren, born of one mother, do not think it fit that we should be the slaves or the lords of one another. On the contrary, the natural equality of our births compelled us to seek after a legal equality in our government; and forbade us to yield subjection to any thing, except to the opinion of virtue and wisdom. Hence it came to pass that all our ancestors, the fathers of the deceased, and they themselves, being thus excellently born, thus nurtured

tured in all liberty, exhibited to all men many and beautiful deeds, both privately and publicly, thinking it their duty as well to protect Grecians against Grecians, as to maintain the general liberty of Greece against the Barbarians. How they repelled the invasions of Eumolpus, of the Amazons, and of other enemies before them, and in what manner they defended the Argives against the Thebans, and the Heracleide against the Argives, the time will not permit me fully to relate: besides, their virtues having been finely celebrated by the poets in their melodious songs, they have been made public to all men; so that we should but disgrace ourselves in attempting the same subject in simple prose. For these reasons, therefore, I think proper to pass over these matters. Justice has been done to their merits. But I think myself obliged to recall the memory of those exploits which, worthy as they were, the poets have not thought worthy of their notice, and which are now almost buried in oblivion; that by setting forth the praises of the great men who performed them, I may woo the poets to admit them into their songs and verses. The chief of these are the actions of our forefathers, the progeny of this soil, who held the hands of those lords of Asia, the Persians, when they attempted to enslave Europe; whose virtue, therefore, in the first place deserves to be commemorated and to be praised. To praise them as they deserve, we ought to take a view of it in that period of time, when all Asia was in subjection to the third king of the Persian race. The first of these was Cyrus, who by his own great abilities freed his countrymen the Persians, enslaved the Medes his masters, and brought under his dominion the rest of Asia, as far as Egypt. His son subdued Egypt, and as much of Lybia as was accessible, by his arms. Darius, the third king, extended the limits of his empire by his land forces as far as Scythia, and by his fleets made himself master of the sea and of the islands; so that no one durst oppose him. The very opinions of all mankind seem to have been subdued: so many, so powerful, and so warlike were the nations which the government of the Persians involved. This Darius accusing us and the Eretrians of an attempt upon Sardis, made that a pretence for sending an army of five hundred thousand men on board his ships and transports, and a fleet of three hundred sail, over which he appointed Datis to be general, ordering him, under the forfeiture of his head, to bring back the Eretrians and Athenians captive. Datis failing to Eretria, against a nation

which of all the Greeks had at that time the greatest reputation for valour, and was moreover very numerous, subdued them in three days; and that none of them might escape, he took this method of searching the whole island. Causing his troops to march to the utmost limits of the Eretrians, and extend themselves from sea to sea, he ordered them to join their hands, and sweep the country, that he might be able to assure the king that not a man had escaped him. With the like design he passed from Eretria to Marathon, imagining he had nothing to do but to place the same inevitable yoke upon the neck of the Athenians, and carry them off as he had done the Eretrians. During these transactions, part of which were accomplished and part attempted, no nation of the Greeks came to the assistance either of the Eretrians or the Athenians, except the Lacedæmonians, and they did not join us till the day after the battle. The rest, struck with terror, and preferring their present safety, kept quiet at home. By this a judgment may be formed of the bravery of those men who received the attack of the Barbarians at Marathon, chastised the arrogance of all Asia, and were the first who erected trophies for their victory over a barbarous enemy; by their example instructing others that the power of Persia was not invincible, and that wealth and numbers must yield to virtue. I call these men, therefore, not only the fathers of our bodies, but also of our liberty, and of the liberty of all Europe. For the Grecians, surveying this day's work, were taught by their Marathonian masters to hazard new battles in the defence of their country. Upon these, therefore, ought we in reason to bestow the first palm, and give the second to them who afterwards fought and conquered in the sea-fights of Salamis and Artemisium. He who would discuss the several actions of these brave men, enumerate the many difficulties they had to encounter both by sea and land, and tell how they surmounted them, would have much to say. But I shall only mention what appears to me to be the greatest exploit after that of Marathon: for by that victory the Greeks had been only taught, that upon land it was possible for a small number of Grecians to overcome a multitude of Barbarians; but that at sea they were able to effect the same thing was not yet evident. The Persians had the reputation of being invincible at sea, by the superiority of their numbers, their riches, their naval skill, and strength. Now what is most praise-worthy in those brave men, who signalized themselves at sea, is, that they

they did thereby, as it were, loosen those bands of terror, what had held the Grecians so fast bound, and caused them no longer to stand in awe of numbers, whether of ships or men. From these two actions, this of Salamis, and that of Marathon, all Greece was instructed and accustomed not to be afraid of the Barbarians, either by land or sea. The third great exploit for the deliverance of Greece, as well in order as in degree, is the action of Platæa; in the glory of which the Lacedæmonians and Athenians had an equal part. This great, this arduous enterprise was achieved, I say, by these two nations; and for this their merit are they now celebrated by us, and will be by our posterity to the latest times. After this, many states of Greece still sided with the Barbarian, and the king himself was reported to have a design of invading Greece once more. It would then be highly unjust not to take notice of those also, who completed the work of their forefathers, and put the finishing hand to our deliverance, by scouring and expelling from the sea every thing that had the name of Barbarian. These were they, who were engaged in the naval fight at Eurymedon, in the expeditions to Cyrus, to Egypt, and many other places. These ought we therefore, to commemorate, and to acknowledge our obligations to them, for having taught the *great king* to fear; to attend to his own safety, and not to be plotting the overthrow of Greece. This war against the Barbarians did our commonwealth, with her own forces only, draw out to the very dregs, for her own security, and that of her allies. Peace being made, and the city honoured, there came upon her that which usually falls on each that are successful, first emulation, and from emulation envy, which drew this city, though unwilling, into a war against the Grecians: upon the breaking out of which war the Athenians fought a battle with the Lacedæmonians at Tanagra, for the liberties of Bœotia. Though the issue of this battle was doubtful, yet the following action proved decisive: for some of the allies of the Bœotians having deserted those, to whose assistance they came, our countrymen having on the third day after obtained a victory, we recovered to a sense of their duty those who, without reason, had fallen off from it. These brave men having fought against Grecians for the liberties of Grecians, and delivered those whose cause they had undertaken to defend, were the first, after the Persian war, upon whom the commonwealth conferred the honour of being buried in this public cœmetary. After this the war became more general; all Greece

attacked us at once, and ravaged our country, ill requiring the favours they had received from this city. But the Athenians, having defeated their enemies in a sea-fight, and taken prisoners in the island of Sphacteria their leaders the Lacedæmonians, when it was in their power to have put them to death, spared their lives, forgave them, and made peace with them; thinking, that although in a war against Barbarians nothing less than their utter ruin should be aimed at, yet that in a war between Grecians and Grecians the contest should be carried on as far as victory indeed, but that the common interest of Greece ought not to be sacrificed to any particular resentment. Are not these brave men, therefore, worthy to be praised, who were engaged in that war, and who now lie buried here? They who made it appear, if indeed it was a question, whether in the first Persian war another nation was not at least equal to the Athenians: they, I say, who made it appear that such a question was entirely groundless. These men made the superiority of the Athenians sufficiently evident, by being victorious in that war, in which all Greece took part against them, and vanquishing in battle, with the forces of Athens only, those who had set themselves up for the chiefs of Greece, though they could pretend to no more than an equal share with the Athenians in their victories gained over the Barbarians. After the peace, arose a third dreadful and unexpected war, in which many brave men fell, who here lie buried. Some of these erected many trophies in Sicily; to which country they had sailed in order to protect the Leóntines in their liberties, whom we were by oath bound to assist. But before they could arrive, the passage being long, the Leontines were reduced to extremities, and disabled from yielding them any assistance; for which reason they gave over the attempt, and were unfortunate; though it must be owned, their enemies, those against whom they came to fight, behaved with such virtue and moderation, that they deserved far greater praise than some who were only confederates in that war. Others signa-
 lized themselves in the Hellespont, by taking all the ships of the enemy in one day, and by several other victories. I called this a dreadful and unexpected war, because some of the states of Greece carried their enmity to this city so far, as to presume to send an embassy to the king of Persia, *their* and *our* most inveterate enemy, to invite, upon their own particular views, that barbarian into Greece, whom, for the common cause, they had formerly joined
 with

with us to drive out of Europe; thus uniting in a league against Athens all the Greeks and Barbarians. Upon which occasion the strength and valour of this state became most conspicuous. For our enemies considering Athens as already vanquished, and having seized some of our ships at Mitylene, these gallant men (for so they confessedly were) whom we now commemorate, went to their relief with sixty sail, and boarding the enemy's ships, gained a victory over them, and delivered their own allies, but met with a lot unworthy of their valour; for their bodies were not, as they ought to have been, taken up out of the sea, but had their burial there. And surely they deserve to be remembered ever with praise and honour. For by their valour we became victorious, not in that engagement only, but throughout the whole war; and through their bravery was it that our city gained the reputation of being invincible, though attacked by the united forces of all mankind. Neither has this reputation been falsified in fact. For we were conquered; not by our enemies, but by our own dissensions. As to them, we remain invincible even to this day. But we have vanquished, have subdued ourselves. After these transactions a calm ensuing, and a peace between us and all other nations, a civil war broke out, which was carried on in such a manner, that if, by the decrees of fate, dissensions must necessarily arise, a man would pray that his country might be so and no otherwise distempered. For how benevolently and familiarly did the people of the Piræus, and those of the city, mingle with each other! And with how much moderation did they lay aside their hostility against those of Eleusis, contrary to the expectations of all Greece! All which is to be ascribed to no other cause than their real consanguinity, which imparts firm friendship not in words but in deeds. We ought not, therefore, to pass over in silence even those, who in this war were slain on either side, but as far as in us lies endeavour to reconcile them to each other; praying and sacrificing upon these occasions to those powers who have the command and direction over them, in as much as we ourselves are reconciled. For they did not attack each other out of hatred and malice, but from the malignity of their fortune. Of this we ourselves are living evidences; who, being of the same common original with them, have forgiven each other, both what we did and what we suffered. After this the city had rest, and enjoyed a profound peace, easily pardoning the Barbarians, who having been ill enough treated
by

by this state, returned it but as they ought. But she was indignant with the Greeks, when she called to mind the benefits they had received, and the retribution they made, by uniting with the Barbarians, depriving us of our ships, to which they formerly owed their own deliverance, and pulling down our walls, in return for our having saved theirs from ruin. The city then having taken the resolution not to give for the future any assistance to the Greeks, whether oppressed by Grecians or Barbarians, remained quiet : upon which the Lacedæmonians, imagining that Athens, the patroness of liberty, was fallen, and that now was the time for them to pursue their proper business, the enslaving of others, set immediately about it. I need not enlarge upon what followed. Those transactions are neither of an antient date, nor perplexed by the variety of actors. We all know in what a consternation the chief states of Greece, the Argives, the Bœotians, the Corinthians, applied to this city for succour ; and what was the most divine of all, that the king of Persia himself was reduced to such a strait, as to have no hopes of safety from any other quarter than from this very city, whose destruction he had so eagerly pursued. And, indeed, if Athens can be justly accused of any thing, it is of having been always too compassionate, too much inclined to heal the wounds of the fallen. For at this very time she was not able to persevere, and to keep to her resolution, of not assisting those in the preservation of their liberties, who had maliciously and designedly injured her. She yielded, she assisted them, and by that assistance rescued them from slavery, and gave them their liberty, till they should think fit to enslave themselves again. She had not indeed the assurance to act so preposterous a part as to send the king of Persia any succours ; she bore too great a reverence to the trophies of Marathon, of Salamis, and Plataea : yet, by conniving at the assistance given him by fugitives, and such as voluntarily entered into his service, she was confessedly the cause of his preservation. At this time she repaired her fortifications and her fleets, and prepared again for war ; finding herself under the necessity of entering into one with the Lacedæmonians for the protection of the Parians. The king of Persia, on his part, as he saw the Lacedæmonians had given over all thoughts of carrying on a war by sea, took umbrage at the Athenians, and resolving to break the peace, demanded those Grecian states which were upon the continent of Asia to be delivered up to him (those very states which the Lacedæmonians had formerly

merly consented to give up) as the condition of his continuing his amity with us and our allies. This demand he did not imagine would be complied with, and he made it only that he might, upon its being rejected, have a fair pretence for breaking the treaty. But he was mistaken as to some of his allies; for the Corinthians, the Argives, and the Bœotians, determined to comply with his demand, and even entered into a treaty with him, which they confirmed by oath, to give up the Greeks upon the continent of Asia, provided he would furnish them with money. But we, and we alone, had not the assurance to abandon those states, much less to swear to such a treaty. That the city of Athens is so generous, free, and firm, that she is so sound, and as it were by nature so averse to the Barbarian, must be ascribed to her being wholly *Greek*, and unmingled with Barbarians. For none of your foreign heroes, Pelops, Cadmus, Ægyptus, Danaus, and many others, who, though living under Grecian laws, were Barbarians by extraction; none of these, I say, are of the number of our citizens. We are genuine Greeks, no half-barbarians. Hence proceeds the genuine and unadulterated enmity of Athens to all Barbarians. Wherefore we were once more left alone, for refusing to do an action so infamous, and so impious as that of delivering up Grecians into the hands of Persians. But being restored to what we had been deprived of in the former war, by the assistance of divinity, we prosecuted this with more success. For, becoming once again masters of a fleet, having rebuilt our walls, and recovered our colonies, we were soon freed from a war, from which our enemies were very glad to be liberated. In this war we lost indeed many gallant men, some at Corinth, by the disadvantage of their situation, others at Lechæum by treachery. Nor were they less gallant, who saved the king of Persia, and drove the Lacedæmonians out of the seas. These are the men I would recall to your remembrance, and in honouring and praising such as these it becomes all of you to join.

Such were the exploits of those brave men who here lie buried; such were the exploits of those others also who, though unhappily deprived of burial, died like them in the service of their country; exploits many and great indeed, as has been related: but more and still greater yet remain untold; to enumerate all which many whole days and nights would scarce suffice. It is the duty, therefore, of all and of every particular man to bear these things in mind, and as in battle to exhort the children of such fathers

not

not to quit the rank, in which their ancestors have placed them, by a base and cowardly retreat. Accordingly, I myself, O ye sons of virtuous men, do now exhort you, and as long as I shall remain among you will never cease reminding and exhorting you, to use your utmost endeavours to become the best of men. But upon this occasion it is my duty to tell you what your fathers, when they were going to expose their lives for their country, commanded us to say to those whom they left behind, in case any accident should befall themselves. I will repeat to you what I heard from their own mouths, and what, if I may judge from the discourse they then held, they would now gladly say to you themselves, were it in their power. Imagine, therefore, you hear them speaking what I shall now relate. These were their words: O children! that ye are the sons of virtuous fathers is evident from our present circumstances. For having it in our option to live with dishonour, we have generously made it our choice to die, rather than bring ourselves and our posterity into disgrace, and reflect infamy back upon our parents and forefathers; persuaded as we were, that the life of one who dishonours his family is not worth living, and that such a man can have no friend either here upon earth among mankind, or among the gods hereafter in the realms beneath. It behoves you, therefore, to bear these our words in remembrance, to the end that all your undertakings may be accompanied with virtue; assuring yourselves that without virtue every acquisition, every pursuit, is base and infamous. For wealth can add no splendour to an unmanly mind. The riches of such an one are for others, not for himself. Neither are beauty, and strength of body, when joined with baseness and cowardice, to be deemed ornamental, but disgraceful: since if they make a man more conspicuous, they at the same time make the baseness of his soul conspicuous also. Science too, when separated from justice and the rest of the virtues, is not wisdom but cunning. Wherefore, in the first place, and in the last, and throughout the whole course of your lives, it is incumbent upon you to labour with all your faculties to surpass us and your progenitors in glory. Otherwise be assured that, in this contest of virtue, if we remain victorious, the victory will cover us with confusion, which, on the contrary, if obtained by you, will make us happy. The most effectual way for you to surpass us, and obtain this victory, is so to order your conduct, as neither to abuse nor waste the glory left you by your ancestors. For can any thing be more ignominious

nious for a man, who would be thought something, than to receive honour, not from his own merit, but from the reputation of his forefathers. Hereditary honour is indeed a beautiful and magnificent treasury. But to enjoy a treasury of riches and honours, and, for want of a proper supply of wealth and glory of your own, not to be able to transmit it to your posterity, is infamous and unmanly. If you endeavour after these things, you will be welcome to us and we to you, whenever your respective fates shall conduct you to us in the world below: but if you disregard them and become profligate, not one of us shall be willing to receive you. Thus much be spoken to our children: but to our fathers and mothers, if any of them should survive us, and it should be thought necessary to administer comfort to them, say, that it is their duty patiently to bear misfortunes, whenever they happen, and not give themselves up to grief: otherwise they will never be without sorrow; for the ordinary occurrences of life will afford sufficient matter for affliction. They should seek to heal and mitigate their troubles in the remembrance, that as to the most considerable point the gods have heard their prayers. For they did not pray that their children might be immortal, but virtuous and renowned. And this, the greatest of all blessings, they have obtained. It is not easy for mortal man to have every thing happen according to his wishes in this life. Besides, by bearing their misfortunes with resolution and fortitude, they will gain the opinion of being the genuine parents of magnanimous children, and of being themselves men of courage and magnanimity; whereas by sinking under their sorrows, they will raise a suspicion of their not being our fathers, or those who shall praise us will be thought to have spoken falsely; neither of which things ought to come to pass. They themselves rather should bear chief testimony to our praise, showing by their actions that they are indeed men and the fathers of men. The old proverb, "Not too much of any thing," seems to be well said, and in fact it is so. For he who has within himself all that is necessary to happiness, or nearly so, and who does not so depend upon other men, as to have himself and his affairs in a perpetual fluctuation, according to their good or ill conduct, he, I say, is best provided for this life; he is moderate, he is prudent, he is brave; and he, upon all occasions, whether he obtains or loses an estate or children, will pay the greatest regard to this proverb: for placing all his confidence in himself, he will neither be

too much elevated with joy, nor depressed with sorrow. Such men we should think worthy to be our fathers; such we wish them to be, and such we affirm they are; such likewise are we now proved to be, by neither murmuring nor trembling at death, though we were to meet it this instant. And this same state of mind do we recommend to our fathers and our mothers; entreating them to make use of such sentiments as these through the remaining part of their lives; and to be persuaded that they will do us the greatest pleasure by not weeping and lamenting for us; that if the dead have any knowledge of what passes among the living, their afflicting themselves, and bearing their misfortunes heavily, will be very unacceptable to us; whereas, on the contrary, by bearing their afflictions lightly, and with moderation, they will be most pleasing to us. Our lives and actions are now going to have an end; but such an end as among men is deemed most glorious, and which therefore ought rather to be graced with honour than sullied with lamentations. By taking care of our wives and children; by educating the latter, and turning themselves and their minds wholly to such-like employments, they will the more readily forget their misfortunes, and lead a life more exemplary, more agreeable to reason, and more acceptable to us. Let this suffice to be spoken on our part to our relations and friends. To the commonwealth we recommend the care of our parents and children; beseeching her to give these an honourable education, and to cherish those in their old age, in a manner worthy of them: but we are sensible that without this recommendation, all proper care will be taken of both."

These things, O ye children, and ye parents of the deceased, have they given me in charge to say to you on their part; and I have most willingly, and to the best of my power, executed their commands. On my own part and for their sakes I beseech you, ye sons! to imitate your fathers: you fathers, to take comfort for the loss of these your sons; assuring yourselves, that both in our public and private capacities, we will take care of you, and cherish your old age, as the respective duties and relations of every one of us may require. You yourselves well know what provisions the commonwealth has made; that by express laws she has ordered care to be taken of the children and parents of those who die in battle; and has given it in charge to the chief magistrate, to take them, above all others, into his particular protection; that the latter may be guarded from all injuries, and the former

former not be sensible of their orphan state, nor feel the want of a father; whose place the commonwealth supplies, by assisting in the care of their education while they are children, and when they are grown up to manhood, dismissing them to their several vocations with an honourable present of a complete suit of armour. And this she does, not only with a view of intimating to them, and reminding them of the occupations of their fathers, by presenting them with those implements of valour which their fathers had so gloriously employed; but also that being arrived to the full strength, and furnished with the armour of a man, when they first go to take possession of their household gods, they may set out with a good omen. Moreover, she fails not from time to time to pay these anniversary honours to the deceased; taking upon her to perform in general, with regard to them, whatever is due to each from their respective relations; and to complete all, by exhibiting games of different kinds, equestrian and gymnastic, musical and poetical, she effectually supplies the office of sons and heirs to fathers; of fathers to sons; and that of guardians and protectors to their parents and kindred: discharging at all times all and every part of the duties that belong to all. Learn, therefore, by reflecting upon these things, to bear your afflictions with more patience; for by so doing you will act the most friendly part as well to the dead as to the living, and be better able to give and receive comfort, to cherish and assist each other. And now, having jointly paid the tribute of your sorrow to the deceased, as the law directs, you may all depart.

This, Menexenus, is the speech¹ of Aspasia the Milesian.

¹ This Oration, which Plato (either from undervaluing his own performance, or with a view of abating the too great esteem which the Athenians entertained for their orators, whom he rallies very finely in the beginning of the dialogue) hath here given to Aspasia the Milesian, was however held in such estimation at Athens, that, as Tully informs us, it was ordered to be repeated every year, on the day appointed for the commemoration of those who had been slain in battle: a plain evidence of the preference which the Athenians gave to this Oration of Plato before all others spoken on the same occasion, though some of them were composed by their greatest orators, as Pericles, Lyfias, Hyperides, and Demosthenes. Those of Hyperides and Demosthenes are not now extant. That ascribed to Pericles by Thucydides, and preserved in his History, was most probably written by that historian. Lyfias's Oration is yet remaining. We have therefore but one genuine oration of any of these orators, upon this subject, with which we can compare this Oration of Plato; to whom I shall not scruple to give the advantage upon the comparison. For the rest, we have the decision of the Athenians, who were acquainted with all the others, in favour of Plato; and in their judgment, I think, we may safely acquiesce.—W.

MEN. By Jupiter, Socrates, you say that Aspasia is blessed, if being a woman she can make such speeches as these.

Soc. If you doubt it, come along with me, and you shall hear her herself.

MEN. I have often been in her company, and know what she is.

Soc. Well then, do you not admire her, and are you not obliged to her for this Oration?

MEN. I am greatly obliged, Socrates, either to her or to him, whoever was the author of it, but more particularly to you, who have repeated it to me.

Soc. Very well: but remember not to speak of it, that I may hereafter be at liberty to communicate to you some more of her fine political discourses.

MEN. You may depend upon my not betraying you. Do you only relate them.

Soc. I will not fail.

THE END OF THE MENEXENUS.

THE CLITOPHO:

AN

EXHORTATORY DIALOGUE.

THE CLITOPHO

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND CLITOPHO.

SOCRATES.

A CERTAIN person lately informed me that Clitopho, the son of Aristonymus, conversing with Lyfias, blamed the pursuits of Socrates, but praised immoderately the conversation of Thrasymachus.

CL. Whoever he was, Socrates, he has not accurately related to you my discourse with Lyfias about you. For in some things I did not praise you, but in others I did. But since you evidently blame me, though you pretend to care nothing about this report, I will most willingly relate to you my conversation with Lyfias, especially since we happen to be alone, that you may see I am not so ill disposed towards you as you might be induced to suppose. For now perhaps you have not rightly heard, and on that account are more exasperated with me than is proper. But if you will permit me to speak freely, I shall most cheerfully relate the affair to you.

Soc. But it would be shameful, when you are willing to benefit me, that I should not suffer you. For it is evident that when I know in what

¹ In this Dialogue, Clitopho, the son of Aristonymus, being asked by Socrates why he preferred Thrasymachus, answers, that though he had often heard excellent exhortations to virtue from Socrates, yet hitherto he had not been able to perceive in what virtue itself consisted, and in what manner he should happily proceed in the study it. Hence, he adds, if Socrates either is ignorant of this, or is unwilling to teach it him, he may with great propriety betake himself to Thrasymachus, or to any other, for the sake of obtaining this knowledge. As the answer of Socrates to this complaint is not added, there is every reason to believe that this Dialogue is imperfect.

respect I am better and worse, I shall pursue some things, and avoid others, to the utmost of my power.

CLI. Hear then. For when I am with you, Socrates, I am often astonished on hearing you discourse, and you appear to me, compared with other men, to speak most beautifully, when reproving men, you exclaim like a god from a tragic machine, "Whither are you borne along? Of this you are ignorant, and your conduct is in no respect becoming. For all your attention is employed in the acquisition of wealth; but you neglect the children to whom you are to leave it, and are not at all anxious that they may know how to use it justly; nor that they may acquire this knowledge, do you procure for them teachers of justice, if justice can be taught, and who may sufficiently exercise them in it, if it is to be obtained by meditation and exercise. Nor yet, prior to this, do you thus cultivate your own minds: but perceiving that you and your children have sufficiently learnt grammar, music, and gymnastic (which you consider as the perfect discipline of virtue), though afterwards you are no less depraved with respect to riches than before, yet you do not despise the present mode of education, nor inquire after those who might liberate you from this unskilful and inelegant condition of life. Though through this confusion and indolence, and not through the discordant motion of the foot to the lyre, brother rises against brother, and city against city, immoderately and unharmoniously; and warring on each other, both do and suffer all that is lawless and dire. But you say, that those who are unjust, are unjust voluntarily, and not through want of discipline, nor through ignorance; and again, you dare to assert that injustice is base, and odious to divinity. How then can any one voluntarily choose this which is so great an evil. It is chosen by him, you say, who is vanquished by pleasure. Is not this therefore involuntary, since to vanquish is voluntary? So that reason perfectly convinces us, that to act unjustly is involuntary. Every man, therefore, privately, and all cities publicly, ought to pay more attention to justice than at present."

When therefore, Socrates, I hear you perpetually asserting these things, I am very much delighted, and praise you in a wonderful manner. This is likewise the case with me, when you say as follows: That those who cultivate their bodies, but neglect their soul, pay attention to that which is naturally in a state of subjection, but neglect that which governs. Likewise,
when

when you assert that it is better for him who does not know how to use a thing to dismiss the consideration of its utility. And that for him who does not know how to use his eyes, ears, and his whole body, it is better neither to hear, nor see, nor to use his body in any respect, than to use it. In a similar manner too, with respect to art. For it is evident, as you say, that he who does not know how to use his own lyre, will not know how to use that of his neighbour. Nor will he who is ignorant of the use of any other instrument or possession belonging to another, know how to use that which belongs to himself. And, in the last place, you beautifully add, that for him who does not know how to use his soul, it is better to be at rest with respect to his soul, and not to live, than to live and act from himself. But if there is any necessity for such a one to live, that it is better for him to lead the life of a slave, than of one free born. This however is to deliver the helm of the dianoëtic part as of a ship to another, who has learnt how to govern men; viz. who has learnt what you, Socrates, have often called the political science; and which is likewise judicial and justice. To these, and many other all-beautiful sentences, in which you assert that virtue¹ can be taught, and that a man ought above all things to pay attention to himself, I have never at any time been adverse, nor do I think that I ever shall be. For I think that these assertions are most exhortatory and useful, and vehemently excite us, as if we were asleep. I have attended, therefore, as one who is to hear what follows, and I have asked, not you, in the first place, Socrates, but your equals in age, those who have the same desires with you, or your companions, or in whatever manner it may be proper to call those that are thus disposed towards you. For among these I have first of all asked those that are most esteemed by you, what will be the discourse after this, and proposing to them to dispute after your manner, I have said to them, O best of men, how are we to receive the present exhortation of Socrates to virtue? Are we to receive it as nothing more than an exhortation, and not apply it to practice? But this will be our employment through the whole of life, to exhort those who are not yet incited. Or is it requisite, after this, that we should ask Socrates and each other, since we confess this conduct should be adopted, what is next to be done? How ought we to

See the Meno, for the manner in which this is to be understood.

begin respecting the discipline of justice? For just as if some one should exhort *us* to pay attention to the body, who like boys do not in any respect perceive that the care of the body is gymnastic and medicinal, and should afterwards reproach us by saying, that we paid every attention to wheat and barley, and such other things as we labour to obtain for the sake of the body, but that we search after no art nor device, by which the body may be rendered in the best condition, though there is such an art,—should any one thus reproach us, might not we ask him, Do you say there are such arts as these? perhaps he would say that there are, and that these are the gymnastic and medicinal arts. After the same manner, let some one now inform us what that art is which we consider as conversant with the virtue of the soul. But he who appears to be most robust in answering such questions as these, will say, This art which you have heard Socrates mention, is no other than justice. To this I reply, You should not only tell me the name of the art, but thus explain the art itself. Medicine is said to be a certain art. But by this, two things are effected: for physicians are always formed by physicians; and health is produced by medicine. But one of these is no longer art, but the work of the medical art teaching and acquired; and this work we denominate health. After a similar manner, two things are effected by the tectonic art, viz. an edifice, and the tectonic art, one of which is a work, and the other a document. Thus too, with respect to justice, one of its effects is to make men just, in the same manner as each of the above-mentioned arts makes artists; but what shall we say the other is, which a just man is able to accomplish for us? One person will, I think, answer us, that it is the profitable; another, that it is the becoming; another, that it is the useful; and another, that it is the convenient. But I in answering to this have objected, that these very names are to be found in each of the arts, viz. to act rightly, conveniently, profitably, and the like. But that to which all these tend, is the peculiarity of each art. Thus, in the tectonic art, the right, the beautiful, and the becoming, tend to this, that wooden furniture may be aptly made, which is not art, but the work of art. In like manner, let some one answer me, respecting the work of justice. Lastly, one of your associates, Socrates, who appeared to speak most elegantly, answered me that the peculiar work of justice is this, which is not effected by any other science, viz. to produce
friendship

friendship in cities. But he being again interrogated, replied, that friendship was a thing good, and by no means evil: and being asked respecting the friendships of boys and wild beasts, as we denominate the attachments of these, he would not admit that such attachments should be called friendships, because they more frequently happen to be noxious than good. He likewise said, that they were falsely called friendships, but that real and true friendship was most clearly concord. But being asked whether he called concord agreement in opinion, or science, he despised the former, because there is a necessity that there should be many and noxious agreements in opinion among men; but he had granted that friendship was a thing perfectly good, and the work of justice. So that he said, concord was the same with science, and not with opinion. But when we were at this part of our discourse, those who were present, doubting the truth of these assertions, called to him, and said, that the discourse revolved to what was at first advanced. They likewise affirmed that the medicinal art is a certain concord; that this is the case with all the other arts; and that they are able to declare what the subject is with which they are conversant. But with respect to that which is called by you justice, or concord, we know not whither it tends, and it is not manifest what is its work.

Concerning these things, Socrates, I have at length asked you; and you tell me that the work of justice is to injure our enemies, and benefit our friends. But afterwards it appeared to you, that the just man will never injure any one, but will act to the advantage of every one in all things. These things have been the subject of discussion, not once, nor twice only; but having assiduously attended you, Socrates, for a long time, I became at length weary; thinking, indeed, that you, in the most excellent manner of all men, exhorted to the study of virtue, but that one of these two things must take place, either that you are able to effect thus much alone, but nothing further, which may happen to be the case respecting any other art; as for instance, he who is not a pilot may endeavour to praise the pilot's art, as a thing most worthy the attention of mankind; and in a similar manner with respect to the other arts. This may perhaps apply to you concerning justice, viz. that you have not a greater knowledge than others of its nature, because you praise it in a beautiful manner. However, I do not think that this is the case. But as I said, one of these two things must take place, either that you

do not know what justice is, or that you are unwilling to impart this knowledge to me. On this account, I think I shall betake myself to Thrasymachus, and wherever else I am able, in order that I may be liberated from my doubts. Not indeed, that I should apply to any one else, if you were willing to finish your exhortatory discourses to me. I mean, if, as you have exhorted me to that care of the body which belongs to gymnastic, and which it is not proper to neglect, you would unfold to me, after an exhortation of this kind, what the nature is of my body, and what the attention which it requires. Let this be done at present. Take it for granted, that Clitopho acknowledges it to be ridiculous, to pay attention to other things, and in the mean time neglect the soul, for the sake of which we labour in other things; and suppose me to admit every thing else which is consequent to this, and which we have now discussed. I request you not to act in any respect otherwise, that I may not be obliged hereafter, as at present, partly to praise and partly to blame you before Lysias and others. For I say, Socrates, that you are inestimably valuable to the man who is not yet exhorted; but that to him who has been exhorted, you are nearly an impediment; since you prevent him from becoming happy, by arriving at the end of virtue.

THE END OF THE CLITOPHO.

THE

T H E I O:

A DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

P O E T R Y.

INTRODUCTION

TO

T H E I O.

THE general subject, says Mr. Sydenham, of this Dialogue, is Poetry; but various titles are found prefixed to the copies of it, assigned probably by the antients. Some style it a Dialogue “concerning the Iliad:” while others, aiming to open the subject more fully and distinctly, entitle it, “Of the Interpretation of the Poets:” and others again, with intention to express the design or scope of it in the title, have invented this, “Concerning the Mark or Characteristic of a Poet.” But none of these titles, or inscriptions, will be found adequate or proper. The ¹ first is too partial and deficient. For the Dialogue, now before us, concerns the Odyssæy as much as the Iliad, and many other poets no less than Homer. As to the next title, the Interpretation or Exposition of the Poets, is but an occasional or accessory subject, introduced only for the sake of some other, which is the principal. The last title is erroneous, and mistakes the main drift and end of this Dialogue,

¹ “Concerning the Iliad.” This however appears to be the most antient, being the only one found in Laertius; and the others being too precise and particular to be of an earlier date. For the titles of all the profane works of the antients, whether dialogues, dissertations, or methodical treatises, written before the age of Plutarch, were as general and as concise as possible, expressing the subject usually in one word. The title that we have chosen appears not indeed in any of the copies of this Dialogue; but perhaps may be supported by the authority of Clemens of Alexandria, a writer little later than Laertius. For citing a passage out of the *Io*, he has these words, *περι μεν ποιητικῆς Πλάτων—γραφει*. *Stromat.* l. vi. near the end. Though it must be owned not absolutely clear, whether he means it as the known title of the Dialogue, or as the subject only of the passage there quoted.—S.

which

which is by no means so slight or unimportant, as merely to show that enthusiasm¹, or the poetic fury, is the characteristic of a true poet; but makes a part of the grand design of Plato in all his writings, that is, the teaching true wisdom: in order to which, every kind of wisdom, falsely so called, commonly taught in the age when he lived, was to be unlearned. The teachers, or leaders of popular opinion among the Grecians of those days, were the sophists, the rhetoricians, and the poets; or rather, instead of these last, their ignorant and false interpreters. Men of liberal education were misled principally by the first of these: the second sort were the seducers of the populace, to whose passions the force of rhetoric chiefly is applied in commonwealths: but the minds of people² of all ranks received a bad impression

¹ Yet only in this light was the *Io* considered by Ficinus, as appears from his Commentary on this Dialogue. And his representations of it have been blindly followed by all who have since his time written concerning it, as Janus Cornarius in his seventh Eclogue, Serranus in his Argument of the *Io*, and Franciscus Patritius in his *Dissertation de Ordine Dialogorum*. Nor must we conceal from our readers the opposite opinion of a very ingenious friend, who supposes Plato to have no other view in this Dialogue, than to expose *Io* to ridicule, and to convince him of his own ignorance. Whatever, therefore, is said, on the subject of enthusiasm in poetry, appears to him wholly ironical, and Socrates to be absolutely in jest, throughout the Dialogue. To this conjecture we shall only say, in the words of Horace, which a reader of Plato ought always to have in mind,

——— *Ridentem dicere Verum*
Quid vetat ——?

What hinders, but that serious truth be spoke
In humour gay, with pleasantry and joke?

As to the other opinion, that which is generally received, we contend not that it has no foundation, nor even at all dispute the truth of it; but deny only the importance of that truth to the *Io*. For though the immediate and direct end of Plato, in this Dialogue, was to prove that the wisdom, which appears in the writings of the elder poets, especially in those of Homer, was not owing to science: yet another thing, which he had obliquely in his view, was the intimating to his readers, to what cause positively it was owing that so many profound truths were contained in those ancient poems. The cause assigned by the philosopher is some universal and divine principle, operating in various ways: partly acting only occasionally, in which respect he terms it, agreeably to the language of those days, the inspiration of the muse; and partly with a continual and constant energy, being a divine genius, but limited, and confined to certain subjects, operating differently in different persons; though in Homer, most of all men, exerting its full force, and the most according to its own nature, that is, universal and divine—S.

² As soon as boys had been taught letters, they were introduced to the reading of the poets; their minds were charged with the memory of shorter poems, and of many passages from the longer;

impression from those of the last-mentioned kind. To prevent the ill influence of these, is the immediate design of the Io; and the way which the philosopher takes to lessen the credit of their poems is not by calling in question the inspiration of the poet, or the divinity of the Muse. Far from attempting this, he establishes the received hypothesis, for the foundation of his argument against the authority of their doctrine: inferring, from their inability to write without the impulse of the Muse, that they had no real knowledge of what they taught: whereas the principles of science, as he tells us in the *Philebus*, descend into the mind of man immediately from heaven; or, as he expresses it in the *Epinomis*, from God himself, without the intervention of any lower divinity. The true philosopher, therefore, who attends to this higher inspiration, he alone possessing that divinest science, the science of those principles, is able to teach in a scientific way. But Plato, of all the polite writers among the ancients the most polite, makes not his attack upon the poets themselves directly: for, as the disaffected to any government, so long as they retain their respect for it, strike at the sovereigns only in the persons of their ministers; in the same respectful manner does the courtly Plato seem to spare those sacred persons, the anointed of the Muses, making free with the rhapsodists only, their interpreters. This he does in the person of Io, one of that number, who professed to interpret the sense of Homer; proving out of his own mouth, that he had no true knowledge of those matters, which he pretended to explain; and insinuating at the same time, that the poet no less wanted true knowledge in those very things, though the subjects of his own poem. For every thing that he says of the rhapsodists and of rhapsody, holds equally true of poets¹ and of poetry.

The

longer; and they had masters appointed to explain, criticise, and comment upon what they had learnt. From the poets consequently did the youth imbibe principles of manners, and general opinions of things: their odes were as commonly sung as ballads among us; and their verses were cited, not only to grace conversation, but even to add weight to grave discourses. Justly therefore does Aristides the orator call them *κοινους των Ελληνων τροφειας και διδασκαλους*, "the common tutors and teachers of all Greece." *Aristid. tom. iii. p. 22. ed. Canter.*—S.

¹This appears to have been so understood by the poets themselves of those days. For what other provocation Socrates could have given them than by some such talk as Plato in this *Dialogue* puts into his mouth is not easy to conceive. The enemies that Socrates had made himself by his free-

The pursuit of this argument naturally leads to a twofold inquiry: one head or article of which regards the sciences, the other concerns the arts. By this partition does Plato divide his *Io*; throwing, however, here, as he does every where else, a graceful veil over his art of composition, and the method with which he frames his dialogues; in order to give them the appearance of familiarity and ease, so becoming that kind of writing: in the same manner as he always takes care to conceal their scope or design; that, opening itself unexpectedly at last, it may strike the mind with greater efficacy. Upon the article of science, Plato represents the poets writing through the inspiration of the Muses, of all things, whether human or divine; of morals, politics, and military affairs; of history, and antiquities; of meteorology, and astronomy; in fine, of the whole universe; yet without any intimate acquaintance with the nature of those things, and without having had any other than a superficial view. Under the other article, that of art, Plato shows that the poets describe, and in description imitate, the operations and performances of many of the arts, though in the principles of those arts uninstructed and ignorant; as having skill in one art only, that, through which they so describe and imitate, the art of poetry: while every other artist hath skill in some one other, his own proper, art; and to the true philosopher, as he tells us in his Dialogue called the Politician, belongs the knowledge of that art, in which are comprehended the principles of all the rest. Hence it follows, that of such poetical subjects as have any relation to the arts, whether military or peaceful, whether imperatorial, liberal, or

dom of speech, as we are informed by himself in his *Apology*, reported to us by Plato, were of three sorts; the politicians, the rhetoricians, and the poets. That the former sort repented his exposing their conceited ignorance, and vain pretensions to political science, is told us by Laertius, b. ii. and is indeed abundantly evident from Plato's *Meno*. That Socrates treated the rhetoricians in the same manner, will appear very sufficiently in the *Gorgias*. Is it not then highly probable, that the repentment of the poets was raised against him by the same means; and that they well understood his attack upon the rhapsodists, a set of men too inconsiderable for any part of his principal notice to be intended against themselves? We should add to this argument the authority of Athenæus, were it of any weight in what regards Plato. For he gives this as one instance of Plato's envious and malignant spirit, which his own malignity against the divine philosopher attributes to him, that in his *Io* he vilifies and abuses the poets. See *Athen. Deipnosoph.* l. xi. p. 506.—S.

mechanical,

mechanical, the knowing in each art are respectively the only proper judges. Such is the design, and such the order of this Dialogue. As to its kind, it is numbered by the antients among the peirastic: but according to the scheme proposed in our synopsis, the outward form or character of it is purely dramatic: and the genius of it is seen in this, that the argumentation is only probable; and in this, also, that the conclusion leaves the rhapsodist Io perplexed and silenced, bringing off Socrates in modest triumph over the embarrassment of his half yielding adversary ¹.

¹ See what has been already observed concerning the Io, in the note at the beginning of the tenth book of the Republic, in which we have given, from Proclus, a copious and admirable account of the different species of poetry, and the nature of poetic fury.—T.

T H E I O.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND IO.

SCENE'.—ATHENS.

SOCRATES.

JOY be with Io^{*}. Whence come you now? what; do you come directly from home, from Ephesus?

Io.

^{*} The scene, though not precisely marked out to us by Plato, evidently lies within the city; and some circumstances make it probable to be the public streets; where Socrates, in passing along, casually met with Io. Not to insist on that of Io's recent arrival at Athens, nor on that other of the seeming haste of Socrates, expressed in his postponing Io's impertinent harangue, and his endeavouring to draw the conversation into a narrow compass, circumstances perhaps ambiguous: one more decisive is the restriction of the number of persons composing the Dialogue to those two. For whenever Plato lays his scene in some public place, frequented for the sake of company, exercise, or amusement; many persons are made parties, or witnesses at least, to the conversation; and this out of regard to probability; because a conversation-party, consisting of more than two persons, may naturally be supposed the most frequent in places, where few of the assembly could fail of meeting with many of their acquaintance. Another circumstance, contributing to determine where the scene lies, is the brevity of this Dialogue. For Plato, to his other dramatic excellencies, in which he well might be a pattern to all dramatic poets, adds this also, to adjust the length of the conversation to the place where it is held: a piece of decorum little regarded even by the best of our modern writers for the stage. Accordingly, the longest conversations, related or feigned by Plato, we may observe to be carried on always in some private house, or during a long walk into the country; unless some peculiar circumstance permits the discourse to be protracted in a place otherwise improper. For the same reason of propriety, the exchange, where much talk would be inconvenient; or the street, where people converse only as they pass along together, and sometimes, removed a little from the throng, standing still a while, is generally made the scene of the shortest dialogues. And in pursuance of the same rule, those of middling length

Io. ³ Not so, Socrates, I assure you; but from Epidaurus⁴, from the feasts of Æsculapius⁵.

Soc. The people of Epidaurus, I think, upon this occasion, propose a trial of skill among the rhapsodists⁶, in honour of the god. Do they not?

Io. They do; and a trial of skill in every other branch of the Muse's art?

Soc.

length have for their scene some public room, a gymnastic or a literary school, for instance, in which were seats fixed all round, for any of the assembly to sit and talk; but in a place of this kind the conversation must be abridged, because liable to interruption; besides that decency, and a regard to the presence of the whole assembly, regulate the bounds of private conversation in those detached and separate parties, into which usually a large company divides itself; appointing it to be confined within moderate compass. As this note regards all the dialogues of Plato, the length of it, we hope, wants no apology.—S.

² To wish joy, was the usual salutation of the antient Greeks, when they met or parted: as ours is, to hope or wish health; an expression of our courtesy, derived to us from the old Romans.—S.

³ As much as to say, "It is not so bad with me neither, as to be obliged ever to be at home." Plato makes him express himself in this manner, partly to shew the roving life of the rhapsodists, inconsistent with the attainment of any real science; but chiefly to open the character of Io, who prided himself with being at the head of his profession, and consequently in having much business abroad. The very first question therefore of Socrates, who knew him well, is on purpose to draw from him such an answer: as the questions that follow next are intended to put him upon boasting of his great performances. Nothing in the writings of Plato, not the minutest circumstance, is idle or insignificant. It would be endless to point out this in every instance. Scarce a line but would demand a comment of this sort. The specimen, however, here given, may suffice to show, with what attention so perfect a master of good writing ought to be read; and with such a degree of attention, as is due, the intelligent reader will of himself discern, in ordinary cases, the particular design of every circumstance, and also what relation it bears to the general design of the whole Dialogue.—S.

⁴ In this city was a temple of Æsculapius, much celebrated for his immediate presence. An annual festival was here likewise held in honour to that god.—S.

⁵ *Ἐκ τῶν Ἀσκληπειῶν*. Ficinus seems to think, this means the worshippers of Æsculapius. Bembo translates it "*da Figliuoli di Esculapio*," an appellation given only to physicians. Seranus interprets it in the same sense that we do, and that this is the true one, appears from Jul. Pollux, Onomast. i. l. c. 13.—S.

⁶ These were a set of people, whose profession somewhat resembled that of our strolling players. For they travelled from one populous city to another, wherever the Greek was the vulgar language, rehearsing, acting, and expounding the works of their antient poets, principally those of Homer. They resorted to the feasts and banquets of private persons, where such rehearsals made part of the
entertainment;

Soc. Well; you, I presume, were one of the competitors: What success had you?

Io. We came off, O Socrates, with the chief prize.

Soc. You say well: now then let us prepare to win the conquest in the Panathenæa¹.

Io. That we shall accomplish too, if fortune favour us.

Soc. Often have I envied you rhapsodists, Io, the great advantages of

entertainment; and in the public theatres performed before the multitude. Especially they failed not their attendance at the general assemblies of the people from all parts of Greece; nor at the religious festivals, celebrated by any particular state. For on these solemn occasions it was usual to have prizes proposed to be contended for, not only in all the manly exercises fashionable in those days, but in the liberal arts also; of which even the populace among the Grecians, then the politest people in the world, were no less fond. The principal of these was poetry: (see the second of Mr. Harris's three Treatises:) and poets themselves often contended for the prize of excellence in this art. But poets were rare in that age. Their places therefore on these occasions were supplied by the rhapsodists; who vied one with another for excellence in reciting. Whoever desires a more particular account of the rhapsodists, so often mentioned in this Dialogue, than can be given within the compass of these notes, may consult the commentary of Eustatius upon Homer, with the notes of the learned Salvini, v. i. p. 15, &c. as also a treatise of H. Stephens de Rhapsodis.—S.

¹ This was a festival kept at Athens yearly in honour of Minerva, who was believed by the Athenians to be the divine protectress of their city. Every fifth year it was celebrated with more festivity and pomp than ordinary; and was then called the Great Panathenæa, to distinguish it from those held in the intermediate years, termed accordingly the Less. We learn from Plato, in his Hipparchus, from whence Ælian almost transcribes it in his Various Hist. l. viii. c. 2. that there was a law at Athens, appointing the works of Homer to be recited by the rhapsodists during the solemnization of this festival: in order, says Isocrates in his Panegyric Oration, to raise in the Athenians an emulation of the virtues there celebrated. From a passage in the Oration of Lycurgus the Orator it appears, that this law regarded only the Panathenæa. On this very solemn occasion it is highly probable, that Io was come to Athens on purpose to show his abilities, and contend for the prize of victory. We cannot help observing by the way, that many writers, ancient as well as modern, express themselves as if they imagined the Greater and the Less Panathenæa to be two different festivals: see in particular Castellan. de Fest. Græc. p. 206, 7. whereas it is clear from the words of Lycurgus, that there was but one festival of that name, though held in a more splendid manner every fifth year. As they nearly concern the subject now before us, we present them to the learned reader at full length: οὗτοι γὰρ ὑπελάβον ἡμῶν οἱ πατέρες, ἐπὶ οὐδαμῶν εἶναι ποιητὴν (sc. τὸν Ὅμηρον) ὥστε νόμον ἐθέντο, καθ' ἑκάστην πενταετηρίδα τῶν Παναθηναίων, μόνου τῶν ἀλλῶν ποιητῶν ῥαψωδίσθαι τὰ ἐπη. P. 223. of Dr. Taylor's edition. "Your ancestors had so high an opinion of the excellence of Homer, as to make a law, that in every fifth year of the Panathenæa his poems, and his only, should be recited by the rhapsodists."—S.

your

your profession. For to be always well dressed¹, and to make the handsomest appearance possible, as becomes a man, no doubt, who speaks in public; to be conversant, besides, in the works of many excellent poets, especially in those of Homer, the best and most divine of them all; and to learn, not merely his verses, but his meaning, as it is necessary you should; these are advantages highly to be envied. For a man could never be a good rhapsodist unless he understood what he recited: because it is the business of a rhapsodist to explain to his audience the sense and meaning of the poet; but this it is impossible to perform well, without a ² knowledge of those things, concerning which the poet writes. Now all this certainly merits a high degree of admiration.

IO. You are in the right, Socrates. And the learning this I have made my principal business. It has given me indeed more trouble than any other branch of my profession. I presume therefore there is now no man living,

¹ The rhapsodists often used to recite in a theatrical manner, not only with proper gestures, but in a garb also suitable to their subject: and when they thus acted the *Odysses* of Homer, were dressed in a purple-coloured robe, ἀλουργγῆ, to represent the wanderings of Ulysses by sea: but when they acted the *Iliad*, they wore one of a scarlet colour, to signify the bloody battles described in that poem. Upon their heads they bore a crown of gold; and held in their hands a wand made of the laurel-tree, which was supposed to have the virtue of heightening poetic raptures; being, we may presume, found to have, like the laurel with us, though a different kind of tree, somewhat of an intoxicating quality. See Eustathius on Homer's *Iliad*, b. i. and the scholiast on Hesiod's *Theogony*, v. 30. This little piece of information, we imagine, will not be disagreeable to our readers: although in this passage, we must own, the common dress of the rhapsodists, when off the stage, seems rather to be intended; and the finery of Io, at that very time of his meeting with Socrates, resembling probably that of our itinerant quack-doctors, to be here ridiculed.—S.

² This whole speech of Socrates is ironical. For Xenophon, in whose writings Socrates is a graver character, with a less mixture of humour than in those of Plato, introduceth his great master expressly declaring, that no sort of people in the world were sillier, πηδωκταί, than the rhapsodists: and Maximus Tyrius calls them a race of men utterly void of understanding, τῶ των ἐκφύτων γενοῦ το ἀνοητότατον. Diff. xxiii. We are to observe however, that notwithstanding this, and our comparison of their manners and way of life with those of mountebanks and strolling players, yet they held a much higher rank in common estimation, equal to that of the most judicious actors in the theatres of our metropolis, or the most ingenious professors of any of the polite arts: were fit company for persons even of the first rank, and guests not unbecoming their tables. We are not therefore to be surprised at seeing Socrates so highly compliment Io, and treat him with so much outward respect, as he does through the whole *Dialogus*.—S.

who differs upon Homer so well as myself: nay, that none of those ¹celebrated persons, ²Metrodorus of Lampfacus, ³Stefimbrotus the Thasian, Glauco⁴, nor any other, whether antient or modern, was ever able to show in the verses of that poet so many and so fine ⁵sentiments as I can do.

Soc.

¹ The persons here mentioned were not rhapsodists, but critics, or as they were afterwards called grammarians; to whose profession antiently belonged the interpreting or explaining of their elder poets. See Dion. Chryf. Orat. liii. p. 553.—S.

² We are told by Diog. Laertius, in his life of Anaxagoras, that this Metrodorus was the first who applied himself to compose a work expressly concerning the philosophy of Homer; meaning without doubt, as appears from Tatian, *Λογ. προς Ἑλλήν*, that he explained Homer's theology from the various operations and phænomena of nature: and further, that he was intimate with Anaxagoras, and improved the moral explications of Homer, which had been given by that philosopher. If all this be true, Metrodorus must have been a great philosopher himself. For to have done this to the satisfaction of such a man as Anaxagoras, the master of Socrates, required certainly no mean degree of knowledge in the nature of man and of the universe. What is more probable is, that Metrodorus having been instructed by Anaxagoras in this knowledge, applied it to the giving a rational account of Homer's mythology, which was understood and received in a literal sense by the vulgar. The book which he composed on this subject, as we learn from Tatian, was entitled *περι Ὁμήρου*, "Concerning Homer."—S.

³ Stefimbrotus is mentioned with honour by Socrates himself in Xenophon's Symposium, as a master in explaining Homer: and his abilities of this kind are there set in contrast with the ignorance of the rhapsodists. As to the time when he lived, we learn from Plutarch, in his Life of Cimon, that he was exactly of the same age with that general. The work, for which he seems here to be celebrated, was entitled *περι τῆς ποιητικῆς Ὁμήρου*, "Concerning the poetry of Homer," as appears, we think, from Tatian, § 48.—S.

⁴ We cannot find this Glauco mentioned by any of the antients, unless he be the same person cited as a grammarian, under the name of Glauco of Tarsus, by an old Greek scholiast upon Homer in the Medicean library, never published. See the passage to which we refer, in Luc. Holsten. de Vita et Scriptis Porphyrii, c. vii. But he appears, we think, from the specimen of his criticisms there given, to have been a grammarian of a much later age: we are inclined, therefore, to suspect a misnomer in this place, and instead of *Γλαυκῶν* would choose to read *Γλαυκός*, if any manuscript favoured us; believing that the person here mentioned is Glaucus of Rhegium, who flourished about this time, and wrote a treatise *περι ποιητῶν*, as we are informed by Plutarch, t. ii. ed. Par. p. 833. C. or as the title of it is elsewhere by the same author given us more at large, *περι τῶν ἀρχαίων ποιητῶν τε καὶ μουσικῶν*, t. ii. 1132. E. See Jonsius de Scriptor. Hist. Philof. l. ii. c. 4. § 4. But certainly much mistaken is J. Alb. Fabricius, Bibl. Gr. l. ii. c. 23. n. 37. in supposing the Glauco, here mentioned, to have been a rhapsodist. That very learned and worthy man was used to read too hastily; and did not therefore duly observe amongst what company Glauco is here introduced.—S.

⁵ We learn from Plato, in this Dialogue, that the rhapsodists not only recited the poems of Homer, but professed to interpret them too. For the multitude every where, having heard that profound secrets

Soc. I am glad, Io, to hear you say so: for I am persuaded you will not be so ill-natured as to refuse the exhibiting before me your abilities in this way.

Io. My illustrations of Homer are indeed, Socrates, well worth your attention. For they are such as, I think, entitle me to receive from the admirers¹ of that poet the ²crown of gold.

Soc. I shall find an opportunity of hearing you descant on this subject some other time. For the present, I desire only to be informed of this; whether you are so great a master in explaining Homer alone, or whether you shine no less in illustrating ³Hesiod and Archilochus.

Io.

secrets of wisdom lay concealed there, thought there was no reason why they should not be made as wise as their betters; and were eager to have those hidden mysteries opened and revealed to them. The philosophers, and those who had studied under them, knew the bulk of the people to be incapable of apprehending those things rightly; or of receiving any real benefit from such revelation; which they considered consequently as a profanation of the truth. The Athenians, therefore, being in a state of democracy, encouraged the rhapsodists to undertake the unfolding to them that secret wisdom, reported to be wrapped up in the fables and allegories of Homer. The rhapsodists accordingly indulged their curiosity; collecting, as well as they were able, every meaning which had been attributed to that poet by grammarians, critics, or philosophers. Thus the people became perplexed with a multiplicity of different opinions, infused into them by men who had never studied the nature of things. See also Mr. Pope's first or introductory note on Homer's Iliad.—S.

¹ Ὑπὸ Ὀρχησίδων. This word in its original sense signified only those who were supposed to be descended from Homer, or from some of his kindred, and were the fathers or founders of that rhapsodical way of life before described. The title was afterwards extended to all their successors in that profession. See the scholiast on Pindar's second Nemæan Ode; and Athenæus, p. 620. H. Stephens seems to think these rhapsodists of Homer to be the persons chiefly intended in this passage. If so, it ought to be translated, or rather paraphrased, thus; "For all the interpreters of that poet ought, I think, to yield me the preference and the prize, consenting to crown me with the golden crown." But believing the word capable of being extended to that larger meaning given it by the old translators, we have ventured to follow them in it, as being a more rational one; the other sense making the arrogance of Io too extravagant and absurd.—S.

² This means not the crown, before mentioned, to have been worn by the rhapsodists at the time of their rehearsal: for so his boast would amount to no more than the pronouncing himself worthy of his profession; a speech too little arrogant for the character of Io: but it means the prize, bestowed on the most excellent performer on this occasion. For that this was a crown of gold, may be seen in Meursius's Panathenæa, c. xxv.—S.

³ These two poets are singled out from the rest of the poetic tribe, because their poetry, next to that of Homer, was the most frequently recited by the rhapsodists. This is fairly deducible from the words of Chamælion, cited by Athenæus. Not only, says he, were the poems of Homer

Io. By no means: for I own my powers confined to the illustrating Homer. To execute this well, is merit enough, I think, for one man.

Soc. But in the writings of Homer and of Hesiod are there no passages in which their sentiments and thoughts agree?

Io. There are, I believe, many passages of that kind.

Soc. In these cases now, are you better able to explain the words of Homer, than those of Hesiod?

Io. Equally well to be sure, Socrates, I can explain the words of both, where they agree.

Soc. But how is it with you, where, in writing on the same subject, they differ? For instance, Homer and Hesiod both write of things that relate to divination.

Io. True.

Soc. Well now; the passages in either of these poets, relating to divination; not only where he agrees with the other, but where he differs from him: who, think you, is capable of interpreting with most skill and judgment, yourself, or some able diviner?

Io. An able diviner, I must own.

Soc. But suppose you were a diviner, and were able to interpret rightly the similar places in both; would your abilities, do you imagine, fail you, when you came to interpret the places in either of them, where he differed from the other?

Io. I should certainly in that case have equal skill to explain both of them.

Soc. How comes it to pass then, that you interpret Homer in so masterly

ing by the rhapsodists, but those of Hesiod too, and of Archilochus; and further, (that is, sometimes,) the verses of Minnervus, and of Phocylides. *Ου μόνον τα Όμηρου, αλλά και τα Ήσιου και Αρχιλοχου. επι δ, Μινερμου και Φωκυλιδου.* Deipnosoph. I. xv. p. 620. The first of these two, Hesiod, is well known; and as he comes nearest to Homer in point of time, of all the poets, any of whose works are yet remaining entire; so is he confessedly the next to him in point of merit, among those who wrote in heroic measure. Archilochus was the first who composed poems of the Iambic kind, in which he is said to have been superior to all, who came after him. (See Athenæus's introduction to his Deipnosoph.) Upon which account Patereulus joins him with Homer; mentioning these two poets, as the only instances of such as advanced those arts, which they invented themselves, to the utmost pitch of perfection. Dion Chrysostom goes beyond this in the praises of Archilochus, putting him in the same rank with Homer, as a Poet; *δυσ γαρ ποιητων γε γοντων εξ απαντος του αιωνος, ος ουδενα των αλλων ζυμβαλειν αξιον, Όμηρου τε και Αρχιλοχου,* x. τ. λ. Dion Orat. xxiii. p. 397. "In all the course of time there have been but two poets, with whom no other is worthy of comparison, Homer and Archilochus."—S.

a manner,

a manner, yet not Hesiod, or any other of the poets? Are the subjects of Homer's writings any thing different from the subjects of other poems, taken all together? Are they not, in the first place, war and military affairs; then, the speeches and mutual discourse of all sorts of men, the good as well as the bad, whether they be private persons or public; the converse also of the gods one with another, and their intercourse with men; the celestial bodies, with the various phænomena of the sky and air; the state of souls departed, with the affairs of that lower world; the generation of the gods, with the descent and race of the heroes? Are not these the ¹ subjects of Homer's poetry?

Io. They are, Socrates, these very things.

Soc. Well; and do not the rest of the Poets write of these very things?

Io. They do, Socrates: but their poetry upon these subjects is nothing like the poetry of Homer.

Soc. What then, is it worse?

Io. Much worse.

Soc. The poetry of Homer, you say then, is better and more excellent than that of other poets.

Io. Better indeed it is, and much more excellent, by Jupiter.

Soc. Suppose now, my friend Io, out of several persons, all in their turns haranguing before an audience upon the nature of numbers, some one made a better speech than the rest; might not one of the auditors be capable of finding out that better speaker, and of giving him the preference due to him?

Io. There might be such a one.

Soc. Would not the same auditor, think you, be a judge of what was said by the worse speakers? or must he be a different person, who was a proper judge of these?

Io. The same person, certainly.

Soc. And would not a good arithmetician be such a person, thus equally able in both respects?

¹ As, in describing the shield of Achilles, Homer has presented us with a view of human life, and of the whole universe, in epitome; so Plato here finely sums up, in the concise manner possible, those very things, as the subjects of the Iliad and the Odyssey; giving us to behold in them a picture of all human affairs, whether in peace or war; of all nature, whether visible or invisible; of the divine causes of things; of the heroic virtues among men, and the greatness of families in antient days from thence arising. S.

Io. Without doubt.

Soc. To put another case to you : suppose among many persons, severally dissenting upon food, what sorts of it were wholesome, there should be one who spoke better than the rest ; would it belong, say you, to one of the hearers to distinguish accurately the better speaker, while it was necessary to look amongst the rest of the audience for a fit judge of the meaner speakers ? or would the speeches of them all be examined judiciously, and their different merits and demerits be estimated justly by the same person ?

Io. By the same person, beyond all doubt.

Soc. Of what character must this person be, who is thus qualified ? What do you call him ?

Io. A physician.

Soc. And do not you agree with me, that this holds true universally ; and that in every case, where several men made discourses upon the same subject, the nature both of the good and of the bad discourses would be discerned by the same person ? For if a man was no proper judge of the defects in the meaner performance, is it not evident that he would be incapable of comprehending the beauties of the more excellent ?

Io. You are in the right.

Soc. It belongs to the same person, therefore, to criticize with true judgment upon all of them.

Io. No doubt.

Soc. Did not you say that Homer, and the rest of the poets, for instance, Hesiod and Archilochus, write concerning the same things, though not in the same manner ? the compositions of the one being excellent, you say, while those of the others are comparatively mean.

Io. I said nothing more than what is true.

Soc. If then you can distinguish and know the compositions which excel, must not you necessarily know those which fall short of that excellence ?

Io. I own it appears probable, from your argument.

Soc. It follows therefore, my good friend, that in affirming Io to be equally capable of explaining Homer and every other poet, we should not miss the truth : since he acknowledges one and the same person to be an able judge of all such as write concerning the same things ; admitting at the same time the subjects of almost all poetical writings to be the same.

Io. What can possibly be then the reason, Socrates, that whenever I am
present

present at an harangue upon any other poet, I pay not the least regard to it ; nor am able to contribute to the entertainment, or to advance any thing upon the subject in my turn, worth the regard of others ; but grow downright dull, and fall asleep : yet that as soon as any mention is made of Homer, immediately I am roused, am all attention, and with great facility find enough to say upon this subject ?

Soc. It is not in the least difficult, my friend to guess the reason., For to every man it must be evident, that you are not capable of explaining Homer on the ¹ principles of art, or from real science. For if your ability was of this kind, depending upon your knowledge of any art, you would be as well able to explain every other poet : since the whole, of what they all write, is poetry ; is it not ?

Io. It is.

Soc. Well now ; when a man comprehends any other art, the whole of it, is not his way of considering and criticising all the ² professors of that art, one and the same ? and does not his judgment in every case depend on the same principles ? Would you have me explain myself upon this point, Io ? do you desire to know the meaning of my question ?

Io. By all means, Socrates. For I take great pleasure in hearing you wise men talk.

Soc. I should be glad, Io, could that appellation be justly applied to me ; but you are the wise men, you rhapsodists and the ³ players, together with the poets, whose verses you recite to us. For my part, I speak nothing but the
simple

¹ The Italian translator has strangely omitted this latter part of the sentence, though very material to the sense.

² In the Greek we read “ *περι ἅπασων τῶν τεχνῶν.*” But if Socrates does indeed, as he undertakes to do, explain the meaning of this sentence in what follows, his own explanation requires us to read “ *περι ἅπαντων τῶν τεχνῶν,*” or rather *τεχνικῶν*, this being the word always used by Plato to signify *artists*. The argument however would bear the reading with less alteration, “ *περι ἅπασων τῶν τεχνιστῶν,*” that is, all the performances in that art. Either way we are thus freed from the necessity, which Ficinus was under, from his retaining the common reading, to insert many words of his own, in order to preserve the justness of the reasoning, and make this passage agreeable to the sequel — S.

³ Plato in other places beside this, as hereafter in this Dialogue, in the 3d book of the Republic, and in the 2d book of the Laws, joins together the arts of rhapsody and of acting plays, as being
arts

simple truth, as it becomes a mere private man to do. For the question, which I just now asked you, see how mean a matter it concerns, how common, and within the compass of every man's reach to know, that which I called ¹ one and the same way of criticising, when a man comprehends the whole of any art. To give an ² instance of such comprehensive skill; painting is an art, to be comprehended as one kind of skill, whole and entire; is it not?

Io. It is.

Soc. Is there not a difference, in degree of merit, between the several professors of that art, whether you consider the ancients or the moderns?

Io. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Now then, do you know any man who is an able critic in the

arts of near affinity. That affinity between them was greater than one would be apt to imagine, and appears in a strong light from what Eustathius says of the rhapsodists, that "frequently they used to act in a manner somewhat dramatic." Hence in the feast of Bacchus, principally celebrated with dramatic entertainments, the rhapsodists had antiently a share: and one of the festival days was called *εορτη των ραψωδων*. See Athenæus, l. v. p. 275. Hesychius therefore with great propriety explains the word *ραψωδοι* rhapsodists, by this description *υποκριται επων*, actors of epic poems.—S.

¹ Socrates here, in the way of irony, after his usual manner, insinuates some very important doctrines of his philosophy, leading us up even to the highest. For, observing that all the arts depend on certain uniform and stable principles, he would have us infer, in the first place, that every art, properly so called, or as it is distinguished from science on the one hand, on the other from mere habit and experience, is built on science; and that no person can be justly called an artist, or a master of the art which he professes, unless he has learnt the epistemonical or scientific principles of it: in the next place, that science is a thing stable, uniform, and general; guiding the judgment with unerring certainty, to know the rectitude and the pravity of every particular, cognisable from the rules of any art depending thus on science: further, that every science hath certain principles, peculiar to it, uniform and identical: and lastly, that all the sciences are branches of science general, arising from one root, which in like manner is uniform, and always the same.—S.

² *Λαβωμεν τω λογω*. Serranus very absurdly translates it thus, "*adhibita ratione comprehendere*." Ficinus imperfectly thus, "*exempli causa*," followed by the Italian, "*come per esempio*." So also Cornarius, "*veri bi causa*." True it is, that *λαβε* τω λογω, frequently signifies *take an instance*. But in this place, *λαβωμεν* refers to the word *λαβη*, *comprehend*, in the preceding sentence; and *λογω* is opposed to an actual comprehending of any art. Thus, to omit many passages in Plato's Republic; in the third book of his Laws, *λογω κατασκευειν την πολιν* is opposed to the actual founding of a city: and again in his Theætetus, *εα μη στήσωμεν αυτους τω λογω* is in opposition to an actual settling, or fixing. Euripides with the same meaning opposes *λογω* to *εργω* in this verse of his Cyclops, *Γενται εν, ω, ατ μη λογω παινης μονον*.—S.

works

works of ¹ Polygnotus, the son of Aglaophon; and can show, with great judgment, which of his pieces he executed well, and which with less success; yet in the works of other painters hath no critical skill; and whenever their performances are brought upon the carpet to be examined and criticised, grows dull and falls asleep, or is unable to contribute his quota to the conversation: but as soon as occasion calls him to declare his judgment about Polygnotus, or any other particular painter whatever, immediately is roused, is all attention, and finds enough to say upon this subject? Know you any such man?

Io. Really I do not.

Soc. Well now; in the statuary's art how is it? Did you ever see any man, who upon the works of ² Dædalus, the son of Metion, or Epeius, son to Panopeus, or Theodorus the Samian, or any other single statuary, was able to display great judgment in showing the excellent performances of so great a master; yet with regard to the works of other statuaries, was at a loss, grew dull, and fell asleep, because he had nothing to say?

Io. I confess I never saw such a man neither.

Soc. Nor is it otherwise, I imagine, with regard to ³ music, whether
we

¹ This excellent artist was, in the days of Socrates, the Homer of the painters; and is here for this reason singled out from the rest of his profession, as the most proper for the comparison; which was intended to show, that the same circumstance attended both the arts, of poetry and painting; this, that true critical skill, to judge of the performances of the best artist, inferred equal judgment with regard to all of inferior class. Polygnotus was the first painter, who gave an accurate and lively expression of the manners and passions, by proper attitudes, and every variety of countenance. He distinguished himself also by giving his portraits what we call a handsome likeness: and, besides many other improvements which he made to his art, invented the way of showing the skin through a transparent drapery. See Aristotle's *Politics*, b. viii. c. 5. and his *Poetics*, c. 2. and 6. Pliny's *Nat. Hist.* b. xxxv. c. 9. and *Ælian's Var. Hist.* b. iv. c. 3.—S.

² Plato here has purposely chosen for his instances three statuaries, famous for their excellence in three very different ways, to make his reasoning more just and less liable to exception; when he is proving, by induction, the sameness of the art of criticising upon all the poets, however different in their kinds. Dædalus then was particularly admirable for his wonderful automations, or self-moving machines, mentioned by Plato in his *Meno*. Epeius is well known to the readers of Homer's *Odyssey*, and Virgil's *Æneid*, for that vast work of his, the Trojan horse, of a size so stupendous. And the excellence of Theodorus consisted in the extreme minuteness and subtilty of his works. See Pliny's *Nat. Hist.* b. xxxiv. c. 8.—S.

³ In this word the ancients comprehended all those arts, which have any relation to the muses.

Every

we consider ¹ wind-instruments, or those of the string-kind; and these last, whether alone, or ² accompanied by the voice; so likewise in rhapsodical recitals; you never, I presume, saw a man, who was a great master

Every species of poetry, known at that time, is included in what follows. For *Αυλησις* includes dithyrambic poetry and satire. *Κιθαρσις*, joined with *αυλησις*, implies comedy and tragedy; because in these the *αυλος* and the *κιθαρα* were the instruments principally used: thus Maximus Tyrius; *αυληματα, η κιθαρσματα, η ει τις αλλη εν Διονυσου μουσα τραγικη τις και κομωδικη*. Dissert. vii. *Κιθαρωδια* means all Lyric poetry, or that, which the musician sung to his own instrument, the *κιθαρα*, or the *λυρα*. And *Ραψωδια* comprehends all poems, usually recited, whether composed in heroic, elegiac, or other measure. We see here then, in what arts were those *αγωνες*, or trials of skill, before mentioned, proposed at the feasts of Æsculapius. True it is, that Plato, in different parts of his writings, useth the word music in different senses. In some places he means by it not only all harmony, whether instrumental or vocal, but all rhythm, whether in sound or in motion: The following remarkable instance of this occurs in his First Alcibiades: ΣΩΚ. Εἶπε πρῶτον, τις ἡ τέχνη, ἧς το κιθαρίζειν, και το αἶναι, και το εμβαίνειν ὀρθως, συναπασαι τις καλεῖται; οὐκ οὐ δυνασαι εἰπειν; ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα. ΣΩΚ. Αλλ' οὐδὲ πείρω. τινες αἱ θεαι, ὧν ἡ τέχνη; ΑΛΚ. Τας Μουσας, ὡ Σωκράτης, λεγεις; ΣΩΚ. Εγωγε. ὅρα δὴ τινα ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐπώνυμιαν ἡ τέχνη εχει; ΑΛΚ. Μουσικὴν μοι δοκεῖς λεγειν. ΣΩΚ. Λεγω γαρ. In other places, he confines it to melody alone. Thus, for instance, in his Gorgias, music is defined to be an art conversant *περι την των μελων ποιησιν*. Sometimes he enlarges it, so as to take in profane eloquence; and sometimes so widely, as to comprehend all the liberal arts. There are passages where it is made to signify virtue; and a few, in which it is applied to the sublimer parts of philosophy. These last metaphorical uses of the word are sufficiently accounted for by Plato himself on proper occasions: the rest we shall take notice of, and vindicate, in their due places. But in the sentence now before us, that enumeration of the species of music fixes the meaning of the word, and limits it to the common acceptation. That *Μουσικη* has the same meaning in the beginning of this Dialogue, where we have translated it, "the Muse's art," is plain from the nature of the subject in that place. For every thing else, comprehended in the larger senses of the word, would there be foreign to the purpose; as being, if we except medicine, nothing to Æsculapius.—S.

¹ The Greek is *οὐδε εν αυλησει γε, οὐδε εν κιθαρσει*. *Αυλος* is known to be a general term for all wind-instruments. *Επιπνεόμενα ὄργανα, το μιν συμπαν. αυλοι και συριγγες*, says Jul. Pollux, Onomastic. l. iv. c. 9. And because the *Κιθαρα* stood at the head of all stringed instruments, it is sometimes taken for them all. Accordingly Maximus Tyrius expresses all instrumental music by these two kinds, *αυληματα και κιθαρισματα*. Dissert. xxxii. See likewise Aristotle's Poetics, ch. i. and Plato's Lesser Hippias, p. 375. ed. Steph. But these two being wholly distinct, the one from the other, we are not to imagine that ever they were either confounded together, and used promiscuously, the one for the other; or that both of them were sometimes signified by the word *αυλος*, as a common term for all instruments of either kind. We make this observation, to prevent the young scholar from being misled by Hesychius, who explains the word *Αυλος* thus, *κιθαρα η συριγξ*: for which egregious mistake his late learned editor has but lamely apologized.—S.

in critising on ³ Olympus, or on Thamyris, or on Orpheus, or on Phemius the rhapsodist of Ithaca; but as to Io the Ephesian, was at a loss what to say about him, and unable to give any account of Io's good or bad performances.

Io. I have nothing to oppose to what you say upon this point, Socrates: but of this I am conscious to myself, that upon Homer I dissent the best of all men, and do it with great ease. Nor is this my own opinion only; for all people agree, that my dissertations of this kind are excellent. But if the subject be any other of the poets, it is quite otherwise with me. Consider then what may be the meaning of this.

Soc. I do consider, Io; and proceed to show you how it appears to me. That you are able to discourse well concerning Homer is not owing to any art of which you are master; nor do you explain or illustrate him, as I said before, upon the principles or from the rules of art; but from a divine power, acting upon you, and impelling you: a power resembling that which acts in the stone, called by Euripides the magnet, but known commonly by the name of ⁴ the loadstone. For this stone does not only attract iron rings, but

² The Greek here is *κithαρῖδα*: which word Eustathius, in his commentary on the Iliad, b. ii. v. 600. by a strange blunder, confounds with *κithαρῖσις*, and makes them both to have the same meaning.—S.

³ These four persons severally excelled in the four arts just before mentioned, each of them in one, according to the order in which they are there ranked. For we learn from Plutarch *περὶ μουσικῆς*, and from Maximus Tyrius, Diff. xxiv. that Olympus's instrument was the *Αυλός*. How excellent a master he was of music we are told by Plato in his *Minos*, and by Aristotle in his *Politics*, b. viii. c. 5. who both agree, that the musical airs of his composing were most divine, and excited enthusiastic raptures in every audience. Thamyris is celebrated by Homer himself, who calls him *κithαρῖστος*, Iliad. l. ii. v. 600. Agreeably to which we are informed by Pliny, that Thamyris was the first who played on the cithara, without accompanying it with his voice. Hist. Nat. l. vii. c. 56. The fame of Orpheus is well known: and among many passages in the writings of the ancients, to prove that he was *κithαρῖδης*, or sung and played on his instrument together, this of Ovid is most express, "*Talia dicentem, nervosque ad verba moventem.*" Metamorph. l. x. v. 40—and this other in l. xi. v. 4. "*Orphea percussis fociantem carmina nervis.*" And as to Phemius, that he recited (or sung in recitativo) poems of the epic kind, touching his lyre at the same time, appears from Homer's *Odyssey*, b. i. v. 153, &c. and b. xvii. v. 262.—S.

⁴ The Greek word here is *ἡρακλεία*, which Bembo translates *di Hercule*. But we are taught by Hesychius, that this name was given to the loadstone from the city Heraclea in Lydia, where probably they were found in greater number than elsewhere. Accordingly, the same stone was also called *λίθος Λυδῖκος*, the *Lydian stone*. The same Hesychius, however, says, that Plato is mistaken

But impart to those rings the power of doing that very thing which itself does, enabling them to attract other rings of iron: So that sometimes may be seen a very long series of iron rings; depending, as in a chain, one from another. But from that stone, at the head of them, is derived the virtue which operates in them all. In the same manner, the Muse, inspiring, moves men herself through her divine impulse. From these men, thus inspired, others¹, catching the sacred power, form a chain of divine enthusiasts. For the best epic poets, and all such as excel in the composing any kind of verses to be recited, frame not those their admirable poems from the rules

in supposing the magnet to be the same with this stone, referring, undoubtedly, to the passage now before us. But it is Hesychius who is mistaken, not Plato. For that the *μαγνῆτις* of the ancients was the same with our magnet, appears from these words of Alexander Aphrodisiensis, an earlier writer than Hesychius, *μαγνῆτις ἔλκει μὲν τὸν σίδηρον*. Com. in Aristot. Problem. fol. 1. and from these of Cicero long before, *Magnetem lapidem—qui ferrum ad se allicit et attrahat*. Cic. de Divinat. lib. i. Yet Hesychius is so fond of his mistake, as to repeat it in three different places; admitting the *ἡρακλεία* to attract iron, but denying that quality to the *μαγνῆτις*. See Hesych. in vocibus, *ἡρακλεία, λίθος Λυδικός, and μαγνῆτις*. *Λίθος Λυδικός* indeed frequently among the ancients signified the touchstone: but so did sometimes *μαγνῆτις*. Witness the following passage of Euripides himself, *τὰς βροτῶν ἰνῶμας σκοπῶν, [οἶδ'] ὥστε μαγνῆτις λίθος*. See also Theophrastus *περὶ λίθων*. The truth seems to be, that the names of these two stones, the touchstone and the loadstone, were not well distinguished, but vulgarly confounded, in the days of Plato. This accounts for that uncertainty and doubtfulness with which Plato here mentions the name of this stone; which in any other light would appear unnecessary and insipid. This, perhaps, also was the reason why no particular name of that stone was mentioned by Aristotle, speaking of it in this passage, *εἰκε δὲ καὶ Θάλης, εἰ ὧν ἀπομνημονεύουσι, κινήτικον τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπολαμβάνειν, εἴτερ τὸν λίθον εἴτε ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὅτι τὸν σίδηρον κινεῖ*. Aristot. de Animâ, lib. i. cap. 2.

¹ The contagion of this kind of enthusiasm is thus beautifully painted by a fine critic, who himself felt all the force of it: Πολλοὶ γὰρ ἀλλοτρίῳ θεοφοροῦνται πνεύματι, τὸν αὐτὸν τροπὸν, ὃν καὶ τὴν Ύδριαν λόγος ἔχει, τρεῖσιν πηκισάουσαν, εἴθε ῥήγμα ἐστὶ γῆς ἀναπνεῖν, ὡς φασιν, αἶμον ἐνδεῶν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἐγκύματα τῆς δαιμονίου καθίσταμένην δύναμει, παρὰ τὰ κτλ. κατ' ἐπιπνοίαν οὕτως ἀπο τῆς τῶν ἀρχαίων μεγαλοφίας, εἰς τὰς τῶν ζήλουτων ἐκείνους ψυχὰς, ὡς ἀπὸ ἱερῶν στήμων, ἀπορροιαὶ τινεὶ φέρονται, ὅφ' ὧν ἐπιπνέμενοι καὶ οἱ μὴ διὰν Φοῖβεσστικοὶ τῶ ἑτέρων συνέθευσις μεγαλεῖ. “Many are possessed and actuated by a divine spirit, derived to them through others: in the same manner as it is reported of the Delphian priests, that when she approaches the sacred tripod, where a chasm in the earth, they say, respires some vapour, which fills her with enthusiasm, she is immediately by that more than human power made pregnant; and is there upon the spot delivered of oracles, such as the particular nature of the inspiration generates. So, from the great genius residing in the ancients, through them, as through some sacred opening, certain effluxes, issuing forth, pass into the souls of their admirers: by which many, who of themselves but little feel the force of Phœbus, swell with the expansive virtue of those great and exalted spirits.” Longin. de Sublim. § 11.—S.

of

of ¹ art; but possessed by the Muse, they write from divine inspiration. Nor is it otherwise with the best lyric poets, and all other fine writers of verses: to be sung. For as the priests of ² Cybele perform not their dances, while they have the free use of their intellect; so these melody poets pen those beautiful songs of theirs only when they are out of their sober minds. But as soon as they proceed to give voice and motion to those songs, adding to their words the harmony of music and the measure of dance, they are immediately transported; and, possessed by some divine power, are like the priestesses of ³ Bacchus, who, full of the god, no longer draw water, but honey

¹ In the Greek it is *οὐκ ἐν τέχνῃς*. Bembo's translation of which, *non con arte*, excludes art from having any share in the best poetical compositions. But Plato's words admit of art, as an attendant upon the Muse; though they make not her art, but her inspiration, to be the mistress and leading cause of all which is excellent in poetry. Serranus happily paraphrases it, *non artis auspiciis*. The following passage in the Phædrus puts the meaning of Plato, with regard to this point, out of dispute. 'Ὅς δ' ἀν ἀνεν μανίας Μοῦσῶν ἐπὶ ποιητικᾷ θυρᾷ ἀφικηται, πειθεὶς ὡς ἀρα ἐν τέχνῃς ἱκανῶς ποιητῆς ἐσομένος, ἀτελής αὐτὸς τε, καὶ ἡ ποιησις ὑπο τῆς τῶν μαινόμενῶν ἢ τοῦ σωφρονούντος ἡφαισθή. "Whoever went, with a mind sober and uninspired, to the gates of the Muses; and made his application to them, in order to be taught their art; persuaded, that the learning that was alone sufficient to qualify him for writing poetry; never attained to any perfection as a poet; and his poetry, as being that of a man cool and sober, is now obliterated all, having been darkened by the splendour of that of the inspired."—S.

² The rites of Cybele and of Bacchus, beyond those of any other deities, were performed in a spirit of enthusiasm: which exerted itself in extraordinary agitations of body. Accordingly, these two religious rites are sung of together, as equally enthusiastical, by the chorus between the first and second acts in the Bacchæ of Euripides.—S.

³ The following account of enthusiasm, and the causes of divine mania, extracted from the third section of Jamblichus de Myst., as it admirably illustrates this part of the Io, will, I doubt not, be gratefully received by every Platonic reader:

Enthusiasm is falsely believed to be an agitation of the dianoëtic part in conjunction with demoniacal inspiration; for the inspiration is from the gods. But neither is it simply an ecstasy, but a reduction and restitution of the soul to a more excellent nature; since inordinate motion and ecstasy indicate a regression to that which is worse. Further still, the advocate for ecstasy adduces that which happens to those that energize enthusiastically, but does not teach us the leading cause, which is this, that the inspired are wholly possessed by a divine power; which possession is afterwards followed by ecstasy. No one, therefore, can justly apprehend, that enthusiasm depends on the soul, or any one of its powers, or on intellect, or energies, or corporeal infirmity, or that it cannot be produced without this. For the work of divine afflation is not human, nor does it derive all its authority from human parts and energies; but these have the relation of subjects, and divinity uses them as instruments. Hence he accomplishes the whole business of prophecy

† honey and milk out of the springs and fountains ; though unable to do any thing like it when they are sober. And in fact there passes in the souls of these poets that very thing which they pretend to do. For they assure us, that out of certain gardens and flowery vales belonging to the Muses, from
fountains

through himself, unmingled with and liberated from other things, and neither the soul nor body moving, energizes by himself. Hence too, prophecies, when they are conducted in this manner, are unattended with falsehood. But when the soul has been previously disturbed, or is moved during the inspiration, or is confounded by the body, and disturbs the divine harmony, then the prophecies become confused and fallacious, and the enthusiasm is no longer true or genuine.

With respect to the causes of divine mania, they are as follow : Illuminations proceeding from the gods ; spirits imparted by them ; and an all-perfect dominion from them, which comprehends all that we possess, and entirely exterminates our proper obsequency and motion. It also produces words which are not understood by those that utter them, but are delivered, as it is said, with an insane mouth ; the possessed being wholly subservient and obedient to the energy alone of the inspiring deity : such, in short, is enthusiasm, and from such like causes does it derive its perfection.

Again, with respect to its proper causes, it must not be said, that it arises from this, that nature leads every thing to its like : for the enthusiastic energy is not the work of nature. Nor is it produced because the temperature of the air, and of that which surrounds us, causes a difference of crasis in the body of the enthusiastic. For the works of the gods are not changed by corporeal powers or temperaments. Nor is it that the inspiration of the gods accords with passions and generated natures. For the gift to men of the proper energy of the gods is more excellent than all generation. But because the power of the Corybantes is of a guardian nature, and adapted to sacred mysteries, and because that of Sabazius pertains to the purification of souls, and a dissolution of antient anger, on this account the inspirations of these divinities are in every respect different.

In short, the spirits which from the divinities excite and agitate men with divine fury, expel all human and physical motion, nor are their operations to be compared with our accustomed energies ; but it is requisite to refer them to the gods, as their primary causes.

Thus we see that Jamblichus very properly suspends enthusiasm and divination from the divinities, and ascribes all the varieties of these to the different characteristic properties of the gods, as to their proper source.—T.

† This place receives great light from the two following passages in Euripides :

Ὅσαις δὲ λευκοῦ πνεύματος ποθεὶς παρῆν,
Ἀκροῖσι δακτυλοῖσι διαμῶσαι χθονά,
Γαλακτὸς ἑσμούς εἰχον' ἐκ δὲ κισσίνων
Θυρῶν γλυκεῖαι μέλιτος ἑσταζόν ῥοαί. Bacch. v. 707.

Ῥεῖ δὲ γαλακτὶ πιδόν,
Ῥεῖ δ' οἶνω, Ῥεῖ δὲ μέλισσαν
Νεκταρί. Bacch. v. 142.

The

fountains flowing there with honey, gathering the ¹ sweetness of their songs, they bring it to us, like the bees; and in the same manner withal, flying. Nor do they tell us any untruth. For a poet is a thing light and volatile, and ² sacred; nor is he able to write poetry, till the Muse entering into him, he is transported out of himself, and has no longer the command of his intellect. But so long as a man continues in the possession of intellect, he is

The first of these is in one of the dialogue scenes of the tragedy, and part of a narration; in English thus,

Some, longing for the milder milky draught,
Green herbs or bladed grass of the blest ground
Cropp'd with light finger; and to them, behold,
Out gush'd the milky liquid: trickling down
To others, from their ivy-twined wands
Dropp'd the sweet honey.—

The other is sung in chorus by the Bacchæ themselves; which we have therefore thus paraphrased,

Streams of milk along the plain
Gently flow in many a vein:
Flows sweet nectar, such as bee
Sips from flow'r and flow'ring tree:
Flow the richer purple rills;
Bacchus' self their current fills.

From hence are to be explained the fabulous relations in Anton. Liberal. Met. lib. x. and Ælian. V. H. lib. iii. c. 42. There is likewise a passage, cited by Aristides the orator, from Æschines, one of the disciples of Socrates, so much like this of Plato, that the reader may, perhaps, have pleasure in comparing them together. Αἱ Βακχᾶι, ἐπειδὴν εὐθεοὶ γίνονται, ὅθεν οἱ ἄλλοι ἐκ τῶν φρενῶν οὐδὲ ὕδωρ δύνανται ὑδρεύεσθαι, ἐκίμαι μέλι καὶ γάλα ἀρύνονται. Aristid. Orat. vol. iii. p. 34. ed. Canter. "The priestesses of Bacchus, when they are become full of the god, extract honey and milk from those wells, out of which no common person is able so much as to draw water."—S.

¹ The Greek is only τὰ μέλι, and is by the old translators rendered simply *carmina*, and *i versis*. We are in doubt whether the true reading is not τὸ μέλι: for the preceding word is *δρεπομένοι*, and the metaphor the same with this of Horace, *Ego apis matinae more modoque, Grata carpentis thyma*, &c. If this alteration be not admitted, an allusion, however, to the word μέλι is certainly meant, in the similarity of sound, which μέλι bears to it. And there is then a necessity, besides, for inserting the word μέλι immediately afterwards, as Ficinus does in his translation; which is making a still greater change in the text of the original.—S.

² Bees were by the antients held sacred, because fabled to have yielded their honey for a nourishment to the Cretan Jupiter in his infancy; (see Virgil's fourth Georgic, v. 150.) and poets, because supposed to be under the influence of the Muse.—S.

unable

unable to sing either odes or oracles; to write any kind of poetry, or utter any sort of prophecy. Hence it is, that the poets say indeed many fine things, whatever their subject be; just as you do concerning Homer: but each is alone able to accomplish this through a divine destiny, on that subject to which he is impelled by the Muse; this poet in ¹ dithyrambic; that in panegyric; one in chorus songs, another in epic verse, another in iambic. In the other kinds every one of them is mean, and makes no figure: and this, because they write not what is taught them by art, but what is suggested to them by some divine power, on whose influence they depend. For if it was their knowledge of the art which enabled them to write good poems upon one subject, they would be able to write poems equally good upon all other subjects. But for this reason it is, that the god, depriving them of the use of their intellect, employs them as his ministers, his ² oracle fingers, and divine ³ prophets; that when we hear them, we may know, ⁴ it is not these men who deliver things so excellent; these, to whom intellect ⁵ is not present; but the god himself speaking, and through these men publishing

¹ The usual accuracy of Plato appears strongly in this passage. For the five species of poetry, here enumerated, were the most of any full of enthusiasm, of the *vis poetica*, and the *os magnafonans*; and appear ranked in their proper degrees of excellence in those respects; beginning with that, which was deemed, and indeed by its effects proved, to be the most highly rapturous.—S.

² Near the seat of the oracle were certain poets employed, as the oracular response was delivered, to put it into metre. And because, in order to execute their office well, they ought to enter into the sense and spirit of those responses, they were piously presumed to be themselves inspired by the oracle.—S.

³ Plato in other places calleth the poets by this name; particularly in the second book of his Republic, where his words are, *οι θεων παιδες ποινται, και προφηται των θεων γενομενοι*, poets, born the children of the gods, and made afterward their prophets. And in the Second Alcibiades he calls Homer, by way of eminence, *θεων προφητης*, the prophet of the gods.—S.

⁴ Thus Tully, who professedly imitated Plato; *Deus inclusus corpore humano jam, non Cassandra, loquitur*. Cic. de Divinat. lib. i.—S.

⁵ The soul, when resigning herself to the inspiring influence of divinity, in consequence of energizing divinely, is no longer governed by intellect; and it may therefore be said, that intellect is then no longer present to her nature. Mr. Sydenham, from not having penetrated the depths of antient theology, has unhappily given, by his translation, an air of ridicule to this passage; and I am sorry to add, that this is not the only instance in which he has done the same, both in this and other dialogues. The original is *οι νους μη παρεστιν*. The translation of Mr. Sydenham, *who are divested of common sense*.—T.

his

his mind to us. The greatest proof of that which I advance, is Tynnichus the Chalcidian; who never composed any other poem, worth the mention or remembrance, beside that ¹ Pæan, which every body sings, of almost all ² odes the most excellent, and as he himself tells us,

³ Wholly a present from the Muse's hands,
Some new invention of their own.

For in him does the god seem to give us a convincing evidence, so as to leave no room for doubt, that those beautiful poems are not human, nor the compositions of men; but divine, and the work of gods: and that poets are only interpreters of the ⁴ gods, inspired and possessed, each of them by that particular deity who corresponds to the peculiar nature of the poet. This, the better to demonstrate to us, did the god purposely choose out a poet of the meanest kind, through whom to sing a melody of the noblest. Do not you think, Io, that I say what is true?

Io. Indeed I do: for I ⁵ feel as it were in my very soul, Socrates, the truth of what you say. To me too such poets, as write finely, appear in their

¹ This was an ode or hymn in honour of Apollo, so called from one of the names or titles of that god: in the same manner, as the word *Dithyrambic* is derived from *Διθύραμκος*, one of the names of Bacchus.—S.

² *Μελων*. In *μελη* are included all poems, made to be sung; as *επη*, in the larger sense of that word, comprehends all those made for recital.—S.

³ The Greek is *ατεχνως εδρηματι μουσαν*. This is a verse in the Alcmanian measure. Whence it appears, that this incomparable ode of Tynnichus, unhappily lost, was of the lyric kind, and in the measure used by Aleman, approaching the nearest of any to the heroic. It is evident, that Plato, in citing this verse, as applicable to his present purpose, alludes to the other sense of the word *ατεχνως*, in which it signifies *inartificially*, or *without art*. It was impossible to preserve this double meaning in our language, unless the word simply may be thought tolerably expressive of it. Cornarius renders it in Latin, *sine arte*: but the rest of the translators, as if it were a word of no force or even meaning at all, have entirely omitted it in their translations. It is probable, however, that they were misled by the false pointing in Aldus's edition, which refers the word *ατεχνως* to the preceding sentence.—S.

⁴ Hence probably was this title given to Orpheus, *sacer, interpretsque deorum*, by Horace, Epist. ad Pison. v. 391.—S.

⁵ The words in the original are very strong and significant, *απη της ψυχης*, *you touch my soul*. Whoever is well versed in Plato's way of writing, and is no stranger to the Socratic way of thinking, will easily imagine, that Plato intends here to hint to us, by what means poetry operates so strongly

their writings to be ¹ interpreters of the gods, in proportion to the kind and degree of those divine powers, allotted severally to each poet.

Soc. Now you rhapsodists interpret in like manner the writings of the poets. Do you not?

Io. So far you still say what is true.

Soc. Do you not then become the interpreters of interpreters?

Io. Very true.

Soc. Mind now, Io, and tell me this; and think not to conceal any part of the truth, in answering to what I am going to ask. At those times, when you perform your rehearsals in the best manner, and strike your audience with uncommon force and efficacy; when you sing, for instance, of Ulysses, hastening to the entrance of his house, appearing in his own proper person to the wooers of his queen, and pouring out his arrows close before him, ready for spreading round him instant death; or represent Achilles rushing upon Hector; or when you rehearse, in a different strain, any of the melancholy mournful circumstances attending Andromache, or Hecuba, or Priam; at such times whether have you the free use of your intellect? or are you not rather ² in a state of mental alienation? Does not your soul, in an ecstasy, imagine herself present to those very things and actions which you relate? as if you had been hurried away by some divine power to Ithaca, or Troy, or wherever else be laid the scene of action.

Io. How clear and convincing a proof, Socrates, of your argument is this which you have produced! For, without concealing any thing, I shall own the truth. When I am reciting any thing pitiable or mournful, my eyes

strongly upon the soul; that is, by touching some inward string the most ready to vibrate; awakening those sentiments, and stirring up those passions, to which the soul is most prompt: insinuating at the same time, that by means of the like aptitude and natural correspondence, truth touches the mind. Thus Io, in the present situation of his soul, reminded of his own past feelings, and made sensible to what cause they were owing, exemplifies and illustrates the truth of that doctrine just before laid down by Socrates.—S.

¹ In this sense it is, that the poets are a little before styled the ministers of the gods, as serving them in the conveying their mind and will to mortals. In the same sense the rhapsodists are called, in the second book of the Republic, *ποιητῶν ὑμνηταί, the ministers of the poets.*—S.

² Agreeably to this, Cicero introduceth his brother Quintus, observing of him, and of Æsop: the orator, *tantum ardorem vultuum atque motuum, ut eum vis quædam abstraxisset à sensu mentis videretur.* Cic. de Divinat. lib. i.—S.

are

are filled with tears ; when any thing dreadful or horrible is the subject, my hairs stand erect, and my heart beats quick, through terror and affright.

Soc. What shall we say then, Io? that a man has, at that time, the free use of his intellect, when, clad in a splendid garb, with a crown of gold upon his head, amidst a feast, or at a festival, he falls into tears, without having lost any part of his finery, or of the entertainment? or when he is affrighted and terrified, standing in the midst of twenty thousand men, all well-disposed and friendly to him, none offering to strip him of his ornaments, or do him the least injury?

Io. To confess the truth, Socrates, he is not, by Jupiter, entirely in the possession of intellect.

Soc. Do you know that you produce this very same effect upon many of your auditors?

Io. I am, indeed, fully sensible of it. For at every striking passage I look down from my ¹ pulpit round me, and see the people suitably affected by it : now weeping, then looking as if horror seized them ; such emotion and such astonishment are spread through all. And it is my business to observe them with strict attention, that if I see I have set them a weeping, I may be ready to receive their money, and to laugh ; but if I find them laughing, that I may prepare myself for a sorrowful exit, disappointed of my expected gain.

Soc. Know you not then, that this audience of yours is like the last of those rings, which one to another, as I said, impart their power, derived from that magnet at the top? The middle ring are ² you the rhapsodist,

¹ This was a place, raised on high above the area, like those two opposite gallery boxes in our magnificent theatre at Oxford ; from whence orators, rhapsodists, and other declaimers, harangued the people.—S.

² Learned men are divided in their opinions concerning Io the rhapsodist, whether he is the same person or not with Io the Chian, a considerable poet, who flourished in the same age. see Jonsius de Scriptor. Hist. Philos. l. ii. c. 13. n. 4. and Bentleii Epist. ad Millium, p. 50, &c. In the great want of good reasoning on either side of the question, it may be worth observing, that in this passage, as also in page 32, Io is contradistinguished from the poets. A negative argument too may be of some weight, from the silence of Plato upon this point. Indeed it is strange, had Io been a poet, and had won the prize of tragedy, which was the case of Io the Chian, that Plato should have made him take none of those many opportunities to glory in it, which offered themselves in this conversation.—S.

and so too is the player: the first ring being the poet himself. By means of all these does the god draw, wherever it pleases him, the souls of men, suspended each on other through attractive virtue. In the same manner too, as from that magnet, is formed a chain of many rows, where ¹ chorus-singers and dancers, masters and ² under-masters, hang, like the collateral rings, attracted and held together side ways, all depending from the Muse. But upon one Muse one of the poets, upon a different Muse another is suspended; ³ possessed we call him, that is held fast; because he is fast held by the Muse. From these first rings, the ⁴ poets hang their followers and admirers; some from one, others from another; inspired by them, and fastened on them, by means of the enthusiastic spirit issuing from

¹ Or rather chorus-fingers dancing; [*χορευταί*:] for they were not different persons: the dance being nothing else than a measured motion, accompanied with certain gestures of body, adapted to the tune, (which they called the harmony,) as that was to the words of the chorus-song, sung by the same persons who performed the dance.—S.

² The hindmost rows of the chorus sang an under part, and had peculiar masters of their own to teach it them, who were therefore called under-masters. At the head of each row was placed the master of it, to give the musical key, and to lead the dance to his proper row. The principal teacher of the whole choir, who also headed the whole, was called *Χορηγός*. See Jul. Pollux, *Onomastic*. l. iv. c. 15.—S.

³ This passage in all the editions of Plato is read thus; *ονομαζόμεν δὲ αὐτοῦ κατεχεται. το δὲ ἐστὶ παραπλησίον· εχεται γαρ*. Which, being nonsense, is thus nonsensically rendered into Latin by Ficinus; “*Vocamus autem id nos occupari*, (altered by Grynæus into *mente capi*;) *quod quidem illi proximum est: tenetur enim*.” And by Cornarius thus; “*Hoc verò corripitur nominamus, quod consimile est: caret enim*.” In the steps of these translators Bembo thought it safest here to tread, as being wholly in the dark himself. For he thus translates it; *e cio chiamamo noi l'esser preso, il che è simile*: and then quite omits the *εχεται γαρ*. Serranus, divining, as it seems, the true sense of the passage, (for the words show it not,) avoids the sinking into nonsense; but hobbles along very lamely. The emendation of the pointing, with omission only of the word *γὰρ*, would make the passage plain and clear, thus read, *ονομαζόμεν δὲ αὐτοῦ κατεχεται, το δὲ ἐστὶ παραπλησίον· εχεται*. But there is another way of amending this passage, that is, by a repetition of the word *εχεται*: and this way we prefer, and follow in our translation, reading it thus; *ονομαζόμεν δὲ αὐτοῦ κατεχεται· το δὲ ἐστὶ, παραπλησίον· εχεται· εχεται γαρ*. The omission of a word, where the same word immediately follows, is a common fault in manuscripts.—S.

⁴ The wrong pointing of this passage in the Greek has occasioned Serranus to translate it, as if it described the poets depending, that is, receiving their inspiration, one from another. But though this fact be true, it is not the primary intention of Plato in this place to describe it. To prevent the same mistake in the readers of any future edition of the original, this sentence ought to be printed with a comma after the word *ποιῶν*, as well as with one before it. Ficinus however and the rest translate it rightly.—S.

them;

them; some to Orpheus, others to Musæus; but the most numerous sort is of such, as are possessed by Homer, and held fast by him. Of this number, Io, are you, inspired as you are, and enthusiastically possessed by Homer. Hence it is, that when the verses of any other poet are sung or recited, you grow dull and fall asleep, for want of something to say: but that, as soon as you hear a strain of that poet poured forth, immediately you are roused, your soul recovers her sprightliness, and much to say presents itself to your mind: because, when you harangue upon Homer, you do it not from art or science, but from enthusiasm, of that particular kind which has possessed you by divine allotment. Just as those, who join in the rites of Cybele, have an acute perception of such music only as appertains to that deity by whom they are possessed; and are not wanting either in words or gestures, adapted to a melody of that kind; but have no regard to any other music, nor any feeling of its power. In the same manner you, Io, when any mention is made of Homer, feel a readiness and a facility of speaking; yet with regard to other poets find yourself wanting. That therefore which your question demands, whence you have within you such an ample fund of discourse, upon every thing relating to Homer; whilst it is quite otherwise with you, when the subject brought upon the carpet is any other of the poets: the cause is this, that not science, but enthusiasm, not art, but a divine destiny, has made you so mighty a panegyrist on Homer.

Io. You speak well, Socrates, I own. But I should wonder if, with all your fine talk, you could persuade me to think myself possessed, and insane, when I make my panegyrics on Homer. Nor would you, as I imagine, think so yourself, were you but to hear from me a dissertation upon that poet.

Soc. And willing am I indeed to hear you; but not till you have answered me this question in the first place, ¹ which of his subjects does Homer

¹ The Greek of this passage in all the editions runs thus; ὡν Ὁμήρου λέγεις, περὶ τίνος εὖ λέγεις; Cornarius, in his Eclogæ, very dogmatically alters the last word of this question into λέγεις. Afterwards H. Stephens, into whose hands had fallen a copy of Plato with conjectural emendations in Ficinus's own hand-writing on the margin, tell us in his notes, that the same alteration was there proposed by Ficinus. This, if admitted, will give a different turn, not only to this question,

Homer handle best? for certainly you will not say, that he excels in all things.

Io. Be assured, Socrates, there is nothing in which he excels not.

Soc. You certainly do not mean to include those things of which Homer writes, and of which you are ignorant.

Io. And what things may those be which Homer writes of, and which I am ignorant of?

Soc. Does not Homer frequently, and copiously too, treat of the arts; for instance, the art of ¹ chariot-driving? If I can remember the verses, I will repeat them to you.

Io. I will recite them rather to you, for I well remember them.

Soc. Recite me then what Nestor says to his son Antilochus, where he gives him a caution about the turning, in that chariot-race celebrated in honour of Patroclus.

Io. His words are these:

There to the left inclining, easy turn
The light-built chariot; mindful then to urge
With pungent whip, and animating voice,
The right-hand courser, and with hand remis
The reins to yield him; hard upon the goal,
Mean time, his partner bearing; till the wheel
Skimming the stony lines of that old mark,
² Doubt if its nave with point projecting touch
Th' extremest margin: bat of those rough stones
Th' encounter rude be careful to decline.

Soc.

but to Io's answer, and to the observation of Socrates thence arising: but the philosopher's drift, in asking the question, and the series of the argument, will be very little affected by it. For the business is to show, that neither poets write, nor rhapsodists interpret, when their subject happens to be some point belonging to any one of the arts, from their real skill in such art. The only difference is, that in the common readings, the poets are concerned immediately; and according to the proposed alteration, the question is pointed at the rhapsodists, and reaches the poets but in consequence. In either way, however, as the argument proceeds, the direct proof equally lies against the rhapsodists. Now in such a case as this, we believe it to be an established rule of sound criticism to forbear altering the text.—S.

¹ What this art was in ancient times, and in what high estimation it was held, such of our readers, as are not conversant in the writings of the antients, may find in the entertaining notes to Mr. Pope's Homer.—S.

² It is great pity, that Mr. Pope, in his elegant version of Homer, has dropt this strong poetical

Soc. Enough. Now in these verses, Io whether Homer gives a right account of what ought to be done upon the occasion or not, who must be the ablest judge, a physician, or a charioteer?

Io. A charioteer, undoubtedly.

Soc. Whether is he thus able, from his having skill in his art, or by some other means?

Io. From his skill in his art only, and no other way.

Soc. ¹ Has not thus every one of the arts an ability, given it by God himself, to judge of certain performances? for the same things, in which we have good judgment from our skill in the art of piloting, by no means shall we be able to judge of well from any skill in the art of medicine.

Io. By no means, undoubtedly.

Soc. Nor the same things, in which our skill in the art of medicine has given us good judgment would the greatest skill in the art of building qualify us to judge of equally well.

Io. Certainly not.

Soc. ² Does it not then hold true alike in all the arts, that of whatever things we are good judges by means of our being possessed of one art, we can never judge well of those very things from our skill in any other art? But before you answer to this question, answer me to this other: Do not you admit a diversity between the arts, and call this some one art, and that some other?

Io. I admit such a diversity.

Soc. Do not you distinguish every art in the same way that I do, inferring

poetical stroke; by which not only the wheel is animated, but the exquisite nicety of turning the goal, in keeping close to the edge of it, without touching, is described by one word in the finest manner possible. This mistake happened to him, from his misunderstanding the word *δοσσεται* to mean, doubling the goal; in which sense this part of the description would be flat, lifeless, and prosaic, altogether unworthy Homer. Had Mr. Pope thought fit to consult Eustathius, he would have set him right. The verses here cited are in the 23d book of the Iliad; where the word *αγ*, in the fifth line, is evidently the right reading, instead of *μν*, which we meet with in the copies of Plato.—S.

¹ In the Greek, as it is printed, this is made an absolute assertion of Socrates, contrary to his usual manner of conversing, and to the genius of this Dialogue in particular, where Socrates is represented as proving the ignorance of Io out of his own mouth.—S.

² This sentence in the original is likewise printed as if it was spoken positively; and is so translated by Bembo: whereas immediately afterwards Socrates himself calls it a question.—S.

a diversity

a diversity between them from the diversity of their subjects? When one art is attended with knowledge of one sort of things, another art by knowledge in things of a different nature, do you not from hence conclude, as I do, that this accordingly is one art, and that another?

Io. I do.

Soc. For if, in any two arts, there was the knowledge of the same things in both, why should we make a distinction, and call this some one art, and that some other different, when both of them were attended by skill in the same sort of things? as I know, for instance, these fingers of mine to be five in number; and you know it as well as I. Now were I to ask you, whether it was by the same art that we know this one and the same thing, by the art of arithmetic, you as well as I, or each of us by a several art; you would certainly answer, it was by the same art.

Io. Undoubtedly.

Soc. The question then, which I was about asking you before, answer me now; whether in all the arts, you think it alike necessary that the same things should be judged of by the same art; and that a different art must not pretend to judge of those very things; but that if in reality it be a different art, different things must of course fall under its cognizance?

Io. I do think so, Socrates.

Soc. No man therefore will be able to judge well of any thing said, or done, relating to any one of the arts in which he has no skill.

Io. You say right.

Soc. In those verses then, which you repeated, can you best tell whether Homer gives a right account of things or not; or is a charioteer the properest judge of this?

Io. A charioteer.

Soc. And that for this reason, because you are a rhapsodist and not a charioteer.

Io. True.

Soc. And because the art of a rhapsodist is different from that of a charioteer.

Io. Right.

Soc. If then it be a different art, it is attended by skill in a different sort of things.

Io. Very right.

Soc.

Soc. Well then; when Homer relates how Hecamede, a damsel of Nestor's, mingled a potion for Machaon to drink, after he had been wounded, giving us this description of it;

Into rough Pramnian carefully she scrapes,
With brazen scraper, acrid-tasted cheese,
Made of thin milk drawn from fallacious goat;
And sets beside the life-reviving bowl
¹ Strong stimulating onion.—

To form a true judgment in this case, whether Homer be in the right or not, does it belong to the art of medicine, or to that of rhapsody?

Io. To the art of medicine.

Soc. Well; and what, where Homer says thus;

Steep down to the low bottom of the main
Then plung'd the goddess; rushing, like the lead,
Pendant from horn of meadow-ranging bull,
Which falls impetuous, to devouring fish
² Bearing the deathful mischief.—

Whether shall we say it belongs to the art of fishing, or to that of rhapsody, to judge best whether this description be right or wrong?

Io. To the art of fishing, Socrates, without doubt.

¹ This latter circumstance is mentioned by Homer at some distance from the former, eight lines intervening. Plato brings them together, selecting them out from the other particulars of that description, as the two most singular and remarkable, the most blamed by the physicians, and ridiculed by the wits of those days. But in the 3d book of his Republic, he answers all their criticisms and cavils himself, in a just defence of the great poet, and of such a method of treating wounded persons, in the more simple, less luxuriant, and healthier ages. The verses of Homer, here cited, are to be found in the eleventh book of the Iliad.—S.

² Had we been to have translated this passage immediately from Homer, we should have made the last line thus: "Bearing their fates destructive"—the Greek word being *νερα* in the copies of Homer, instead of which we read *πυρ* in those of Plato. Upon this occasion, we beg leave, once for all, to advertise our readers, that in many passages of Homer, as cited by Plato, there are variations, and those sometimes material, from the received reading of the text of that poet; and that this was one of the reasons on which we grounded our undertaking to translate all those passages afresh; when Mr. Pope's version, so excellent upon the whole, might otherwise have well excused us from that trouble. The passage of Homer, now before us, occurs in the last book of the Iliad.—S.

Soc.

Soc. Consider now, suppose yourself had taken the part of questioner, and were to say to me thus ; Since then, Socrates, you have found what passages in Homer it belongs to ¹ each of those arts before mentioned, severally to discern and criticise with good judgment ; come, find me out, upon the subject of divination, what passages it is the business of a diviner critically to examine, and to tell us whether the poetical account be right or wrong : consider, how easily I should be able to give you a satisfactory and a proper answer. For Homer has many passages relating to this subject in his *Odyssey*, particularly one, where Theoclymenus the diviner, ² one of the race of Melampus, addresses the wooers of Penelope in this manner ;

Mark'd out by Heav'n for great events ! What ill
Is this attends ye ! what sad omens point
Prefageful ! round ye some dark vapour spreads
His dusky wings ; head, face, and lower limbs
In shades involving : thick through burden'd air
Roll hollow sounds lamenting : dropping tears
Stain of each mourning statue the wet cheeks :
Crowded the porch, and crowded is the hall
With spectres ; down to Pluto's shadowy reign
Ghosts seem they gliding : the sun's cheery light
Is lost from heaven : a gloom foreboding falls,
O'erhanging all things, sadd'ning every heart.

On the same subject he writes in many places of his *Iliad* ; as, for instance, where he describes that fight, which happened under the Grecian fortifications. For he there gives us this relation of it ;

While eager they prepar'd to pass the moat,
And force th' intrenchments ; o'er them came a bird

¹ It is observable, that Plato here takes his four instances from four different sorts of arts ; the first from one of the arts military ; the second from one of the liberal arts ; the third from one of the mechanical kind ; and the fourth from one of those arts relating to religion. His ends in thus multiplying and varying his instances are these ; one is, to show the universality of Homer's genius ; and another is, to make it appear the more plainly, what a variety of arts the poet must have been master of, had he wrote, not from a divine genius, but from real skill humanly acquired. With the same view he instances again a little further in the arts imperatorial, liberal, servile, and mechanical.—S.

² See the *Odyssey* of Homer, b. xv. v. 225, &c. But the fine descriptive speech following is taken out of the twentieth book of that poet.—S.

Tow'ring

Tow'ring, an eagle, from the ' left of heaven,
 Their enterprize forbidding: on he came,
 And in his talons bore a dragon, huge,
 Enormous, glist'ning horrid with red scales.
 Still liv'd the serpent; and though clofe with death
 He strove, and gasp'd, and panted; yet his rage
 And venom he forgot not; for half round
 Wreathing the pliant joints of his high crest,
 With backward stroke he pierc'd his griping foe:
 His breast he pierc'd, where clofe beneath the neck
 Soft to the stroke it yielded. Stung with smart,
 Loosen'd his gripe the foe, and to the ground
 Down dropp'd him. Mid the martial throng the beast
 Fell: while the bleeding bird with clangor shrill
 Strain'd onward his weak flight, where bore the winds.

These passages, and others of the same kind, shall I say, it belongs to the diviner to consider, and to criticise?

Io. So will you say what is true, Socrates.

Soc. You speak truth yourself, Io, in this. Come on then, and tell me, as I have selected out for you certain passages from the *Odyssey*, and from the *Iliad*, appertaining some of them to the diviner, some to the physician, and others to the fisherman; in return, do you pick out for me (since you are better versed in Homer than I am) such passages, Io, as appertain to the rhapsodist, and relate to the rhapsodical art: such as it becomes the rhapsodist to examine and to criticise, with a judgment and skill superior to that of other men.

Io. The whole of Homer I affirm it to be, Socrates.

¹ This circumstance is very important. For upon the principles of augury, one kind of divination, had the flight of the eagle over their heads been, on the contrary, from the right side of the heavens, that is, from the east, making toward the left, or west, it had been a presage of good success. Yet is this circumstance carelessly omitted by Mr. Pope. Now the passage being cited by Plato, expressly, as an instance to show that Homer treats of the art of divination, we could not, without an absurdity, pass over that part of it, which is the most material with regard to the scope of our author in this place. And as this often is the case, that where Plato cites Homer for some particular purpose, Mr. Pope's version happens there to be defective, we found ourselves obliged, for this further reason, to attempt setting those passages in their proper light by a new translation. This is cited from the *τευχμαχία*, or twelfth book of the *Iliad*.—S.

VOL. V.

3 P

Soc.

Soc. You denied it, Io, but just now, to be the whole of Homer. ¹ What, are you so forgetful? It ill becomes, however, a man, who is a rhapsodist, to be forgetful.

Io. But what is it now that I have forgot?

Soc. Do you not remember, that you affirmed the art of rhapsody to be an art different from that of chariot-driving?

Io. I do remember it.

Soc. Did not you allow too, that being a different art, it was accompanied by skill and judgment in a different sort of things?

Io. I did allow it.

Soc. The art of rhapsody therefore, according to your own account, is not accompanied by skill and judgment in things of every sort: nor will the rhapsodist know all things.

Io. With an exception, perhaps, Socrates, of such sort of things.

Soc. By such sort of things, which you are pleased to except, you mean such things as belong to nearly all the other arts. But, since the rhapsodist knows not all things, pray what are those things which he does know?

Io. He knows, I presume, what is proper for a man to speak, and what for a woman; what for a slave, and what for a freeman; what for those who are under government or command, and what for the governor and the commander.

Soc. For the commander, do you mean who has the command of a ship at sea, amidst a tempest, what is proper for him to speak, that the rhapsodist will know better than the master of a ship?

Io. Not so; for this indeed the master of a ship will know best.

Soc. For the governor then, who has the government of the sick, what is proper for such a one to speak, will the rhapsodist know better than the physician?

Io. Not this neither.

Soc. But that which is proper for a slave, you say.

Io. I do.

¹ The Greek here is erroneously printed in all the editions, thus $\frac{1}{2}$ (instead of $\frac{3}{4}$) οὕτως ἐπυθησάμην αἱ; accordingly, Cornarius translates it, "*Aut ita oblitivius es?*" This error of the press, we hope, will be corrected in the next edition of Plato.—S.

Soc.

Soc. For instance now, a slave, whose office it is to keep the cattle, what is proper for him to speak, when the herd grows wild and madding, in order to pacify and tame them; do you say the rhapsodist will know this better than the cow-keeper?

Io. No, to be sure.

Soc. That, however, which is proper for a woman to speak; for a woman-weaver now, suppose, relating to the fabric of cloth.

Io. No, no.

Soc. But he will know what is proper for a man to speak, who has the command of an army, in order to animate his men.

Io. You have it; such sort of things the rhapsodist will know.

Soc. What is the art of rhapsody then the art of commanding armies?

Io. Truly I¹ should know what speech is proper for the commander of an army.

Soc. Because you have, perhaps, the art of generalship, Io. For suppose you were skilled in the arts of horsemanship and of music, both of them, you would be a good judge of what horses were well-managed, and would be able to distinguish them from such as were managed ill. Now, in that case, were I to ask you this question, by which of your arts, Io, do you know the well-managed horses? do you know them through your skill in horsemanship, or through your skill in music? what answer would you make me?

Io. Through my skill in horsemanship, I should answer.

Soc. Again; when you distinguished rightly the good performers in music, would not you own, that you distinguished them by your being skilled in music; and not say it was owing to your skill in horsemanship?

Io. Certainly.

Soc. But now that you understand what belongs to the² command of

¹ In the printed editions of the Greek we here read γινῶσκῃς τοὺς ἀρ' ἔγω, whereas certainly we ought to read γινῶσκῃς αὐτὸν (or else ἀπ') ἐγώ.—S.

² This refers to an assertion of Io's a little before. It seems necessary, therefore, in this place to read στρατὰ πηλικά, (as the sense also requires), and not στρατιωτικά, *military affairs*, as it is printed, and accordingly translated by Cornarius and Serranus. Ficinus, however, Grynæus, and Bembo, agree with us.—S.

armies, whether do you understand this by means of your skill in the art of generalship, or as you are an excellent rhapsodist?

Io. There appears to me no difference.

Soc. What mean you by no difference? Do you mean, that the art of rhapsody and the art of generalship are one and the same art? or do you admit them to be two different arts?

Io. I think they are one art only.

Soc. Whoever then happens to be a good rhapsodist, the same man must also be a good general.

Io. By all means, Socrates.

Soc. ¹ And whoever happens to be a good general, must he be a good rhapsodist too?

Io. This, I think, does not hold true.

Soc. ² But that other consequence, you think, will hold true, that whoever is a good rhapsodist is also a good general.

Io. Beyond all doubt.

Soc. Now are not you the most excellent of all the Grecian rhapsodists?

Io. Certainly so, Socrates.

Soc. Do you also then, Io, excel the rest of the Grecians in knowing how to command armies?

Io. ³ Be assured, Socrates, that I do; for I have acquired that knowledge from the works of Homer.

Soc. In the name of the gods then, Io, what can be the meaning that, excellent as you are above the rest of the Grecians, both as a general and as a rhapsodist, you choose to make your appearance only in this latter character; and travel about all over Greece, reciting and expounding, but take not the command of the Grecian armies? Is it because you think the Grecians

¹ We choose, here, to tread in the steps of Ficinus, deviating from the printed original, where the sentence is not interrogative, but affirmative.—S.

² By a strange perverseness in the editors or printers of the Greek text, this sentence is changed into a question; by which means the humorous turn of it is half lost.—S.

³ The words of Plato are *eu lothi*. This was an arrogant expression, frequent in the mouths of the sophists. See Plato's Symposium. In the same spirit he here very properly attributes it to Io. Yet Bembo renders it thus in Italian, *Tu il fai bene*; following the sense, or rather nonsense, given it by Cornarius and Serranus.—S.

are in great need of a rhapsodist, or of a man to repeat verses to them with a golden crown upon his head, but have no occasion at all for a general?

Io. The city, which I belong to, Socrates, is under the government of yours, and her forces are commanded by the Athenians: therefore she is in no want of a general. And as to your city, or that of the Lacedæmonians, neither of you would appoint me her general, because you have, both of you, a high opinion of your own sufficiency.

Soc. What, my friend Io, do you not know Apollodorus of Cyzicum?

Io. Which Apollodorus?

Soc. Him, whom the Athenians have often appointed to the command of their armies, though a foreigner. Then there is, besides, Phanosthenes the Andrian, and ¹ Heraclides of Clazomenæ; upon whom the city, notwithstanding that they are foreigners, yet because they have ² approved themselves considerable and worthy men, confers the chief command of her army, with other posts of power and government. And will not the city then bestow her honours on Io the Ephesian, and appoint him her general, should he

¹ This general is mentioned by Ælian in his Various Histories, b. xiv. c. 5. together with Apollodorus of Cyzicum, and both of them with high commendations; but in such a manner, it must be owned, as to induce a suspicion, that he had all his knowledge of them from this passage of the Io — S.

² Plato seems to take this opportunity of expressing the esteem he had for these three commanders; under whom, it is probable, that Socrates had served his country in some of those campaigns which he had made with so much glory. See Plato's Banquet. This whole passage, however, is understood in a very different sense by Athenæus, b. xi. p. 5:6 who takes this praise to be ironical: in consequence of which mistake he bestows ill language on Plato, for having here, as he pretends, vilified these commanders, and thrown a reflection upon the city for promoting them. According to the supposition, therefore, of Athenæus, they are introduced here, on purpose to depreciate them, and put them on a level with an ignorant rhapsodist. A strange interpretation! by which is weakened, if not entirely destroyed, as well the force of the argument here used by Socrates, as of that ridicule, with which he all along treats Io. For by setting him in comparison with commanders of real merit only, could Socrates, consistently with his own reasoning, invalidate the account given by Io, why he was not promoted, in that he was a foreigner. Since the argument would be very inconclusive, if this were supposed the meaning: "You see how the city chooses to prefer a pack of fellows, who have no merit, and are foreigners as well as yourself; if you then are truly an expert and able general, though a foreigner, you may reasonably expect a share in so injudicious a promotion." And as to the irony, Socrates is thus

he appear a man valuable, and worthy that regard? What, are not ¹ you Ephesians originally of Athens? and then, besides, does Ephesus yield the preference to any city in point of greatness? But the question is about your own character, Io; What shall we think of you? For if you speak truth, when you say that you are able to display the excellencies of Homer through your skill in any art or science, you are a man who does not act fairly. For after you had professed to know many fine things, from which you could illustrate the works of Homer, and had undertaken to give me a specimen of that knowledge of yours, you deceive and disappoint me: whilst you are so far from doing as you promised, and giving me such a specimen, that you will not so much as inform me what those things are in which you have so profound a skill; and this, notwithstanding I have long pressed you to tell me: but absolutely become, like Proteus, all various and multiform, changing backwards and forwards, till at last you escape me, by starting up a general; for fear, I suppose, you should be driven to discover how deep your wisdom is in the works of Homer. If then you really are an artist, and when you had promised to give me a specimen of your art and knowledge in Homer, wilfully disappoint me; you act, as I just now said, unfairly. If indeed you

made to go out of his way, and take off the ridicule from Io, whilst he turns it upon others. But the reasoning is just, and the ridicule on Io continued strong, upon the contrary supposition, expressed in other words thus: "Your being a foreigner can be no bar to your preferment; let not that deter you from so laudable an ambition: you see what regard the city pays to men of great abilities, though born in other countries. Let the success, therefore, of Apollodorus and the rest encourage you to offer yourself a candidate: for you on other accounts have still fairer pretensions." Were the point, now in debate, a matter to be decided by authority, to that of Athenæus we might oppose that of Ælian, who commends the compliment, made by Plato in this passage, not only to the three foreign generals, but to the city of Athens at the same time, for giving her first honours to superior virtue, wherever found, without regard to birth-place or to popular favour. See Ælian. Var. Hist. lib. xiv. c. 5.—S.

¹ Socrates, having now sufficiently derided the personal arrogance and ignorance of Io, before he quits him, bestows an ironical sarcasm or two upon the general vanity of Io's countrymen; who, while they were sunk in Asiatic luxury and effeminacy, valued themselves highly, in the first place, upon their descent from the Athenians, so illustrious for wisdom and valour, and next on account of their opulence and magnificence; circumstances, in truth, redounding only to their shame; yet the usual topics of boast, these two, high descent and outward greatness, whether in nations or private persons, degenerated from their ancestors, and void of those virtues which raised them to that greatness.—S.

are not an artist, but an enthusiast, one of those who from divine allotment are inspired by Homer ; and thus, without any real knowledge, are able to utter abundance of fine words about the writings of that poet, agreeably to the opinion which I had of you before ; in this case you are not guilty of any unfair dealing. Choose then, whether of these two opinions you would have me entertain of you ; whether this, that you are a man, who acts unfairly ; or this other, that you are a man under the influence of some divinity.

IO. Great is the difference, O Socrates : it is certainly much the better thing to be deemed under divine influence.

Soc. This better thing then, IO, is with you, to be deemed by us, in your encomiums upon Homer, an enthusiast, and not an artist.

THE END OF THE IO.

THE

THE CRATYLUS:

A DIALOGUE

ON

THE RECTITUDE OF NAMES.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE CRATYLUS.

THE ensuing Dialogue, which disputes whether names have been assigned to things from nature or position, and whether some at least are not derived from a more divine origin than that of human invention, has been highly censured by modern critics for its etymologies, which they contend are for the most part false. This censure originated from not perceiving that the intention of Plato in this Dialogue is to investigate names philosophically, and not grammatically, and that he despises the matter, but is especially attentive to the form of names; though this was obvious to the philologist Selden, as may be seen in his treatise on the Syrian gods:—and in the next place, Plato mingles, in his investigation, the serious with the jocose: so that in the first part of the Dialogue, when he investigates the names of the gods, he is perfectly in earnest, as is highly proper on such an occasion; and in the middle part he facetiously ridicules the followers of Heraclitus, who considered all things as perpetually flowing, without admitting any periods of repose. Hence, in order to explode this opinion, which is erroneous in the extreme, when extended to intelligible as well as sensible natures, he proves that, by an abuse of etymologies, all names may be shown to have been established, as belonging to things borne along, flowing, and in continual generation.

With respect to the subject matter of this logical Dialogue, which is the invention, and as it were generation of names, it is necessary to observe, that there were two opinions of the ancients on this particular; one of Heraclitus

and his followers, among whom Cratylus held a considerable rank ; the other of certain Parmenidæans, among whom Hermogenes was no ignoble advocate. Of the former of these, Cratylus, it is reported that Plato was an auditor ; and he is said to have been under the tuition of the latter in theological concerns. And the Heraclitics indeed asserted that names consist from nature alone, and that the consent of men contributes nothing to their formation or invention. But the Parmenidæans affirmed, that names were not the productions of nature, but received their conformation from the arbitrary decision of men, by whom they were assigned and imposed upon things. The more early Academics or disciples of Plato embraced the opinion of the Heraclitics ; and the more early Peripatetics that of Hermogenes : while in the mean time each sect endeavoured to bring over its leader to the doctrine which it embraced ; though, as we shall now shew from Ammonius[†], the sentiments of Plato and Aristotle on this subject differed only in words, and not in reality.

In order therefore to be convinced of this, it is necessary to observe, that the dogma of those who considered names as consisting from nature, and not from the will of men, received a two-fold distribution. Hence one part, as the Heraclitics, were of opinion that names were natural, because they are the productions and works of nature. For (say they) proper and peculiar names are prepared and assigned from the nature of things, no otherwise than proper or secret senses are attributed from the same cause to every thing. For that which is visible is judged to be different from that which is tangible, because it is perceived by a different sense. But names are similar to natural resemblances ; i. e. to such as are beheld in mirrors, or in water, and not to such as are the productions of art. And indeed those are to be considered as denominating things, who produce true and solid names of this kind ; but those who act in a different manner, do not properly denominate, but only emit a sound or voice. But it is the business of a prudent, learned, and truly philosophic man, always to investigate names, which are peculiarly constituted and assigned to each particular from the nature of things ; just as it is the province of one who possesses an acute sight, to know and judge rightly the proper similitudes of every visible object.

† In *Aristot. de Interpretatione*.

But

But the other class of those who defended this opinion, asserted that names consist from nature, because they correspond to the nature of the denominated particulars. For (say they) names ought to be illustrious and significant, that they may express things with perspicuity and precision. As if (for instance) any one should be born with a disposition admirably adapted to imperial command, such a one may with great propriety be called *Agésilæus* or *Archidamus*. And that on this account such names are natural, because they significantly accord with the things which such names imply. For the person just adduced may be elegantly called *Archidamus*, because he is able to rule over the people; and *Agésilæus*, because he is the leader of the people. They add besides, that names are indeed similar to images; but to those only which do not consist from nature, but which are the offspring of human art, such as pictures and statues, in which we evidently perceive that various similitudes of resemblances correspond to the various exemplars of things; and that these render more, but those less express effigies of things, according as the skill of the artificer, by employing the dexterity of art, is able to fashion them in a more or less convenient manner. But the truth of this (say they) may be clearly evinced from hence, that we often investigate the natures of things by an analysis of names; and, after a process of this kind, demonstrate that names are assigned adapted to the things which they express.

In like manner, the dogma of those who ascribed names to the consent of men received a two-fold division. And one part indeed defended such a position of names, as the *Parmenidæan* *Hermogenes* in the present Dialogue, viz. that names might be formed according to every one's arbitrary determination, though this should take place without any rational cause: so that if a man should call any thing by just whatever name he pleased, the name in this case would be proper, and accommodated to the things denominated. But the other part, such as the more antient *Peripatetics*, asserted that names ought not to be formed and assigned by men rashly, according to the opinion of *Hermogenes*, but with deliberation and design. And that the artificer of names ought to be a person endued with universal science, in order that he may be able to fabricate proper and becoming names for all the variety of things. Hence they assert that names consist from the determinations of men, and not from nature, because they are the inventions of the reasoning soul, and are properly accommodated from hence to things themselves. For
those

those antient founders of names did not rashly and without design denominate marshes of the female genus, but rivers of the male (not to mention the various tribes of animals), but they characterized the former by the feminine genus, because, like the soul, they are certain receptacles; and called the latter by a masculine appellation, on account of their entering into and mingling themselves with the former. In like manner they assigned the masculine genus to intellect, and marked soul with a feminine appellation; because intellect diffuses its light upon soul, which, in consequence of receiving it from thence in her inmost penetralia, is most truly said to be filled and illuminated by intellect. They likewise very properly employed an equal analogy in the sun and moon, on account of the abundant emanation of light from the former, and the reception of the prolific rays by the latter. But with respect to the neuter and common genus, as they judged that these were constituted and composed from the mixture or separation of the masculine and feminine genus, hence they significantly assigned them to certain things in a congruous proportion of nature.

Hence it appears that Aristotle and the Peripatetics differ only in words from Plato and the Academics: since the latter assert that names consist from nature, because they signify particulars in a manner accommodated to the nature of things; but the former contend that names are the offspring of human invention, because they have been sagaciously assigned by a most skilful architect as it were of speaking, and this according to the exigency of nature. But the present Dialogue sufficiently proves that this is a true interpretation of Plato's opinion on this interesting subject; since Socrates here establishes himself as a medium between Hermogenes and Cratylus, and remarkably reprehends each by a multitude of very conclusive reasons. For he plainly demonstrates that names cannot alone consist from the arbitrary determination of men, as Hermogenes seemed to assert, on account of the universal genera of things, and immutable and eternal natures to which a stable and right reason of names may be well ascribed, both because they are perpetual and constant, and known to all men from the beginning, and because they are allotted a nature definite and immovable. And again, he shows that neither can names consist from nature in the manner which the Heraclitics endeavour to support, on account of the gliding and fluxible nature of individuals,

dividuals, to which names can neither be conveniently assigned nor well adapted for any considerable period of time.

But that the reader may see the progression of names from their sources, which are the gods, let him attend to the following beautiful passage from Proclus on the Theology of Plato¹. "The first, most principal, and truly divine names must be considered as established in the gods themselves. But those of the second order, and which are the resemblances of these, subsisting in an intellectual manner, must be said to be of a dæmoniacal condition. And those in the third rank, emanating indeed from truth, but fashioned logically, and receiving the last representation of divine concerns, make their appearance from scientific men, who at one time energize according to a divine afflatus, and at another time intellectually, generating images in motion of the inward spectacles of their souls. For as the demiurgic intellect establishes about matter representations of the first forms subsisting in his essence, temporal resemblances of things eternal, divisible of such as are indivisible, and produces as it were shadowy images of true beings; in the same manner, as it appears to me, the science which we possess, fashioning an intellectual production, fabricates resemblances both of other things and of the gods themselves. Hence it assimilates through composition that which in the gods is incomposite; that which is simple in them through variety, and that which is united through multitude. And thus forming names, it manifests images of divine concerns, according to their last subsistence: for it generates each name as if it was a statue of the gods. And as the Theurgic art, through certain symbols, calls forth the unenvying goodness of the gods, into an illumination of the artificial statues; in the same manner, the intellectual science of divine concerns, through compositions and divisions of sounds, exhibits the occult essence of the gods. With great propriety therefore does Socrates in the Philebus assert—that he proceeds with the greatest dread in that which respects the names of the gods, on account of the caution which should be employed in their investigation. For it is necessary to venerate the last resounding echoes as it were of the gods; and in consequence of this reverence to establish them in their first exemplars²."

Thus

¹ Lib. i. cap. 29.

² Agreeably to this, likewise, Proclus, in the fourth book of his Commentary on the Parmenides, which is justly called by Damascius, *υπερσυνετα στήνησις*, a transcendent exposition, observes

Thus far the truly divine Proclus; from which admirable passage the Platonic reader will find all his doubts on this intricate subject fully solved, if he only bestows on it that attention which it so well deserves. I only add, that every ingenuous mind may be convinced, from the etymologies of divine names in this Dialogue, that the latter Platonists were not perverters of their master's theology, as is ignorantly asserted by verbal critics and modern theologists. This, indeed, will be so apparent from the ensuing notes, that no greater proof can be desired of the dreadful mental darkness in which such men are involved, notwithstanding the great acumen of the former, and the much-boasted but delusive light of the latter.

as follows: πολλὰι τάξεις εἰσι καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων, ὥσπερ δὴ καὶ τῶν γνῶσεων· καὶ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν θεῖα λέγεται, δι' ὧν οἱ καταδεστέροι θεοὶ τοὺς πρὸ αὐτῶν ὀνομάζουσι· τὰ δὲ ἀγγελικά, δι' ὧν οἱ ἀγγελοὶ ἐαυτοὺς τε καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς· τὰ δὲ δαιμονία, τὰ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνια. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ ρητὰ καὶ ἴμιν, τὰ δὲ ἀρρητὰ. καὶ ὅλως ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς οὐ Κρατύλος ἀναδιδασκεῖ, καὶ πρὸ τούτου ἡ ἐνθὺς παραδοσις, καὶ γνῶσις, καὶ ὀνομασία διαφορὸς ἐστὶ.—*i. e.* “There are many orders of names, as well as of cognitions; and some of these are called divine, through which subordinate gods denominate such as are prior to them: but others are angelic, through which angels denominate themselves and the gods; and others are dæmoniacal, and others again human. And some are effable by us, but others are ineffable. And universally, as the Cratylus informs us, and prior to this, the divine tradition (*i. e.* the Zoroastrian oracles), there is a difference in nomination as well as in knowledge.”

THE CRATYLUS.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

HERMOGENES, CRATYLUS, SOCRATES.

HERMOGENES.

ARE you willing, then, that we should communicate this discourse to Socrates?

CRAT. If you think proper.

HERM. Cratylus here, Socrates, says, that there is a rectitude of name naturally subsisting in every thing; and that this is not a name which certain persons pronounce from custom, while they articulate a portion of their voice; but that there is a certain rectitude of names which is naturally the same both among Greeks and Barbarians. I ask him, therefore, whether Cratylus is his true name, or not. He confesses it is. I then inquire of him, what is the appellation belonging to Socrates? He replies, Socrates. In all other particulars, therefore, I say, is not that the name by which we call each? Yet, says he, your name is not Hermogenes, though all men should agree in calling you so. And upon my eagerly desiring to know the meaning of what he says, he does not declare any thing, but uses dissimulation towards me, feigning as if he was thinking about something on this subject, which if he should be willing to relate clearly, he would oblige me to agree with him in opinion, and to say the same as he does. If, therefore, you can by any means conjecture this divination of Cratylus, I shall very gladly hear you; or rather, if it is agreeable to you, I should much more gladly hear your opinion concerning the rectitude of names.

Soc. O Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus, according to the antient proverb, beautiful things are difficult to be understood ; and the discipline respecting names is no small affair. If, therefore, I had heard that demonstration of Prodicus, valued at fifty drachmas, which instructed the hearer in this very particular, as he himself says, nothing would hinder but that you might immediately know the truth respecting the rectitude of names : but I never have heard it ; and am acquainted with nothing more than the circumstance about the drachmas. Hence I am unacquainted with the truth respecting these particulars ; but am nevertheless prepared to investigate this affair, along with you and Cratylus. But as to his telling you, that your name is not in reality Hermogenes, I suspect that in this he derides you : for he thinks, perhaps, that you are covetous of wealth, and at the same time have not obtained your desire. But, as I just now said, the knowledge of these matters is difficult. However, placing the arguments in common, it is proper to consider, whether the truth is on your side, or on that of Cratylus.

HERM. But indeed, Socrates, though I have frequently disputed with Cratylus and many others, yet I cannot persuade myself, that there is any other rectitude of nomination, than what custom and mutual consent have established. For to me it appears, that the name which any one assigns to a thing, is a proper name ; and that, if he should even change it for another, this name will be no less right than the first ; just as we are accustomed to change the names of our servants. For I am of opinion, that no name is naturally inherent in any thing, but subsists only from the law and habit of those by whom it is instituted and called. But, if the case is otherwise, I am prepared both to learn and hear, not only from Cratylus, but from any other person whatever.

Soc. Perhaps, Hermogenes, you say something to the purpose. Let us consider therefore. Is that by which any one calls any thing, the name of that thing ?

HERM. To me it appears so.

Soc. And this, whether a private person calls it, or a city ?

HERM. I think so.

Soc. What, then, if I should call any thing in such a manner, as to denominate that an horse which we now call a man, and that a man which we

now

now call a horse; would not the name man remain the same publicly, but the name horse privately; and again, privately the name man, and publicly the name horse? Would you not speak in this manner?

HERM. It appears so to me.

SOC. Tell me, then, do you call it any thing to speak true and false?

HERM. I do.

SOC. Therefore, one thing will be a true sentence, but another a false one. Will it not?

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. Will not that sentence, then, which speaks of things as they are, be a true sentence; but that which speaks of them different from what they are, a false one?

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. Is not this, therefore, to speak of things which are, and which are not, by discourse.

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. But with respect to a sentence which is true, is the whole true, but the parts of it not true?

HERM. The parts, also, are no otherwise than true.

SOC. But whether are the large parts true, and the small ones not? or, are all the parts true?

HERM. I think that all the parts are true.

SOC. Is there any part of what you say, smaller than a name?

HERM. There is not. But this is the smallest of all.

SOC. And does not this name belong to a true sentence?

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. And this, you say, is true.

HERM. I do.

SOC. But is not the part of a false sentence false?

HERM. I say it is.

SOC. It is permitted us, therefore, to call a name true and false, since we can call a sentence so.

HERM. How should it not be so?

SOC. Is that, therefore, which each person says the name of a thing is, the name of that thing?

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. Will there be as many names belonging to a thing, as any person assigns it ; and at that time when he assigns them ?

HERM. I have no other rectitude of name, Socrates, than this ; that I may call a thing by one name, which I assign to it, and you by another, which you think proper to attribute to it. And after this manner, I see that in cities, the same things are assigned proper names, both among the Greeks with other Greeks, and among the Greeks with the Barbarians.

Soc. Let us see, Hermogenes, whether things appear to you to subsist in such a manner, with respect to the peculiar essence of each, as they did to Protagoras, who said that man was the measure of all things ; so that things are, with respect to me, such as they appear to me ; and that they are such to you, as they appear to you : or do some of these appear to you to possess a certain stability of essence ?

HERM. Sometimes, Socrates, through doubting, I have been led to this, which Protagoras asserts ; but yet this does not perfectly appear to me to be the case.

Soc. But what, was you never led to conclude that there is no such thing as a man perfectly evil ?

HERM. Never, by Jupiter ! But I have often been disposed to think, that there are some men profoundly wicked, and that the number of these is great.

Soc. But have you never yet seen men perfectly good ?

HERM. Very few, indeed.

Soc. You have seen such then ?

HERM. I have.

Soc. How, then, do you establish this ? Is it thus : That those who are completely good, are completely prudent ; and that the completely bad, are completely imprudent ?

HERM. It appears so to me.

Soc. If, therefore, Protagoras speaks the truth, and this is the truth itself, for every thing to be such as it appears to every one, can some of us be prudent, and some of us imprudent ?

HERM. By no means.

Soc. And this, as I think, appears perfectly evident to you, that, since there

there is such a thing as prudence and imprudence, Protagoras does not entirely speak the truth; for one person will not in reality be more prudent than another, if that which appears to every one, is to every one true.

HERM. It is so.

Soc. But neither do I think you will agree with Euthydemus, that all things subsist together with all, in a similar manner, and always; for thus things would not be good, and others evil, if virtue and vice were always, and in a similar manner, inherent in all things.

HERM. You speak the truth.

Soc. If, therefore, neither all things subsist together similarly and always with all things, nor each thing is what it appears to each person, it is evident that there are certain things which possess a stability of essence, and this not from us, nor in consequence of being drawn upwards and downwards by us, through the power of imagination, but which subsist from themselves, according to the essence which naturally belongs to them.

HERM. This appears to me, Socrates, to be the case.

Soc. Will, therefore, the things themselves naturally subsist in this manner, but their actions not so? or are their actions, in like manner, one certain species of things?

HERM. They are perfectly so.

Soc. Actions therefore, also, are performed according to the nature which they possess, and not according to our opinion. As, for instance, if we should attempt to cut any thing, shall we say that each particular can be divided just as we please, and with what we please? or rather, shall we not say, that if we desire to cut any thing according to its natural capacity of receiving section, and likewise with that instrument which is natural for the purpose, we shall divide properly, effect something satisfactory, and act rightly? But that if we do this contrary to nature, we shall wander from the purpose, and perform nothing?

HERM. To me it appears so.

Soc. If therefore we should attempt to burn any thing, we ought not to burn it according to every opinion, but according to that which is right; and this is no other, than after that manner in which any thing is naturally adapted to burn and be burnt, and with those materials which are proper on the occasion.

HERM. It is so.

Soc.

SOC. Must we not, therefore, proceed with other things after the same manner?

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. Is not to speak, therefore, one particular operation?

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. Whether, therefore, does he speak rightly, who speaks just as he thinks fit; or he, who speaks in such a manner as the nature of things requires him to speak, and themselves to be spoken of; and who thinks, that if he speaks of a thing with that which is accommodated to its nature, he shall effect something by speaking; but that, if he acts otherwise, he shall wander from the truth, and accomplish nothing to the purpose?

HERM. It appears to me, it will be just as you say.

SOC. Is not, therefore, the nomination of a thing, a certain part of speaking? For those who denominate things, deliver after a manner sentences.

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. Is not the nomination of things, therefore, a certain action, since to speak is a certain action about things?

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. But it has appeared that actions do not subsist with respect to us, but that they have a certain proper nature of their own.

HERM. It has so.

SOC. It follows, therefore, that we must give names to things, in such a manner as their nature requires us to denominate, and them to be denominated, and by such means as are proper, and not just as we please, if we mean to assent to what we have before asserted. And thus we shall act and nominate in a satisfactory manner, but not by a contrary mode of conduct.

HERM. It appears so to me.

SOC. Come then, answer me. Must we not say, that a thing which ought to be cut, ought to be cut with something?

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. And that the thread, which ought to be separated in weaving, ought to be separated with something? And that the thing which ought to be perforated, ought to be perforated with something?

HERM.

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. And likewise that the thing which ought to be named, ought to be named with something?

HERM. It ought.

Soc. But with what are the threads separated in weaving?

HERM. With the shuttle.

Soc. And what is that with which a thing is denominated?

HERM. A name.

Soc. You speak well. And hence a name is a certain organ.

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. If, therefore, I should inquire what sort of an instrument a shuttle is, would you not answer, that it is an instrument with which we separate the threads in weaving?

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. But what do we perform in weaving? Do we not separate the woof and the threads, which are confused together?

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. Would you not answer in the same manner concerning perforating, and other particulars?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. Can you in like manner declare concerning a name, what it is which we perform, whilst we denominate any thing with a name which is a certain instrument?

HERM. I cannot.

Soc. Do we teach one another any thing, and distinguish things according to their mode of subsistence?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. A name, therefore, is an instrument endued with a power of teaching, and distinguishing the essence of a thing, in the same manner as a shuttle with respect to the web.

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. But is not the shuttle textorial?

HERM. How should it not?

Soc. The weaver therefore uses the shuttle in a proper manner, so far as concerns

concerns the art of weaving ; but he who teaches employs a name beautifully, according to the proper method of teaching.

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. Through whose operation is it that the weaver acts properly when he uses the shuttle ?

HERM. The carpenter's.

Soc. But is every one a carpenter, or he only who possesses art ?

HERM. He who possesses art.

Soc. And whose work does the piercer properly use, when he uses the auger ?

HERM. The blacksmith's.

Soc. Is every one therefore a blacksmith, or he only who possesses art ?

HERM. He who possesses art.

Soc. But whose work does the teacher use when he employs a name ?

HERM. I cannot tell.

Soc. Nor can you tell who delivered to us the names which we use ?

HERM. I cannot.

Soc. Does it not appear to you that the law delivered these ?

HERM. It does.

Soc. He who teaches, therefore, uses the work of the legislator when he uses a name.

HERM. It appears so to me.

Soc. But does every man appear to you to be a legislator, or he only who possesses art ?

HERM. He who possesses art.

Soc. It is not the province, therefore, of every man, O Hermogenes, to establish a name, but of a certain artificer of names ; and this, as it appears, is a legislator, who is the most rare of artificers among men.

HERM. It appears so.

Soc. But come, consider, what it is which the legislator beholds, when he establishes names ; and make your survey from the instances above adduced. What is it which the carpenter looks to, when he makes a shuttle ? Is it not to some such thing as is naturally adapted to the purposes of weaving ?

HERM.

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. But if the shuttle should break during its fabrication, do you think the carpenter would make another, taking pattern by the broken one? or rather would he not look to that form, agreeably to which he endeavoured to make the broken shuttle?

HERM. It appears to me that he would look to this in his fabrication.

SOC. Do we not, therefore, most justly call this form, the shuttle itself?

HERM. It appears so to me.

SOC. When, therefore, it is requisite to make shuttles, adapted for the purpose of weaving a slender garment, or one of a closer texture, or of thread or wool, or of any other kind whatever, it is necessary that all of them should possess the form of the shuttle; but that each should be applied to the work to which it is naturally accommodated, in the most becoming manner.

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. And the same reasoning takes place with respect to other instruments. For an instrument must be found out which is naturally adapted to the nature of each particular, and a substance must be assigned to it, from which the artificer will not produce just what he pleases, but that which is natural to the instrument with which he operates. For it is necessary to know, as it appears, that an auger ought to be composed of iron, in order to operate in each particular naturally.

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. And that a shuttle should for this purpose be made of wood.

HERM. It is so.

SOC. For every shuttle, as it appears, is naturally adapted to every species of weaving; and other things in a similar manner.

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. It is necessary, therefore, excellent man, that the legislator should know how to place a name naturally, with respect to sounds and syllables; and that, looking towards that particular of which this is the name, he should frame and establish all names, if he is desirous of becoming the proper founder of names. But if the founder of names does not compose every name from the same syllables, we ought to take notice, that neither does every blacksmith use the same iron, when he fabricates the same instrument for the sake of the same thing; but that the instrument is properly composed, so long as they fabricate it according to the same idea, though from different sorts of

iron, whether it is made here, or among the Barbarians. Is not this the case?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. Will you not therefore be of opinion, that as long as a founder of names, both here and among the Barbarians, assigns a form of name accommodated to each, in any kind of syllables, that while this is the case, the founder of names here will not be worse than the founder in any other place?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. Who therefore is likely to know whether a convenient form of the shuttle is situated in every kind of wood? Does this belong to the artificer of the shuttle, or to the weaver by whom it is used?

HERM. It is probable, Socrates, that he is more likely to know this, by whom the shuttle is used.

Soc. Who is it, then, that uses the work of the fabricator of the lyre? Is it not he who knows how to instruct the artificer of it in the best manner, and who is able to judge whether it is properly made or not?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. But who is this?

HERM. The lyrist.

Soc. And who is it that uses the work of the shipwright?

HERM. The pilot.

Soc. And who is he that knows whether the work of the founder of names is beautiful, or not; and who is able to judge concerning it when finished, both here and among the Barbarians? Must it not be the person who uses this work?

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. And is not this person, one who knows how to interrogate?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. And likewise to answer?

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. But would you call him, who knows how to interrogate and answer any thing else, than one who is skilled in dialectic?

HERM. I should not.

Soc. It is the business, therefore, of the shipwright to make a rudder, according to the directions of the pilot, if he means to produce a good rudder.

HERM.

HERM. It appears so.

SOC. And the legislator, as it seems, ought, in the establishing of names, to consult a man skilled in dialectic, if he means to found them in a beautiful manner.

HERM. He ought.

SOC. It appears, therefore, O Hermogenes, that the imposition of names is no despicable affair, as you think it is, nor the business of depraved men, or of any that may occur. And Cratylus speaks truly, when he says that names belong to things from nature, and that every one is not the artificer of names, but he alone who looks to that name which is naturally accommodated to any thing, and who is able to insert this form of a name in letters and syllables.

HERM. I have nothing proper to urge, Socrates, in contradiction of what you say. And, perhaps, it is not easy to be thus suddenly persuaded. But I think that I should be more easily persuaded by you, if you could show me what that is which you call a certain rectitude of name according to nature.

SOC. As to myself, O blessed Hermogenes, I say nothing; but I even almost forget what I said a short time since, that I had no knowledge in this affair, but that I would investigate it in conjunction with you. But now, in consequence of our mutual survey, thus much appears to us, in addition to our former conviction, that a name possesses some natural rectitude; and that every man does not know how to accommodate names to things, in a becoming manner. Is not this the case?

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. After this, therefore, it is necessary to inquire, what the rectitude of name is, if you desire to know this.

HERM. But I do desire to know it.

SOC. Consider then.

HERM. But in what manner is it proper to consider?

SOC. The most proper mode of inquiry, my friend, must be obtained from those endued with science, offering them money for this purpose, and loading them with thanks: and these are the sophists, through whom your brother Callias, in consequence of having given them a great quantity of money, appears to be a wise man. But, since you have no authority in paternal matters, it is proper to supplicate your brother, and entreat him to show you that rectitude about things of this kind, which he has learned from Protagoras.

HERM. But this request of mine, Socrates, would be absurd, if, notwithstanding my entirely rejecting the truth of Protagoras, I should be pleased with assertions resulting from this truth, as things of any worth.

Soc. But if this does not please you, it is proper to derive our information from Homer, and the other poets.

HERM. And what does Homer say, Socrates, concerning names; and where?

Soc. Every where. But those are the greatest and most beautiful passages, in which he distinguishes between the names which are assigned to the same things by men, and those which are employed by the gods. Or do you not think that he speaks something in these, great and wonderful, concerning the rectitude of names? For it is evident that the gods call things according to that rectitude which names naturally possess. Or do you not think so?

HERM. I well know, that if the gods denominate any thing, they properly denominate it. But what are the passages you speak of?

Soc. Do you not know, that speaking of the Trojan river, which contested in a singular manner with Vulcan, he says,

Xanthus its name with those of heav'nly birth,
But call'd *Scamander* by the sons of earth?¹

HERM. I do.

Soc. But what then, do you not think that this is something venerable, to know in what respect it is more proper to call that river *Xanthus*, than *Scamander*? Likewise, if you are so disposed, take notice that he says², the same bird is called *Chalcis* by the gods, but *Cymindis* by men. And do you think this is a despicable piece of learning, to know how much more proper it is to call the same bird *Chalcis* than *Cymindis*, or *Myrines* than *Batica*; and so in many other instances, which may be found both in this poet and others? But these things are, perhaps, beyond the ability of you and me to discover. But the names *Scamandrius* and *Astyanax* may, as it appears to me, be comprehended by human sagacity; and it may easily be seen, what kind of rectitude there is in these names, which, according to Homer, were given to the son of Hector. For you doubtless know the verses in which these names are contained.

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. Which therefore of these names do you think Homer considered as more properly adapted to the boy, *Astyanax* or *Scamandrius*?

¹ *Iliad* xx. v. 74.

² *Iliad* xiv. v. 291.

HERM. I cannot tell.

Soc. But consider the affair in this manner: if any one should ask you, which you thought would denominate things in the most proper manner, the more wife or the more unwise?

HERM. It is manifest that I should answer, the more wife.

Soc. Which therefore appears to you to be the more wife in cities, the women or the men, that I may speak of the whole genus?

HERM. The men.

Soc. Do you not therefore know that, according to Homer, the son of Hector was called by the men of Troy, Aftyanax, but by the women, Scamandrius?

HERM. It appears that it was so.

Soc. Do you not think that Homer considered the Trojan men as wiser than the Trojan women?

HERM. I think he did.

Soc. He therefore thought that the name Aftyanax was more proper for the boy than Scamandrius.

HERM. It appears so.

Soc. But let us consider the reason which he assigns for this denomination: for, says he,

Aftyanax the Trojans call'd the boy,
From his great father, the defence of Troy¹.

On this account, as it appears, it is proper to call the son of the saviour of his country Aftyanax, that is, the king of that city, which, as Homer says, his father preserved.

HERM. It appears so to me.

Soc. But why is this appellation more proper than that of Scamandrius? for I confess I am ignorant of the reason of this. Do you understand it?

HERM. By Jupiter, I do not.

Soc. But, excellent man, Homer also gave to Hector his name.

HERM. But why?

Soc. Because it appears to me that this name is something similar to Aftyanax, and that these names were considered by the Greeks as having the

¹ Iliad vi. v. 402.

same meaning; for *king* and *Hector* nearly signify the same, since both these names are royal. For whoever is a *king*, is also doubtless a *Hector*; since such a one evidently *rules over*, *possesses*, and *has*, that of which he is the king. Or do I appear to you to say nothing to the purpose, but deceive myself, in thinking, as through certain vestiges, to touch upon the opinion of Homer respecting the rectitude of names?

HERM. By no means, by Jupiter, but perhaps you in some degree apprehend his meaning.

SOC. For it is just, as it appears to me, to call the offspring of a lion, a lion, and the offspring of a horse, a horse. I do not say, that this ought to be the case when something monstrous is produced from a horse, and which is different from a horse; but only when the offspring is a natural production. For if the natural progeny of an ox should generate a horse, the offspring ought not to be called a calf, but a colt. [And if a horse, contrary to nature, should generate a calf, the offspring ought not to be called a colt, but a calf¹.] And again, if from a man an offspring not human should be produced, the progeny, I think, ought not to be called a man. And the same reasoning must take place respecting trees, and all other producing natures. Or does it not appear so to you?

HERM. It does.

SOC. You speak well: for take care that I do not fraudulently deceive you. For the same reason, therefore, the offspring of a king ought to be called a king. But it is of no consequence, though the same thing should be

¹ A great part of this sentence within the crotchets is omitted in the Greek text of all the printed editions of Plato; and a great part likewise of the preceding sentence is wanting: though Ficinus, as is evident from his version, found the whole complete in the manuscript, from which he made his translation. In the Greek, there is nothing more than, *εαν βοος εκγονον φυσει ιππος παρα φυσιν τεκη μοσχον, ου πωλον κλητεον, αλλα μοσχον*. Instead of which we ought to read, *εαν βοος εκγονον φυσει ιππον τεκη ου μοσχον κλητεον, αλλα πωλον, και εαν ιππος παρα φυσιν τεκη μοσχον, ου πωλον κλητεον, αλλα μοσχον*. But though, without this emendation, the passage is perfect nonsense, yet this has not been discovered by any of the verbalists; a plain proof this, that they never read this Dialogue with a view to understand it. Or perhaps, they considered an emendation of this kind beneath their notice; for doubtless it is not to be compared with the remarks with which their works abound. Such as, for instance, the following observation in Fischer's edition of this Dialogue, p. 2. in which we are informed that instead of *αυτων*, "the Basil edition has *αυτων*, and this not badly:" "Ald. Baf. 1. 2. *αυτων*, non male." And this author's edition is replete with remarks no less curious, acute, and important.

expressed

expressed in different syllables, or a letter should be added or taken away, as long as the essence of the thing possesses dominion, and manifests itself in the name.

HERM. What is this which you say?

SOC. Nothing complex. But, as you well know, we pronounce the names of the elements, but not the elements themselves, four alone excepted, viz. ϵ & υ , and $\omicron$ & ω : and adding other letters, as well to the other vowels as to the non-vowels, we form names, which we afterwards enunciate. But, as long as we insert the apparent power of the element, it is proper to call the name that which is manifested to us by the element. As is evident, for instance, in the letter $\beta\eta\tau\omega$: for here you see that the addition of the η , and the τ , and the ω , does not hinder the nature of that element from being evinced by the whole name, agreeably to the intention of its founder; so well did he know how to give names to letters.

HERM. You appear to me to speak the truth.

SOC. Will not, therefore, the same reasoning take place respecting a king? For a king will be produced from a king, *good* from *good*, and *beauty* from *beauty*; and in the same manner with relation to every thing else, from every genus a progeny of the same kind will be produced, unless something monstrous is generated; and will be called by the same name. But it is possible to vary these names in such a manner by syllables, that, to ignorant men, the very same appellations will appear to be different from each other. Just as the medicines of physicians, when varied with colours or smells, appear to us to be different, though they are still the same; but to the physician, as one who considers the power of the medicines, they appear to be the same, nor is he at all astonished by the additions. In like manner, perhaps, he who is skilled in names speculates their power, and is not astonished, if at any time a letter should be added, or changed, or taken away; or that in other all-various letters, the same power of name should be found. As in the names *Astyanax* and *Hector*, which we have just spoken of, they do not possess any thing of the same letters, except the ι , and yet, at the same time, they signify the same thing. So likewise with respect to the name $\alpha\chi\epsilon\pi\omicron\lambda\iota\varsigma$, or a *ruler of a city*, what communication has it in letters with the two preceding names? and yet it has the same signification. And there are many
other

ether words which signify nothing else than a king; many which signify nothing else than the leader of an army, as *αγης*, *πολεμαρχος*, *ευπολεμος*; and likewise many which imply a professor of medicine, as *ιατροκλης* and *αιεσιμβος*. And perhaps many other may be found, disagreeing indeed in syllables, and letters, but in power vocally emitting the same signification. Does this appear to you to be the case, or not?

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. And that to things which subsist according to nature, the same names should be assigned?

HERM. Perfectly so.

SOC. But that, as often as generations take place contrary to nature, and by this means produce things in the form of monsters, as when from a good and pious man an impious man is generated, then the offspring ought not to be called by the name of his producer; just as we said before, that if a horse should generate the progeny of an ox, the offspring ought not to be called a horse, but an ox?

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. When an impious man, therefore, is generated from one who is pious, the name of the genus to which he belongs must be assigned him.

HERM. It must so.

SOC. Such a son, therefore, ought not to be called either one who is a friend to divinity, or mindful of divinity, or any thing of this kind: but he should be called by that which signifies the contrary of all this, if names ought to possess any thing of rectitude.

HERM. This ought to be the case more than any thing, Socrates.

SOC. Just, Hermogenes, as the name Orestes appears to be properly invented; whether a certain fortune assigned him this name, or some poet, evincing by this appellation his rustic nature, correspondent to an inhabitant of mountains.

HERM. So it appears, Socrates.

SOC. It appears also, that the name of his father subsists according to nature.

HERM. It does so.

SOC. For it seems that Agamemnon was one who considered that he ought to labour and patiently endure hardships, and obtain the end of his designs

designs through virtue. But his stay before Troy, with so great an army, evinces his patient endurance. That this man, therefore, was wonderful, with respect to perseverance, is denoted by the name Agamemnon. Perhaps also Atreus is a proper denomination: for his slaughter of Chryseus, and the cruelty which he exercised towards Thyestes, evince that he was *pernicious* and *noxious*. His surname, therefore, suffers a small degree of declination, and conceals its meaning; so that the nature of the man is not evident to every one; but to those who are skilful in names, the signification of Atreus is sufficiently manifest. For his name properly subsists throughout, according to the *intrepid*, *inexorable*, and *noxious*. It appears also to me, that the name given to Pelops was very properly assigned: for this name signifies one who sees things near at hand, and that he is worthy of such a denomination.

HERM. But how?

SOC. Because it is reported of this man, that in the slaughter of Myrtilus, he neither provided for any thing, nor could perceive afar off how great a calamity his whole race would be subject to from this circumstance; but he only regarded that which was just before him, and which then subsisted, that is, what was *πelas*, or *near*; and this when he desired, by all possible means, to receive Hippodamia in marriage. So that his name was derived from *πelas* *near*, and *αἶψα* *fight*. Every one also must think that the name given to Tantalus was properly and naturally assigned him, if what is related concerning him is true.

HERM. But what is that relation?

SOC. That, while he was yet living, many unfortunate and dire circumstances happened to him, and at last the whole of his country was subverted; and that, when he was dead, a stone was suspended over his head in Hades, these particulars, as it appears corresponding with his name in a wonderful and artless manner: for it is just as if any one should be willing to call him *ταλαντατος*, i. e. *most miserable*, but, at the same time, desirous to conceal this circumstance, should call him Tantalus instead of Talantatus. And it seems that the fortune of rumour caused him to receive this appellation. But it appears that the name of him who was called his father, is composed in an all-beautiful manner, though it is by no means easy to be understood: for in reality the name of Jupiter is, as it were, a sentence; but dividing it into

two parts, some of us use one part, and some another, for some call him *ζῆνα*, and some *δια*. And these parts collected into one, evince the nature of the god; which, as we have said, a name ought to effect: *For there is no one who is more the cause of living, both to us and every thing else, than he who is the ruler and king of all things*¹. It happens, therefore, that this god is rightly denominated, through whom life is present with all living beings; but the name, though one, is distributed, as I have said, into two parts, viz. into *δια* and *ζῆνα*. But he who suddenly hears that this god is the son of Saturn, may perhaps think it a reproachful assertion: for it is rational to believe that Jupiter is the offspring of a certain great dianoëtic power; for, when Saturn is called *ῥεφες*, it does not signify a *boy*, but the purity and incorruptible nature of his intellect². But, according to report, Saturn is

¹ It is evident from hence, that Jupiter, according to Plato, is the demiurgus, or artificer of the universe; for no one can be more the cause of living to all things, than he by whom the world was produced. But if this be the case, the artificer of the world is not, as we have before observed according to the Platonic theology, the first cause: for there are other gods superior to Jupiter, whose names Plato, as we shall shortly see, etymologizes agreeably to the Orphic theology. Indeed, his etymology of Jupiter is evidently derived from the following Orphic verses, which are cited by Joannes Diac. Allegor. ad Hesiodi Theog. p. 278.

Ἔστιν δὲ πάντων ἀρχὴ Ζεὺς. Ζεὺς γὰρ ἔδωκε,
Ζωὰ τ' ἐγέννησεν καὶ Ζῆν αὐτὸν καλεῖσθαι,
Καὶ Δία τ' ὅδ', ὅτι δὴ διὰ τοῦτον ἀπαντὰ τετυκται.
Εἰς δὲ πατὴρ ὅστις πάντων, θῆρων τε βροτῶν τε.

i. e. "Jupiter is the principle of all things. For Jupiter is the cause of the generation of animals and they call him Ζην, and Δία also, because all things were fabricated *through* him; and he is the one father of all things, of beasts and men." Here too you may observe that he is called *fabricator* and *father*, which are the very epithets given to the demiurgus of the world by Plato in the *Timæus*. In short, Jupiter, the artificer of the world, subsists at the extremity of that order of gods which is called *ῥεφες*, *intellectual*, as is copiously and beautifully proved by Proclus, in *Plat. Theol. lib. v.* And he is likewise celebrated by the Chaldaic theology, as we are informed by Damascius and Pselus under two names, *δις ἐπέκεινα*, *twice beyond*.

² Saturn, therefore, according to Plato, is *pure intellect*, viz. the first intellectual intellect: for the intellects of all the gods are pure in the most transcendent degree; and therefore purity here must be characteristic of supremacy. Hence Saturn subsists at the summit of the intellectual order of gods, from whence he is received into all the subsequent divine orders, and into every part of the world. But from this definition of Saturn we may see the extreme beauty of that divine fable, in which he is said to devour his children: for this signifies nothing more than the nature of an intellectual god, since every intellect returns into itself: and consequently its offspring, which are intellectual conceptions, are, as it were, absorbed in itself.

the

the son of Heaven: and sight directed to things above is called by this name, *οὐρανία*¹, from beholding things situated on high. From whence, O Hermogenes, those who discourse on sublime affairs, say that a pure intellect is present with him, and that he is very properly denominatèd Heaven. Indeed, if I did but remember the genealogy of the gods, according to Hesiod, and the yet superior progenitors of these which he speaks of, I should not desist from showing you the rectitude of their appellations, until I had made trial of this wisdom, whether it produces any thing of consequence, or not; and whether those explanations which I have just now so suddenly delivered, though I know not from whence, are defective or true.

HERM. Indeed, Socrates, you really appear to me to pour forth oracles on a sudden, like those who are agitated by some inspiring god.

Soc. And I think indeed, O Hermogenes, that this wisdom happened to me through the means of Euthyphro, the son of Pantius: for I was with him in the morning, and listened to him with great attention. It seems therefore, that, being divinely inspired, he has not only filled my ears with divine wisdom, but that he has also arrested my very soul. It appears therefore to me, that we ought to act in such a manner as to make use of this wisdom to-day, and contemplate what yet remains concerning the rectitude of names. But to-morrow, if it is agreeable to you, we will lay it aside, and purify ourselves from it, finding out for this purpose one who is skilled in expiating things of this kind, whether he is some one of the priests, or the sophists.

¹ Heaven, which is here characterized by sight, is the heaven which Plato so much celebrates in the Phædrus, and composes that order of gods which is called by the Chaldean oracles *νοητός καὶ νοερός*, i. e. *intelligible, and at the same time intellectual*. This will be evident from considering that Plato, in what follows, admits with Hesiod, that there are gods superior to heaven, such as night, chaos, &c: But as sight corresponds to intelligence, and this is the same with that which is both intelligible and intellectual, and as Saturn is the summit of the intellectual order, it is evident that heaven must compose the middle order of gods characterized by intelligence, and that the order above this must be entirely intelligible. In consequence of all this, what must we think of their system, who suppose Heaven, Saturn, and Jupiter, and indeed all the gods of the antients, to have been nothing more than dead men deified, notwithstanding the above-etymologies, and the express testimony of Plato to the contrary in the Timæus, who represents the demiurgus commanding the subordinate gods, after he had produced them, to fabricate men and other animals? For my own part, I know not which to admire most, the ignorance, the impudence, or the impiety of such assertions. All that can be said is, that such opinions are truly barbaric, modern and Galilæan.

HERM. I assent to this ; for I shall hear, with great pleasure, what remains of the discussion concerning names.

SOC. It is necessary to act in this manner. From whence then are you willing we should begin our speculation, since we have insisted upon a certain formula of operation ; that we may know whether names themselves will testify for us, that they were not entirely fabricated from chance, but contain a certain rectitude of construction ? The names, therefore, of heroes and men may perhaps deceive us : for many of these subsist according to the surnames of their ancestors, and sometimes have no correspondence with the persons, as we observed in the beginning of this disputation. But many are added, as tokens of renown, such as *the prosperous, the saviour, the friend of divinity*, and a variety of others of this kind. It appears to me, therefore, that we ought to neglect the discussion of these : but it is probable that we shall particularly find names properly fabricated, about eternal and natural beings ; for it is most becoming to study the position of names in these. But, perhaps, some of these are established by a power more divine than that of men.

HERM. You appear to me, Socrates, to speak excellently well.

SOC. Will it not therefore be just, to begin from the gods, considering the reason why they are properly denominated gods ?

HERM. It will be proper.

SOC. I therefore conjecture as follows :—It appears to me that the most ancient of the Greeks, or the first inhabitants of Greece, considered those only as gods, which are esteemed such at present by many of the Barbarians ; I mean, the sun and the moon, the earth, the stars, and the heavens. As they therefore perceived all these *running* round in a perpetual course, from this nature of *running* they called them gods ; but afterwards, understanding that there were others besides these, they called all of them by the same name. Has what I say any similitude to truth, or not ?

HERM. It possesses a perfect similitude.

SOC. What then shall we consider after this ?

HERM. It is evident that we ought to speculate concerning dæmons, heroes, and men.

SOC. Concerning dæmons ? And truly, Hermogenes, this is the proper method of proceeding. What then are we to understand by the name dæmon ? See whether I say any thing to the purpose.

HERM.

HERM. Only relate what it is.

Soc. Do you not know who those dæmons are which Hesiod speaks of?

HERM. I do not.

Soc. And are you ignorant that he says, the golden race of men was first generated¹?

HERM. This I know.

Soc. He says, therefore, concerning this, "that after this race was concealed by Fate, it produced dæmons² denominated holy, terrestrial, good, expellers of evil, and guardians of mortal men."

HERM. But what then?

Soc.

¹ The different ages of men which are celebrated by Hesiod; in his Works and Days, are not to be understood literally, as if they once really subsisted, but only as signifying, in beautiful poetical images, the mutations of human lives from virtue to vice, and from vice to virtue. For earth was never peopled with men either wholly virtuous or vicious; since the good and the bad have always subsisted together on its surface, and always will subsist. However, in consequence of the different circulations of the heavens, there are periods of fertility and sterility, not only with respect to men but likewise to brutes and plants. Hence places naturally adapted to the nurture of the philosophical genius, such as Athens and Egypt, will, in periods productive of a fertility of souls, such as was formerly the case, abound with divine men: but in periods such as the present, in which there is every where a dreadful sterility of souls, through the general prevalence of a certain most irrational and gigantic impiety, *αλογιστος και γιγαντικη ανοσιουργια*, as Proclus elegantly calls the established religion of his time, in Plat. Polit. p. 369—at such periods as these, Athens and Egypt will no longer be the seminaries of divine souls, but will be filled with degraded and barbarous inhabitants. And such, according to the arcana of ancient philosophy, is the reason of the present general degradation of mankind. Not that formerly there were no such characters as now abound, for this would be absurd, since mankind always have been, and always will be, upon earth, a mixture of good and bad, in which the latter will predominate; but that during the fertile circulations of the heavens, in consequence of their being a greater number of men than when a contrary circulation takes place, men will abound who adorn human nature, and who indeed descend for the benevolent purpose of leading back apostate souls to the principles from which they fell. As the different ages therefore of Hesiod signify nothing more than the different lives which each individual of the human species passes through, hence an intellectual life is implied by the golden age. For such a life is pure, and free from sorrow and passion; and of this impassivity gold is an image, through its never being subject to rust or putrefaction. Such a life, too, is with great propriety said to be under Saturn, because Saturn, as we have a little before observed, is pure intellect. But for a larger account of this interesting particular, and of the allegorical meaning of the different ages celebrated by Hesiod, see Proclus upon Hesiod, p. 39, &c.

² By dæmons, here, must not be understood those who are essentially such, and perpetually subsist as mediums between gods and men, but those only who are such *κατα σchein*, or according

Soc. I think, indeed, that he calls it a golden race, not as naturally composed from gold, but as being beautiful and good: but I infer this, from his denominating our race an iron one.

HERM. You speak the truth.

Soc. Do you not therefore think, that if any one of the present times should appear to be good, Hesiod would say he belonged to the golden race?

HERM. It is probable he would.

Soc. But are the good any other than such as are prudent?

HERM. They are the prudent.

Soc. On this account therefore, as it appears to me, more than any other he calls them *dæmons*, because they were *prudent* and *learned* (*δαίμονες*). And, in our antient tongue, this very name is to be found. Hence both he, and many other poets, speak in a becoming manner, when they say that a good man after death will receive a mighty destiny and renown, and will become a *dæmon*, according to the surname of prudence. I therefore assert the same, that every good man is *learned* and *skillful*; that he is *dæmoni*acal, both while living and when dead; and that he is properly denominated a *dæmon*.

HERM. And I also, Socrates, seem to myself to agree with you perfectly in this particular. But what does the name *hero*¹ signify?

Soc.

to habitude; or, in other words, the souls of truly worthy men, after their departure from the present life: for such, till they descend again upon earth, are the benevolent guardians of mankind, in conjunction with those who are essentially *dæmons*.

¹ Heroes form the last order of souls which are the perpetual attendants of the gods, and are characterized by a venerable and elevated magnanimity; and as they are wholly of an anagogic nature, they are the progeny of love, through whom they revolve about the first beauty in harmonic measures, and with ineffable delight. Men likewise, who in the present life knew the particular deity from whom they descended, and who lived in a manner conformable to the idiom of their presiding and parent divinity, were called by the antients, *sons of the gods*, *demigods*, and *heroes*: i. e. they were *essentially* men, but *according to habitude*, *κατὰ ὄρεσιν*, *heroes*. But such as these were divided into two classes; into those who lived according to *intellectual*, and those who lived according to *practical* virtue: and the first sort were said to have a god for their father, and a woman for their mother; but the second sort, a goddess for their mother and a man for their father. Not that this was literally the case; but nothing more was meant by such an assertion, than that those who lived according to an intellectual life, descended from a deity of the male order, whose illuminations they copiously participated; and that those who lived according to practical virtue, descended from a female divinity, such a species of life being more imbecile and passive than

SOC. This is by no means difficult to understand ; for this name is very little different from its original, evincing that its generation is derived from love.

HERM. How is this ?

SOC. Do you not know that heroes are demigods ?

HERM. What then ?

SOC. All of them were doubtless generated either from the love of a god towards a mortal maid, or from the love of a man towards a goddess. If, therefore, you consider this matter according to the antient Attic tongue, you will more clearly understand the truth of this derivation : for it will be evident to you that the word hero is derived from love, with a trifling mutation for the sake of the name : or you may say, that this name is deduced from their being wife and rhetoricians, sagacious and skilled in dialectic, and sufficiently ready in interrogating ; for *εἰπεν* is the same as to speak. Hence, as we just now said in the Attic tongue, those who are called heroes will prove to be certain rhetoricians, interrogators, and lovers : so that the genus of rhetoricians and sophists is, in consequence of this, an heroic tribe. This, indeed, is not difficult to understand ; but rather this respecting men is obscure, I mean, why they were called *αἰρωτοί*, *men*. Can you tell the reason ?

HERM. From whence, my worthy friend, should I be able ? And, indeed, if I was by any means capable of making this discovery, I should not exert myself for this purpose, because I think you will more easily discover it than I shall.

than the former. But the masculine genius in the gods, implies the cause of stable power, being, identity, and conversion ; and the feminine, that which generates from itself all-various progressions, divisions, measures of life, and prolific powers. I only add, that as the names of the gods were not only attributed by the antients to *essential* dæmons and heroes, but to men who were such according to *habitude*, on account of their similitude to a divine nature ; we may from hence perceive the true origin of that most stupid and dire of all modern opinions, that the gods of the antients were nothing but dead men, ignorantly deified by the objects of their adoration. Such an opinion indeed, exclusive of its other pernicious qualities, is so great an outrage to the common sense of the antients, that it would be disgraceful even to mention the names of its authors. For,

O'er such as these, a race of nameless things,
Oblivion scornful spreads her dusky wings.

SOC.

Soc. You appear to me to rely on the inspiration of Euthyphro.

HERM. Evidently so.

Soc. And your confidence is proper: for I now seem to myself to understand in a knowing and an elegant manner; and I am afraid, if I do not take care, that I shall become to-day wiser than I ought. But consider what I say. For this, in the first place, ought to be understood concerning names, that we often add letters, and often take them away, while we compose names just as we please; and, besides this, often change the acute syllables. As when we say *Δι φίλος*, a friend to Jove: for, in order that this name may become instead of a verb to us, we take away the other *ιωτα*, and, instead of an acute middle syllable, we pronounce a grave one. But, on the contrary, in others we insert letters, and others again we enunciate with a graver accent.

HERM. You speak the truth.

Soc. This, therefore, as it appears to me, takes place in the name *man*: for a noun is generated from a verb, one letter, *α*, being taken away, and the end of the word becoming more grave.

HERM. How do you mean?

Soc. Thus. This name *man* signifies that other animals, endued with sight, neither consider, nor reason, nor contemplate; but man both sees, and at the same time contemplates and reasons upon that which he sees. Hence man alone, of all animals, is rightly denominated *ανθρωπος*, viz. *contemplating what he beholds*¹. But what shall we investigate after this? Shall it be that, the inquiry into which will be very pleasing to me?

HERM. By all means.

Soc. It appears then to me, that we ought, in the next place, to investigate concerning soul and body; for we call the composition of soul and body, *man*.

HERM. Without doubt.

Soc. Let us, then, endeavour to divide these in the same manner as the former subjects of our speculation. Will you not therefore say, that we should first of all consider the rectitude of this name *soul*, and afterwards of the name *body*?

¹ For every thing receives its definition from its *huparxis*, or summit, which in man is *intellectual reason*; and this is entirely of a contemplative nature.

HERM.

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. That I may speak, then, what appears to me on a sudden, I think that those who assigned this name *soul*, understood some such thing as this, that whenever this nature is present with the body, it is the cause of its life, extending to, and refrigerating it with, the power of respiration; but that when the refrigerating power ceases, the body at the same time is dissolved and perishes: and from hence, as it appears to me, they called it soul (*ψυχή*). But, if you please, stop a little; for I seem to myself to perceive something more capable of producing persuasion than this, among the followers of Euthyphro: for, as it appears to me, they would despise this etymology, and consider it as absurd. But consider whether the following explanation will please you.

HERM. Only say what it is.

SOC. What other nature, except the soul, do you think gives life to the whole body, contains, carries, and enables it to walk about?

HERM. No other.

SOC. But what, do you not believe in the doctrine of Anaxagoras, that intellect and soul distribute into order, and contain the nature of every thing else?

HERM. I do.

SOC. It will be highly proper, therefore, to denominate that power which carries and contains nature, *ψυχή*: but it may more elegantly be called *ψυχή*.

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. And this latter appellation appears to me to be more agreeable to art than the former.

HERM. For it certainly is so.

SOC. But it would truly appear to be ridiculous, if it was named according to its composition.

HERM. But what shall we next consider after this?

SOC. Shall we speak concerning body?

HERM. By all means.

SOC. But this name appears to me to deviate in a certain small degree from its original: for, according to some, it is the *sepulchre* of the soul, which they consider as buried at present; and because whatever the soul

signifies, it signifies by the body; so that on this account it is properly called *σημα*, a *sepulchre*. And indeed the followers of Orpheus appear to me to have established this name, principally because the soul suffers in body the punishment of its guilt, and is surrounded with this enclosure that it may preserve the image of a prison¹. They are of opinion, therefore, that the body should retain this appellation, *σῶμα*, till the soul has absolved the punishment which is her due, and that no other letter ought to be added to the name.

¹ With this doctrine, that the body is the sepulchre of the soul, and that the soul suffers the punishment of her guilt in body, as in a prison, Heraclitus and the Pythagoreans perfectly agree. Thus Heraclitus, speaking of unembodied souls: Ζῶμεν τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον, τεθρῆκαμεν δὲ τοῦ ἐκείνων ζῆον, i. e. "We live their death, and we die their life." And Empedocles, blaming generation, beautifully says of her:

Ἐκ μὲν γὰρ ζῶων ἐτίθει νεκρά, εἶδε ἀμείβων.

"The species changing with destruction dread,
She makes the *living* pass into the *dead*."

And again, lamenting his connection with this corporeal world, he pathetically exclaims:

Κλαύσα τε καὶ κωκυσα, ἰδὼν ἀσυνήτῃα χῶρον.

"For this I weep, for this indulge my woe,
That e'er my soul such novel realms should know."

Thus too the celebrated Pythagorean Philolaus, in the following remarkable passage in the Doric dialect, preserved by Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromat.* lib. iii. p. 403: Μαρτυροῦνται δὲ καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ θεολογοὶ τε καὶ μαντεῖς, ὡς διὰ τινὰς τεμερίας, αἱ ψυχὰ τῶ σωματί συνεζευκταί, καὶ καθάπερ ἐν σωματί τούτῳ τεθαπται, i. e. "The antient theologists and priests also testify that the soul is united with body for the sake of suffering punishment; and that it is buried in body, as in a sepulchre." And lastly, Pythagoras himself confirms the above doctrine, when he beautifully observes, according to Clemens in the same book: Θάνατος ἐστὶν ὅκοσα ἐγερθέντες ὀρεομεν ὅκοσα δὲ εὐδόντες ὕπνος, i. e. "Whatever we see when awake is death, and when asleep a dream." Hence, as I have shown in my Treatise on the Eleusinian Mysteries, the antients by Hades signified nothing more than the profound union of the soul with the present body; and consequently, that till the soul separated herself by philosophy from such a ruinous conjunction, she subsisted in Hades even in the present life; her punishment hereafter being nothing more than a continuation of her state upon earth, and a transmigration, as it were, from sleep to sleep, and from dream to dream: and this, too, was occultly signified by the shows of the lesser mysteries. Indeed, any one, whose intellectual eye is not perfectly buried in the gloom of sense, must be convinced of this from the passages already adduced. And if this be the case, as it most assuredly is, how barbarous and irrational is the doctrine, which asserts that the soul shall subsist hereafter in a state of bliss, connected with the present body.

HERM. But it appears to me, Socrates, that enough has been said concerning these particulars. But do you think we can speak about the names of the gods, in the same manner as we considered the name of Jupiter, and determine the rectitude of their denominations?

SOC. By Jupiter, Hermogenes, if we are endued with intellect, we shall confess that the most beautiful mode of conduct, on this occasion, is to acknowledge that we know nothing either concerning the gods, or the names by which they denominate themselves¹: for it is evident that they call themselves by true appellations. But the second mode of rectitude consists, I think, in calling the gods by those names which the law ordains us to invoke them by in prayer, whatever the names may be which they rejoice to hear; and that we should act thus, as knowing nothing more than this: for the method of invocation which the law appoints appears to me to be beautifully established. If you are willing, therefore, let us enter on this speculation, previously, as it were, declaring to the gods that we speculate nothing concerning their divinities, as we do not think ourselves equal to such an undertaking; but that we direct our attention to the opinion entertained by those men who first fabricated their names: for this will be the means of avoiding their indignation.

HERM. You appear to me, Socrates, to speak modestly: let us therefore act in this manner.

SOC. Ought we not, therefore, to begin from Vesta, according to law?

HERM. It is just that we should.

¹ A modern reader will doubtless imagine, from this passage, that Plato denied in reality the possibility of knowing any thing concerning divine natures, and particularly if he should recollect the celebrated saying of Socrates, "This one thing I know, that I know nothing." But as Proclus beautifully observes, in his book on Providence, Socrates, by such an assertion, meant to insinuate nothing more than the middle kind of condition of human knowledge, which subsists between intellect and sense; the former possessing a total knowledge of things, because it immediately knows the essence of things, and the reality of being; and the latter neither totally knowing truth, because it is ignorant of essence, nor even the nature of sensible things, a knowledge of which is feigned to have a subsistence. So that the Oracle might well call Socrates the wisest of men, because he knew himself to be not truly wise. But who, except a wise man, can possess such a knowledge? For a fool is ignorant that he is ignorant; and no one can truly know the imperfection of human knowledge, but he who has arrived at the summit of human wisdom. And after this manner the present assertion of Plato must be understood.

Soc. What then shall we say is to be understood by this name 'Εστια?

HERM. By Jupiter, I do not think it is easy to discover this.

Soc. It appears, indeed, excellent Hermogenes, that those who first established names were no despicable persons, but men who investigated sublime concerns, and were employed in continual meditation and study.

HERM. But what then?

Soc. It seems to me that the position of names was owing to some such men as these. And, indeed, if any one considers foreign names, he will not less discover the meaning of each. As with respect to this which we call *ευσια*, *essence*, there are some who call it *εσια*, and others again *ωσια*. In the first place, therefore, it is rational to call the essence of things 'Εστια, according to one of these names, *εσια*: and because we denominate that which participates of essence 'Εστια, *essence*, Vesta may, in consequence of this, be properly called 'Εστια': for our ancestors were accustomed to call *ουσια*, *essence*, *ωσια*. Besides, if any one considers the business of sacrifice, he will be led to think that this was the opinion of those by whom sacrifices were ordained. For it was proper, that those who denominated the essence of all things 'Εστια (Vesta), should sacrifice to Vesta, before all the gods. But those who called *essence* *ωσια*, these nearly, according to the opinion of Heraclitus, considered all things as perpetually flowing, and that nothing had any permanent subsistence. The cause, therefore, and leader of things, with them, is *impulse*: and hence they very properly denominated this impelling cause *ωσια*. And thus much concerning the opinion of those who may be considered as knowing nothing. But, after Vesta, it is just to speculate concerning Rhea

* The goddess Vesta has a manifest agreement with *essence*, because she preserves the being of things in a state of purity, and contains the summits of the wholes from which the universe consists. For *being* is the most ancient of all things, after the first cause, who is truly super-essential; and Earth, which, among mundane divinities, is Vesta, is said by Plato, in the *Timæus*, to be the most ancient of all the gods in the heavens. This goddess first subsists among the liberated *απολυται*, gods, of whom we have already given an account in our notes on the *Phædrus*, and from thence affords to the mundane gods an unpolluted establishment in themselves. Hence every thing which is stable, immutable, and which always subsists in the same manner, descends to all mundane natures from this supercelestial Vesta. So that, from the stable illuminations which she perpetually imparts, the poles themselves, and the axis about which the spheres revolve, obtain and preserve their immoveable position; and the earth itself stably abides in the middle.

and Saturn, though we have discussed the name of Saturn already. But, perhaps, I say nothing to the purpose.

HERM. Why so, Socrates?

SOC. O excellent man, I perceive a certain hive of wisdom.

HERM. But of what kind is it?

SOC. It is almost ridiculous to mention it; and yet I think it is capable of producing a certain probability.

HERM. What probability is this?

SOC. I seem to myself to behold Heraclitus formerly asserting something wisely concerning Saturn and Rhea, and which Homer himself also asserts.

HERM. Explain your meaning.

SOC. Heraclitus then says, that all things subsist in a yielding condition, and that nothing abides; and assimilating things to the flowing of a river, he says, that you cannot merge yourself twice in the same stream.

HERM. He does so.

SOC. Does he, therefore, appear to you to conceive differently from Heraclitus, who places Rhea and Saturn among the progenitors of the other gods? And do you think that Heraclitus assigned both of them by chance, the names of streams of water? As, therefore, Homer¹ calls Ocean the generation of the gods, and Tethys their mother, so I think the same is asserted by Hesiod. Likewise Orpheus says,

In beauteous-flowing marriage first combin'd
Ocean, who mingling with his sister Tethys join'd².

Behold,

¹ Iliad ix.

² Ocean, according to Proclus, in Tim. lib. iv. is the cause, to all secondary natures, of all motion, whether intellectual, psychical (ψυχική) or natural. But Tethys is the cause of all the distinction and separation of the streams proceeding from the Ocean; conferring on each its proper purity, in the exercise of its natural motion. Ocean therefore may with great propriety be called the generation of the gods, as it is the cause of their progressions into the universe, from their occult subsistence in the intelligible order. But it is necessary to observe, that this mutual communication of energies among the gods was called by ancient theologists *ἱερός γάμος*, a *sacred marriage*; concerning which Proclus, in the second book of his MS. Commentary on the Parmenides, admirably remarks as follows: Ταύτην δὲ τὴν κοινωνίαν, ποτε μὲν ἐν τοῖς συστοιχοῖς ὁρῶσι θεοὶς (αἱ θεολογοὶ) καὶ καλοῦσι γάμον Ἥρος καὶ Διός, Οὐρανοῦ καὶ Γῆς, Κρόνου καὶ Ρέας· ποτε δὲ τῶν καταλειπτερώων πρὸς τὰ κρείττω, καὶ καλοῦσι γάμον Διὸς καὶ Δημητράς· ποτε δὲ καὶ ἐμπλαῖν τῶν κρείττωνων πρὸς τὰ υφεύμενα, καὶ λέγουσι Διὸς καὶ Κέρης γάμον. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν βίων ἀλλὰ μὲν τισὶν αἱ πρὸς τὰ συστοιχὰ κοινωνίαι, ἀλλὰ δὲ αἱ πρὸς τὰ προαὐτῶν ἀλλὰ

Behold, therefore, how all these consent with each other in their doctrine, and how they all tend towards the opinion of Heraclitus!

HERM. You seem to me, Socrates, to say something to the purpose, but I do not understand what the name Tethys implies.

SOC. But this nearly implies the same, and signifies that it is the occult name of a fountain; for *leaping forth*, and *straining through*, represent the image of a fountain. But from both these names the name Tethys is composed.

HERM. This, Socrates, is an elegant explanation.

SOC. What then shall we next consider? Jupiter we have already spoken of.

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. Let us, therefore, speak of his brothers, Neptune and Pluto, and that other name by which Pluto is called.

HERM. By all means.

SOC. He, therefore, who first called Neptune *πρωτεύων*, appears to me to have given him this name from the nature of the sea, restraining his course when he walks, and not permitting him to proceed any further, as if it be-

αλλαί δε αἰ πρὸς τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα. Καὶ δει τὴν ἑκάστης ιδιότητα κατανοεῖν καὶ μεταγίγειν ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν ἐπὶ τὰ εἶδη τὴν τοιαύτην διαπλοκὴν: i. e. "Theologists at one time considered this communion of the gods, in divinities coordinate with each other; and then they called it the marriage of Jupiter and Juno, of Heaven and Earth, of Saturn and Rhea. But at another time they considered it as subsisting between subordinate and superior divinities; and then they called it the marriage of Jupiter and Ceres. But at another time, on the contrary, they beheld it as subsisting between superior and subordinate divinities; and then they called it the marriage of Jupiter and Proserpine. For, in the gods there is one kind of communion, between such as are of a coordinate nature; another, between the subordinate and supreme; and another again, between the supreme and subordinate. And it is necessary to understand the idiom of each, and to transfer a conjunction of this kind from the gods, to the communion of ideas with each other." And in lib. i. in Tim. p. 26, he observes: Καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν (supple θεῶν) ἑτέροις, ἢ τὸν αὐτὸν θεὸν πλείοσι συζευγνύσθαι, λαβὼς ἂν ἐκ τῶν μυστικῶν λόγων, καὶ τῶν ἐν ἀποφρητοῖς λεγομένων Ἱερῶν Γάμων: i. e. "And that the same goddess is conjoined with other gods, or the same god with many goddesses, may be collected from the *mystic discourses*, and those marriages which are called, in the *mysteries*, *Sacred Marriages*." Thus far the divine Proclus; from the first of which admirable passages the reader may perceive how adultery and rapes are to be understood, when applied to the gods; and that they mean nothing more than a communication of divine energies, either between a superior and subordinate, or a subordinate and superior divinity. For none, but a person of the most simple understanding, would ever suppose that the ancient theological poets believed there was any such thing as marriage or adultery among the gods, according to the literal meaning of the words.

came

came a bond to his feet. He, therefore, denominated the ruler of this power *πρωιδων*, as *πρωιδεσμον οντα*, viz. *having a fettered foot*¹. The *ι* perhaps was added for the sake of elegance. But, perhaps, this was not the meaning of its founder, but two *λλ* were originally placed instead of *ι*; signifying that this god knows a multitude of things. And, perhaps, likewise he was denominated *σειων*, i. e. *shaking*, from *σειειν*, to *shake*, to which *α* and *δ* were added. But Pluto was so called from the donation of *πλουτος*, *wealth*, because riches are dug out of the bowels of the earth. But by the appellation *αιδης*, the multitude appear to me to conceive the same as *αιδεις*, i. e. *obscure and dark*; and that, being terrified at this name, they call him Pluto.

HERM. But what is your opinion, Socrates, about this affair?

SOC. It appears to me, that men have abundantly erred concerning the power of this god, and that they are afraid of him without occasion; for their fear arises from hence; because, when any one of us dies, he abides for ever in Hades; and because the soul departs to this god, divested of the body. But both the empire of this god, and his name, and every other particular respecting him, appear to me to tend to one and the same thing.

HERM. But how?

SOC. I will tell you how this affair appears to me. Answer me, therefore, Which of these is the stronger bond to an animal, so as to cause its detention, necessity, or desire?

HERM. Desire, Socrates, is by far the most prevalent.

SOC. Do you not think that many would fly from Hades, unless it held those who dwell there by the strongest bond?

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. It binds them, therefore, as it appears, by a certain desire; since it binds them with the greatest bond, and not with necessity.

HERM. It appears so.

SOC. Are there not, therefore, many desires?

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. It binds them, therefore, with the greatest of all desires, if it binds them with the greatest of bonds.

¹ See the Additional Notes on this Dialogue.

HERM.

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. Is there then any greater desire, than that which is produced when any one, by associating with another, thinks that, through his means, he shall become a better man?

HERM. By Jupiter, Socrates, there is not any.

SOC. On this account, Hermogenes, we should say, that no one is willing to return from thence hither, not even the Syrens themselves; but that both they, and all others, are enchanted by the beautiful discourses of Pluto. And hence it follows that this god is a perfect sophist; that he greatly benefits those who dwell with him; and that he possesses such great affluence as enables him to supply us with those mighty advantages which we enjoy; and from hence he is called Pluto. But does he not also appear to you to be a philosopher, and one endued with excellent prudence and design, from his being unwilling to associate with men invested with bodies, but then only admits them to familiar converse with him, when their souls are purified from all the evils and desires which subsist about the body? for this divinity considered, that he should be able to detain souls, if he bound them with the desire belonging to virtue; but that, while they possess the consternation and furious insanity of body, even his father Saturn would not be able to detain them with him, in those bonds with which he is said to be bound.

HERM. You seem, Socrates, to speak something to the purpose.

SOC. We ought then, O Hermogenes, by no means to denominate αἰδης from αἰδης, dark and invisible, but much rather from a knowledge of all beautiful things¹: and from hence this god was called by the fabricator of names αἰδης.

HERM.

¹ The first subsistence of Pluto, as well as that of Neptune, is among the supermundane gods, and in the demiurgic triad, of which he is the extremity. But his first allotment and distribution is according to the whole universe; in which distribution he perpetually administers the divisions of all mundane forms, and converts all things to himself. But his second distribution is into the parts of the universe; and in this he governs the sublunary region, and perfects intellectually the terrestrial world. His third progression is into that which is generated; and in this he administers, by his providence, the earth, and all which it contains, and is on this account called terrestrial Jupiter. But his fourth distribution is into places under the earth, which, together with the various streams of water which they contain, Tartarus, and the places in which souls are judged, are subject to his providential command. Hence souls, which after generation are purified and punished,

and

HERM. Be it so. But what shall we say concerning the names Ceres, Juno, Apollo, Minerva, Vulcan, Mars, and those of the other gods?

Soc. It appears that Ceres was so called from the donation of aliment, being, as it were, *διδουσα μητηρ*, or a *bestowing mother*¹. But Juno, from being *lovely*, on account of the love which Jupiter is said to have entertained for her². Perhaps also the founder of this name, speculating things on high, denominated the air *ἡρα*; and, for the sake of concealment, placed the beginning at the end. And this you will be convinced of, if you frequently pronounce the name of Juno. With respect to the names *Περσεφαστα*, or Proserpine, and Apollo, many are terrified at them, through unskilfulness as it appears in the recitation of names. And indeed, changing the first of these names, they consider *Περσεφονη*; and this appears to them as something terrible and dire. But the other name, *Περσεφαστα*, signifies that this goddess is wise: for that which is able to touch upon, handle, and pursue things which are borne along, will be wisdom. This goddess therefore may, with great propriety, be named *Περσεπασα*, or something of this kind, on account of her wisdom, and contact of that which is borne along³: and hence the wife *αἰδης*,

or

and either wander under the earth for a thousand years, or again return to their principle, are said to live under Pluto. And lastly, his fifth distribution is into the western centre of the universe, since the west is allied to earth, on account of its being nocturnal, and the cause of obscurity and darkness. Hence, from the preceding account of Pluto, since he bounds the supermundane demiurgic triad, and is therefore intellectual, the reason is obvious why Plato characterizes him according to a *knowledge of all beautiful things*; for the beautiful first subsists in intellect.

¹ See the Additional Notes on this Dialogue for an account of this goddess.

² Juno, so far as she is filled with the whole of Venus, contains in herself a power of illuminating all intellectual life with the splendour of beauty. And hence, from her intimate communion with that goddess, she is very properly characterized by Plato as lovely. But her agreement with Venus is sufficiently evident, from her being celebrated as the goddess who presides over marriage; which employment was likewise ascribed by the ancients to Venus.

³ Proserpine first subsists in the middle of the vivific supermundane triad, which consists of Diana, Proserpine, and Minerva. Hence, considered according to her supermundane establishment, she subsists together with Jupiter, and in conjunction with him produces Bacchus, the artificer of divisible natures. But considered according to her mundane subsistence, she is said (on account of her procession to the last of things) to be ravished by Pluto, and to animate the extremities of the universe, these being subject to the empire of Pluto. “But Proserpine (says Proclus, in Plat. Theol. p. 371) is conjoined paternally with Jupiter prior to the world, and with Pluto in the world, according to the beneficent will of her father. And she is at one time said to have been

or Pluto, associates with her, because of these characteristics of her nature. But men of the present times neglect this name, valuing good pronunciation more than truth; and on this account they call her *Φερρὸφαιττα*. In like manner with respect to Apollo, many, as I said before, are terrified at this name of the god, as if it signified something dire. Or are you ignorant that this is the case?

HERM. I am not; and you speak the truth.

SOC. But this name, as it appears to me, is beautifully established, with respect to the power of the god.

HERM. But how?

SOC. I will endeavour to tell you what appears to me in this affair: for there is no other one name which can more harmonize with the four powers of this god, because it touches upon them all, and evinces, in a certain respect, his *harmonic, prophetic, medicinal, and arrow-darting skill*¹.

HERM.

incestuously violated by Jupiter, and at another to have been ravished by Pluto, that first and last fabrications may participate of vivific procreation." According to the same author too, in the same admirable work, p. 373, the epithet of wisdom assigned to this goddess by Plato, in the present place, evinces her agreement with Minerva: and this correspondence is likewise shown by her contact of things in progression: since nothing but wisdom can arrest their flowing nature, and subject it to order and bound. But her name being terrible and dire to the multitude, is a symbol of the power which she contains, exempt from the universality of things, and which, on this account, is to the many unapparent and unknown.

¹ For an accurate and beautiful account of these four powers of the sun, and his nature in general, let the Platonic reader attend to the following observations, extracted from Proclus, on Plato's theology, and on the *Timæus*; and from the emperor Julian's oration to this glorious luminary of the world. To a truly modern reader, indeed, it will doubtless appear absurd in the extreme, to call the sun a god; for such regard only his visible orb, which is nothing more than the vehicle (deified as much as is possible to body) of an intellectual and divine nature. One should think, however, that reasoning from analogy might convince even a careless observer, that a body so transcendently glorious and beneficent, must be something superior to a mere inanimate mass of matter. For if such vile bodies, as are daily seen moving on the surface of the earth, are endued with life (bodies whose utility to the universe is so comparatively small), what ought we to think of the body of the sun! Surely, that its life is infinitely superior, not only to that of brutes, but even to that of man: for unless we allow, that as body is to body, so is soul to soul, we destroy all the order of things, and must suppose that the artificer of the world acted unwisely, and even absurdly, in its fabrication. And from hence the reader may perceive how necessarily impiety is connected with unbelief in ancient theology. But to begin with our account of the powers and properties of this mighty ruler of the world:

The

HERM. Tell me, then ; for you seem to me to speak of this name as something prodigious.

Soc.

The solar sun subsists in Jupiter, the perfect artificer of the world, who produced the hypostasis of the sun from his own essence. Through the solar fountain contained in his essence, the demiurgus generates solar powers in the principles of the universe, and a triad of solar gods, through which all things are unfolded into light, and are perfected and replenished with intellectual goods ; through the first of these solar monads participating unpolluted light and intelligible harmony ; but from the other two, efficacious power, vigour, and demiurgic perfection. The sun subsists in the most beautiful proportion to the good : for as the splendour proceeding from the good is the light of intelligible natures ; so that proceeding from Apollo is the light of the intellectual world ; and that which emanates from the apparent sun is the light of the sensible world. And both the sun and Apollo are analogous to the good ; but sensible light and intellectual truth are analogous to supereffential light. But though Apollo and the sun subsist in wonderful union with each other, yet they likewise inherit a proper distinction and diversity of nature. Hence, by poets inspired by Phœbus, the different generative causes of the two are celebrated, and the fountains are distinguished from which their hypostasis is derived. At the same time they are described as closely united with each other, and are celebrated with each other's mutual appellations : for the sun vehemently rejoices to be celebrated as Apollo ; and Apollo, when he is invoked as the sun, benignantly imparts the splendid light of truth. It is the illustrious property of Apollo to collect multitude into one, to comprehend number in one, and from one to produce many natures ; to convolve in himself, through intellectual simplicity, all the variety of secondary natures ; and, through one hyparxis, to collect into one, multiform essences and powers. This god, through a simplicity exempt from multitude, imparts to secondary natures prophetic truth ; for that which is simple is the same with that which is true : but through his liberated essence he imparts a purifying, unpolluted, and preserving power ; and his emission of arrows is the symbol of his destroying every thing inordinate, wandering, and immoderate in the world. But his revolution is the symbol of the harmonic motion of the universe, collecting all things into union and consent. And these four powers of the god may be accommodated to the three solar monads, which he contains. The first monad *, therefore, of this god is enunciative of truth, and of the intellectual light which subsists occultly in the gods. The second † is destructive of every thing wandering and confused : but the third ‡ causes all things to subsist in symmetry and familiarity with each other, through harmonic reasons. And the unpolluted and most pure cause, which he comprehends in himself, obtains the principality, illuminating all things with perfection and power, according to nature, and banishing every thing contrary to these.

Hence, of the solar triad, the first monad unfolds intellectual light, enunciates it to all secondary natures, fills all things with universal truth, and converts them to the intellect of the gods ; which employment is ascribed to the prophetic power of Apollo, who produces into light the truth contained in divine natures, and perfects that which is unknown in the secondary orders of things. But

* i. e. Mercury.

† Venus.

‡ Apollo.

Soc. This name then is well harmonized as to its composition, as belonging to an harmonical god: for, in the first place, do not purgations and purifi-

the second and third monads are the causes of efficacious vigour, demiurgic effecton in the universe, and perfect energy, according to which these monads adorn every sensible nature, and exterminate every thing indefinite and inordinate in the world.

And one monad is analogous to musical fabrication, and to the harmonic providence of natures which are moved. But the second is analogous to that which is destructive of all confusion, and of that perturbation which is contrary to form, and the orderly disposition of the universe. But the third monad, which supplies all things with an abundant communion of beauty, and extends true beatitude to all things, bounds the solar principles, and guards its triple progression. In a similar manner, likewise, it illuminates progressions with a perfect and intellectual measure of a blessed life, by those purifying and pæonian powers of the king Apollo, which obtain an analogous principality in the sun.—The sun is allotted a supermundane order in the world, an unbegotten supremacy among generated forms, and an intellectual dignity among sensible natures. Hence he has a two-fold progression, one in conjunction with other mundane gods, but the other exempt from them, supernatural and unknown. For the demiurgus, according to Plato in the *Timæus*, enkindled in the solar sphere a light unlike the splendour of the other planets, producing it from his own essence, extending to mundane natures, as it were from certain secret recesses, a symbol of intellectual essences, and exhibiting to the universe the arc anenature of the supermundane gods. Hence, when the sun first arose, he astonished the mundane gods, all of whom were desirous of dancing round him, and being replenished with his light. The sun, too, governs the two-fold coordinations of the world, which coordinations are denominated hands, by those who are skilled in divine concerns, because they are effective, motive, and demiurgic of the universe. But they are considered as two-fold; one the right hand, but the other the left.

As the sun, by his corporeal heat, draws all corporeal natures upwards from the earth, raising them, and causing them to vegetate by his admirable warmth; so by a secret, incorporeal, and divine nature resident in his rays, he much more attracts and elevates fortunate souls to his divinity. He was called by the Chaldeans, the seven-rayed god: and light, of which he is the fountain, is nothing more than the sincere energy of an intellect perfectly pure, illuminating in its proper habitation the middle region of the heavens: and from this exalted situation scattering its light, it fills all the celestial orbs with powerful vigour, and illuminates the universe with divine and incorruptible light.

The sun is said to be the progeny of Hyperion and Thea; signifying by this that he is the legitimate progeny of the supereminent god, and that he is of a nature truly divine. This god comprehends, in limited measures, the regions of generation, and confers perpetuity on its nature. Hence, exciting a nature of this kind with a sure and measured motion, he raises and invigorates it as he approaches, and diminishes and destroys it as he recedes: or rather, he vivifies it by his progress, moving, and pouring into generation the rivers of life. The sun is the unifying medium of the apparent and mundane gods, and of the intelligible gods who surround the good. So far as the sun contains in himself the principles of the most beautiful intellectual temperament, he becomes Apollo, the

purifications, both according to medicine and prophecy, and likewise the operations of pharmacy, and the lustrations, washings and sprinklings employed by

the leader of the Muses; but so far as he accomplishes the elegant order of the whole of life, he generates Esculapius in the world, whom at the same time he comprehended in himself prior to the world: and he generates Bacchus, through his containing the cause of a partial essence and divisible energy. The sun, too, is the cause of that better condition of being belonging to angels, dæmons, heroes, and partial divine souls, who perpetually abide in the reason of their exemplar and idea, without merging themselves in the darkness of body. As the sun quadruply divides the three worlds, viz. the empyrean, the æthereal, and the material, on account of the communion of the zodiac with each; so he again divides the zodiac into twelve powers of gods, and each of these into three others: so that thirty-six are produced in the whole. Hence a triple benefit of the Graces is conferred on us from those circles, which the god, quadruply dividing, produces, through this division, a quadripartite beauty and elegance of seasons and times. Minimus and Azizus, viz. Mercury and Mars, are the attendants of the sun, in conjunction with whom they diffuse a variety of goods on the earth. The sun loosens souls from the bands of a corporeal nature, reduces them to the kindred essence of divinity, and assigns them the subtle and firm texture of divine splendour as a vehicle in which they may safely descend to the realms of generation. And lastly, the sun being supermundane, emits the fountains of light; for, among supermundane natures, there is a solar world, and total light: and this light is a monad prior to the empyrean, æthereal, and material worlds.

I only add, that it appears, from the last chapter of the 4th book of Proclus on Plato's Theology, that the celebrated seven worlds of the Chaldeans are to be distributed as follows: One empyrean; three æthereal, situated above the inerratic sphere; and three material, consisting of the inerratic sphere, the seven planets, and the sublunary region. For, after observing, that of the comprehending triad of gods, one is fiery or empyrean, another æthereal, and another material, he inquires why the gods called Teletarchs, or sources of initiation, are distributed together with the comprehending gods? To which he replies, "Because the first, on account of his possessing the extremities, governs, like a charioteer, the wing of fire. But the second, comprehending the beginning, middle and end, perfects æther, which is itself triple. And the third, comprehending, according to one union, a round, right-lined and mixed figure, perfects unfigured and formless matter: by a round figure, forming that, which is inerratic, and the first matter: but by a mixed figure, that which is erratic, and the second matter; for there (that is, among the planets) circumvolution subsists: and by a right-lined figure, a nature under the moon, and ultimate matter." From this passage, it is evident that both Patricius and Stanley were mistaken, in conceiving the meaning of the account given by Pfellus (in his summary exposition of the Assyrian Dogmata) of these seven worlds; which, when properly understood, perfectly corresponds with that of Proclus, as the following citation evinces: *Ἑπτα δὲ ρασι κόσμους σωματικούς. Ἐμπύρεον ἓνα καὶ πρῶτον. καὶ τρεῖς μὲν αὐτοῦ αἰθερίους: ἑπείτα τρεῖς υδαίνου, το ἀπλανές, το πλανώμενον, καὶ το ὑποσέπινον.* "They assert that there are seven corporeal worlds; one empy-

rean,

by the divining art, all tend to this one point, viz. the rendering man pure, both in body and soul?

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. Will not then the purifying god, who washes and frees us from evils of this kind, be Apollo?

HERM. Perfectly so.

SOC. According, therefore, to the solutions and washings which he affords, as being the physician of such-like things, he will be properly called *απολυων* or *the liberator*; but according to his prophetic power and truth, he may be most properly called *ἄπλος*, or *simple*, as he is denominated by the Thessalians; since simplicity is the same with truth: for all the Thessalians call this god the simple. But, on account of his perpetually prevailing might in the jaculation of arrows, he may be called *αἰ βάλλον*, that is, perpetually darting. But with respect to his harmonic power, it is proper to take notice, that *α* often signifies the same as together, as in the words *ακολουθος*, *a follower*, and *ακοιτις*, *a wife*. So likewise in the name of this god, *α* and *πολησις* signify the revolution subsisting together with, and about the heavens, which they denominate the pole; and the harmony subsisting in song, which they call symphony. Because all these, according to the assertions of those who are skilled in music and astronomy, revolve together with a certain harmony. But this god presides over harmony, *ομοπολων*, i. e. converting all these together, both among gods and men. As, therefore, we call *ομοκελευθος*, and *ομοκοιτις*, i. e. going together, and lying together, *ακολουθος* and *ακοιτις*, changing *ο* into *α*, so likewise we denominate Apollo as *ομοπολων*, inserting at the same time another *λ*; because otherwise it would have been synonymous with a difficult name. And this many of the present time suspecting, through not rightly perceiving the power of this name, they are terrified at it, as if it signified a certain corruption. But in reality this name, as we just now ob-

rean, and the first; after this, three æthereal worlds; and last of all, three material, the inerratic sphere, the planetary system, and the sublunary region." But Patricius and Stanley conceived the passage, as if the three æthereal and three material worlds were distributed by the Assyrians into the inerratic sphere, the planets, and the sublunary world. It is likewise worthy of observation, that the Assyrians, as we are informed by Julian in his Hymn to the Sun, considered that luminary as moving beyond the inerratic sphere, in the middle of these seven worlds; so that the sun, in consequence of this dogma, must revolve in the last of the æthereal worlds.

served

served, is so composed, that it touches upon all the powers of the god, viz. his simplicity, perpetual jaculation, purifying, and joint-revolving nature.— But the name of the Muses, and universally that of Music, was derived, as it seems, from *μῦσθαι*, *to inquire*, and from investigation and philosophy. But *λητώ*, i. e. Latona, was derived from the mildness of this goddess, because she is *εὐελήμων*, viz. willing to comply with the requests of her suppliants. Perhaps, too, they denominate her as a stranger; for many call her *ληθω*: and this name *ληθω* they seem to have assigned her, because her manners are not rough, but gentle and mild. But *αἰρετις*, i. e. Diana, appears to signify integrity and modesty, through her desire of virginity. Perhaps also the founder of her name so called her, as being skilful in virtue¹. And it is not likewise improbable, that, from her hating the copulation of man and woman, or through some one, or all of these, the institutor of her name thus denominated the goddess.

HERM. But what will you say concerning Dionysius and Venus?

Soc. You inquire about great things, O son of Hipponicus. But the mode of nomination, belonging to these divinities, is both serious and jocose. Ask therefore others about the serious mode; but nothing hinders us from relating the jocose: for these deities are lovers of jesting and sport. Dionysius, therefore, is the giver of wine, and may be jocosefely called *διδυνυσος*. But *οἶνος*, wine, may be most justly denominated *οἶνους*, because it is accustomed to deprive those of intellect who possessed it before². But, with respect to Venus,

it

¹ We have before observed, that Diana first subsists in the supermundane vivific triad: and her being characterized according to *virtue*, in this place, evidently shows her agreement with Minerva, the third monad of that triad, who is the first producing cause of all virtues. This goddess, according to her mundane subsistence, is, as is well known, the divinity of the moon; from whence, says Proclus (in Plat. Polit. p. 353), she benignantly leads into light the reasons of nature, and is on this account called *Phœbe*, or *light-bearer*. He adds, that the moon was called by the Thracians, *Bendis*.

² Dionysius, or Bacchus, is the deity of the mundane intellect, and the monad of the Titans, or ultimate fabricators of things. This deity is said, in divine fables, to have been torn in pieces by the Titans, because the mundane soul, which participates of this divinity, and is on this account intellectual, is participated by the Titans, and through them distributed into every part of the universe. But the following beautiful account of this deity by Olympiodorus, in his MS. Commentary on the Phædo, will, I doubt not, be highly acceptable to the Platonic reader: Σπαρττεται δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγος ἐν τῇ γενεᾷ τῶν μοιῶν δὲ τιτάνων ὁ Διδυνυσος. Κατ' ἐπιβουλὴν δὲ τῇ Ηῑῶϊ, διότι κινῶν σέως ἐφορος
π. 2. 65

it is not proper to contradict Hesiod, but to allow that she was called *αφροδιτη*, through her generation from *αφρος*, foam¹.

HERM. But, Socrates, as you are an Athenian, you ought not to neglect the investigation of Minerva, Vulcan, and Mars.

Soc. For such a neglect is, indeed, by no means becoming.

HERM. Certainly not.

ἡ θεὸς καὶ προοδὸν· διὸ καὶ συνεχῶς ἐν τῇ Ἰλιάσιν ἐξανίστησιν αὐτὴ· καὶ διεγερτοὶ τὸν Δία εἰς προνοίαν τῶν δευτέρων· καὶ γενέσεως ἄλλως εὐφορὸς ἐστὶν ὁ Διόνυσος, διότι καὶ ζωῆς καὶ τελευτῆς· ζωῆς μὲν γὰρ εὐφορὸς, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τῆς γενέσεως, τελευτῆς δὲ διότι εἰθουσίαν ὁ οἶνος ποιεῖ. καὶ περὶ τὴν τελευτὴν δὲ εὐθευσιαστικωτέρως γινώσκου· ὡς δὲ οἱ παρ' Ὀμήρῳ Προκλὸς, μαντικὸς γεγονὼς περὶ τὴν τελευτὴν, καὶ τὴν τραγῳδίαν, καὶ τὴν κωμῳδίαν ἀνέσθαι φασὶ τῷ Διόνυσῳ. τὴν μὲν κωμῳδίαν παίγιον οὖσαν τοῦ βίου· τὴν δὲ τραγῳδίαν ὡς τὰ πάθη, καὶ τὴν τελευτὴν. οὐκ ἀρα παλὸς οἱ κωμικοὶ τοῖς τραγικοῖς ἐγκαλῶσιν, ὡς μὴ Διονυσιακοὺς οὖσιν, λέγοντες ὅτι οὐδὲν ταῦτα πρὸς τὸν Διόνυσον. κέρανοι δὲ τούτοις ὁ Ζεὺς, τοῦ κέρανου δῆλουτος τὴν ἐπιστροφὴν. τυ. ὅτι ἐπὶ τὰ ἀνὰ κινούμενα. ἐπιστρέφει εἰς αὐτοὺς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν. i. e. "The form of that which is universal is plucked off, torn in pieces, and scattered into generation and Dionysus is the monad of the Titans. But his laceration is said to take place through the stratagems of Juno, because this goddess is the inspective guardian of motion and progression: and, on this account, in the Iliad she perpetually rouses and excites Jupiter to providential energies about secondary concerns. And, in another respect, Dionysus is the inspective guardian of generation, because he presides over life and death: for he is the guardian of life, because of generation; but of death, because wine produces an enthusiastic energy. And we become more enthusiastic at the period of dissolution, as Proclus evinces agreeably to Homer; for he became prophetic at the time of his death. They likewise assert, that tragedy and comedy are referred to Dionysus; comedy, indeed, as being the play or jest of life; but tragedy, on account of the passions and death, which it represents. Comedians, therefore, do not properly denominate tragedians, as if they were not Dionysiacal, asserting at the same time that nothing tragical belongs to Dionysus. But Jupiter hurled his thunder at the Titans; the thunder signifying a conversion on high: for fire naturally ascends. And hence Jupiter by this means converts the Titans to himself."—Thus far the excellent Olympiodorus; from which admirable passage the reader may see the reason of Plato's asserting, that *the mode of nomination belonging to this divinity is both serious and jocose*.

¹ As Venus first subsists in the anagogic triad of the super-mundane gods, her production from the foam of the genitals of heaven may occultly signify her proceeding into apparent subsistence from that order of gods, which we have before mentioned, and which is called *νενος καὶ νορες*, *intelligible*, and at the same time *intellctual*; and likewise from the prolific and splendid power of this order, which the *foam* secretly implies. The nomination, too, of Venus, may be said to be *serious*, considered according to her supermundane subsistence; and she may be said to be *a lover of jesting and sport*, considered according to her mundane establishment; for to all sensible natures she communicates an exuberant energy, and eminently contains in herself the cause of the gladness, and, as it were, mirth of all mundane concerns, through the illuminations of beauty which she perpetually pours into every part of the universe.

Soc.

Soc. One of the names of Minerva, therefore, it is by no means difficult to explain.

HERM. Which do you mean?

Soc. Do we not call her Pallas?

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. This name, therefore, we must consider as derived from leaping in armour; and in so doing, we shall, as it appears to me, think properly: for to elevate oneself, or something else, either from the earth or in the hands, is denominated by us to vibrate and be vibrated, and to dance and be made to dance.

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. The goddess, therefore, is on this account called Pallas.

HERM. And very properly so. But how will you explain her other name?

Soc. Do you mean that of Athena?

HERM. I do.

Soc. This name, my friend, is of greater moment; for the ancients appear to have considered Athena in the same manner as those of the present day, who are skilled in the interpretation of Homer: for many of these explain the poet as signifying, by Athena, intellect and the dianoëtic power. And he who instituted names seems to have understood some such thing as this about the goddess, or rather something yet greater, expressing, by this means, the intelligence of the goddess, as if he had said that she is *θεωρον*, or deific intelligence, employing after a foreign mode α instead of η , and taking away ι and σ . Though perhaps this was not the case, but he called her *θεωρον*, as understanding divine concerns in a manner superior to all others. Nor will it be foreign from the purpose to say that he was willing to call her *ηθωρον*, as being intelligence in manners¹. But either the original founder of this name, or certain persons who came after him, by producing it into something which they thought more beautiful, denominated her Athena.

HERM.

¹ This whole account of Minerva is perfectly agreeable to the most mystic theology concerning this goddess, as will be evident from the following observations. In the first place, one of her names, Pallas, signifying to *vibrate* and *dance*, evidently alludes to her agreement with the Curetes, of the progressions of which order she is the monad, or proximately exempt producing cause. For the Curetes, as is well known, are represented as dancing in armour; the armour being a symbol of guardian power, through which, says Proclus, the Curetes contain the wholes

HERM. But what will you say concerning Vulcan?

Soc. Do you inquire concerning the noble arbiter of light?

HERM. So it appears.

Soc.

of the universe, guard them so as to be exempt from secondary natures, and defend them established in themselves; but the dancing, signifying their perpetually preserving the whole progressions of a divine life according to one divine bound, and sustaining them exempt from the incursions of matter. But the first subsistence of Minerva, considered as the summit, or, as it were, flower of the Curetes, is in the intellectual order of gods, of which Jupiter, the artificer of the world, is the extremity: and, in this order, she is celebrated as the divinely pure heptad. But as Proclus, in Tim. p. 51 and 52, beautifully unfolds the nature of this goddess, and this in perfect agreement with the present account of Plato, I shall present the following translation of it to the reader.

“In the father and demiurgus of the world many orders of unical gods appear; such as guardian, demiurgic, anagogic, connective, and perfective of works. But the one pure and untamed deity of the first intellectual unities in the demiurgus, according to which he abides in an uninclining and immutable state, through which all things proceeding from him participate of immutable power, and by which he understands all things, and has a subsistence separate and solitary from wholes;—this divinity all theologists have denominated Minerva: for she was, indeed, produced from the summit of her father, and abiding in him, becomes a separate and immaterial demiurgic intelligence. Hence Socrates, in the Cratylus, celebrates her as *θεον, or deific intelligence*. But this goddess, when considered as elevating all things, in conjunction with other divinities, to one demiurgus, and ordering and disposing the universe together with her father;—according to the former of these employments, she is called the philosophic goddess; but, according to the latter, philopolemic, or *a lover of contention*. For, considered as unifically connecting all paternal wisdom, she is philosophic; but, considered as uniformly administering all contrariety, she is very properly called philopolemic. Hence Orpheus, speaking concerning her generation, says “that Jupiter produced her from his head, shining with armour similar to a brazen flower.” But, since it is requisite that she should proceed into the second and third orders, hence in the Coric order (that is, among the first Curetes) she appears according to the unpolluted heptad; but she generates from herself every virtue and all anagogic powers, and illuminates secondary natures with intellect and an unpolluted life: and hence she is called *νενη τριτογενής, or a virgin born from the head of Jupiter*. But she is allotted this virgin-like and pure nature from her Minerval idiom. Add too, that she appears among the *liberated* gods with intellectual and demiurgic light, uniting the lunar order, and causing it to be pure with respect to generation. Besides this, she appears both in the heavens and in the sublunary region, and every where extends this her two-fold power; or, rather, she distributes a cause to both, according to the united benefit which she imparts. For sometimes the severity of her nature is intellectual, and her separate wisdom pure and unmixed with respect to secondary natures; and the one idiom of her Minerval providence extends to the lowest orders: for where there is a similitude among partial souls to her divinity, she imparts an admirable wisdom and exhibits an invincible strength.

But

Soc. This divinity, therefore, being φωστὸς, luminous, and attracting to himself ἦ, is called ἡφαιστος, or the arbiter of light ¹.

HERM. It appears so, unless you think it requires some other explanation.

Soc. But, that it may not appear otherwise to me, inquire concerning Mars.

HERM. I inquire then.

Soc. If you please, then, the name of Mars shall be derived from το ἀρρεν *masculine*, and το ανδρειον *bold*. But if you are willing that he should be called Mars, from his hard and inconvertible nature ², the whole of which is denominated ἀρρατον, this also will perfectly agree with the properties of the warlike god.

But why should I speak concerning her Curetic, daemoniacal, or divine orders, together with such as are mundane, liberated, and ruling? For all things receive the two-fold idioms of this goddess as from a fountain. And lastly, this goddess extends to souls, Olympian and anagogic benefits, exterminates gigantic and generation-producing phantasms, excites in us pure and unperverted conceptions concerning all the gods, and diffuses a divine light from the recesses of her nature "

¹ Light, according to Proclus, and I think according to truth, is an immaterial body, viz. a body consisting of matter so refined, that, when compared with terrene matter, it may be justly called immaterial: and Vulcan is the artificer of every thing sensible and corporeal. Hence this deity, when considered as the fabricator of light, may with great propriety be called *the arbiter of light*. For, since he is the producing cause of all body, and light is the first and most exalted body, the definition of his nature ought to take place from the most illustrious of his works. But this deity first subsists in the demiurgic triad of the liberated gods, and from thence proceeds to the extremity of things. He is fabled to be lame, because (says Proclus, in Tim. p. 44) he is the artificer of things last in the progressions of being, for such are bodies; and because these are unable to proceed into any other order. He is likewise said to have been hurled from heaven to earth, because he extends his fabrication through the whole of a sensible essence. And he is represented as fabricating from brass, because he is the artificer of resisting solids. Hence he prepares for the gods their apparent receptacles, fills all his fabrications with corporeal life, and adorns and comprehends the resisting and sluggish nature of matter with the supervening irradiations of forms; but, in order to accomplish this, he requires the assistance of Venus, who illuminates all things with harmony and union.

² The character of *hard* and *resisting*, which is here given to Mars, is symbolical of his nature, which (says Proclus, in Plat. Repub. p. 388) perpetually separates and nourishes, and constantly excites the contraries of the universe, that the world may exist perfect and entire from all its parts. But this deity requires the assistance of Venus, that he may insert order and harmony into things contrary and discordant. He first subsists in the *defensive* triad of the *liberated gods*, and from thence proceeds into different parts of the world.

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. Let us therefore dismiss our investigations concerning the names of the gods, as I am afraid to discourse about them. But urge me to any thing else you please, that you may see the quality of the horses of Euthyphro.

HERM. I will consent to what you say, if you will only suffer me to ask you concerning Hermes; for Cratylus says that I am not Hermogenes. Let us endeavour, then, to behold the meaning of the name Hermes, that we may know whether he says any thing to the purpose.

SOC. This name seems to pertain to discourse, and to imply that this god is an interpreter and a messenger, one who steals, and is fraudulent in discourse, and who meddles with merchandise¹: and the whole of this subsists about the power of discourse. As, therefore, we said before, *το εἰπεῖν* is the use of speech: and of this Homer frequently says, *ἐμνηστο*, i. e. he deliberated about it. This name, therefore, is composed both from to speak and to deliberate; just as if the institutor of the name had authoritatively addressed us as follows: "It is just, O men, that you should call that divinity, who makes speech the object of his care and deliberation, *Εἰρήμενος*." But we of the present times, thinking to give elegance to the name, denominate him *Ἑρμῆς*, Hermes. But Iris² likewise is so called, from *το εἰπεῖν*, to speak, because she is a messenger.

HERM. By Jupiter, then, Cratylus appears to me to have spoken well, in denying that I am Hermogenes; because I am by no means an excellent artist of discourse.

SOC. It is likewise probable, my friend, that Pan³ is the bipartite son of Hermes.

HERM. But why?

SOC. You know that speech signifies *the all*; that it circulates and rolls perpetually; and that it is two-fold, true and false.

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. Is not, therefore, that which is true in speech, smooth and divine,

¹ For an account of Hermes, see the Additional Notes to the First Alcibiades, vol. i.

² "Iris," says Proclus in his MS Commentary on the Parmenides, book v. "is an archangelic deity, the peculiarity of whose essence is to conduct secondary natures to their proper principle, according to the demiurgic intellect, and especially to lead them up to Juno, the ruler of all the mundane divinities of a feminine characteristic."

³ See the last note on the Phædrus, in vol. iii.

and dwelling on high in the gods; but that which is false, a downward inhabitant, dwelling in the multitude of mankind, and, besides this, rough and tragic? For in speech of this kind, the greater part of fables, and the falsities about a tragic life, subsist.

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. With great propriety, therefore, he who indicates every thing, and perpetually rolls, is *παναιπιολος*, the biform son of Hermes; who in his upper parts is smooth, but in his lower parts rough and goat-formed: and Pan is either speech, or the brother of speech, since he is the son of Hermes. But it is by no means wonderful that brother should be similar to brother. However, as I just now said, O blessed man! let us leave these investigations of the gods.

HERM. Gods of this kind, if you please, Socrates, we will omit; but what should hinder you from discussing the names of such divinities as the sun and moon, stars and earth, æther and air, fire and water, the seasons and the year?

Soc. You assign me an arduous task; yet at the same time, if it will oblige you, I am willing to comply.

HERM. It will so, indeed.

Soc. What therefore do you wish we should first investigate? Or shall we, agreeably to the order in which you mentioned these, begin with the sun?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. It seems, then, that this would become more manifest, if any one should use the Doric appellation: for the Dorians call the sun *αλιον*. He will therefore be *αλιος*, from his collecting men into one, when he rises; and likewise, from his always revolving about the earth. To which we may add, that this name belongs to him, because he varies, in his circulation, the productions of the earth. But *το ποικιλεν*, and *αιολειν*, have one and the same meaning.

HERM. But what will you say of *σεληνη*, or the moon?

Soc. This name seems to prefs upon Anaxagoras.

HERM. Why?

Soc. Because it seems to manifest something of a more antient date,
which

which he lately revived, when he said that the moon derives her light from the sun.

HERM. But how?

SOC. Σελας is the same with φως, *light*.

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. But this light about the moon is perpetually νεον and ενον, νεω and οld, if what the Anaxagorics say is true: for, perpetually revolving in a circle, it perpetually renews this light; but the light of the former month becomes old.

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. But many call the moon σελανοιας.

HERM. They do so.

SOC. But, because it perpetually possesses new and old splendour, it may be more justly called σελαεννορεια; but is now concisely denominated σελανοια.

HERM. This name, Socrates, is dithyrambic. But what will you say of month and the stars?

SOC. Μηνς, or month, may be properly so called, from μειουσθαι, *to be diminished*; but the stars appear to derive their appellation from αστρατη, *coruscation*. But αστηρις is denominated from ωπας ανιστηφει, i. e. converting to itself the light; but now, for the sake of elegance, it is called αστηρις.

HERM. But what is your opinion concerning fire and water.

SOC. I am in doubt with respect to fire; and it appears, that either the Muse of Euthyphro deserts me, or that this word is most extremely difficult to explain. Behold then the artifice which I employ, in all such things as cause me to doubt.

HERM. What is it?

SOC. I will tell you. Answer me, therefore: Do you know on what account πυρ, *fire*, is so called?

HERM. By Jupiter, I do not.

SOC. But consider what I suspect concerning it: for I think that the Greeks, especially such as dwelt under the dominion of the Barbarians, received many of their names from the Barbarians.

HERM. But what then?

SOC. If any one, therefore, should investigate the propriety of these
names

names according to the Greek tongue, and not according to that language to which the name belongs, he would certainly be involved in doubt.

HERM. It is likely he would.

SOC. Consider then, whether this name, *πῦρ*, is not of Barbaric origin: for it is by no means easy to adapt this to the Greek tongue; and it is manifest that the Phrygians thus denominate fire, with a certain trifling deviation; as likewise that *ὕδωρ* *water*, *κύων* *dogs*, and many other names, are indebted to them for their origin.

HERM. They are so.

SOC. It is not proper, therefore, to use violence with these words, since no one can say any thing to the purpose about them. On this account, therefore, I shall reject the explanation of *πῦρ* *fire*, and *ὕδωρ* *water*. But air, O Hermogenes, is so called, because it elevates things from the earth; or because it always flows; or because, from its flowing, spirit is produced: for the poets call spirits *αἶται*, *winds*. Perhaps, therefore, it is called *αἴη*, as if implying a *flowing spirit*, or a *flowing blast of wind*. But I consider æther as deriving its appellation from *always running in a flowing progression, about the air*; and on this account it may be called *αἰθερ*. But *γῆ*, or *earth*, will more plainly signify its meaning, if any one denominates it *γαῖα*. For *γαῖα* may be properly called *γεννητριά*, the *producer*, as Homer says; for he calls *γενναῖσι*, *γεννησθαι*, or *that which is produced in itself*.

HERM. Let it be so.

SOC. What then remains for us to investigate after this?

HERM. The hours, Socrates, and the year.

SOC. But *ώραι*, that is, *the hours*, must be pronounced in the Attic tongue, as that which is more ancient, if you wish to know the probable meaning of this word. For they are *ώραι*, on account of their bounding the winter and summer, as likewise winds and proper occasions subservient to the fruits of the earth. And hence, because they *bound*, *δέζουσαι*, they are most justly called *ώραι*. But *εἰναυτος* and *ετος*, *the year*, appear to be one and the same: for that which, at stated periods, educes into light the productions of the earth, and explores them in itself, is *the year*. And as in the foregoing part of our discourse we gave a two-fold distribution to the name of Jupiter, and asserted that he was by some called *Ζην*, and by others *Δις*; so likewise, with respect to *the year*, it is called by some *εἰναυτος*, because *it explores in itself*; but

ετος, because *it explores*. But the entire reason of its denomination is because it explores things in itself; so that two names are generated, ενιαυτος and ετος, from one reason.

HERM. But now, Socrates, you have certainly proceeded to a great length.

SOC. I seem, indeed, to have pursued wisdom to a considerable distance.

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. Perhaps you will urge me still further.

HERM. But after this species of inquiry, I would most gladly contemplate the rectitude of those beautiful names concerning virtue, such as φρονησις *prudence*, συνεσις *consciousness*, δικαιοσυνη *equity*, and all the rest of this kind.

SOC. You raise up, my friend, no despicable genus of names. But however, since I have put on the lion's skin, I ought not to fly through fear, but to investigate prudence and intelligence, consideration and science, and all the other beautiful names which you speak of.

HERM. We ought by no means to desist till this is accomplished.

SOC. And indeed, by the dog, I seem to myself not to prophesy badly, about what I understand at present, that those antient men who established names, experienced that which happens to many wise men of the present times; for, by their intense investigation concerning the manner in which things subsist, they became giddy, far beyond the rest of mankind, and afterwards, things themselves appeared to them to stagger and fluctuate. They did not however consider their inward giddiness as the cause of this opinion, but the outward natural fluctuation of things; for they imagined that nothing was stable and firm, but that all things flowed and were continually hurried along, and were full of all-various agitation and generation. I speak this, as what I conceive respecting the names which we have just now mentioned.

HERM. How is this, Socrates?

SOC. Perhaps you have not perceived that these names were established as belonging to things borne along, flowing, and in continual generation.

HERM. I do not entirely perceive this.

SOC. And, in the first place, the first name which we mentioned entirely pertains to something of this kind.

HERM. Which is that?

SOC. *Prudence*, or φρονησις: for it is the intelligence of local motion and fluxion. It may also imply the advantage of local motion; so that it is
plainly

plainly conversant with agitation. But if you will, *γνώμη*, or *consideration*, perfectly signifies the inspection and agitation of begetting: for *το νομάν* is the same as *το σκοπεῖν*, to *speculate*. Again, *νοησις*, or *intelligence*, if you please, is *τοῦ νέου εἰς*, or *the desire of that which is new*: but that things are new, signifies that they perpetually subsist in becoming to be. Hence, that the soul desires things of this kind, is indicated by him who established this name *νεοσις*: for it was not at first called *νοησις*, but two *ν* ought to be substituted instead of *η*, so as to produce *νεοσις*. But temperance signifies the safety of that prudence which we have just now considered: and science, indeed, implies that the soul does not disdain to follow things hurried along with local motion; and that she neither leaves them behind, nor goes before them. On which account, by inserting *ν*, it ought to be called *ἐπιστημένης*. But *συνεσις* appears to be, as it were, a syllogism. And when *συνιέναι* is said to take place, the same thing happens in every respect, as when any one is said *ἐπιστάσθαι*, to *know*: for *συνιέναι* asserts that the soul follows along with things in their progressions; but wisdom signifies the touching upon local motion. This, however, is more obscure and foreign from us. But it is necessary to recollect from the poets, that when they wish to express any thing which accedes on a sudden, they say *εὐθι*, *it rushed forth*: and the name of a certain illustrious Lacedæmonian was *Σους*, i. e. *one who rushes forward*; for thus the Lacedæmonians denominate *a swift impulse*. Wisdom, therefore, signifies the contact of this local motion, as if things were continually agitated and hurried along. But *το ἀγαθόν*, the *good*, signifies *that which excites admiration*, in the nature of every thing: for, since all things subsist in continual progression, in some swiftness, and in others slowness, prevails. Every thing, therefore, is not swift, but there is something in every thing which is *admirable*. Hence the name *ταγαθόν* is the same with *το φηστόν*, the *admirable*. But, with respect to the name *equity*, we may easily conjecture that it is derived from the intelligence of that which is just: but the signification of the *just itself*, is difficult to determine: for it appears that the multitude agree thus far to what we have said, but that what follows is a subject of doubt. For, indeed, such as think that the universe subsists in progression, consider the greatest part of it to be of such a nature that it does nothing else than yield to impulsion; that, on this account, something pervades through every thing, from which all generated natures are produced; and

that this pervading nature is the swiftest and most attenuated of all things: for it would not be able to pass through every thing, unless it was the most attenuated, so that nothing can stop its progression; and the swiftest, so that it may use other things as if in an abiding condition with respect to itself. Because, therefore, it governs all other things *δικαίον*, i. e. by pervading through them, it is properly called *δικαίων*, receiving the power of the *α* for the sake of elegant enunciation. And thus far the multitude agree with us, concerning the meaning of *το δικάιον*, *the just*. But I, O Hermogenes, as being assiduous in my inquiries about this affair, have investigated all these particulars, and have discovered in the *ἀπορρητα*, or sacred mysteries, that *the just* is the same with *cause*. For that through which a thing is generated, is the cause of that thing: and a certain person said, that it was on this account properly denominated *το δικάιον*. But, notwithstanding this information, I do not the less cease to inquire, O best of men, what *the just* is, if it is the same with *cause*. I seem, therefore, now to inquire further than is becoming, and to pass, as it is said, beyond the trench; for they will say that I have sufficiently interrogated and heard, and will endeavour, through being desirous to satisfy me, to give different solutions of the difficulty, and will no longer harmonize in their opinions. For a certain person says that the sun is *the just*, because the sun alone, by his pervading and heating power, governs all things. But when, rejoicing in this information, I related it to another person, as if I had heard something beautiful and excellent, he laughed at me when I told it him, and asked me if I thought that there was no longer any thing just in men after sun-set? Upon my inquiring, therefore, what *the just* was, according to him, he said it was fire. But this is by no means easy to understand. But another person said, it was not fire, but the heat which subsisted in fire. Another again said, that all these opinions were ridiculous, but that *the just* was that intellect which Anaxagoras speaks of; for he said that this was an unrestrained governor, and that it was mingled with nothing, but that it adorned all things, pervading through all things. But in these explanations, my friend, I find myself exposed to greater doubts than before I endeavoured to learn what justice is. But, that we may return to that for the sake of which we entered on this disputation, this name appears to be attributed to *equity*, for the reasons which we have assigned.

HERM.

HERM. You appear to me, Socrates, to have heard these particulars somewhere, and not to have fabricated them yourself.

Soc. But what do you say respecting my other explanations?

HERM. That this is not entirely the case with them.

Soc. Attentively hear then; for perhaps I may deceive you in what remains, by speaking as if I had not heard.—What then remains for us after equity? I think we have not yet discussed fortitude: for injustice is evidently a real hinderance to the pervading power; but fortitude signifies that it derived its appellation from contention, or battle. But contention in a thing, if it flows, is nothing else than a contrary fluxion. If any one, therefore, takes away the δ from this name $\alpha\upsilon\delta\eta\iota\alpha$ *fortitude*, the name $\alpha\upsilon\eta\iota\alpha$, which remains, will interpret its employment. Hence it is evident that a fluxion, contrary to every fluxion, is not fortitude, but that only which flows contrary to *the just*; for otherwise fortitude would not be laudable. In like manner $\tau\omicron$ $\alpha\tilde{\rho}\tilde{\rho}\tilde{\iota}\nu$, that is, the male nature, and $\alpha\eta\eta\varsigma$ *man*, are derived from a similar origin, that is, from $\alpha\omega\omega\tilde{\iota}\sigma\eta$, or *a flowing upwards*. But the name woman appears to me to imply *begetting*; and the name for the female nature seems to be so called from the pap or breast. But the pap or breast, O Hermogenes, seems to derive its appellation from causing to germinate and shoot forth, like things which are irrigated.

HERM. It appears so, Socrates.

Soc. But the word $\theta\alpha\lambda\lambda\epsilon\iota\nu$, *to flourish*, appears to me to represent the increase of youth, because it takes place swiftly and suddenly: and this is imitated by the founder of the name, who composed it from $\theta\epsilon\iota\nu$ *to run*, and $\alpha\lambda\lambda\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ *to leap*. But do you not perceive that I am borne, as it were, beyond my course, since I have met with words plain and easy? But many things yet remain, which appear to be worthy of investigation.

HERM. You speak the truth.

Soc. And one of these is, that we should consider the meaning of the word *art*.

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. Does not the word $\tau\epsilon\chi\eta\eta$, then, signify $\epsilon\chi\omicron\nu\omicron\eta$, or *the habit of intellect*, taking away for this purpose τ , and inserting ϵ between χ and η , and between η and η ?

HERM. And this in a very far-fetched manner, Socrates.

Soc. But do you not know, blessed man! that such names as were first

established, are now overwhelmed through the studious of tragic discourse; who, for the sake of elegant enunciation, add and take away letters; and who entirely pervert them, partly through ornament, and partly through time? For in the word *κατοπτρῶ*, a *mirror*, does not the addition of the *ρῶ* appear to you absurd? But such alterations as these are, I think, made by those who care nothing for truth, but are solicitous about the elegant conformation of the mouth: so that these men, having added many things to the first names, at length rendered it impossible for any one to apprehend the meaning of a name; as in the name *Sphynx*, which they call *σφρυγγ* instead of *σφρυξ*, and so in many others.

HERM. This is indeed the case, Socrates.

Soc. Indeed, if it should be allowed for every one to add to, and take away from names, just as he pleased, this would certainly be a great licence; and any one might adapt every name to every thing.

HERM. You speak the truth.

Soc. The truth indeed. But I think that you who are a wise president, ought to preserve and guard the moderate and the probable.

HERM. I wish I could.

Soc. And I also, O Hermogenes, wish the same in conjunction with you. But you should not, O demoniacal man, demand a discussion very exact, lest you perfectly exhaust my force: for I shall ascend to the summit of what I have said, when, after *art*, I have considered *artifice or skill*. For *μυχανη*, or *artifice*, seems to me to signify the completion of a thing in a very high degree. It is composed therefore from *μυκος*, length, and *ακναι*, to finish a thing completely. But, as I just now said, it is proper to ascend to the summit of our discourse, and to inquire the signification of the names virtue and vice.—One of these, therefore, I have not yet discovered; but the other appears to me to be manifest, for it harmonizes with all that has been said before: for, in consequence of every thing subsisting in progression, whatever passes on badly will be *depravity*; but this, when it subsists in the soul, badly acceding to her concerns, then most eminently possesses the appellation of the whole of depravity. But it appears to me, that the faulty mode of progression is manifest in *timidity*, which we have not yet discussed; though it is proper to consider it, after fortitude. And we likewise seem to have omitted many other names. *Timidity* therefore signifies, *that the bond of the soul is strong*: for the word

vehement

vehement implies a certain strength. And hence the most vehement and greatest bond of the soul, will be timidity: just as *want* is an evil; and every thing as it appears, which is an impediment to passing on and progression.—*Passing on badly*, therefore, seems, to evince a detention and hindrance of progression: and when the soul is thus affected, she then becomes full of evil. But if the name *vice* is applicable to such things as these, the contrary of this will be virtue; signifying, in the first place, facility of progression; and, in the next place, that the flowing of a good soul ought to be perpetually loosened and free. And hence, that which always flows unrestrained and without impediment, may, as it appears, very properly receive this denomination, *αἰσχροτή*. Perhaps also, some one may call it *αἰσπετή*, because this habit is the most eligible of all. Perhaps, too, you will say that I feign; but I assert, that if the preceding name *vice* is properly established, the same may be said of the name virtue.

HERM. But what is the meaning of *το κακόν*, *evil*, through which you explained many things in the word *depravity*?

SOC. It appears to me, by Jupiter, to imply something prodigious, and difficult to collect. I introduce therefore to this also the artifice mentioned above.

HERM. What is that?

SOC. To assert that this name is something Barbaric.

HERM. And, in so doing, you appear to me to speak properly. But, if you think fit, we will omit these, and endeavour to consider the rectitude of composition in the names, *the beautiful*, and *the base*.

SOC. *The base*, then, seems to me to evince its signification plainly, and to correspond with the preceding explanations: for he who established names appears to me, throughout, to have reviled that which hinders and detains the flowing of things; and that he now assigned the name *ἀεὶσχροῦρον* to that which always detains a flowing progression. But, at present, they call it collectively *αἰσχροτόν*.

HERM. But what will you say concerning the *beautiful*?

SOC. This is more difficult to understand, though they say that the *α* in this word, is produced only for the sake of harmony and length.

HERM. But how?

SOC.

Soc. It appears that this appellation is the surname of the dianoëtic energy.

HERM. How do you prove this ?

Soc. What do you think is the cause of the denomination of every thing ? Is it not that which establishes names ?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. Will not this cause, then, be the dianoëtic conception, either of gods, or men, or of both ?

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. To call things therefore, and *the beautiful*, are the same with dianoëtic energy.

HERM. It appears so.

Soc. Are not, therefore, the operations of *intellect* and the dianoëtic power laudable ; but such things as are not the result of their energies blameable ?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. That which belongs to medicine, therefore, produces medical works ; and that which belongs to the carpenter's art, carpentry works : or what is your opinion on the subject ?

HERM. The same as yours.

Soc. Does not therefore the *beautiful* produce things beautiful ?

HERM. It is necessary that it should.

Soc. But this as we have said, is dianoëtic energy.

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. Το καλον, therefore, or *the beautiful*, will be properly the surname of *prudence*, which produces such things as, in consequence of acknowledging to be beautiful, we are delighted with.

HERM. It appears to be so.

Soc. What then remains for us to investigate, of such like names ?

HERM. Whatever belongs to *the good* and *the beautiful* ; such as the names signifying *things conducive, useful, profitable, lucrative*, and the contraries of these.

Soc. You may find then what το συμφερον, or *the conducive* is, from our foregoing speculations ; for it appears to be a certain brother of science. For it evinces nothing else than the local motion of the soul, in conjunction with things ; and that things resulting from hence should be called συμφεροντα and συμφορα, i. e. conducive, from συμπεριφερειν, or *being borne along in conjunction*.

HERM.

HERM. It appears so.

Soc. But the name *lucrative* (κερδαλέον) is derived from κέρδος, *gain*. And if any one inserts a $\bar{\iota}$ instead of a $\bar{\epsilon}$ in this name, it will manifest its meaning : for it will thus, after another manner, become the name *for good* ; since he who assigned it this name intended to express that power which it possesses, of becoming mingled with, and pervading through all things, and thus, by placing $\bar{\iota}$ instead of $\bar{\epsilon}$, he pronounced it κέρδος.

HERM. But what will you say concerning λυσιτελεον, or *the useful* ?

Soc. It appears, O Hermogenes ! that this name was not established according to the meaning in which it is employed by inn-keepers, *because it frees from expense* ; but because it is the swiftest of being, and, in consequence of this, does not suffer things to stand still, nor *lotion*, by receiving an end of being borne along, to stop, and rest from its progression : but, on the contrary, it always departs from *lotion*, as long as any end remains to be obtained, and renders it unceasing and immortal. And, on this account, it appears to me λυσιτελεον was called *the good* ; for that which *dissolves the end of lotion* was called λυσιτελεον. But ωφέλιμον, or *the profitable*, is a foreign name ; and Homer himself often uses τῷ οφέλλειν. But this is the surname of *increasing and making*.

HERM. But what shall we say respecting the contraries of these ?

Soc. There is no occasion, as it appears to me, to evolve such as are the negations of these.

HERM. But what are they ?

Soc. The *non-conducive, useless, unprofitable, and the non-lucrative*.

HERM. You speak the truth.

Soc. But may we not inquire concerning ἐλαβεῖν and ζημιαῖος, the *noxious and pernicious*.

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. And το ἐλαβεῖν, indeed, or *the noxious*, says that it is ἐλαπτον τον ρεον. But ἐλαπτον signifies *that which wishes to bind* ; and ἄπτειν, *to bind*, is the same as δεῖν : but this it blames in every respect. He, therefore, who wishes ἄπτειν ρεον, i. e. *to bind that which flows*, will be most properly called εὐλαπτερον ; but it appears to me, that, for the sake of elegance, it was denominated ἐλαβεῖν.

HERM. A variety of names, Socrates, presents itself for your consideration ; and you just now appeared to me to have founded a prelude on your pipe,

pipe, as it were, of the melody belonging to Minerva, while you pronounced this name *Εὐλαπτέρων*.

Soc. I am not, Hermogenes, the cause of this, but he who founded the name.

HERM. You speak the truth ; but what will you say about *ζημιοῦδες*, *the pernicious* ?

Soc. I will tell you, Hermogenes, the meaning of this word ; and do you behold how truly I shall explain it, by asserting that men, through adding and taking away letters, very much vary the meaning of names, so that sometimes a very small alteration causes a word to imply the very contrary of what it did before. As, for instance, in the word *το δειν*, *the becoming* : for I understood, and called to mind just now, in consequence of what I am about to say to you, that this beautiful word *δειν* is new to us, and induces us to enunciate *το δειν* and *ζημιοῦδες* contrary to their meaning, and by this means to obscure their signification : but the antient name evinces the sense of both these words.

HERM. How is this ?

Soc. I will tell you. You know that our ancestors very frequently used the *ι*, and *δ*, and that this was not less the case with such women as particularly preserved the antient tongue. But now, instead of the *ι*, they perversely use either *ε* or *η*, and *ζ* instead of *δ*, as being more magnificent.

HERM. But how ?

Soc. Just as, for instance, the most antient men called day *ἡμερα*, and some of them *ἐμερα* ; but those of the present times *ἡμερα*.

HERM. This is indeed the case.

Soc. You know, therefore, that this antient name only manifests the conceptions of its founder ; for, because light emerges from darkness, and shines upon men rejoicing in and desiring its beams, they called day *ἡμερα*.

HERM. It appears so

Soc. But as it is now celebrated in tragical performances, you can by no means understand what *ἡμερα* means ; though some are of opinion that day is called *ἡμερα*, because it renders things *ἡμερα*, placid and gentle.

HERM. So it appears to me.

Soc. And you likewise know that the antients called *ζυγον*, *a beam*, *δυογον*.

HERM.

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. And ζυγον, indeed, manifests nothing: but that which subsists for the sake of bringing two things together, so that they may be bound, is very justly named δυογον. But it is now called ζυγον; and this is the case with a great variety of other particulars.

HERM. It appears so.

Soc. Hence then, the word δεον, when it is thus pronounced, signifies the contrary to all the names which belong to *the good*. For this name being a species of the good, appears to be a bond and impediment of local motion; as being the brother of βλαβερον, the noxious.

HERM. And indeed, Socrates, it appears to be very much so.

Soc. But this will not be the case if you use the antient name, which it is much more probable was properly founded than the present name. But you will agree with those antient good men, if you substitute $\bar{\epsilon}$ for ϵ ; for δεον, and not δειον, will signify that good which is celebrated by the institutor of names. And thus the founder of names will not contradict himself, but the names δεον, ωφελιμον, λυσιτελουν, κερδαινον, αγαθον, συμφρον, ευπορον, or *proceeding with facility*, will all of them appear to have the same meaning: for he meant to signify and celebrate, by different names, that which adorns and pervades through every part of the universe; and to reprobate that which detains and binds. And indeed, in the name ζημιωδες, if, according to the antient tongue, you substitute $\bar{\epsilon}$ for ϵ , it will appear to you that this name was composed from δουντι το ιον, or binding that which is in progression, and was called δημιωδες.

HERM. But what will you say concerning pleasure, pain, desire, and such like names?

Soc. They do not appear to me to be very difficult, Hermogenes: for *pleasure* seems to be an action tending towards emolument, and on this account to have derived its appellation; but the $\bar{\epsilon}$ was added, that it might be called ηδνη, instead of ηση. But *pain* seems to have derived its appellation from the dissolution of the body, which the body experiences in this passion: and the name *sorrow* was so called from impeding the motion of progression: but the name αλγιδων, i. e. *torment*, appears to me to be foreign, and to be so called from αλγεινος, *troublesome*. Οδυη, i. e. *anxiety*, was denominated from the ingress of pain.

HERM. It appears so.

Soc. But *αχθῆδων*, grief, clearly signifies that it is a name assimilated to the slowness of lation : for *αχθος* is a burthen, and *ιον*, any thing in progression. Joy seems to have received its appellation from the diffusion and easy progression of the flowing of the soul ; but *τερψις*, delight, was derived from *τερπνος*, the pleasant. But *το τερπνον* was so called, from being assimilated to the breathing of delight through the soul ; it was therefore justly called *ἐρπνον*, i. e. inspiring ; but in the course of time, it came to be denominated *τερπνον*. But, with respect to *εὐφροσύνη*, or hilarity, there is no occasion to explain *the why* of its denomination ; for it is obvious to every one, that it was so called from *εὐ* and *συμπερῆσθαι*, that is, from the soul's being well borne along in conjunction with things. Hence it ought, in justice, to be denominated *εὐφρωσύνη* ; but, notwithstanding this, we call it *εὐφροσύνη*. But neither is it difficult to discover the meaning of *ἐπιθυμία*, *desire* : for it evinces a power proceeding to *θυμός*, *anger*. But *θυμός*, *anger*, derives its appellation from *θυπέω*, and *ζέσσω*, *raging* and *ardour*. And again, *ἡμερος*, *amatory desire*, was so called from *ῥῶ*, or *a flowing which vehemently attracts the soul* ; for because it flows excited, and desiring the possession of things, it strongly allures the soul through the incitement of its flowing. And hence, from the whole of this power, it is called *ἡμερος*. But *πῶθος*, *desire*, was so called, from signifying that it is not conversant with present amatorial desire, and its effluxive streams, like *ἡμερος*, but with that which is elsewhere situated, and is absent. But, *ἔρις*, *love*, received its appellation from implying that it flows inwardly from an external source ; and that this flowing is not the property of him by whom it is possessed, but that it is adventitious through the eyes. And hence love was called by our ancestors *εἶρος*, from *εἶρειν*, to flow inwardly. But at present it is called *ἔρις*, through the insertion of *α* instead of *ο*. But what shall we consider after this ?

HEM. What *opinion*, and such-like names, appear to you to signify.

Soc. *Opinion*, *δόξα*, was denominated from the *pursuing* which the soul employs in her progressive investigations concerning the nature of things, or else from *the darting of an arrow* ; and this last appears to be the most likely derivation. Hence *αἰσῖς*, *opinion*, harmonizes with *δοξῶ* ; for it signifies the *οἰσῖς*, or ingress of the soul, in considering the *οἶον*, or quality of a thing. Just as *βουλή*, counsel or deliberation, is so called from *βάλῃ*, *hurting forth* : and *βουλεύσθαι*, to be willing, signifies to *ἐπισθῆναι*, to desire, and *βουλεύσθαι*, to consult. For all these following *δοξᾶ*, opinion, appear to be certain resemblances

blances of *βολή*, *hurling forth*; just as the contrary of this *αβουλία*, or *a want of counsel*, appears to be a misfortune, as neither hurling forth, nor obtaining that which it wishes for, about which it deliberates, and which is the object of its desire.

HERM. You seem to me, Socrates, to have introduced these particulars with great density of conception; let us therefore now, if it is pleasing to divinity, end the discussion. Yet I should wish you to explain the meaning of *necessity*, which is consequent to what we have already unfolded, and *that which is voluntary*.

Soc. Το ἐκουσιον, therefore, or *the voluntary*, signifies that which yields and does not resist, but as I may say *εἰκον τῷ ἰοντι*, *yields to that which is in progression*; and thus evinces that this name subsists according to *βουλήσις*, *the will*. But το ἀναγκαιον and ἀντιτυπον, i. e. *the necessary* and *the resisting*, since they are contrary to the will, must subsist about *guilt* and *ignorance*. But they are assimilated to a progression through a valley; because, on account of their being passed through with difficulty, and their rough and dense nature, like a place thick-planted with trees, they impede progression. And hence, perhaps, *necessity* was denominated from an assimilation to a *progression through a valley*. But as long as our strength remains we ought not to desert it; do not therefore desist, but still interrogate me.

HERM. I ask you then about things the greatest and most beautiful, viz. *truth*, *falsehood*, and *being*; and why *name*, which is the subject of our present disputation, was so called?

Soc. What therefore do you call *μαεσθαι*?

HERM. I call it *ζῆτειν*, *to inquire*.

Soc. It appears then that this word *ονομα*, *a name*, was composed from that discourse which asserts that *ον*, *being*, is that about which name inquires. But this will be more evident to you, in that which we call *ονομαστον*, or *capable of being named*; for in this it clearly appears that *name* is *an inquiry about being*. With respect to *ἀληθεία*, *truth*, this name seems to have been mingled, as well as many others; for this name appears to have received its composition from the divine lation of being, and therefore implies that it is *θεῖα ἀλη*, *a divine wandering*. But *ψευδός*, *falsehood*, signifies the contrary to lation. For here again the institutor of names blames that which detains and compels any thing

thing to rest. This name, however, is assimilated to those who are asleep; but the addition of the τ conceals its meaning. But *ov*, *being*, and *ουσια*, *essence*, harmonize with truth, by receiving the addition of an *i*; for then they will signify *iov*, or that which is in progression. And again, *το ουν ov*, or *non-being*, is by some denominated *ουν iov*; that is, *not proceeding*.

HERM. You appear to me, Socrates, to have discussed these particulars in a very strenuous manner. But if any one should ask you, what rectitude of nomination there is in the words *iov*, *proceeding*, *πειρ*, *flowing*, and *δουν*, *binding*, would you be able to answer him or not?

Soc. I should perfectly so. And something just now occurred to me, by the mentioning of which I may appear to say something to the purpose.

HERM. What is it?

Soc. That, if we are ignorant of any thing, we should say, it is of Barbaric origin: for, perhaps, this is really the case with some names; and others are, perhaps, inscrutable on account of their antiquity. For, through names being every where wrested from their proper construction, it will be by no means wonderful, if the antient tongue, when compared with the present, is in no respect different from a Barbaric language.

HERM. And, indeed, you say nothing foreign from the purpose.

Soc. I say that, indeed, which is probable; but yet the contest does not appear to me to admit of an excuse. Let us, however, endeavour to consider this affair, and make our inquiry, as follows: If any one should always investigate those words through which a name derives its subsistence, and again those words through which words are enunciated, and should do this without ceasing, would not he who answers such a one at length fail in his replies?

HERM. It appear so to me.

Soc. When, therefore, will he who fails to answer, justly fail? Will it not be when he arrives at those names which are, as it were, the elements both of other discourses and names? For these, if they have an elementary subsistence, can no longer be justly said to be composed from other names. Just as we said above, that *το αγαθον* was composed from *αγατος*, *admirable*, and *δωος*, *swift*. But *δωος*, we may perhaps say, is composed from other words, and these last again from others: but if we ever apprehend that which

is no longer composed from other names, we may justly say, that we have at length arrived at an element; and that we ought no longer to refer this to other names.

HERM. You seem to me to speak properly.

SOC. Are not the names, then, which are the subject of your present inquiry, elements? And is it not necessary that the rectitude of their formation should be considered in a manner different from that of others?

HERM. It is probable.

SOC. It is probable certainly, Hermogenes. All the former names, therefore, must be reduced to these: and if this be the case, as it appears to me it is, consider again along with me, lest I should act like one delirious, while I am explaining what the rectitude of the first names ought to be.

HERM. Only do but speak; and I will endeavour to the utmost of my ability to speculate in conjunction with you.

SOC. I think then you will agree with me in this, that there is one certain rectitude of every name, as well of that which is first as of that which is last; and that none of these differ from one another, so far as they are names.

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. But the rectitude of those names which we have just now discussed, consists in evincing the quality of every thing.

HERM. How should it be otherwise?

SOC. This property, then, ought no less to belong to prior than posterior names, if they have the proper requisites of names.

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. But posterior names, as it appears, produce this through such as are prior.

HERM. It appears so.

SOC. Be it so then. But after what manner can first names, which have no others preceding them, be able, as much as possible, to unfold to us the nature of things, if they have the properties of names? But answer me this question: If we had neither voice nor tongue, and yet wished to manifest things to one another, should we not, like those who are at present mute, endeavour to signify our meaning by the hands, head, and other parts of the body?

HERM. How could it be otherwise, Socrates?

SOC. I think, therefore, that if we wished to signify that which is upwards
and

and light, we should raise our hands towards the heavens, imitating the nature of the thing itself; but that if we wished to indicate things downwards and heavy, we should point with our hands to the earth. And again, if we were desirous of signifying a running horse, or any other animal, you know, that we should fashion the gestures and figures of our bodies, as near as possible, to a similitude of these things.

HERM. It appears to me, that it would necessarily be as you say.

SOC. In this manner then, I think, the manifestations of the body would take place; the body imitating, as it seems, that which it wishes to render apparent.

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. But since we wish to manifest a thing by our voice, tongue, and mouth, will not a manifestation of every thing then take place through these, when an imitation of any thing subsists through these?

HERM. It appears to me, that it must be necessarily so.

SOC. A name then, as it seems, is an imitation of voice, by which every one who imitates any thing, imitates and nominates through voice.

HERM. It appears so to me.

SOC. But, by Jupiter, my friend, I do not think that I have yet spoken in a becoming manner.

HERM. Why?

SOC. Because we must be compelled to confess, that those who imitate sheep and cocks, and other animals, give names to the things which they imitate.

HERM. You speak the truth.

SOC. But do you think this is becoming?

HERM. I do not. But what imitation, Socrates, will a name be?

SOC. In the first place, as it appears to me, it will not be such an intimation as that which takes place through music, although this imitation should be effected by the voice: nor, in the next place, though we should imitate the same things as music imitates, yet we should not appear to me to denominate things. But I reason thus: Is there not a certain voice, figure, and colour, in many things?

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. It appears, therefore, that though any one should imitate these, yet
the

the denominating art would not be conversant with these imitations: for these are partly musical, and partly the effects of painting. Is not this the case?

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. But what will you say to this? Do you not think that there is an essence belonging to every thing, as well as colour, and such things as we just now mentioned? And, in the first place, is there not an essence belonging to colour, and voice, and to every thing else, which is considered as deserving the appellation of being?

HERM. It appears so to me.

SOC. But what then? If any one is able to imitate the essence of every thing, by letters and syllables, must he not evince what every thing is?

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. And how would you denominate him who is able to do this? For, with respect to the former characters, one you called musical, and the other conversant with painting. But how will you call this character?

HERM. This person, Socrates, appears to me to be that institutor of names which we formerly fought after.

SOC. If this then is true, as it appears to be, let us consider about those names which are the subjects of your inquiry, i. e. *πον, flowing, ιερα, te go, αχρεσις, habitude*, whether, in the letters and syllables from which they are composed, they really imitate essence, or not.

HERM. By all means.

SOC. Come then, let us see whether these alone belong to the first names, or many others besides these.

HERM. I think that this is the case with many others besides these.

SOC. And your opinion is probable. But what will the mode of division be, from whence the imitator will begin to imitate? Since then the imitation of essence subsists through letters and syllables, will it not be most proper to distribute in the first place the elements? just as those who are conversant with rhythms, in the first place, distribute the powers of the elements, and afterwards of the syllables; and thus at length begin to speculate the rhythms themselves, but never till this is accomplished.

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. In like manner, therefore, ought not we first of all to divide the
vowels,

vowels, and afterwards the rest according to species, both mutes and semivowels? For this is the language of those who are skilled in these matters. And again, ought we not after this to divide such as are capable of being founded indeed, yet are not semivowels, and consider the different species of vowels, with reference to one another? And after we have properly distributed all these, it is again requisite to impose names, and to consider, if there are certain things into which both these may be referred as elements; and from which both these may be known; and whether species are contained in them after the same manner as in the elements. But all these particulars being contemplated in a becoming manner, it is proper to know how to introduce each according to similitude; whether one ought to be introduced to one, or many mingled together: just as painters, when they wish to produce a resemblance, sometimes only introduce a purple colour, and sometimes any other paint: and sometimes again they mingle many colours together, as when they make preparations for the purpose of producing the likeness of a man, or any thing else of this kind; and this in such a manner, I think, as to give to every image the colours which it requires. In the same manner we should accommodate the elements of words to things, and one to one, wherever it appears to be necessary, and should fabricate symbols, which they call syllables. And again, combining these syllables together, from which nouns and verbs are composed, we should again from these nouns and verbs compose something beautiful and entire; that what the animal described by the painter's art was in the above instance, discourse may be in this; whether constructed by the onomastic, or rhetorical, or any other art. Or rather this ought not to be *our* employment, since we have already surpassed the bounds of our discourse; for, if this is the proper mode of composition, it was adopted by the antients. But if we mean to speculate artificially, it is proper that, distinguishing all these, we should consider whether or not first and last names are established in a proper manner; for to connect them without adopting such a method would be erroneous, my dear Hermogenes, and improper.

HERM. Perhaps so, indeed, by Jupiter, Socrates.

SOC. What then? Do you believe that you can divide them in this manner? for I cannot.

HERM.

HERM. There is much greater reason, then, that I should not be able to do this.

Soc. Let us give up the attempt then : or are you willing that we should undertake it to the best of our ability, though we are able to know but very little concerning such particulars ? But as we said before respecting the gods, that, knowing nothing of the truth belonging to their names, we might conjecture the dogmas of men concerning them ; so now, with regard to the present subject, we may proceed in its investigation, declaring that, if these particulars have been properly distributed, either by us or by any other, they ought, doubtless, to have been so divided. Now, therefore, as it is said, it is requisite that we should treat concerning them in the best manner we are able. Or, what is your opinion on the subject ?

HERM. Perfectly agreeable to what you say.

Soc. It is ridiculous, I think, Hermogenes, that things should become manifest through imitation produced by letters and syllables : and yet it is necessary ; for we have not any thing better than this, by means of which we may judge concerning the truth of the first names ; unless, perhaps, as the composers of tragedies, when they are involved in any difficulty, fly to their machinery, introducing the gods, in order to free them from their embarrassment ; so we shall be liberated from our perplexity, by asserting that the gods established the first names, and that on this account they are properly instituted. Will not such an assertion be our strongest defence ? or that which declares we received them from certain Barbarians ? For the Barbarians are more ancient than us. Or shall we say that, through antiquity, it is impossible to perceive their meaning, as is the case with Barbaric names ? But all these solutions will only be so many plunderings, and very elegant evasions of those who are not willing to render a proper reason concerning the right imposition of the first names ; though, indeed, he who is ignorant of the proper establishment of first names cannot possibly know such as are posterior ; for the evidence of the latter must necessarily be derived from the former ; and with these he is perfectly unacquainted. But it is evident, that he who professes a skill in posterior names ought to be able to explain such as are first, in the most eminent and pure manner, or, if this is not the case, to be well convinced that he trifles in his explanation of posterior names. Or does it appear otherwise to you ?

HERM. No otherwise, Socrates.

SOC. My conceptions then, about the first names, appear to me very insolent and ridiculous. If you are willing, therefore, I will communicate them to you; and do you, in your turn, if you have any thing better to offer, impart it to me.

HERM. I will do so; but speak confidently.

SOC. In the first place, then, ρ appears to me to be as it were the organ of all motion, though we have not yet explained why motion is called $\kappaίνησις$. But it is evident that it implies $εἰσις$, *going*; for π was not formerly used, but τ . But its origin is from $\kappaίειν$, *to go*, which is a foreign name, and signifies $εἰναί$. If, therefore, any one could find out its antient name, when transferred to our tongue, it might be very properly called $εἰσις$. But now from the foreign name $\kappaίειν$, and the change of the π , together with the interposition of the τ , it is called $\kappaίνησις$. It ought, however, to be called $\kappaεινησις$, or $εἰσις$. But $\sigmaτασις$, or *abiding*, is the negation of $εἰναί$, *to go*; and for the sake of ornament is called $\sigmaτασις$. The element, therefore, ρ , as I said, appeared to the institutor of names to be a beautiful instrument of motion, for the purpose of expressing a similitude to lation; and hence he every where employed it for this purpose. And in the first place, the words $ρεῖν$ and $ρον$, that is, *to flow*, and *flowing*, imitate lation, or local motion, by this letter; and this resemblance is found, in the next place, in the words $τρομος$ and $τραχὺς$, i. e. *trembling*, and *rough*; also, in words of this kind, $κραίνειν$, *to strike*; $δραίνειν$, *to wound*; $ερχεῖν$, *to draw*; $θρυπτειν$, *to break*; $κερματίζειν$, *to cut into small pieces*; and $ῥεμίζειν$, *to roll round*. For all these very much represent motion through the ρ . Not to mention that the tongue, in pronouncing this letter, is detained for the least space of time possible, and is agitated in the most eminent degree; and on this account it appears to me that this letter was employed in these words. But the institutor of names used the τ for the purpose of indicating all attenuated natures, and which eminently penetrate through all things. And hence this is imitated by the words $εἰναί$ and $εἰσθαί$, *to go*, and *to proceed*, through the τ : just as through ϕ , ψ , σ , and ξ , because these letters are more inflated, the author of names indicated all such things as $\psiυχρον$, *the cold*; $\zetaεον$, *the fervid*; $σεισθαί$, *to be shaken*; and universally $σεισμον$, *convulsion*. And when he wished to imitate any thing very much inflated, he every where, for the most part, appears to have introduced such-like letters.

But

But he seems to have thought that the power of compressing δ and τ , and the tongue's action in adhering, were useful for the purpose of imitating the words $\delta\epsilon\sigma\mu\omicron\varsigma$, *a bond*, and $\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\iota\varsigma$, *abiding*. And because the tongue remarkably slides in pronouncing λ , the institutor of names perceiving this, and employing this letter in an assimilative way, he established the names $\lambda\epsilon\iota\alpha$, *smooth*; $\omicron\lambda\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\iota\upsilon\epsilon\iota\nu$, *to slip*; $\lambda\iota\pi\alpha\rho\omicron\nu$, *unctuous*; $\kappa\omicron\lambda\lambda\omega\delta\epsilon\varsigma$, *liquid*; and all other such-like words. But in consequence of the tongue sliding through λ , he employed the power of the τ , and thus imitated $\gamma\lambda\iota\sigma\chi\chi\rho\omicron\nu$, *the slippery*; $\gamma\lambda\upsilon\kappa\upsilon$, *the sweet*; and $\gamma\lambda\epsilon\iota\omega\delta\epsilon\varsigma$, *the viscous*. Perceiving likewise that the sound of the τ was inward, he denominated $\tau\omicron\epsilon\nu\delta\omicron\nu$, *the inward*, and $\tau\alpha\epsilon\nu\tau\iota\varsigma$, *things inward*, that he might assimilate words to letters. But he assigned α to $\mu\epsilon\gamma\alpha\lambda\omicron\nu$, *the great*, and η to $\mu\eta\kappa\omicron\varsigma$, *length*, because these letters are great. But in the construction of $\sigma\tau\rho\omicron\gamma\gamma\upsilon\lambda\omicron\nu$, *round*, which requires the letter σ , he mingled ϵ abundantly. And in the same manner the legislator appears to have accommodated other letters and syllables to every thing which exists, fabricating a signature and name; and from these, in an assimilative manner, to have composed the other species of names. This, Hermogenes, appears to me to be the rectitude of names, unless Cratylus here asserts any thing else.

HERM. And, indeed, Socrates, Cratylus often finds me sufficient employment, as I said in the beginning, while he declares that there is a rectitude of names, but does not clearly inform me what it is; so that I cannot tell whether he is willingly or unwillingly thus obscure in his assertions. Now, therefore, Cratylus, speak before Socrates, and declare whether you are pleased with what Socrates has said respecting names, or whether you have any thing to say on the subject more excellent; and if you have, disclose it, that either you may learn from Socrates, or that you may teach both of us.

CRAT. But what, Hermogenes! Does it appear to you to be an easy matter to perceive and teach any thing so suddenly, and much more that which seems to be the greatest, among things which are the greatest?

HERM. To me, by Jupiter, it does not; but that assertion of Hesiod[†] appears to me very beautiful, "that it is worth while to add a little to a little." If, therefore, you are able to accomplish any thing, though but trifling, do not be weary, but extend your beneficence both to Socrates and me.

[†] Opera et Dies, lib. i.

Soc. And, indeed, Cratylus, I do not confidently vindicate any thing which I have above asserted; but I have considered with Hermogenes what appeared to me to be the truth: so that on this account speak boldly, if you have any thing better to offer, as I am ready to receive it. Nor shall I be surprised if you produce something more beautiful on this subject; for you appear to me to have employed yourself in speculations of this kind, and to have been instructed in them by others. If, therefore, you shall assert any thing more excellent, you may set me down as one of your disciples about the rectitude of names.

CRAT. But, indeed, Socrates, as you say, I have made this the subject of my meditations, and perhaps I shall bring you over to be one of my disciples: and yet I am afraid that the very contrary of all this will take place: for, in a certain respect, I ought to say to you what Achilles said to Ajax¹ upon the occasion of his embassy; but he thus speaks: "O Jove-born Telamonian Ajax, prince of the people, you have spoken all things agreeably to my opinion." In like manner you, O Socrates, appear to have prophesied in conformity to my conceptions, whether you were inspired by Euthyphro, or whether some muse, who was latently inherent in you before, has now agitated you by her inspiring influence.

Soc. O worthy Cratylus, I myself have some time since wondered at my wisdom, and could not believe in its reality; and hence I think it is proper to examine what I have said: for to be deceived by oneself is the most dangerous of all things; for since the deceiver is not for the least moment of time absent, but is always present, how can it be otherwise than a dreadful circumstance? But it is necessary, as it seems, to turn ourselves frequently to the consideration of what we have before said, and to endeavour, according to the poet², "to look at the same time both before and behind." And let us at present take a view of what we said. We said then, that rectitude of name was that which pointed out the quality of a thing. Shall we say that this definition is sufficient for the purpose?

CRAT. To me, Socrates, it appears to be very much so.

Soc. Names, then, are employed in discourse for the sake of teaching?

CRAT. Entirely so.

¹ Iliad ix. ver. 640.

² Iliad i. ver. 341; and Iliad iii. ver. 109.

SOC. Shall we not therefore say, that this is an art, and that it has artificers?

CRAT. Perfectly so.

SOC. But who are they?

CRAT. Those legislators, or authors of names, which you spoke of at first.

SOC. Shall we then say, that this art subsists in men, like other arts, or not? But what I mean is this: Are not some painters more excellent than others?

CRAT. Entirely so.

SOC. Will not such as are more excellent produce more beautiful works, i. e. the representations of animals; but such as are inferior, the contrary? And will not this also be the case with builders, that some will fabricate more beautiful, and others more deformed houses?

CRAT. It will.

SOC. And with respect to legislators, will not some produce works more beautiful than others?

CRAT. It does not appear to me that they will.

SOC. It does not therefore appear to you, that some laws are better, and others worse?

CRAT. It certainly does not.

SOC. One name, therefore, does not seem to you to be better assigned than another?

CRAT. It does not.

SOC. All names, therefore, are properly established?

CRAT. Such indeed as are names.

SOC. But what then shall we say to this name of Hermogenes, which we spoke of before? Shall we say that this name was not rightly assigned him, unless something *ἑρμου γενεσέως*, of the generation of Mercury, belongs to him? Or that it was, indeed, assigned him, but improperly?

CRAT. It does not seem to me, Socrates, to have been assigned him in reality, but only in appearance; and I think that it is the name of some other person, who is endued with a nature correspondent to the name.

SOC. Will not he then be deceived, who says that he is Hermogenes?
for

for he will no longer be the person whom he calls Hermogenes, if he is not Hermogenes.

CRAT. What is this which you say?

SOC. Is the efficacy of your assertion founded in the opinion, that it is impossible to speak any thing which is false? for this has been said, my dear Cratylus, by many formerly, and is the opinion of many at present.

CRAT. How is it possible, Socrates, that, when any one speaks about any thing, he should speak about that which is not? Or is not to speak of non-being, to speak of things which are false?

SOC. This discourse, my friend, is more elegant than my condition and age require. But at the same time inform me, whether it appears to you impossible to discourse about that which is false, but possible to pronounce it?

CRAT. It appears to me impossible even to pronounce it.

SOC. And are you of opinion likewise, that it is impossible to denominate it? As if, for instance, any one, on meeting you, should in an hospitable manner take you by the hand, and say, I am glad to see you, O Athenian guest, Hermogenes, son of Smicrion, would he not some way or other, by means of voice, express these words? And would it not be this Hermogenes, and not you, whom he thus denominated, or else no one?

CRAT. It appears to me, Socrates, that he would enunciate these words in vain.

SOC. Let it be so. But whether would he who pronounced these words, pronounce that which is true or false? Or would some of these words be true, and some false? for this last supposition will be sufficient.

CRAT. I should say, that he sounded these words, moving himself in vain, just as if any one should move brass by striking on it.

SOC. Come then, see, Cratylus, whether we agree in any respect. Do you not say that a name is one thing, and that of which it is the name another?

CRAT. I do.

SOC. And do you not acknowledge, that a name is a certain imitation of a thing?

CRAT. I acknowledge this the most of all things.

SOC.

Soc. And will you not therefore confess that pictures are in a different manner imitations of certain things?

CRAT. Certainly.

Soc. But come, for perhaps I do not understand sufficiently what you say, through you perhaps speak properly. Can we distribute and introduce both these imitations, viz. the pictures and the names, to the things of which they are imitations? Or is this impossible?

CRAT. It is possible.

Soc. But consider this in the first place. Can any one attribute the image of a man to a man, and that of a woman to a woman; and so in other things?

CRAT. Entirely so.

Soc. And is it possible, on the contrary, to attribute the image of a man to a woman, and that of a woman to a man?

CRAT. This also is possible.

Soc. Are both these distributions therefore proper; or only one of them?

CRAT. Only one of them.

Soc. And this I think must be that which attributes to each, the peculiar and the similar?

CRAT. It appears so to me.

Soc. Left therefore you and I, who are friends, should fall into verbal contention, take notice of what I say; for I, my friend, call such a distribution in both imitations (i. e. in the pictures and names) right; and in names not only right, but true: but I call the other attribution and introduction of the dissimilar, not right; and when it takes place in names, false.

CRAT. But consider, Socrates, whether it may not indeed happen in paintings, that an improper distribution may take place, but not in names; but that these must always be necessarily right.

Soc. What do you say? What does this differ from that? May not some one, on meeting a man, say to him, This is your picture, and shew him perhaps by chance his proper image, or by chance the image of a woman? But I mean by *showing*, placing it before his eyes.

CRAT. Entirely so.

Soc. But what, may he not again, meeting with the same person, say to him, This is your name? for a name is an imitation, as well as a painting.

But

But my meaning is this: May he not therefore say, This is your name? And after this, may he not present to his sense of hearing, perhaps, an imitation of what he is, and which asserts that he is a man; and perhaps an imitation of a female of the human species, and which asserts that he is a woman? Does it not appear to you, that this may be some time or other possible?

CRAT. I am willing to allow you, Socrates, that this may be so.

SOC. You do well, my friend, if the thing subsists in this manner; for neither is it proper at present to contest much about it. If, therefore, there is a distribution of this kind in names, we must confess that one of these wishes to call a thing according to truth, but the other falsely. And if this is the case, and it is possible to distribute names erroneously, and not to attribute things adapted to each, it will also be possible to err in words. And if words and names may be thus established, this must likewise necessarily be the case with sentences; for sentences are, I think, the composition of these. Or what is your opinion, Cratylus?

CRAT. The same as yours; for you appear to me to speak beautifully.

SOC. If, therefore, we assimilate first names to letters, the same things will take place as in pictures, in which it is possible to attribute all convenient colours and figures; and again, not to attribute all, but to leave some and add others, and this according to the more and the less. Will not this be the case?

CRAT. It will.

SOC. He then who attributes every thing proper, will produce beautiful letters and images; but he who adds or takes away, will indeed produce letters and images, but such as are defective?

CRAT. Certainly.

SOC. But will not he who imitates the essence of things through syllables and letters, according to the same reasoning, produce a beautiful image, when he attributes every thing in a convenient manner? And this beautiful image is a name. But if any one fails in the least circumstance, or sometimes makes an addition, does it not follow that he will, indeed, produce an image, but not a beautiful one? And so that some of the names will be beautifully fabricated, and others badly?

CRAT. Perhaps so.

Soc.

Soc. Perhaps therefore the one will be a good, and the other a bad artificer of names?

CRAT. Certainly.

Soc. But was not the name which we assigned to this character that of legislator?

CRAT. Certainly.

Soc. Perhaps therefore, by Jupiter, as in other arts, one legislator will be good and another bad, if we only agree in what has been before asserted?

CRAT. It will be so. But do you perceive, Socrates, that when we attribute the letters α and β , and each of the elements to names, according to the grammatical art, if we take away, add, or change any thing, a name indeed is described for us, yet not properly; or rather, it is by no means described, but becomes immediately something else, if it suffers any thing of this kind?

Soc. Let us thus consider this affair, Cratylus, lest we should not contemplate it in a becoming manner.

CRAT. But how?

Soc. Perhaps such things as ought necessarily either to be composed or not from a certain number, are subject to the property which you speak of; as ten things, or if you will any other number, if you take away or add any thing, immediately become some other number. But perhaps there is not the same rectitude of any certain quality and of every image, but a contrary one: for neither is it necessary to attribute to an image every thing belonging to that which it represents, in order to its becoming an image. But consider if I say any thing to the purpose. Would then these be two things, I mean Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, if any one of the gods should not only assimilate your colour and figure, after the manner of painters, but should produce all such inward parts as you contain, and attribute the same softness and heat, the same motion, soul, and wisdom, as you possess; and, in one word, should fashion every thing else similar to the parts which you contain; whether in consequence of such a composition would one of these be Cratylus, and the other the image of Cratylus, or would there be two Cratyluses?

CRAT. It appears to me, Socrates, that there would be two.

Soc. Do you see then, my friend, that it is necessary to seek after another rectitude of an image than that which we just now spoke of; and that it does not necessarily follow, that if any thing is taken away or added, it will no longer be an image? Or do you not perceive how much images want, in order to possess the same things as their paradigms?

CRAT. I do.

Soc. Those particulars therefore of which names are names, would become ridiculous through names, if they were in every respect assimilated to them: for all things would become double; and the difference between a thing and its name could no longer be ascertained.

CRAT. You speak the truth.

Soc. You may therefore, generous man, confidently own that some names are properly composed, and others not so; nor will you be obliged to attribute every letter to a name, that it may be perfectly such as that of which it is the name: but you will sometimes suffer a letter which is not convenient to be introduced; and if a letter, you will likewise permit an unadapted name in a discourse; and if a name, you will suffer a sentence unadapted to things to be introduced in a discourse; and will at the same time acknowledge, that a thing may nevertheless be denominated and spoken of, as long as the name or sentence contains the effigies of the thing which is the subject of discourse; just as in the names of the elements, which, if you remember, I and Hermogenes just now discussed.

CRAT. I do remember.

Soc. It is well, therefore; for when this effigies is inherent, though every thing properly adapted may not be present, yet the representation may be said to subsist as it ought. But let us now, blessed man! cease our disputation, that we may not be exposed to danger, like those who travel late by night in Ægina; and that we may not, in a similar manner, appear to have arrived at the truth of things later than is becoming. Or at least seek after some other rectitude of name, and do not confess that a manifestation produced by letters and syllables is the name of a thing: for, if you admit both these assertions, you cannot be consistent with yourself.

CRAT. But you appear to me, Socrates, to speak in a very becoming manner, and I lay down the position which you mention.

Soc.

SOC. Since therefore we thus far agree, let us consider what remains. We say then, that in order to the beautiful position of a name, it ought to possess convenient letters?

CRAT. Certainly.

SOC. But it is proper that it should contain such as are similar to things?

CRAT. Entirely so.

SOC. Such then as are beautifully composed will be composed in this manner. But if any name is not rightly composed, it will perhaps, for the most part, consist of convenient and similar letters, since it is an image; but it will possess something unadapted, through which it is neither beautiful, nor beautifully established. Shall we speak in this manner, or otherwise?

CRAT. There is no such occasion, I think, Socrates, of contesting; though it does not please me to say, that a name has a subsistence, and yet is not beautifully composed.

SOC. Is this also unpleasing to you, that a name is the manifestation of a thing?

CRAT. It is not.

SOC. But do you think it is not beautifully said, that some names are composed from such as are first, and that others are themselves first names?

CRAT. I think, it is well said.

SOC. But if first names ought to be manifestations of certain things, can you mention any better method of accomplishing this, than their being to formed as to become, in the most eminent degree, such as the things which they render manifest? Or does the method which Hermogenes and many others speak of, please you better, that names are signatures, that they manifest by signatures, and that they are prescient of things? And, besides this, that rectitude of name subsists by compact; and that it is of no consequence whether any one composes them as they are at present composed, or the contrary; calling, for instance, that which is considered at present as small σ , great, and ω , $\omicron$? Which of these modes is most agreeable to you?

CRAT. It is wholly and universally, Socrates, better to evince by similitude that which any one wishes to evince, than by any other method.

SOC. You speak well. If, therefore, a name is similar to a thing, is it not necessary that the elements from which first names are composed should be naturally similar to things themselves? But my meaning is this: Could any one produce a picture, which we have just now said is the similitude of some

particular thing, unless the colours from which the picture is composed were naturally similar to the things which the art of painting imitates? Is it not otherwise impossible?

CRAT. Impossible.

SOC. In a similar manner, therefore, names can never become similar to any thing, unless the things from which names are composed possess, in the first place, some similitude to the particulars of which names are the imitations. But the component parts of names are elements.

CRAT. Certainly.

SOC. You therefore now participate of the discourse which Hermogenes a little before received. Tell me, then, whether we appear to you to have determined in a becoming manner, or not, that the letter $\bar{\rho}$ is similar to local motion, to motion in general, and to hardness?

CRAT. In a becoming manner, in my opinion.

SOC. But the letter $\bar{\lambda}$ to the smooth and soft, and other things which we mentioned?

CRAT. Certainly.

SOC. Do you know therefore that the same word, i. e. *hardness*, is called by us *σκληροτης*, but by the Eretrians *σκληροτηρ*?

CRAT. Entirely so.

SOC. Whether, therefore, do both the $\bar{\rho}$ and the σ appear similar to the same thing; and does the termination of the $\bar{\rho}$ manifest the same thing to them, as the termination of the $\bar{\sigma}$ to us: or is nothing manifested by letters different from ours?

CRAT. The word evinces its meaning by both letters.

SOC. Is this accomplished, so far as $\bar{\rho}$ and $\bar{\sigma}$ are similars, or so far as they are not?

CRAT. So far as they are similars.

SOC. Are they, therefore, in every respect, similars?

CRAT. Perhaps they are so, for the purpose of manifesting lation.

SOC. But why does not the insertion of $\bar{\lambda}$ signify the contrary of hardness?

CRAT. Perhaps, Socrates, it is not properly inserted, just as in the names which you lately discussed with Hermogenes, taking away and adding letters where it was requisite. And you then appeared to me to act properly. And now, perhaps, $\bar{\rho}$ ought to be inserted instead of $\bar{\lambda}$.

Soc.

SOC. You speak well. Do we, therefore, according to our present manner of speaking, mutually understand nothing when any one pronounces the word *σκληρον*? And do you not understand what I now say?

CRAT. I do, my friend, through custom.

SOC. But when you say through custom, what else do you think you imply by this word, except *compact*? Or do you call custom any thing else than this, that when I pronounce this word, and understand by it *hardness*, you also know that this is what I understand. Is not this what you mean?

CRAT. Certainly.

SOC. If, then, you know this, when I pronounce it, something becomes manifest to you through me.

CRAT. Certainly.

SOC. But what I understand, I enunciate from that which is dissimilar? since λ is dissimilar to the *σκληροτης*, which you pronounce. But if this is the case, what else can be the consequence, but that you accustom yourself to this, and that you derive rectitude of name through compact; since both similar and dissimilar letters manifest the same thing to you, through custom and compact? But if custom is very far from being compact, it will no longer be proper to say that similitude is a manifestation, but this ought to be asserted of custom: for this, as it appears, manifests both from the similar and the dissimilar. Since then, Cratylus, we allow the truth of these things (for I consider your silence as a signal of assent), it is necessary that compact and custom should contribute to the manifestation of what we understand and enunciate. For if, O best of men! you are willing to pass on to the consideration of number, from whence do you think you can be able to attribute similar names to each number, if you do not permit your consent and compact to possess some authority about the rectitude of names? The opinion, indeed, pleases me, which asserts that names should be as much as possible similar to things. But yet I am afraid, lest perhaps, as Hermogenes said, the attraction of this similitude should be very precarious, and we should be obliged, in this troublesome affair, to make use of compact, in order to obtain rectitude of names: since, perhaps, we shall then speak as much as possible in the most beautiful manner, when our speech is composed either entirely, or for the most part, from similars, that is, from things convenient; but

in the most safe manner, when the contrary takes place. But still further inform me, what power names possess with respect to us, and what beautiful effect we must ascribe they are able to produce.

CRAT. Names, Socrates, appear to me to teach, and that it is simply true, that he who knows names, knows also things.

SOC. Perhaps, Cratylus, your meaning is this : that when any one knows the quality of a name (and it is of the same quality as a thing), he then also knows a thing, since it is similar to a name. But there is one art of all things which are similar to one another ; and in consequence of this you appear to me to ascribe, that he who knows names, knows also things.

CRAT. You speak most truly.

SOC. But come, let us see what this mode of teaching things is, which you now speak of, and whether there is any other method, this at the same time being the best ; or whether there is no other than this. Which do you think is the case ?

CRAT. That there is no other method than this, but that this is the only one, and the best.

SOC. But whether do you think that the invention of things is the same as the invention of names, and the same as the discovery of those things, of which names are at present significant ? Or do you think that it is necessary to seek and find according to another method, and that this should be learned ?

CRAT. I think that we ought, above all things, to seek after and discover these things according to this method.

SOC. But let us consider, Cratylus, if any one, while seeking after things, follows after names, speculating the quality of each, do you perceive that there is no small danger of his being deceived ?

CRAT. How ?

SOC. Because, evidently, he who first established names fashioned them such as he thought things themselves were. Is it not so ?

CRAT. Certainly.

SOC. If, therefore, he did not think rightly, but fashioned them agreeable to his conceptions, what must we think of those who were persuaded to follow him ? Can it be any thing else, than that they must be deceived ?

CRAT.

CRAT. But this is not the case, Socrates : but it is necessary that he who composed names must have known how to compose them ; for otherwise, as I have before observed, names would never have existed. But you may derive the greatest conviction, that the inventor of names did not wander from the truth, by considering that, if he had conceived erroneously, all things would not have thus corresponded with his conceptions. Or, did you not perceive this, when you were saying that all names were composed according to the same conceptions, and tended to the same thing ?

SOC. But this apology, my worthy Cratylus, is of no weight : for if the founder of names was deceived in the first instance, but compelled other things to this his first conception, and obliged them to harmonize with it ; just as in diagrams, in which sometimes a very trifling and unapparent error taking place, all the remaining parts, which are very numerous, consent notwithstanding with each other : if this be the case, every one ought in the beginning of a thing to employ much discussion and diligent consideration, in order that he may know whether the principle is properly established, or not ; for this being sufficiently examined, what remains will appear consequent to the principle. And yet I should wonder if names harmonized with each other. For let us again consider what we discussed before ; in the course of which we asserted, that, in consequence of every thing *proceeding, hurrying along, and flowing*, names signified us *essence*. Does this appear to you to be the case, or not ?

CRAT. Very much so, and that they properly signify this.

SOC. Let us consider, then, repeating some of these. In the first place, then, this name *ἐπιστήμη*, *science*, is dubious, and seems rather to signify that it stops (*ἵστησιν*) our soul at certain things, than that it is borne along with them ; and hence it is more proper to call its beginning as now, than by the ejection of *ι*, *πιστήμη*, and to insert an *ι* instead of *ι*. In the next place, *το βεβαιον*, *the firm*, is so called, because it is the imitation of a certain *basis* and *abiding*, but not of *lotion*. Again, *ἱστορία*, *history*, signifies that it stops the flowing of things ; and *πιστον*, *the credible*, implies that which produces *perfect stability*. Likewise *μνήμη*, or *memory*, entirely indicates *a quiet abiding in the soul*, and not local motion. And, if you will, *ἁμαρτία*, *guilt*, and *συμφορα*, *calamity*, when these names are attentively considered, appear to be the same with *συνεσις*, *intelligence*, and *ἐπιστήμη*, *science*, and
all

all the other names belonging to things of an excellent nature. But still further, *αμαθεια*, and *ακολασια*, that is, *ignorance* and *intemperance*, will appear to be similar to these: for *ignorance* will signify the progression of one proceeding in conjunction with divinity; but *intemperance* will appear to be a perfect pursuit of things. And thus, those names which we consider as belonging to the basest of things, will appear to be most similar to the names of the most beautiful things. And I think that any one may discover many others of this kind, if he applies himself to the investigation; from which he may be led to think, that the institutor of names did not indicate things proceeding and borne along, but such as stably abide.

CRAT. And yet you see, Socrates, that he signified many things according to the conception of agitation and flowing.

SOC. What then shall we do, Cratylus? Shall we number names like suffrages? And does their rectitude consist in the same thing being signified by the most names?

CRAT. This is by no means proper.

SOC. Certainly not, my friend. But, omitting these particulars, let us consider whether you will agree with us in this, or not. Have we not already acknowledged, that those who instituted names in the several cities, both of Greeks and Barbarians, were legislators, and that the art, which is capable of accomplishing this, is legislative?

CRAT. Entirely so.

SOC. Tell me now, then, whether those who founded the first names knew the things to which they assigned names, or were ignorant of them?

CRAT. It appears to me, Socrates, that they were acquainted with them.

SOC. For, friend Cratylus, they could not accomplish this, while ignorant of things.

CRAT. It does not appear to me that they could.

SOC. Let us then return again from whence we have digressed: for you lately said, if you recollect, that he who established names must have previously known the things to which he assigned names. Are you, therefore, of this opinion at present, or not?

CRAT. I am.

SOC. Will you say, that he who established first names, established them in consequence of possessing knowledge?

CRAT.

CRAT. Yes.

SOC. From what names, then, did he either learn or find out things, since first names were not yet established? But have we not said, that it is impossible to learn and find out things any other way, than by learning or finding out ourselves the quality of names?

CRAT. You appear to me, Socrates, to say something to the purpose.

SOC. After what manner then, shall we say that they possessing knowledge established names? Shall we say, that founders of names existed prior to the establishment of names, and that they then possessed a knowledge of names, since it is impossible to learn things otherwise than by names?

CRAT. I think, Socrates, that the opinion about these particulars is most true, which asserts that a power greater than the human assigned the first names to things; in consequence of which they must of necessity be rightly established.

SOC. Do you think that he who established names, whether he was a certain dæmon, or a god, would establish things contrary to himself? Or do we appear to you, to have just now said nothing to the purpose?

CRAT. But the other sort of these were not names.

SOC. Which sort do you mean, best of men! those which lead to permanency, or those which lead to lation? For, as we just now said, this cannot be determined by their multitude.

CRAT. Your observation is indeed just, Socrates.

SOC. Since names then contest with each other, and, as well these as those, assert that they are similar to the truth, how shall we be able to determine in this affair? Or where shall we turn ourselves? For we cannot have recourse to other names different from these; for there are no others. But it is evident that certain other things, besides names, must be sought after, which may show us, without names, which of these are true; pointing out for this purpose the truth of things.

CRAT. It appears so to me.

SOC. It is possible, therefore, Cratylus, as it seems, to learn things without names, if what we have just now asserted is true.

CRAT. It appears so.

SOC. Through what else, then, do you expect to learn things? Can it be

through any thing else than that which is proper and most just, and through their communion with each other, if they are in any respect mutually allied, and especially through themselves? For that which is different, and foreign from these, will signify something else, and not these.

CRAT. You appear to me to speak the truth.

SOC. But tell me, by Jupiter, have we not often confessed that names, which are properly established, are similar to the things of which they are the names, and are indeed the images of things?

CRAT. Certainly.

SOC. If then it is possible, in the most eminent degree, to learn things through names, and likewise through themselves, which will be the most excellent and the clearest discipline? Will it be possible to obtain this knowledge from an image, if it should be beautifully assimilated, and to perceive the truth, of which this is the image? Or rather, shall we be able from truth to obtain truth itself, and its image, if the image is but properly fabricated?

CRAT. It appears to me, that this must necessarily be obtained from truth.

SOC. After what manner, therefore, it is necessary to learn, or to find out things, is perhaps a degree of knowledge beyond what you and I are able to obtain. It will be sufficient, therefore, to acknowledge this, that things are not to be learned from names, but are much rather to be learned and discovered from themselves.

CRAT. It appears so, Socrates.

SOC. But still further, let us consider, lest this multitude of names tending to the same thing should deceive us, if, in reality, those by whom they were established considered all things as proceeding and flowing; for they appear to me to have held this opinion. But should this be the case, their opinion is however erroneous: for these men having fallen, as it were, into a certain vortex, are themselves confounded, and would willingly, by dragging us along, hurl us into the same whirlpool. For consider, O wonderful Cratylus! that which I often dream about, whether or not we should say that there is any such thing as the beautiful itself, and the good, and so of every thing else.

CRAT. It appears to me, Socrates, that there is.

Soc.

Soc. Let us therefore consider this affair, not as if a certain countenance, or any thing of this kind, is beautiful ; for all these appear to flow : but we ask, whether the beautiful itself does not always remain such as it is ?

CRAT. It is necessary that it should.

Soc. Can it therefore be properly denominated, if it is always secretly flying away ? And can it, in the first place, be said that it is, and, in the next place, that it is of such a particular nature ? Or is it not necessary, in this case, that, while we are speaking about it, it should immediately become something else, secretly withdraw itself, nor be any longer such as it was ?

CRAT. It is necessary.

Soc. How, then, can that be any thing, which never subsists in a similar manner ? For if, at any time, it should subsist in a similar manner, in that time in which it is thus similarly effected, it is evident that it would suffer no mutation : but, if it always subsists in a similar manner, and is the same, how can it suffer mutation, or be moved, since it never departs from its idea ?

CRAT. By no means.

Soc. But neither can it be known by any one ; for, as soon as that which is endued with knowledge accedes to it, it becomes something different and various, so that it cannot be known what quality it possesses, or how it subsists : for no knowledge can know that which it knows, when the object of its knowledge has no manner of subsistence.

CRAT. It is as you say.

Soc. But neither, Cratylus, can there be any such thing as knowledge, if all things glide away, and nothing abides. For if knowledge itself does not fall from a subsistence, as knowledge, knowledge will perpetually abide, and will be always knowledge : but if the form itself of knowledge glides away, it will at the same time glide into something different from the form of knowledge, and will no longer be knowledge ; but if it always glides away, it will always be something different from knowledge : and from hence it follows that neither knowledge, nor the object of knowledge, will have any subsistence. But if that which knows always is, then that which is known will always have a subsistence, together with the beautiful, the good, and every thing else which we are now speaking of ; and none of these, as it appears to me, will be similar either to that which flows, or is borne along.

But whether things of this kind subsist in this manner, or whether as the followers of Heraclitus and many others assert, it is by no means easy to perceive : nor is it very much the province of a man endued with intellect, to give himself up, and his own soul, to the study of names, believing in their reality, and confiding in their author, as one endued with knowledge : and thus, in consequence of possessing no sound knowledge, either concerning the founder of names, or things themselves, considering all things as flowing like earthen vessels, and viewing them similar to men diseased with a rheum, as if every thing subsisted according to flowing and distillation. Perhaps, therefore, Cratylus, this may be the case, and perhaps not. Hence it is proper to consider this affair in a very strenuous and diligent manner, since it is by no means easy to apprehend the truth : for as yet you are but a young man, and in the vigour of your age ; and if you should discover any thing in the course of your inquiries, you ought to communicate it to me.

CRAT. I shall act in this manner. And I very well know, Socrates, that I am not at present without consideration ; but, in consequence of speculating this affair, the truth seems to me to be much more on your side, than on that of Heraclitus.

SOC. Afterwards therefore, my friend, when you come hither again, instruct me : but now, agreeably to your determination, proceed to the field ; and Hermogenes, here, will attend you.

CRAT. Be it so, Socrates : and do you also endeavour to think upon these things.

THE END OF THE CRATYLUS.

THE

THE EPISTLES

OF

PLATO.

THE
EPISTLES OF PLATO.

EPISTLE I.*

DION to DIONYSIUS—Prosperity.

WHILE I resided so long with you, and managed the affairs of your kingdom with such fidelity, that you might be benefited beyond others, I sustained grievous calumnies. For I know you are convinced, that nothing inhuman was ever perpetrated with my consent. And of the truth of this, all those are my witnesses, who governed in conjunction with you; many of whom, through strenuous endeavours, I liberated from no trifling calamities. And when you possessed the sole authority, I often preserved your city; but at length I was dismissed by you, and ordered to set sail, in a more ignominious manner than it becomes you to expel a mendicant; and this, after I had so long resided with you. As to what remains, therefore, I shall consult respecting myself in a more inhuman manner. But you being so great a tyrant, will govern alone. As to the splendid gold, which you gave for my dismissal, I return it you by Bacchius, the bearer of this Epistle: for it was neither sufficient for a viaticum, nor useful for the rest of life. It would likewise procure great disgrace to you as the giver, and not much less to me as the receiver. But it evidently makes no difference to you, either to give or receive as much gold as this; and on its being returned to you, you may make the same present to some other of your associates, as you made to me. For you have paid sufficient attention to me. And now that sentence of Euri-

* This and the fifth Epistle appear to have been written by Dion, the celebrated but unfortunate disciple of Plato, though the Aldine edition ascribes them to Plato.

pides seasonably occurs to my remembrance, "That when affairs happen to be different from what they are at present, you will pray for such a man to be present with you." But I wish to remind you, that the greater part of other tragic poets, when they introduce a tyrant dying through the machinations of some one, make him vociferate as follows: "Miserable that I am, I perish destitute of friends." But no one represents a tyrant perishing through the want of gold. The following poetical sentences, likewise, will not be disapproved by the intelligent: "Not splendid gold, in this miserable life of mortals most rare, not diamonds, nor tables of silver, which are highly valued by men, are so glittering to the sight; nor yet fertile, weighty acres of wide extended land, as the unanimous conceptions of good men." Farewell, and know thus much of us who are far distant, that you may conduct yourself better towards others.

 EPISTLE II.

PLATO to DIONYSIUS—*Prosperity.*

I HAVE heard from Archidemus, that you think respecting yourself, that not only I, but my familiars, Dion alone excepted, ought neither to do you any injury, nor speak ill of you. But this assertion, that Dion is to be excepted signifies that I do not rule over my familiars. For if I had dominion, as well over others, as you and Dion, I think great good would be the result, both to all you and the rest of the Greeks. But now I am great, in rendering myself obedient to the dictates of my reason. I speak in this manner, because Cratistolus and Polyxenus have not given you any genuine information: for they report, that one of these should say, he had heard among the Olympians that many of my associates reviled you. Perhaps he heard more accurately than I did. But it is proper, as it appears to me, that, whenever any thing of this kind respecting my associates is mentioned to you, to write to me respecting the affair: for I shall neither be afraid nor ashamed to speak the truth. But to you and me things are thus mutually circumstanced. Nor are we unknown to any one of the Greeks, as I may say, nor is our conversation passed over in silence; nor should it be concealed from you, that neither will it be passed over in silence by posterity: for those by whom it is received are such, that they are neither few nor obscure. But why do I thus speak? I will now tell you, assuming an elevated exordium.

Wisdom and mighty power naturally tend to the same: and these two always pursue, seek, and unite with each other. In the next place, men are delighted with these, whether they make them the subject of their private conversations, or hear them celebrated in poetical compositions. Thus those who discourse about Hiero, and Pausanias the Lacedæmonian, rejoice to mention the familiarity of Simonides with these men, and to relate what he

did and said to them. In like manner they are accustomed to celebrate Periander the Corinthian in conjunction with Thales the Milesian ; Pericles and Anaxagoras, Cræsus and Solon, as powerful with wise men, and Cyrus as a powerful man. Poets too, in imitation of this, bring together Creon and Tiresias ; Polydus and Minos ; Agamemnon and Nestor ; Ulysses and Palamedes : and, as it appears to me, for the same reason, the first men joined Prometheus with Jupiter. But of these, they represent some as discordant, and others as friendly with each other ; and again, some as at one time friendly, and at another discordant : and they celebrate as well their mutual agreements as their dissensions. But I mention all these particulars, because I am willing to evince that men will not be silent respecting us when we are dead ; so that we ought not to neglect the opinion of mankind. For it is necessary, as it seems, that we should pay attention to futurity ; since it comes to pass, through a certain nature, that the most illiberal of mankind are not at all concerned about the opinion of posterity : but the most worthy men do every thing that they may be justly celebrated hereafter. And this I consider as an argument that the dead have a certain perception of what is transacted here. For the most excellent souls prophesy that this will be the case ; but this is not asserted by the most depraved. And the prophecies of divine men are more powerful than of those that are not divine. I also think, that if it were permitted those deceased persons, of whom I have spoken above, to correct their conversations, they would very earnestly endeavour that better things might be said of them than at present. This, therefore, it is yet permitted us to say, through the favour of divinity, that if we have done any thing unbecoming during our former acquaintance with you, either in word or deed, we may correct it ; that a true opinion may be entertained of us by posterity respecting philosophy ; viz. a better opinion if we are worthy, and the contrary if we are depraved. And indeed, if we pay attention to this, we cannot do any thing more pious, nor is any thing more impious than the neglect of it. But how this ought to take place, and what the justice is which it contains, I will tell you.

When I came into Sicily, I had the reputation of excelling very much in philosophy. I was also willing on my arrival among the Syracusians to have you a witness of my renown, that philosophy might also be honoured for me
by

by the multitude. But my wishes were not crowned with success. I do not however assign as the cause of this, that which is assigned by many, but I attribute it to your not entirely believing in me. But you were willing to dismiss me and call others, and to inquire into the nature of my business, by this as it seems distrustful of me. And those that spoke loudly of these things were many, and who likewise affirmed that you indeed despised me, and seriously applied yourself to other things. Such indeed were the reports at that time.

Now hear however what after these things it is just to do, that I may reply to your question, how you and I ought mutually to conduct ourselves. If then you entirely despise philosophy, you must bid farewell to it. But if you have either heard from another, or have yourself discovered things more excellent than those you have received from me, then honour these. But if our doctrines please you, then you ought highly to honour me. Now, therefore, as from the beginning, do you lead and I will follow. For being honoured by, I will honour you; but not being honoured, I will remain silent. Further still, if you honour me, and in doing this take the lead, you will appear to honour philosophy: and this will procure you that which you ardently desire, the reputation of being considered by the multitude as a philosopher. But if I should honour you, without being honoured by you, I should seem to admire and pursue wealth: and we know that this is considered as disgraceful by all men. In short, if you honour me, an ornament to both of us will ensue; but if I honour you, disgrace to both of us will be the consequence. And thus much for these particulars.

But the little sphere ¹ is not properly made: and this Archidemus will show you on his arrival. It is likewise requisite to render apparent to him the particulars respecting that which is far more honourable and divine than this, and about which you interrogate me through him. For you say, according to his report, that I have not sufficiently demonstrated to you the particulars respecting the first nature. I must speak to you therefore in enigmas, that in case the letter should be intercepted either by land or sea, he who reads it may not understand this part of its contents: *All things are situated about the*

¹ What this little sphere was is uncertain. Perhaps it was a kind of orrery.

king¹ of all things; and all things subsist for his sake, and he is the cause of all beautiful things. But second things are situated about that which is second; and

¹ The following observations, extracted from the second book of Proclus on the Theology of Plato, form an excellent comment on the present passage, which is no less deeply mystical than truly admirable:

Plato here evidently neither connumerates the ineffable principle of things with the other principles posterior to him, nor does he coarrange it, as the leader of a triad, with the second and third powers. For in a triadic division, the first monad is the leader of the first orders, and which are coordinate with itself: but the second is the leader of second orders; and the third of those that are third. And if some one should apprehend that the first principle is the leader of all things, so as to comprehend at once both second and third allotments, yet the cause which subsists according to comprehension, is different from that which similarly pervades to all things. And all things indeed are subject to the king of all things, according to one reason and one order: but to the first of the triad, things first are subjected according to the same order; and it is necessary that things second and third should be subservient according to their communion with the remaining kings. Is it not evident, therefore, that what is here said in a remarkable manner celebrates the exempt nature of the first cause, and his uncoordination with the other kingdoms of the gods? For Plato says, that the king of all similarly reigns over all things, that all things subsist about him, and that both essence and energy are present with all things for his sake.

Observe too, that Plato calls the first god king, but he does not think proper to give this appellation to the rest. He likewise calls him the king not only of things first, as the second of things second, and the third of things third, but as the cause at once of all being and of all beauty. Hence the highest god precedes the other causes in an exempt and uniform manner, and is neither celebrated by Plato as coordinated with them, nor as the leader of a triad.

But when Plato a little after says, "This your inquiry concerning the cause of all beautiful things is as of a nature endued with a *certain quality*," he clearly indicates that neither language nor knowledge is adapted to that which is first: for, as being unknown, it cannot be apprehended by intelligence, and as being uncircumscribed, it cannot be explained by words. But whatever you say of it, you will say, as of a *certain* thing; and you will speak indeed *a'out* it, but you will not speak *it*. For speaking of the things of which it is the cause, we are unable to say, or to apprehend, through intelligence, what it is.

Here, therefore, the addition of quality and the busy energy of the soul remove it from the goodness which is exempt from all things, by the redundancy of its conceptions about it. This likewise draws the soul down to kindred, connate, and multiform intelligibles, and prevents her from receiving that which is characterized by unity, and is occult in the participation of *the good*. And it is not only proper that the human soul should be purified from things coordinate with itself in the union and communion with that which is first, and that for this purpose it should leave all the multitude of itself behind, and, exciting its own hyparxis, approach with closed eyes, as it is said, to the king of all things, and participate of his light as much as this is lawful for it to accomplish; but intellect also, which is prior to us, and all divine natures, by their highest unions,

and such as are third in gradation about that which is third. The human soul therefore extends itself in order to learn the quality of these things, and looks to such

unions, superessential torches *, and first hyparxes, are united to that which is first, and always participate of its exuberant fulness; and this not so far as they are that which they are, but so far as they are exempt from things allied to themselves, and converge to the one principle of all. For the cause of all disseminated in all things impressions of his own all-perfect transcendency, and through these establishes all things about himself, and being exempt from wholes, is ineffably present to all things. Every thing, therefore, entering into the ineffable of its own nature, finds there the symbol of the father of all. All things too naturally venerate him, and are united to him, through an appropriate mystic impression, divesting themselves of their own nature, and hastening to become his impression alone, and to participate him alone, through the desire of his unknown nature, and of the fountain of good. Hence, when they have run upwards as far as to this cause, they become tranquil, and are liberated from the parturitions and the desire which all things naturally possess of goodness unknown, ineffable, imparticipable, and transcendently full. But that what is here said is concerning the first god, and that Plato, in these conceptions, leaves him uncoordinated with and exempt from the other causes, has been, I think, sufficiently evinced.

Let us then in the next place consider each of the dogmas, and adapt them to our conceptions concerning cause, that from these we may comprehend, by a reasoning process, the scope of the whole of Plato's theology. Let then one truth concerning the first principle be especially that which celebrates his ineffable, simple, and all-transcending nature; which establishes all things about him, but does not assert that he generates or produces any thing, or that he pre-exists as the end of things posterior to himself. For such a form of words neither adds any thing to the unknown, who is exempt from all things, nor multiplies him who is established above all union, nor refers the habitude and communion of things secondary to him who is perfectly imparticipable. Nor in short does it announce that it teaches any thing about him, or concerning his nature, but about the second and third natures which subsist after him.

Such then being this indication of the first god, and such the manner in which it venerates the ineffable, the second to this is that which converts all the desires of things to him, and celebrates him as the object of desire to and common end of all things, according to one cause which precedes all other causes. For the last of things subsists only for the sake of something else, but the first is that only for the sake of which all other things subsist: and all the natures that subsist between participate of these two idioms. Hence they genuinely adhere to the natures which surpass them, as objects of desire, but impart the perfection of desires to subordinate beings.

The third speculation of the principle of things is far inferior to the preceding, considering him as giving subsistence to all beautiful things. For to celebrate him as the supplier of good, and as end preceding the two orders of things, is not very remote from the narration which says, that all causes are posterior to him, and derive their subsistence from him, as well those which are

* *ὑπερῤυσσεντες; ὑπάρξεις.* Proclus thus denominates the superessential unities conformably to what is said of them by Plato in the 6th book of the Republic; for he there considers them as analogous to light.

such particulars as are allied to itself, none of which are sufficient for the purpose. But about the king himself, and the natures of which I have spoken, there is

paternal, and the sources of good, as those that are the suppliers of prolific powers. But to ascribe to him a producing and generative cause, is still more remote from the all-perfect union of the first. For as it cannot be known or discussed by language, by secondary natures, it must not be said that it is the cause, or that it is generative of beings, but we should celebrate in silence this ineffable nature, and this perfectly causeless cause which is prior to all causes. If, however, as we endeavour to ascribe to him *the good* and *the one*, we in like manner attribute to him *cause*, and that which is final or paternal, we must pardon the parturition of the soul about this ineffable principle, aspiring to perceive him with the eye of intellect, and to speak about him; but, at the same time, the exempt transcendency of *the one* which is immense must be considered as surpassing an indication of this kind.

From these things, therefore, we may receive the sacred conceptions of Plato, and an order adapted to things themselves. And we may say that the first part of this sentence sufficiently indicates the simplicity, transcendency, and in short the uncoordination with all things of the king of all. For the assertion that all things subsist about him, unfolds the hyparxis of things second, but leaves that which is beyond all things without any connexion with things posterior to it. But the second part celebrates the king of all things as prearranged in the order of *end*. For that which is the highest of all causes, is immediately conjoined with that which is prior to cause; but of this kind is the final cause, and that for the sake of which all things subsist. This, therefore, is posterior to the other, and is woven together with the order of things, and the progression of the Platonic doctrine.

Again, the third part asserts him to be productive of all beautiful things, and thus adds to him a species of cause inferior to the final. Whence also Plotinus, I think, does not hesitate to call the first god the fountain of the beautiful. It is necessary therefore to attribute that which is best to the best of all things, that he may be the cause of all, and in reality prior to cause. But this is *the good*. This too, which is an admirable circumstance, may be seen in the words of Plato, that the first of these three divinedogmas, neither presumes to say any thing about *the good*, and this ineffable nature, nor does it permit us to refer any species of cause to it. But the second dogma leaves indeed *the good* ineffable, as it is fit it should, but, from the habitude of things posterior to it, enables us to collect the final cause: for it does not refuse to call it that for the sake of which all things subsist. But when it asserts that all things are for the sake of *the good*, it excites in us the conception of the communion and coordination of that which is the object of desire with the desiring natures. And the third dogma evinces that *the good* is the cause of all beautiful things. But this is to say something concerning it, and to add to the simplicity of the first cause, and not to abide in the conception of the end, but to conjoin with it the producing principle of things second. And it appears to me that Plato here indicates the natures which are proximately unfolded into light after the first. For it is not possible to say any thing concerning it except at one time being impelled to this from all things, and at another from the best of things: for it is the cause of hyparxis to all things, is first participated by the best of things, and unfolds its own separate union through the idiom of these.

We

is nothing of this kind: but the soul speaks of that which is posterior to this. Indeed, O son of Dionysus and Doris, this your inquiry concerning the cause of all beautiful¹ things, is as of a nature endued with a certain quality. Or rather it is a parturition respecting this ingenerated in the soul; from which he who is not liberated will never in reality acquire truth.

You have said, that you thought of mentioning this to me, in the garden, when we were seated under the laurel trees, and that it was your invention. But I have said, that if this appears to you to subsist in this manner, you have freed me from a long discussion. Nor shall we ever find any other inventor; but about this I shall be very busily employed. Perhaps however you have heard this from some one, or perhaps you have been impelled to advance thus far by a *divine allotment*. You have not however apprehended what a stability the demonstrations of this thing possess; but you spring forward at different times in a different manner, about that which is the object of phantasy, while in the mean time the thing of which we are now speaking is not any thing of this kind. Nor is this the case with you alone: but be well assured that no one, when he first hears me, is in the beginning otherwise affected. And one indeed, finding more difficulty, and another less, they are scarcely at length liberated from parturition. But nearly all of them labour not a little. As this therefore has been, and is the case, in my opinion, we have nearly found that about which you inquire in your letters, I mean, how we ought to be affected towards each other. For after you have discussed these particulars, with the assistance of other persons, and

We ascribe to it therefore *the one* and *the good*, from the donation from it which pervades to all things. For of those things of which all participate, we say there is no other cause than that which is established prior to all these. But *the about which* (το περί ο), *the through which* (το δι ου), *the from which* (το απ' ου), particularly subsist in the intelligible gods: and from these they are ascribed to the first god. For whence can we suppose the unical gods derive their idioms, except from that which is prior to them? To this summit of intelligibles therefore the term *about* is adapted, because all the divine orders occultly proceed about this summit which is arranged prior to them. But the term *through which* pertains to the middle order of intelligibles: for all things subsist for the sake of eternity and an hyparxis perfectly entire. And the term *from which* is adapted to the extremity of intelligibles: for this first produces all things, and adorns them uniformly.

¹ In all the editions of Plato that I have seen, *κακων* is here erroneously printed instead of *καλων*. I say erroneously, because not only the authority of Proclus but the sense of the passage proves it to be so.

have

have compared them with the opinions of others, and considered them by themselves, then, if your inquiry has been properly conducted, you will accord both with them and us. How then is it possible that these things, and all of which we have spoken, should not take place?

You have, therefore, acted rightly in now sending Archidemus to us. And after he has returned to you and has related my opinion, other doubts will perhaps rise in your mind. If, therefore, you consult properly, you will send Archidemus to me again. But he, as if laden with merchandise, will again return to you. And if you do this, twice or thrice, and sufficiently examine the things which I shall send, I should wonder if you are not much better disposed with respect to the particulars you are in doubt of than at present. You should, therefore, boldly act in this manner: for neither you, nor Archidemus, can engage in any merchandise more becoming or more acceptable to divinity than this. Be careful, however, that these things do not fall among men void of discipline: *for, as it appears to me, there are scarcely any particulars which will appear more ridiculous to the multitude than these; nor again, any which will appear more wonderful and enthusiastic to those that are well born.* But when often repeated and continually heard, and this for many years, they are scarcely at length, with great labour, purified like gold.

But hear the wonderful circumstance which takes place in this affair: for there are many men who have heard these things, who are able to learn and able to remember, who are sagacious in examining and judging, who are now advanced in years, and who have heard these things for not less than thirty years; these men now say, that things which formerly appeared to them to be most incredible, now appear to them to be most credible and perspicuous. And things which were formerly considered by them as most credible, now appear to them to be the very contrary. Looking therefore to this, be careful lest you repent of what you have now unworthily uttered. But the greatest means of defence in this case, consists not in writing, but learning: for things which are written cannot be kept from the public view. On this account, I have never at any time written any thing about these particulars. Nor is there any book professedly composed by Plato, nor will there be. But what has now been said, is to be ascribed

ascribed ¹ to Socrates, who was a worthy character, even while a young man. Farewell, and be persuaded by me; and when you have often read this Epistle, commit it to the flames. And thus much for these particulars.

With respect to Polyxenus, you wonder that I do not send him to you. But I say the same at present as I have formerly said concerning Lycophron, and the others that are with you, viz. that, both naturally and from the method of your discourse, you very much excel them in the art of speaking. Nor is any one of them willingly confuted as some suppose, but unwillingly. And you appear indeed to have used and bestowed gifts upon them sufficiently well. Many other things may be said about these particulars, as well as about others of the same kind. But if you use Philistion, do not spare him. And if you can, employ Speusippus, and dismiss him. Speusippus indeed stands in need of your assistance. But Philistion promised me that he would very willingly come to Athens, if you would dismiss him. You will likewise do well to dismiss him who belongs to the stone quarries. But the request is trifling, both respecting his domestics, and Egeusippus the son of Ariston: for in one of your letters to me you say, that if any one either injures him, or his domestics, and you perceive it, you will not suffer a continuance of the injury. Besides, it is worth while to speak the truth respecting Lyficles: for he alone, of those who came from Sicily to Athens, has made no alteration respecting our intimacy with each other, but continually speaks of our past conduct as laudable and good.

¹ Plato means nothing more by this, than that what has been above said is conformable to the doctrine of Socrates.

EPISTLE III.

PLATO to DIONYSIUS—*Health.*

YOU inquire, by your letter, whether it is better in salutations to use the word *health*, or rather to write, as I am accustomed to do in letters to my friends, *prosperity*. For you, as those who were then present relate, flattering the god who is worshipped at Delphi, call him by this very appellation. And as they say, you write *hail*, and yet preserve the voluptuous life of a tyrant. But I address neither man nor divinity with this salutation. Not divinity, because in so doing I should place him in an order contrary to his nature; as he is far removed from pleasure and pain. Nor man, because pleasure often produces detriment and pain, and generates in the soul, indocility, oblivion, stupidity, and insolence. And thus much respecting salutation, which, after you have read, you may take as you please.

But not a few report, that you said to certain ambassadors who were with you, that you intended to reestablish the Grecian cities in Sicily, to rectify the government of the Syracusians, and give them a kingdom instead of a tyranny. You assert, however, that though you very much desired, yet being impeded by me, you had not then an opportunity to put these intentions in execution; that I now teach Dion to do the very same things himself; and that, according to your conceptions of things, we shall subvert your government. You indeed know whether you derive any advantage from such assertions; but you certainly injure me by speaking contrary to the truth: for I am become sufficiently odious both to the mercenary foldiers and the Syracusan vulgar, through Philistides and many others, on account of my residence in the acropolis. For then those that dwelt out of the tower blamed me as the author of every crime, and asserted that you did
every

every thing through my persuasions. However, you most clearly know, that of my own accord I meddled very little with politics, and that this was only at first, when I thought I might in some degree be beneficial, while with a sufficient degree of earnestness I was composing my books of Laws; to which you, or some other person, have made additions contrary to my intention. For I hear that, afterwards, some of you acted in a fraudulent manner with respect to these writings: and these things indeed are manifest to those that are able to distinguish the nature of my disposition. But, as I just now said, I do not stand in need of calumny from the Syracusians, and certain others whom you may have persuaded by these assertions; but I am much more in want of an apology against the former calumny, than that which has now arisen after it, as being greater and more vehement.

Against these two calumnies, therefore, it is necessary I should make a two-fold apology. In the first place asserting, that I very properly avoided engaging with you in political affairs: and in the second place, that my advice was not that which you say it was, and that I did not impede you, when you designed to reestablish the Grecian cities. Hear then, in the first place, the particulars of my first apology. I came to Syracuse, in consequence of being called by you and Dion, who was already approved of by me, and who had formerly been my guest. He likewise had arrived at that period of life which we call a middle age, and in which those that are endued with the smallest degree of intellect, will apply themselves to such affairs as were then the subject of your deliberations. But you were very young, and very ignorant of those particulars in which you ought to have been skilled; and you were likewise perfectly unknown to me. After this, some man, or god, or a certain fortune in conjunction with you, expelled Dion, and you were left alone. Do you think therefore, that at that time I had any communion with you in political affairs; perceiving as I did, that a prudent counsellor was banished by you, and that an imprudent person was left, with a multitude of base men; so that he did not govern in reality, but while he thought he had dominion, he was governed by men of this description? In these circumstances, what ought to have done? Does it not necessarily follow, that I ought to have done what I did do? I mean, to

bid farewell to politics, in order to avoid the calumnies of the malevolent, and to endeavour that you and Dion, who were far separated from, and discordant with each other, might become in the highest degree mutual friends. You are my witness, that I never at any time remitted my endeavours to accomplish this. At the same time, we could scarcely agree that I should return home, and that when the war was finished, in which you were then engaged, I and Dion should come to Syracuse; and that you would call us. These were the transactions which happened when I first came among the Syracusians, and on my returning home with safety.

After this, peace being made, you called me, not, however, according to the agreement, but you wrote to me that I should come alone, and that you would send for Dion afterwards. On this account I did not come, which displeased Dion, who thought it would be better to comply with your request. On the following year a three-banked galley and letters came from you, and in these epistles you say, that if I will come, the affairs of Dion shall be settled according to my mind; but that if I did not come, the very contrary should take place. I am ashamed to say how many letters then came, both from you, and others through you, from Italy and Sicily, to me, and to such as were my kindred and familiars; all of them exhorting and requesting me to comply by all means with your entreaties. It appeared, therefore, to all these, beginning from Dion, that I ought to set sail, and not behave effeminately, though I excused myself on account of my age, and mentioned my doubts that you would not be sufficient to resist my calumniators, and those who wished to sow dissension between us. For I then saw, and now see, with respect to the great and surpassing possessions both of private persons and monarchs, that in proportion to their magnitude, they nourish calumniators, and those that devise noxious pleasures; a greater evil than which neither wealth, nor the power of any other prerogative can produce. However, bidding farewell to all these considerations, I determined to come, that my friends might not accuse me of ruining, through my negligence, the affairs of Dion, when they might have been safe.

You well know all that happened on my arrival. For I indeed thought, according to the compact made by you in your letters, that you would in the
first

first place recall Dion, and restore him to his former familiarity with you. If, as I persuaded you, you had done so at that time, perhaps, as my opinion prophesies, things would have been better for you, and the Syracusians, and the other Greeks. Afterwards, I thought that the property of Dion ought to be restored, and that it ought not to be given to those among whom you thought proper it should be divided. Besides this, I thought that the usual sum of money should be sent to him every year, and that it ought rather to be increased than diminished on account of my being present. But as none of these things took place, I determined to depart. After this, however, you persuaded me to stay for a year, affirming that you would restore all the property of Dion, so that one half would be sent to Corinth, and that the other half should be left for his son. I could relate many other things which you promised to do, but have not performed; but I omit them, on account of their multitude: for as you sold all the possessions of Dion without his consent, though you affirmed you would not unless he consented to it, you have placed a most glorious colophon, O wonderful man, on all your promises. For you devised a thing neither beautiful nor elegant, nor just, nor advantageous; I mean, you attempted to frighten me, as being ignorant of the transactions at that time, that I might cease entreating you to send money to Dion. For when you banished Heraclides, which did not appear just either to the Syracusians, or to me, and I, together with Theodotus and Euribius, requested you to pardon him, making use of this as a sufficient pretext, you said that it had been for some time past evident to you, that I was not at all concerned about you, but only for Dion, and his friends and kindred. And now, as Theodotes and Heraclides are calumniated as being the familiars of Dion, you assert that I endeavour, by every possible device, that they may not suffer punishment. And thus much for the political transactions of you and me. And if you have seen any thing else discordant in me with respect to you, think it is reasonable that all this should have happened, and do not wonder that it has: for I should deservedly appear to be depraved to a man endued with any portion of intellect, if, persuaded by the magnitude of your authority, I should betray my antient friend and guest when acting evilly through you, and yet, as I may say, being in no respect a worse character than you are; and if I should prefer you though acting unjustly, and should do every thing which you enjoin for the sake of accumulating wealth. For if
there

there had been any change in my conduct, no other cause than this would have been assigned of such mutation. And thus much for this; you being the occasion of the deceitful friendship and disagreement between you and me.

But my discourse now nearly brings me in connection to the second part of my apology. Attend therefore diligently, and consider whether I appear to you to assert that which is false, and not the truth: for I say, that when Archidemus and Aristocritus were with you in the garden, about twenty days before I returned home from Syracuse, you reproached me with the very same thing as at present; I mean, that I was more concerned for Heraclides, and every other person, than for you. You likewise interrogated me before them, whether I remembered, on my first coming to Syracuse, that I advised you to reestablish the Grecian cities. But I acknowledged that I did remember: and, even now, it appears to me that it were best to do so. I must likewise relate, O Dionysius, what was said after this: for I asked you, whether I should advise you to do this alone, or something else besides this. But you answered me in an angry and insolent manner; and on this account the injurious reply which you then made me is now become a true vision instead of a dream. But you asked me, in a very undisguised manner, and laughing at the same time if I remember, whether I exhorted you as one properly instructed to do all these things or not. I replied, that you very properly reminded me. You then asked me whether I exhorted you as one learned in geometry, or how? But after this I did not say what I might have said, fearing lest, for the sake of a trifling word, the navigation which I expected should be contracted, instead of being ample. That, therefore, for the sake of which all this has been said by me, is as follows: I am unwilling to be calumniated by you, as having hindered you from reestablishing the Grecian cities, which were subverted by the Barbarians, and assisting the Syracusians, by giving them a kingdom instead of a tyranny. For you cannot falsely assert any thing of me, which less becomes me than this.

Indeed, if there appeared to be any sufficient judgment of this affair, I could adduce other arguments, still clearer than these, to prove that I exhorted you to do these things, but that you were unwilling to do them: for it is by no means difficult to show, in a perspicuous manner, that by thus acting

acting you would have done the best for yourself, the Syracusians, and all Sicily. If, therefore, you deny that you said these things, when at the same time you did say them, this is sufficient to condemn you. But if you acknowledge that you did, think after this, that Stesichorus was a wise man, and imitating his recantation[†], betake yourself from a false assertion to one that is true.

[†] See the Phædrus of Plato, where the circumstance here alluded to is cited at length.

EPISTLE IV.

PLATO to DION of SYRACUSE—Prosperity.

I THINK that my alacrity with respect to casual actions is apparent at all times, and that I very seriously apply myself to accomplish them, not more for the sake of any thing else, than emulation in things beautiful. For I consider it as just, that those who are in reality worthy men, and who act in this manner, should obtain that renown which is their due. At present, therefore, through the favour of divinity, things subsist in a proper manner : but with respect to future events there is the greatest contest. For to excel in fortitude, swiftness, and strength, may appear a thing possible to be accomplished by others ; but to excel in truth, justice, magnificence, and graceful conduct respecting all these, pertains to those, beyond all others, who aspire after the honour attendant on such things as these. Now, therefore, what I say is manifest. But at the same time, we ought to remind ourselves, that it is proper, as you well know, that we should differ more from other men than other men from boys. Hence it is evident that we ought to become such characters as we assert ourselves to be ; especially since, through the favour of divinity, we may say that this will be easy for us to accomplish : for others, in order to effect this, must necessarily wander through many places. But the state of your affairs is such, that this must be accomplished by you in one particular part of the earth ; and in this part the eyes of all men are especially turned towards you. As you are therefore beheld by all men, prepare yourself to exhibit to the world a specimen of the ancient Lycurgus and Cyrus, or any other, who appears to have surpassed in the moral and political virtues ; especially since many, and indeed nearly all, men say, there is great reason to expect that, when Dionysius is taken away, things will be in a ruinous state, through the emulation of you, Heraclides, Theodotus, and other illustrious persons.

If

If, therefore, this should happen to be the case, which we must hope will not, do you apply a remedy, that affairs may be brought to the best condition. It will perhaps seem to you ridiculous that I should mention these things, because you are not ignorant of them: but I see that in the theatres the combatants are incited by boys, and not by their friends, though it might be supposed that these would be induced earnestly to exhort them, through benevolence. Now therefore do you begin the contest, and inform me by a letter if you require my assistance. Affairs here are just as when you were with us. Inform me, likewise, what you have done, or what you are now doing: for though we hear many things, we know nothing; and now letters from Theodotus and Heraclides are come to Lacedæmon and Ægina. But we, as I have said, though we hear many things about these particulars, yet we know nothing with certainty. Think likewise, that you appear to certain persons to be less affable than is proper. Do not therefore forget, that the power of acting arises from pleasing mankind, but that moroseness occasions a desertion of associates. May prosperity attend you.

EPISTLE V.

DION to PERDICCAS.

I HAVE persuaded Euphræus, as you request me in your letter, to pay constant attention to your affairs. But it is just, hospitable, and holy, that I should both advise you respecting other things, and how you ought to use Euphræus. I ought, however, mostly to advise you in that of which you are now indigent through your age, and the scarcity of youthful monitors. For there is a particular sound from the several polities, just as if it were emitted from certain animals, one from a democracy, another from an oligarchy, and another again from a monarchy. Many assert that they understand these voices, but, except a few, they are very far from understanding them. Whichever of these polities therefore emits a proper sound, both towards the gods, and towards men, and produces actions correspondent to its sound, that polity always flourishes and is preserved. But when it imitates another sound, it is corrupted. For this Euphræus will be useful to you in no small degree, though he will likewise possess fortitude in other things. for I hope that he will discover the reasons of a monarchy, not less than your associates. If you employ him therefore for this purpose, you will both derive advantage to yourself, and greatly benefit him.

But if any one, hearing these things, should say, Plato professed to know what is advantageous to a democracy, but though he had an opportunity, in his own city, of speaking to the people, and giving them the best advice, yet he never was known to rise and address them; to this it may be answered, that Plato came late to his country, and that he became acquainted with the people when they were advanced in years, and after they had been accustomed by those prior to him to do many things contrary to his

his

his advice : for he would most willingly have consulted for its good, as for that of his father, if he had not thought he should have exposed himself to needless danger. But I think that the same thing will take place with respect to his advice to me : for if we should appear to be incurable, he will bid a long farewell to us, and will abstain from advising either me or mine. May you be prosperous.

EPISTLE VI.

PLATO to HERMIAS, ERASTUS, and CORISCUS—Prosperity.

IT appears to me, that some one of the gods has benevolently and abundantly procured for you good fortune, if you only receive it in a becoming manner: for you dwell near to, and are able to benefit each other in the greatest degree. And to Hermias I say, that neither a multitude of horses, nor any other warlike apparatus, nor even an abundance of gold, possesses greater power, than friends that are stable, and endued with sound manners. But to Erastus and Coriscus I say, though I am an old man, that befits this beautiful wisdom of ideas, that wisdom is requisite which possesses a guardian and defensive power against the base and unjust: for they are unskilled in fraud, through living for a long time with us, who are orderly, and not vicious men. On this account I have said, that they stand in need of these two kinds of wisdom, lest they should be compelled to neglect true wisdom, and should pay more attention than is proper to human and necessary wisdom. But Hermias appears to me to have received this power from a nature which is not yet connate, and from art through experience. What then do I say? To you, Hermias, I, as being more skilled in the manners and disposition of Erastus and Coriscus than you are, assert, indicate, and testify, that you will not easily find men whose manners deserve greater confidence than these your neighbours. I advise you, therefore, to cultivate an acquaintance with these men as much as possible. And again, I advise you, Erastus and Coriscus, to cultivate in return an acquaintance with Hermias, and endeavour, by mutual offices of kindness, to be united in the bonds of friendship.

But

But if any one of you shall appear to dissolve this union (for human affairs are not altogether stable), send hither to me and mine an epistle containing an accusation of the delinquent. For I think that the reasons which our answer to this letter will contain, unless there has been some great cause for this dissolution, will again bind you in your former friendship and union, more than any incantation. Indeed, if all we and you philosophize as much as we are able, and as far as is permitted to each of us, the things which have now been oracularly delivered will possess their proper authority. But if we do not act in this manner, I will not relate the consequences: for I predict a good omen to you, and I say, that if divinity pleases, you will perform all these good actions. But it is requisite that this Epistle should be read by you three together; or at least by two of you in common, as often as possible; and that you should use it by compact, and an established law; at the same time taking an oath, with an earnestness by no means inelegant, and with discipline, the sister of this earnestness, and swearing by that god, who is the leader¹ of all things present and future, and by the father and lord of this leader and cause: whom, if we truly philosophize, we shall all clearly know, in as great a degree as is possible to happy men.

¹ By that god who is the leader of all things, Plato means Jupiter the artificer of the universe; and by the father and lord of this leader, the ineffable principle of things.

 EPISTLE VII.

PLATO to the Kindred and Associates of DION—Prosperity.

YOU write to me, that it is requisite to think that your sentiments about politics are the same as those of Dion; and that I should be exhorted to join with you as much as possible, both in word and deed. Indeed, if you have the same opinion and desire with him, I shall certainly join with you; but if you have not, it will be requisite to deliberate frequently on the subject. But his thoughts and desire were not such as you conjecture. I, however, as knowing them, can clearly relate what they were.

When I first came to Syracuse, I was nearly forty years old, and the age of Dion was then the same as that of Hipparinus is at present. He has likewise always persevered in the opinion which he then entertained; I mean, that the Syracusians ought to be free, and that they should be governed by the best laws. So that it is by no means wonderful, if some god has caused Dion to accord with him in opinion respecting a polity. But the manner in which this was effected, is a thing which deserves to be heard both by young and old. I will, however, endeavour to relate the affair to you from the beginning: for at present it will be opportune.

When I was a young man I was affected in the same manner as the many. For I determined, as soon as I became my own master, to betake myself immediately to the common affairs of the city. In the mean time, the following political circumstances happened to me: The polity which existed at that time being reviled by many, a change took place. Then one and fifty men being chosen as governors, eleven of them presided in the city, and ten in the Piræus; and each of these directed the affairs in the city. But the remaining thirty were invested with supreme authority. Some of these being my familiars, were well known to me, and immediately called

on

on me to attend to politics, as a thing proper for me to study. But the manner in which I was affected was not at all wonderful, on account of my youth: for I thought that they ought to govern the city so as to bring it from an unjust life to just manners. And in consequence of this, I very diligently attended to their conduct. But I perceived that these men, in a short time, evinced that the former polity was golden in comparison with theirs: for, besides acting unjustly in other respects, they sent Socrates, who was my friend, and older than I am, and who, I am not ashamed to say, was the most just of any one then existing; they sent him, I say, together with certain others, in order to bring back one of the citizens by force, that he might be punished with death. They likewise endeavoured to make Socrates join with them in the management of affairs, whether he was willing or not. He refused however to comply, and determined to expose himself to every danger, rather than be a partaker of their impious deeds. All which when I perceived, together with other similar particulars of no small importance, I was indignant, and withdrew myself from the evil men of that time.

Not long after this, the thirty tyrants were cut off, and the whole of the then existing polity was subverted. Again, therefore, I was incited, though in a more moderate degree, to engage in common and political affairs. But many circumstances then took place, at which any one might be indignant, owing to the disordered state of affairs at that time. Nor was it wonderful, that in such mutations certain enemies should be punished in a more severe manner, although those that returned were very equitable. However, through a certain fortune, it happened, that our associate Socrates was brought into a court of justice, and was accused of the greatest impiety, and which pertained to Socrates the least of all men. For some led him along as an impious person, but others gave sentence against him, and condemned him to death, who at that very time was unwilling to partake of the unholy deed respecting the removal of one of his exiled friends. On perceiving these things therefore, together with the men who had the management of political affairs, and their laws and manners, the more I considered them as I advanced in years, by so much the more difficult did the right administration of political concerns appear to me: *for this cannot be accomplished without friends and faithful associates.* But at that time, it was not easy to find

find these : for our city was then no longer governed according to our fathers manners and pursuits ; and it was not possible to obey such as were new, with any degree of ease, in consequence of the written laws and the manners being corrupted.

This likewise was wonderful in the affair, that I, who at first was ardently desirous of engaging in political concerns, when I beheld the disordered state of things, was at length giddy with the view. However, I did not withdraw my attention from them, but determined to see whether something better might not take place respecting these very things, and the whole polity, and always to wait a fit opportunity of acting. At last I perceived that all the cities existing at present were badly governed. For as to what relates to laws, they are nearly in an incurable state, without the assistance of some wonderful apparatus in conjunction with fortune. I am therefore compelled to say, praising *genuine philosophy*, that through this we are enabled to perceive such political concerns as are just, and all the affairs of private individuals. *Hence, the human race will not be liberated from evils, till either the genus of those that philosophize with rectitude and truth obtains the government of political affairs, or those that govern in cities, from a certain divine allotment, truly philosophize.* With this conception, I first came to Italy and Sicily. But on my arriving thither, I was by no means pleased with the life which is called happy ; a life full of the Italian and Syracusan tables, and which consists in repletion twice a day, in never lying alone by night, and such other particulars as follow a life of this kind : for from these manners, no man under the heavens would ever become wise, if he is nourished in them from his youth, however admirable his natural disposition may be : nor will such a one ever become temperate. And the same thing may be said respecting the other virtues. But no city can acquiesce in its laws, while the citizens are of opinion, that it is proper to consume all their possessions in superfluous cost ; and that, neglecting every thing else, they should give themselves up to feasting and venereal delight. For it is necessary that such cities as these should never cease changing into tyrannies, oligarchies, and democracies, and that the powerful among them should not even endure the name of a just and equitable polity. With these, and the above-mentioned conceptions, I came to Syracuse : perhaps through the interference of fortune. It appeared indeed, that the administration of the
present

present affairs respecting Dion and the Syracusians, was devised by *some one of the natures more excellent*¹ *than mankind*. And I am afraid, that you, on consulting me a second time, will be less persuaded by me than before. However, I affirm that the beginning of all the transactions was my journey to Sicily. For I associated with Dion who was then a young man; and in my discourse, explained to him, and advised him to do, such things as appeared to me to be best for mankind; not knowing that certain persons were then secretly contriving a dissolution of the tyranny. For Dion being very docile, both with respect to other things, and what was then said by me, he so acutely apprehended, and readily embraced my doctrines, that he surpassed all the young men with whom I was ever acquainted. He was likewise determined to pass the remainder of his life in a manner superior to many of the Italians and Sicilians, viz. in pursuing virtue, rather than pleasure and luxury. Hence he was hated by those, who lived conformably to tyrannic institutes, even till the death of Dionysius.

After this he perceived that the very same conception, which he had framed through the assistance of right reason, did not subsist in him alone, but in certain other persons, though they were not numerous, among whom he thought was Dionysius the younger. He likewise hoped that if this were the case, both his own life, and that of the other Syracusians, would be transcendently more blessed. On this account he thought that I ought by all means to come with the utmost celerity to Syracuse, that I might assist them in their undertakings; remembering how easily, by my conversation, he was inflamed with the desire of leading the most beautiful and best life. If he could but enkindle this desire in Dionysius, as he was attempting to do, he was in hopes that a happy and true life, without slaughter and death, and the evils which exist at present, would flourish through every part of Syracuse.

Dion rightly conceiving that this would be the case, persuaded Dionysius to send for me, and himself requested that I would by all means come with the utmost celerity, before certain other persons, associating with Dionysius, turned him to a life different from that which is best. But it is necessary to relate more fully what he said. Why, says he, should we expect a fitter

¹ Viz. by some one of those who are essentially dæmons or heroes.

opportunity than that which now presents itself to us through a certain divine fortune? He likewise mentioned the empire of Italy and Sicily, the power of Dionysius in this empire, and his vehement desire after philosophy and erudition. He informed me how much inclined his own kindred and familiars were to the doctrines and mode of life which I inculcated, and that he himself was most sufficient to incite Dionysius to embrace them. He added, that in consequence of this, if at any time, there was now every reason to hope that these persons would become philosophers and rulers of mighty cities. With these therefore, and many other such reasons, did he urge me to comply with his request. But I was fearful of the event; as the desires of young men are hasty, and are often borne along in a direction contrary to themselves.

However, I knew that the disposition of Dion was naturally grave, and that his age was sufficiently mature. Hence, while I was considering and doubting whether I should go and comply with his request, or not, it at the same time occurred to me that I ought to go; and that if ever any one thought of attempting to give perfection to laws and a polity, now was the time to make the attempt. For I considered, that if I could only persuade one person, I should sufficiently produce every good. With this conception and this confidence, and not from the motives which some have thought, I left my home; feeling at the same time in myself the greatest shame lest I should ever appear to myself to be nothing more than a man of words, and should never voluntarily accomplish any thing in deeds. I was likewise fearful, lest the hospitality and friendship of Dion should be exposed to no small dangers; who, if he should fall into any calamity, or be banished by Dionysius, and his other enemies, would fly to us, and thus address us: "I come to you, O Plato, an exile, but am neither indigent of horses nor soldiers to oppose my enemies, but I am in want of words and persuasion, by which I know you are especially able to convert young men to probity and justice, and unite them in friendship and fellowship with each other; through a defect of which on your part I have now left Syracuse, and have betaken myself hither. As to what relates to myself indeed, this will bring you less disgrace: but as to philosophy, which you always praise, and which you say is dishonoured by other men, is it not now betrayed by you together with

with me? If, indeed, we had been inhabitants of Megara, you would have come to my assistance when I had called you, or I should have considered you as the most depraved of all men. But now, excusing yourself through the length of the journey, and the magnitude of the voyage and the labour, you think you shall avoid infamy, though this is far from being the case."

If Dion had thus addressed me, I should certainly have been at a loss for a becoming answer. I, therefore, came to Syracuse, with reason and justice, leaving my own pursuits, which were not unbecoming, under a tyranny, which was neither adapted to my discourses nor myself. But when I came thither I liberated myself, and thus preserved the allotment of hospitable Jupiter, and of a philosopher, unblameable. This allotment indeed would have been disgraceful, if, being in any respect effeminate and timid, I had been a partaker of vicious shame. On my arrival then (for there is no occasion to be prolix) I found all things about Dionysius full of sedition, and calumnies respecting the tyranny of Dion. I defended Dion, therefore, to the utmost of my power, but I was able to effect but little. For, on the fourth month nearly after my arrival, Dionysius accused Dion of endeavouring to obtain the tyranny by stratagem, and disgracefully sent him into exile in a small ship. After this all of us that were the friends of Dion were fearful lest Dionysius should accuse and punish any one of us as cooperating with Dion in his stratagem. It was likewise reported in Syracuse, that I was put to death by Dionysius, as being the cause of every thing that then happened. But he perceiving that we were all thus affected, and dreading lest something of greater consequence should arise from our fear, received all of us benevolently, consoled me, desired me to confide in him, and requested that I would by all means stay; as he would derive no advantage from my flight, but from my continuing at Syracuse. On this account, he pretended to request me very much to stay. However, we know that the requests of tyrants are mingled with necessity.

Contriving, therefore, to prevent my departure, he obliged me to reside in the acropolis, whence no sailor could lead me away, not because he would be hindered by Dionysius, but because he could not accomplish this without his orders. Nor was there any merchant, or provincial magistrate, who, on seeing me leaving the country, would not immediately have brought me back again to Dionysius; especially since the report at that time was con-

trary to that which was circulated before ; for now it was said that Dionysius again received Plato with wonderful kindness. And indeed this was the case : for it is necessary to speak the truth. He behaved therefore to me with increasing kindness every day, and was delighted with my manners and habits. But he wished me to praise him more, and to consider him as my friend in a far greater degree than Dion : and this he strove to accomplish in a wonderful manner. However, he neglected the most beautiful means of effecting his purpose, if it could have been effected, I mean associating and becoming familiar with me, by hearing and learning discourses on philosophy. But this he was fearful of doing, lest, as was asserted by my calumniators, he should be impeded in his designs, and Dion should have the entire management of affairs. However, I endured every thing, persevering in the opinion which I entertained when I first came to Syracuse, and trying if by any possible means Dionysius could be brought to a desire of a philosophic life. But he rendered my endeavours ineffectual by his opposition. And such are the particulars of my first voyage to Sicily.

However, in consequence of the earnest solicitations of Dionysius, I made a second voyage to Sicily. But on what account I came thither, and what I did there, I may reasonably and justly relate to you, when I advise you how it is proper to act in the present state of affairs. I say I may relate this to you, for the sake of those who ask why I came a second time to Sicily. I speak in this manner, that superfluous things may not be preferred by me to such as are important.

I think, indeed, that he who gives his advice to a sick man, and one who uses bad diet, should persuade him in the first place to change his mode of living ; and if the diseased person is willing to comply with him in this, that he should then persuade him to other things ; but if he is unwilling to comply, then I should think that his adviser, if he abandons him, acts like a man and a physician, but if he still continues with him, that he acts like one effeminate and destitute of art. I assert the same thing likewise of a city, whether it has one governor, or many. For if the polity proceeds in a right way, it is the province of a man, endued with intellect, to give it useful advice ; but if the very contrary of this happens to be the case, and the people do not by any means wish to tread in the vestiges of an upright polity, but proclaim to their adviser that he must relinquish his concern about the polity,

polity, and not disturb it, for if he does he shall suffer death ; and at the same time exhort him to be subservient to their wills and desires, and thus advise them how they may always procure pleasures with celerity and ease ; when this is the case, I should consider him who endures to give such advice, as effeminate, but him who does not endure it, as a man.

In consequence of this conception, when any one consults me about one of the greatest concerns of his life, such as about the acquisition of riches, or the attention pertaining to the body or soul, if he appears to me to live daily in an orderly manner, or is willing to be persuaded when I give him my advice, then I readily join with him in consultation, nor do I desist till the affair is brought to a conclusion. But if either he does not at all consult me, or, if he does, obviously neglects to follow my advice, in this case I should not of my own accord give advice to such a one, nor would I be compelled to give it, even if he were my son. But I would voluntarily give advice to a slave, and, if he were unwilling, force him to follow it. I should not however think it holy to force my father, unless he was void of understanding through disease.

Again, if those that consult me live according to an established mode which is pleasing to themselves, but not to me, I would not hate them, because I had admonished them in vain, nor yet flattering be subservient to them, and afford them those means of gratifying their desires, which, if I were to embrace, I should not wish to live. With the same conceptions respecting his country, a prudent man ought to live, exposing its errors, if it appears to him not to be well governed, when this can be done, without speaking in vain, or losing his life. But he should never by violence effect a change in the government of his country, when it cannot be brought to the best condition, without the expulsion and slaughter of the citizens, but in this case, leading a quiet life, he should pray for the good both of himself and the city.

In the very same manner I advise you to act. And I advised Dionysius to live daily in such a manner with Dion, that he might both have the mastery over himself, and acquire faithful friends and associates, that the same thing might not befall him which happened to his father. For his father having obtained the possession of and reestablished many and great cities in Sicily, which had been subverted by the Barbarians, could not establish in the politics

tics of these faithful men, neither from his own associates, nor from among strangers, nor from his younger brothers, whom he himself had educated. Nor yet could he find men worthy to be trusted, either among the private persons whom he had made governors, or the poor, whom he had made very rich. But among these he could not procure one faithful associate, either by persuading or teaching, or the benefits which he conferred. But he was seven times worse than Darius, who neither confiding in his brothers, nor in those that were educated by him, but alone associating with himself in the government of his kingdom a Mede and captive eunuch, he divided seven parts of his dominions between them, each of which was larger than all Sicily, and found them to be faithful adherents, and neither insidious to him, nor to each other. He likewise gave an example how a good legislator and king ought to act. For he established laws by which the Persian government is preserved even at present. To which we may add, that the Athenians, after they had taken possession of many Grecian cities, which they had not founded themselves, and which had been subverted by the Barbarians, preserved their empire over them for seventy years, in consequence of procuring to themselves friends in each of the cities.

But Dionysius having collected all Sicily into one city, and through his wisdom confiding in no one, was with difficulty saved. For he was destitute of friends, and men in whom he could confide, than which there can be no greater sign of vice, as on the contrary the possession of these is the greatest proof of virtue. I therefore and Dion advised Dionysius to procure himself friends from his associates, and such as were his equals in age, and who unanimously cultivated virtue, since, through the situation of his father's affairs, he neither cultivated learning, nor had proper associates. But we particularly advised him to accord with himself. For we asserted that he was in a wonderful manner deficient in this respect, not indeed in perspicuous terms (for this was not safe), but in an obscure manner, contending in our discourse, that when this is the case, every man will become the favourer both of himself and those whom he governs; but that when he does not accord with himself, he will cause the very contrary of this to take place. If therefore, as we said, he was consistent with himself, and acquired prudence and temperance, and if afterwards he restored the desolated cities of Sicily, and bound them together with such laws and politics, that they might

might be friendly both to him and to each other, in resisting the incursions of the Barbarians, then he would not only double, but in reality multiply his paternal kingdom. For thus the Carthaginians would much more readily become subject to his power, than they were to that of Gelon; nor would he on the contrary, like his father, be compelled to pay a tribute to the Barbarians.

This was the substance of what we said, and the advice which we gave to Dionysius, at the very time when it was reported in many places that we were forming stratagems against him. Indeed, the men who raised these reports prevailed over Dionysius, expelled Dion, and threw us into fear. But, in short, Dion, departing from Peloponnesus and Athens, admonished Dionysius in reality. When therefore Dion had liberated and twice restored the city to its inhabitants, the Syracusians were then affected in the same manner towards him, as Dionysius had been before. For Dionysius had endeavoured to educate Dion so as that he might become a king worthy of his kingdom, and be his associate through the whole of life. But those that calumniated Dion, reported that he endeavoured to gain the tyranny by stratagem, and did every thing at that time, that the mind of Dionysius, which was allured by discipline, might neglect the affairs of government, and commit them entirely to Dion, who, by fraudulent usurpation, would expel Dionysius from the empire.

These things being then reported a second time among the Syracusians, vanquished by a very absurd and base victory those who were the causes of the victory. But it is proper that the particulars of this affair should be heard by you, who now call upon me to settle the present affairs. I therefore being an Athenian, the associate of Dion, and one who joined with him in opposing the tyrant, that he might make peace instead of war, was vanquished in opposing the calumniators. But Dionysius, by loading me with honours and riches, endeavoured to persuade me to stay with him, and to make me his friend, that I might serve as a witness that he had not undeservedly expelled Dion. However, he was entirely disappointed in his expectations. But Dion afterwards returning home, brought with him two Athenian brothers, who had not become his friends from philosophy, but from that casual association of most friends, which arises from performing the

the rites of hospitality, and from being mutually initiated in sacred mysteries. From these causes, and from offering to attend Dion in his return to Syracuse, he had contracted a friendship with them. But these men, on their coming to Sicily, when they understood that Dion was calumniated as endeavouring by stratagem to obtain the tyranny, by those very men whom he had liberated, not only betrayed their associate and guest, but becoming as it were perpetrators of murder with their own hands, they assisted the murderers with arms. However, I shall neither pass by in silence, nor relate the particulars of this base and unholy deed: for it has been elegantly related by many others, and will be again in some future period of time.

But I will wipe away the infamy with which the Athenians are branded. For I say, that *he* was an Athenian, who could never be induced either by riches or honours to betray the city. For he was not made a friend through illiberal benevolence, but through the communion of liberal discipline; in which alone, he who is endued with intellect ought to confide, rather than in the alliance of souls and bodies. These men, therefore, are not of consequence sufficient to bring disgrace on the city for killing Dion: for they were men of no renown. But I have said thus much for the sake of giving advice to the friends and kindred of Dion.

I give you likewise the same advice as before, and address you in the same words the third time, viz. that you should neither subject Sicily, nor, in my opinion, any other city, to despotic men, but to the laws; for this is neither better for the governors nor the governed, nor for their children, nor their children's children, but the experiment is perfectly pernicious. But little and illiberal souls delight to seize gain of this kind, understanding nothing of things just and good, human and divine, whether pertaining to the present time, or to futurity. Of the truth of these things, I endeavoured first to persuade Dion, and afterwards Dionysius, and now, in the third place, you. Be persuaded therefore by me, for the sake of Jupiter the third saviour.

In the next place, look to Dionysius and Dion, the former of whom, not following my advice, now lives in an unbecoming manner; but the latter, who acted conformably to my persuasions, died beautifully. For he who aspires after the most excellent things, both for himself and his country, will endure whatever may befall him in an upright and beautiful manner: for no

one of us is naturally immortal¹, nor if this should happen to be the case with anyone of us, would he on that account become happy, as it appears he would to the multitude. For in things inanimate, there is nothing either of good or ill which deserves to be regarded : but good or ill happens to every soul, either during its union with, or separation from, body. But it is always proper thus to believe in antient and sacred discourses, which inform us that the soul is immortal, that it has judges of its conduct, and that it suffers the greatest punishments when it is liberated from the body. On this account it is requisite to think that it is a lesser evil to suffer than to do the greatest injuries. This, indeed, the man who is a lover of wealth, and who is poor in soul does not hear, and if he did hear, he would deride it, in consequence of thinking that he ought impudently to seize on all sides, like a wild beast, whatever he can eat or drink, and whatever can contribute to venereal delight, which is a thing servile and ungrateful, and is not properly denominated pleasure. Such a one being blind, does not perceive that he can never satisfy insatiable desire, nor see what a mighty evil is unholy conduct, nor what the particulars are with which it is always attended in conjunction with every unjust deed. For he who acts unjustly, must necessarily attract to himself impiety, both while he rolls on the earth, and when he accomplishes under the earth a journey, perfectly and in every respect dishonourable and miserable.

When I said these, and other things of the like kind to Dion, I persuaded him of their truth. But I was most justly enraged with his murderers, in the same manner nearly as with Dionysius : for both of them injured me, and all the rest, as I may say, in the highest degree. For they destroyed a man who was willing to use justice : but Dionysius, who did not by any means wish to use justice, through the whole of his government, obtained the greatest power. If, however, under his government, philosophy and power had been united in reality, they would have presented to all men, both Greeks and Barbarians, a true and sufficiently luminous opinion, that neither any city nor any man can ever be happy, unless they pass through life with prudence², and in subjection to justice ; whether they possess these in themselves, or are properly educated and instructed in the manners of holy governors.

The conduct, therefore, of Dionysius in these things was noxious : but other

¹ Viz. the union of the soul with this terrene body is not an immortal union.

² See the General Introduction prefixed to this work for the accurate meaning of this word.

things in which I was injured are small when compared to these. But he who slew Dion, did not know that he had done the same thing as Dionysius. For I clearly know, as far as it is possible for one man to speak confidently of another, that if Dion had retained his government, he would never have changed it into any other form than that which he first gave to his own country, Syracuse, when he delivered it from slavery, caused it to assume a joyful and splendid appearance, and established it in liberty. After this, he would have adorned the citizens, by every possible contrivance, with such laws as are adapted to them, and are the most excellent. And besides these things, he would have diligently endeavoured to make all Sicily inhabited, and free from the Barbarians, by expelling some and subjecting others, more easily than this was done by Hiero. But if these things had taken place, through a man just, brave, temperate, and who was a philosopher, the same opinion of virtue would have been produced among the multitude, as would have flourished among all men, if Dionysius had followed my advice. But now either some dæmon, or some pernicious character, replete with iniquity and impiety, and, what is of the greatest consequence, with the audacity of ignorance, in which all evils are rooted, and from which they germinate and afterwards produce the most bitter fruit,—this dæmon, or this dire person, has a second time subverted and destroyed every thing. However, for the sake of augury, we now ominate good things the third time.

I advise therefore you, my friends, to imitate Dion, and acquire that patriotic benevolence which he possessed, and that temperate mode of living which he adopted. But you have clearly heard from me, what are the auspices by which you should endeavour to accomplish his wish : and if there is any one among you, who is unable to live in a Doric manner, according to paternal institutes, but follows the Sicilian mode of living, and that which was adopted by the murderers of Dion, neither call on him to join with you, nor believe that he will ever be sincere and faithful in any undertaking. But you should exhort the rest to reestablish the whole of Sicily, and introduce both in Sicily and all Peloponnesus equitable laws, without dreading the Athenians : for men are to be found there who surpass all others in virtue, and who hate the audacity of those that slaughter their guests.

But if these things should take place afterwards, and the many and all various seditions and discords which spring up daily urge us to immediate exertion ;

exertion; in this case, every man who, through a divine fortune, partakes, though in a small degree, of right opinion, ought to know, that there will be no end to the evils resulting from sedition, till those who vanquish in battle refrain from slaughtering and banishing their fellow-citizens, and from the remembrance of injuries, and giving respite to their desire of vengeance, become reconciled to their enemies; and till obtaining the empire over themselves, they establish common laws, which no less pertain to themselves, than to those they have vanquished, at the same time compelling them to use these laws. But they should compel them by a two-fold necessity, viz. of fear and shame. By the necessity of fear, evincing their power; in consequence of being superior to them: but by the necessity of shame, through their appearing to surpass them, both in vanquishing pleasures, and in subjection to the laws. For there is no other way by which a city labouring under sedition can find a period to its evils. But seditions, enmities, hatred, perfidy, will always arise in cities, which are thus affected towards themselves. Those, therefore, that have the greatest power in cities, if they desire the welfare of their country, should choose among themselves, in preference to others, such men as they have heard to be the most excellent characters: and, in the first place, they should choose old men, who possess children, wives, and estates, together with such of their progenitors as are most worthy and renowned, and possess sufficient property. But ten thousand and fifty inhabitants will be sufficient for a city of this kind. These should be sent from their places of abode with prayers and the greatest honours: but after they are called from home, they should be bound by an oath, and exhorted to establish laws, that they may not attribute more to the victors than the vanquished, but impart the equal and that which is common to the whole city. All things, however, consist in the establishment of laws. For when the victors are more willing to be subject to the laws than those that are vanquished, all things will be well, and full of felicity, and every evil will be exiled. But if this is not the case, there is no occasion to call me, or any other, to join with him in the administration of affairs, who is not persuaded by the precepts I have now enjoined. For these are the sisters of the things which I and Dion very wisely attempted to accomplish among the Syracusians. They were, however, second attempts: for the first were those common goods, which we attempted to effect in conjunction with Dionysius. But a certain fortune superior to man-

kind frustrated our attempt. Do you therefore now endeavour to accomplish these things more prosperously, through a good destiny, and a certain divine fortune. And thus much concerning my advice and epistle, and my first visit to Dionysius.

But my second voyage to Sicily was both becoming and proper, of which he may now hear an account who is so inclined. For the first time of my residence in Sicily passed away as I have already said, before I could advise the kindred and associates of Dion; but after this I persuaded Dionysius, to the utmost of my power, to suffer me to depart: but we mutually agreed, that when a peace took place (for there was then a war in Sicily), Dionysius should recall Dion and me, as soon as his government was more securely established. He likewise thought it proper that Dion should understand that I was not then banished by him, but was to return to him at a certain time. And I agreed to these conditions:

A peace therefore taking place, Dionysius sent for me, but required that Dion should absent himself, for another year: but he requested me by all means to come. Dion therefore exhorted and entreated me to set sail; for it was very much reported from Sicily, that Dionysius was again wonderfully inflamed with a desire of philosophy: and on this account Dion earnestly requested me to set sail for Sicily. But I, though I knew that many such things happened to young men respecting philosophy, at the same time thought it more safe not to comply with the request of Dionysius and Dion. I therefore answered both of them, that I was an old man, and that nothing which was done at present was according to the agreement. But it seems that after this Archytas¹ had betaken himself to Dionysius: for, before I set sail from Sicily, I had made Archytas, and certain other Tarentines, the guests and friends of Dionysius. There were likewise certain others among the Syracusians who were the auditors of Dion, and among these some who were full of depraved doctrines respecting philosophy, and who appeared to me to endeavour to discourse with Dionysius about things of this kind, as if Dionysius had heard all such particulars as were the subject of my thoughts. But he was not naturally unapt with respect to learning, and was ambitious in a wonderful degree. Perhaps, therefore, he was pleased with the discourse of these men; and he was ma-

¹ A famous Pythagorean philosopher.

nifestly ashamed that he heard nothing from me when I went to see him. Hence he was at the same time inflamed with a desire of hearing me more clearly, and stimulated by ambition. But on what account he did not hear me discourse, when I first came to Sicily, I have related above.

After therefore I had returned home safe, and refused to comply with his second invitation, Dionysius appeared to be perfectly ambitious, and through his desire of renown to be afraid lest I should seem to certain persons to despise him, and that my dislike of his disposition, habits, and mode of living, had induced me to refuse complying with his request. But it is just that I should speak the truth, and endure with equanimity, if any one on hearing the past transactions should despise my philosophy, and think that the tyrant was endowed with intellect: for Dionysius sent to me, the third time, a three-ranked galley, for the sake of procuring me an easy passage. He sent also Archidemus, whom he thought I most esteemed of all the familiars of Archytas that were then in his dominions, together with other illustrious persons in Sicily. But all these announced to us the same thing, viz. that Dionysius was wonderfully given to philosophy. Besides this, he sent me a long epistle, knowing how I was affected towards Dion, and that Dion was desirous I should set sail and come to Syracuse. The letter, therefore, was composed with a view to all these particulars, and the beginning of it was as follows:

Dionysius to Plato: after which followed such things as are usual, and he said nothing after this, except that complying with his request I should now come to Sicily. He then proceeded: "In the first place the particulars respecting Dion shall be accomplished according to your wish; but I know you wish for moderate measures, and that I would accede to them. However, unless you come, your desires respecting Dion will not be gratified, nor yet respecting other things pertaining to yourself." This is what he wrote. But the other parts of his letter were prolix, and foreign to the purpose. Other letters likewise came to me from Archytas, and other Tarentines, praising the philosophic disposition of Dionysius, and adding, that unless I now came their friendship with Dionysius, which had been effected through me, and which was of no small consequence with respect to political affairs, would be entirely destroyed.

As therefore, at that time, I was thus incited to comply with the request of
Dionysius,

Dionysius, some drawing me from Sicily and Italy, and others at Athens impelling me, as it were, by their prayers; and again reason proclaiming, that I ought not to betray Dion, together with the guests and others belonging to Tarentum:—when I likewise considered, that it was nothing wonderful, if a young man who was formerly unwilling to hear respecting things of great moment should become docile, and be inflamed with a desire of the best life, and that it was proper to prove clearly, in what manner he was affected, and not by any means betray him, nor become myself the cause of a disgrace so truly great, if the case with respect to Dionysius was in reality such as it was reported to be;—screened by this reasoning as with a veil, I commenced my journey, fearing many things, and prophesying as it seems not altogether well. I came therefore to Sicily the third time under the protection of the saviour Jupiter. And this voyage I actually accomplished, being again fortunately saved. But for these things I return thanks to Dionysius, after divinity; because when many were willing to slay me, he prevented them, and conducted himself with some degree of moderation in my affairs.

When therefore I came to Sicily, I thought it was proper, in the first place, to try whether Dionysius was in reality enkindled by philosophy as by a fire, or whether the report concerning him at Athens was entirely vain. But there is a certain method of making an experiment about things of this kind, by no means ignoble, but truly adapted to tyrants, and especially to those that are full of depraved doctrines, which, as soon as I arrived, I perceived was very much the case with Dionysius. But to such as these, it is requisite to show that philosophy is a thing of the greatest consequence, and that it is only to be obtained by great study and mighty labour. For he who hears that this is the case, if he is truly a lover of wisdom, and is adapted to and worthy of its acquisition, being a divine person, will think that he hears of an admirable way, that he ought immediately to betake himself to this path, and make it the great business of his life. After this, he will not cease exciting both himself, and the leader of this way, till he either obtains the consummation of his wishes, or receives a power by which he may be able to conduct himself without a guide.

Such a one, therefore, will so live, that all his actions may accord with these conceptions. But before all things he will be perpetually intent on philosophy,

philosophy, and will daily procure for himself such nutriment, as may especially render him docile, of a good memory, and able to reason; living soberly, and hating intoxication.

But those that are not lovers of wisdom in reality, but are coloured over with opinions, like those whose bodies are burnt by the sun, when they perceive what a multitude of disciplines, what mighty labour, and what temperate food are requisite, to the acquisition of philosophy, such as these, thinking that philosophy is a thing difficult and impossible for them to obtain, cannot be brought to make it the object of their pursuit. But some of these persuade themselves, that they have sufficiently heard the whole of philosophy, and that they require nothing further. This mode of experiment is perspicuous and most safe, when employed upon the effeminate, and such as are incapable of enduring labour: for thus they can never accuse him who points out to them the arduousness of the undertaking, but must blame themselves as unable to engage in all that is requisite to the acquisition of philosophy.

This method of examination I employed upon Dionysius; but I neither enumerated all the requisites, nor did Dionysius require that I should. For there were many things, and those of the greatest consequence, in which he pretended to be sufficiently knowing, through the depraved doctrines which he had heard from others. But I am informed that he afterwards wrote about the things which he then heard, as if the composition was the result of his own art, when at the same time it contained nothing of his own. However, I am entirely ignorant as to the truth of this report. But I know that certain others have written about the same things, though without understanding what they wrote.

Thus much however I shall say respecting all those who either have written, or shall write, affirming that they know those things which are the objects of my study, (whether they have heard them from me or from others, or whether they have discovered them themselves,) that they have not heard any thing about these particulars conformable to my opinion: for I never have written, nor ever shall write, about them. For a thing of this kind² cannot be expressed by words like other disciplines, but by long familiarity, and living in conjunction with the thing itself, a light as it were leaping from

² Plato here means by *a thing of this kind*, true being, the proper object of intellect.

a fire will on a sudden be enkindled in the soul, and there itself nourish itself. Indeed, thus much I know, that things which have been written or said by me, have been said in the best manner; and I do not feel the smallest degree of pain from things being ascribed to me that are badly written.

But if it appeared to me that the particulars of which I am speaking could be sufficiently communicated to the multitude by writing or speech, what could we accomplish more beautiful in life than to impart a mighty benefit to mankind, and lead an intelligible nature into light, so as to be obvious to all men? I think, however, that an attempt of this kind would only be beneficial to a few, who from some small vestiges previously demonstrated are themselves able to discover these abstruse particulars. But with respect to the rest of mankind, some it will fill with a contempt by no means elegant, and others with a lofty and arrogant hope, that they should now learn certain excellent things. I intend, therefore, to speak further about these particulars: for thus perhaps I shall say something clearer respecting them than I have yet said. For there is a certain true discourse which is adverse to him, who dares to write about things of this kind, and which has often been delivered by me before, and as it seems must be delivered by me at present.

There are three things belonging to each of those particulars through which science is necessarily produced. But the fourth is science itself. And it is requisite to establish as the fifth that which is known and true. One of these is the name of a thing; the second its definition; the third the resemblance; the fourth science. Now take each of these, desiring to learn what we have lately asserted, and think as follows concerning them all. A circle is called something, whose name we have just expressed. After this follows its definition, composed from nouns and verbs. For that which every where is equally distant from the extremes to the middle, is the definition of that which we signify by the name of a round, and a circumference, and a circle. But the third is the circle which may be painted, or blotted out, which may be made by a wheel, or destroyed. None of which affections, the circle itself, which each of these respects, suffers, as being of a different nature. But the fourth is science and intellect, and true opinion about these. And the whole of this again must be established as one thing which neither sub-

sists

lifts in voice, nor in corporeal figures, but is inherent in soul¹. It is therefore manifest, that this fourth is different from the nature itself² of the circle, and again different from the three we have previously mentioned. But among the number of these, intellect, by its relation and similitude, proximately adheres to the fifth, while the rest are more remote from its nature. The same may likewise be affirmed of a straight and crooked figure, of colour, and of the good, the beautiful, and the just. And again of every body, whether fashioned by the hand, or the work of nature, whether fire or water, and the rest of this kind; likewise of every animal, and the manners of souls; and of all actions and passions. For unless among these some one after a manner receives that fourth, he will never perfectly participate the science about the fifth. For, in addition to what has been said, these four no less endeavour to evince about every thing the quality which it possesses; but likewise its being, through the imbecility of reasons. On this account, no one endued with intellect will ever dare to consider as equally immutable, things which are the objects of intellectual vision, and such as have a subsistence in corporeal figures.

But again, it is requisite to attend to what we have just now said. Every circle, which by the hands of men is either painted, or fashioned by a wheel, is plainly contrary to our fifth: for it every where participates of the right line. But we must affirm that the circle itself has neither more nor less of any thing whatever; that is, it possesses in itself nothing of a contrary nature. Besides, none of these is endued with any stability of name: for nothing hinders our applying the appellation of straight to that which we now denominate round, and calling the straight by the denomination of the round; nor will there be any less stability in these, when their names are changed into the contrary. The same reasoning is likewise true of definition, since it is composed from nouns and verbs which possess no stability. And in a variety of ways it may be proved, that no one of these four is certain and firm. But the greatest thing of all, as I just before observed, is

¹ Viz. in the dianoëtic part of the soul: for the forms, or essential reasons subsisting in this part, are the objects of science.

² For the circle itself is an *intellectual form*, and is not to be apprehended by the discursive energies of the dianoëtic part, but by the simple projections of intellect.

this, that since there are two things, essence and quality, when the soul seeks to know not the quality of a thing, but what it is, unless it first investigates each of these four, and sufficiently discusses them by a reasoning process and sensible inspection, and this continually through every thing which is asserted and shown, it will be filled, as I may say, with all possible ambiguity and obscurity.

In such things therefore, as through a depraved education we are not accustomed to investigate the truth, but are contented with an image exhibited to our view, we do not become ridiculous to each other, when being interrogated, we are able to discuss and argue about those four. But in such particulars as we are compelled to separate that fifth from other things, and evince its nature, he who wishes to subvert what we have evinced, vanquishes, and causes him who explains this fifth, either by speech, or writing, or answers, to appear to the multitude of his hearers entirely ignorant of the things about which he attempts either to write or speak; men sometimes being ignorant, that it is not the soul of the writer or speaker that is confuted, but the nature of each of the above-mentioned four particulars, when it is badly affected. But the procession through all these, and the transition to each upwards and downwards, scarcely at length produces the science of that which naturally subsists in an excellent condition, in the soul of one naturally well affected. But when any one is naturally ill affected, as is the case with the habit of soul possessed by the multitude, who are badly disposed, with respect to learning, and whose manners are depraved, not even Lynceus himself can enable such as these to see. But in one word, neither docility nor memory will confer on any one the power of perceiving things of this kind, who is not allied to them: for they are not inherent from the first in foreign habits. So that those who are not naturally adapted and allied to what is just, and other things that are beautiful, though they may be docile, and of a good memory with respect to other particulars; and again, those that are allied to the just and beautiful, but are indocile and of a bad memory, will never learn, as far as it is possible to learn, the truth pertaining to virtue and vice. For it is necessary to learn this, and at the same time the falsehood and truth of the whole of essence, with all possible exercise, and a great length of time, as I said in the beginning. But after agitating together the several names and reasons, and sensible perceptions of these things, confuting
in

in a benevolent manner, and employing questions and answers without envy, then striving as much as is possible to human power, prudence and intellect about each of these will scarcely at length shine forth.

On this account, every worthy man will be very far from writing[†] about things truly worthy, as he will thus subject himself to envy and ambiguity. But, in one word, it is requisite to know from these things, that when any one sees the writings of another, whether of a legislator on the laws, or on certain other subjects, he will see that these are not such writings as are considered by him to be the most worthy of all others, if he is himself a worthy character: but the objects of his pursuit are situated in a most beautiful region. And if he should find in writings such things as truly deserve the highest regard, it might then be said, that not the gods indeed, but men destroy the intellects of men. And thus much for this fable and digression, which he who acutely follows will well understand.

Whether therefore Dionysius has written any thing about the highest and first natures, or any other person inferior or superior to him, according to my decision, he has neither heard nor learnt any thing sound respecting these natures; for otherwise he would have venerated them in the same manner as I do, and would not have dared to hurl them into incongruity and indecency. For he could not write about them, for the sake of recalling them to his memory; as there is no occasion to fear that any one will ever forget them, when they are once comprehended by the soul: for they lie in the shortest space of all things. But perhaps he did this for the sake of base ambition, either asserting that these doctrines were his own, or as partaking of discipline of which he was unworthy to partake, loving the renown which arises from such participation.

Perhaps, however, we may allow that Dionysius has written about these things, if what he has asserted was produced by one conversation. But, O Jupiter, says the Theban, how was it produced! For I discussed these things with him as I have said, and only once; but never afterwards. In the next place, he who is anxious to find out the cause of what then happened respecting these things, ought to know why we did not discuss them a second and a third time, and often: whether it was that Dionysius, having only heard them

[†] Viz. he will be unwilling to write perspicuously about the most sublime truths, unless the age in which he lives renders it necessary so to do, in order to preserve them to posterity.

once, thought that he knew them, and knew them sufficiently, or that he discovered them himself, or had formerly learnt them from others. Or was it that he thought the things that were said were trifling? Or did a certain third thing happen to be the case, viz. that they were in reality too great for him, who was solicitous to lead a life of prudence and virtue? For if it is said that he considered the things about which he wrote as trifling, this will be opposed by many witnesses who assert the contrary, and who are much better judges about things of this kind than Dionysius. But if he invented them, or learnt them, and they deserve to be made subservient to the discipline of a liberal soul, is it not wonderful that he should so readily despise the leader and master of these things?

But how he despised him I will now relate. Not long after this he would not permit the procurators of Dion to send that portion of his wealth to Peloponnesus, which some time before he had suffered him to possess and enjoy, as if he had entirely forgotten the letter which he wrote to me. For he asserted that this property did not belong to Dion, but to Dion's son, who, as he was his own grandson, was according to law under his protection. And such were the transactions of that time.

From hence, however, we may accurately see how Dionysius was affected towards philosophy; and it is lawful for me to be indignant whether I am willing or not: for it was then summer, and the time for ships to sail. But it seemed that I ought not to be more offended with Dionysius than myself, and with those who compelled me to come the third time to the strait about Scylla, and

“ Dire Charybdis measure o’er again’.”

I was therefore forced to tell Dionysius, that it was impossible for me to stay with him while Dion was used so ignominiously. But he consoled me, and requested me to stay; thinking it would not be well for him that I should be so swift a messenger of such transactions as these: and when he could not persuade me, he said he would prepare my dismissal. However, being enraged, I was determined to depart in a fleet of ships, thinking that I ought to suffer every thing, if he should attempt to stop me; as I was manifestly injured, though I had done no injury. But when he found that I could not by any

¹ Odyss. lib. xii. v. 428.

means be induced to stay, he devised the following mean to retard my departure. On the day after these things had taken place, he thus plausibly addressed me: Dion, says he, and the affairs of Dion, about which we have often disagreed, shall be entirely removed from you and me; for on your account I will act as follows towards Dion. I think it fit that he shall take up his residence in Peloponnesus, not as an exile, but as one who may come hither, when it shall seem good to him, to me, and to you who are his friend. This shall take place, if he forms no stratagems against me; and you, your familiars, and the familiars of Dion, that are here, shall be bound for his fulfilling this agreement. But the money which he may receive shall be deposited in Peloponnesus and Athens, with those you shall think fit: Dion too shall enjoy the benefit of this money, but shall not be authorized to take it away without your consent; for I should not very much believe that justice would be done to me, if he had the entire possession of this wealth, which is not inconsiderable. But I have greater confidence in you and your familiars. See, therefore, whether these things are agreeable to you, and stay for the sake of them this year, at the expiration of which you shall receive this money and depart. I well know, indeed, that Dion will be greatly indebted to you for acting in this manner on his account.

When I heard these things, I was perfectly indignant, but at the same time I said that I would consider the affair, and give him my opinion on the following day. This was our compact at that time. I therefore consulted with myself after this, but in a very confused manner; but the following consideration first presented itself to me, as the leader of my consultation: What if Dionysius intends to do nothing of what he promises to do, but on my departure both he and many others should write in a plausible manner to Dion, what he has now said to me, that he indeed was willing, but that I was unwilling he should act in this manner, and that I entirely neglected his concerns; and besides this, if Dionysius, being unwilling I should depart, should give no orders to any pilot, but should easily signify to all men, that he did not consent to my setting sail, what sailor would be willing to take me on board, from the palace of Dionysius? For, in addition to other evils, I dwelt in the garden which surrounded the palace; from whence the porter would not be willing to dismiss me, without an order from Dionysius. But if I stay another year, I can indeed send an account of these transactions to Dion, and acquaint him with
my

my situation and conduct. And if indeed Dionysius should do any thing of what he promises to do, my conduct will be not entirely ridiculous : for perhaps the property of Dion, when rightly estimated, does not amount to less than a hundred talents¹. But if the issue of affairs should be such as it is likely to be, I shall be at a loss how to act. At the same time, it is perhaps necessary that I should stay a year longer, and endeavour in reality to frustrate the machinations of Dionysius.

Thus thinking with myself, I told Dionysius, on the following day, that I thought it best to stay ; but I said he ought not to consider me as possessing absolute authority over Dion. I added, that he should write to Dion in conjunction with me, acquainting him with the compact we had made, and asking him whether he was satisfied with these things, and with me, and whether he wished for any thing further. Lastly, that he should write to him as soon as possible, and should not make any innovation in his affairs. This is what was said, and these are nearly the things in which we agreed.

But after this the ships failed, and therefore it was no longer possible for me to depart. Dionysius, therefore, as if recollecting something he had omitted, said that the half of Dion's property ought to remain with his son, and that the other half should be sent to Dion. This property, he said, he would sell, and when he had sold it, deliver one half to me to be sent to Dion, and keep the other half for his son ; for he added, it will be most just to act in this manner. I therefore, being struck with what he said, thought it would be entirely ridiculous to say any thing further. At the same time, however, I observed to him, that we ought to wait for an answer from Dion, and again send him an account of these particulars. But Dionysius, after this, in a very juvenile manner, told the whole of Dion's property to whom and for what he pleased, without making any mention of it whatever to me : and again I in like manner said nothing to him respecting the affairs of Dion ; for I thought I should be able to do nothing further in them. And thus far I gave assistance both to philosophy and my friends.

But after this, I and Dionysius so lived together, that I like a bird was always looking out, and longing to fly away, but he was devising after what manner he might prevent my flight, and gave up no part of the property of

¹ i. e. upwards of 13,300*l*.

Dion. At the same time, however, we were said to be sociable through the whole of Sicily. But at that period, Dionysius endeavoured to diminish the pay of the mercenaries, contrary to the custom of his father; and the soldiers being enraged, assembled in a body, and declared this should not take place. Dionysius therefore endeavoured to force them to submission, and for this purpose shut the gates of the acropolis: but the soldiers immediately marched to the walls, vociferating a certain barbarous and warlike pæon; at which Dionysius being terrified, granted the soldiers all they desired, and those that carried crescent shields more than their usual pay. But a report was rapidly spread that Heraclides was the cause of this disturbance; upon hearing which, Heraclides immediately disappeared. Dionysius therefore endeavoured to take him; but not being able to discover his place of retreat, he ordered Theodotes to attend him in the gardens, in which at that time I happened to be walking. Other parts, therefore, of their discourse I neither known or heard; but what Theodotes said to Dionysius before me I both know and remember. For he said, Plato, I am persuading Dionysius, that if I were able to bring Heraclides hither, he would answer to the crimes which are now laid to his charge: and if it does not appear fit to Dionysius that he should dwell in Sicily, yet I think it is proper that, receiving his wife and son, he should be permitted to set sail for Peloponnesus, and there reside, not injuring Dionysius in any respect, and enjoying his own property. I have therefore, prior to this, sent, and shall again send for him. But whether he complies with my first or second citation, I think it proper that he should receive no injury, either here or in the suburbs, but that he shall be sent out of the kingdom, till Dionysius shall think fit to recall him; and I request Dionysius to accede to these terms. Do you accede or not? says he, speaking to Dionysius. He answered, I do accede; nor shall he suffer any thing worse than what has now been mentioned, though he should make his appearance in your house.

However, on the evening of the following day, Eurybius and Theodotes came to me in great haste and wonderfully alarmed: and Theodotes said to me, Plato, was you not a witness yesterday to the compact which Dionysius made with me and you respecting Heraclides? To which I replied, Undoubtedly I was. But now, says he, the soldiers with crescent shields are running every where in order to take Heraclides, and there is reason to fear that

that he is concealed at no great distance. Attend us therefore to Dionysius with every possible artifice. In consequence of this, we followed and came to him; and they indeed stood silent and weeping; but I said, These men, Dionysius, are afraid lest you should make some alteration respecting Heraclides, contrary to your compact yesterday: for it appears to me that he is evidently at no great distance from hence. But Dionysius on hearing this was violently enraged, and his countenance exhibited all various colours, such as anger produces: but Theodotes falling at his feet, and taking his hand, wept, and suppliantly implored him not to do any such thing. Then I, resuming the discourse, consoled him and said, Take courage, Theodotes, for Dionysius dares not to act contrary to the compact which he made yesterday. But he looking at me, and in a very tyrannic manner, With you, says he, I made no compact, neither great nor small. To which I replied, By the gods, you promised me, that you would not do the very things, which this man now requests you not to do. Having thus said, I turned from him and left the place.

After this Dionysius endeavoured to find Heraclides: however, Theodotes sent messengers to him, and exhorted him to fly. But Dionysius sent Tifias and the soldiers with the crescent shields, and ordered them to pursue him. Heraclides, however, as it is said, escaped their pursuit, and in the small part of a day fled into the dominions of the Carthaginians. But now, from the enmity towards me which this occasioned, Dionysius appeared to have a pretext for doing that which, for a long time, he had been attempting to accomplish by stratagem, I mean, withholding the property of Dion. And in the first place he sent me from the acropolis, pretending it was requisite that the women should perform a sacrifice, which lasts for ten days, in the gardens in which I resided. He therefore ordered me at that time to take up my residence, out of the acropolis, with Archidemus: but when I was there, Theodotes sending for me, was indignant at many of the then transactions, and complained of Dionysius. But Dionysius hearing that I had been with Theodotes, made this another pretext of enmity towards me, similar to the former, and sent a certain person to ask me, whether I had really been with Theodotes at his request. To which I readily replied, I had. The messenger therefore said, Dionysius ordered me to tell you, that you by no means do well, in always preferring to him Dion and the friends of Dion. This is
what

what was said ; and after this Dionysius never again sent for me to his palace, as it was now clear that I was the friend of Theodotes and Heraclides, and an enemy to him ; and he no longer considered me as well affected towards him, because the property of Dion was entirely consumed.

After this I dwelt out of the acropolis among the mercenary soldiers : but as well others as certain Athenian citizens, who acted as servants to Dionysius, came to me and informed me that I was calumniated by the soldiers. And besides this, certain persons threatened to kill me, if they could apprehend me. I devised therefore the following means of preservation : I sent to Archytas, and other friends at Tarentum, and informed them of my situation : but they, under the pretext of a certain embassy from the city, sent Lamiscus, who was one of my friends, with a galley of thirty ranks ; and he, on his arrival, informed Dionysius that I wished to depart, and desired him by all means to grant my request. To this Dionysius assented, and dismissed me with a passport. However, I neither asked for the money belonging to Dion, nor did any one give it me.

But when I came to Peloponnesus to the Olympic games, I there met with Dion, who was beholding the celebration of them, and informed him of the past transactions ; but he, calling Jupiter to witness, immediately declared to me, and my domestics and friends, that he would prepare to punish Dionysius, both on account of his deceiving me, while I was his guest (for thus he said and thought), and expelling and banishing him unjustly. On hearing this, I persuaded him to call his friends if he were willing. But I said, as to myself, since you have forced me after a manner, together with others, to become the companion and guest of Dionysius, and a partaker with him of sacred rites, he will doubtless think that I ought to conduct myself as an equitable medium between both parties, especially since, when I was accused by many of forming stratagems in conjunction with you against him and his tyranny, he did not put me to death, though he was not prevented from doing so by fear. To this I added, that my age rendered me unfit to engage in the concerns of war ; and that I should act as a mediator between them, if at any time their friendship would require the assistance of a conciliator. But I informed them, that as long as they were averse to each other, they must call others to their assistance. I said these things, in consequence of hating my wandering and adverse fortune about Sicily.

However, as they were not persuaded by the arguments which I adduced, they have been the causes of all the evils that exist at present. Indeed, if Dionysius had given to Dion the property which was his due, or if he had been perfectly reconciled to him, we may say, as far as the condition of human affairs permits us to judge, that nothing adverse would have happened : for I could easily have kept Dion from hostile measures, both by my will and power. But now, being impelled against each other, they fill all things with evils ; though indeed Dion had the same wish, which I should say both I and every other moderate person ought to have, respecting his own power, and that of his friends, and respecting his own city, I mean the wish to benefit when in authority, and when in the greatest power to impart the greatest benefits. But this will not be effected by him who endeavours to enrich himself and his friends, who forms stratagems against the city, and being poor collects together conspirators, and having no dominion over himself is through timidity vanquished by pleasure : who besides this slays those that are wealthy, calling them enemies, seizes their wealth, and at the same time proclaims to his adjutants and associates, that no one ought to accuse him, as he is poor. After the same manner, he who benefits his city will be honoured by it, in consequence of distributing by decrees the property of a few among the many. And this will likewise be the case, when any one governing a great city, and at the same time many lesser cities, unjustly distributes to his own city the wealth of the lesser. For after this manner, neither Dion, nor any other person, would ever voluntarily take upon them an authority, which would always be pernicious to himself and posterity ; but he will endeavour to establish such a polity, and such laws, as are the most just, and the best, and which can be affected by the fewest deaths and banishments.

This conduct indeed was now adopted by Dion, who preferred suffering things impious to the commission of them ; but who, at the same time that he was cautious lest he should suffer them, fell, after he had arrived at the summit of advantage over his enemies. Nor did he in this suffer any thing wonderful : for the soul of a pious man will never be wholly deceived respecting things impious, temperate, and prudent. But neither perhaps is it wonderful, if the same thing has happened to him as to a good pilot, from whom the future storm is not entirely concealed, but who may be ignorant of a sudden tempest, which is of an unexpected magnitude, and by which he may be violently overwhelmed.

overwhelmed. After the same manner, through the fewest circumstances, was Dion deceived: for he was not entirely ignorant that his enemies were bad men, though he was unacquainted with the profundity of their ignorance, and of the rest of their depravity and voracity. Through being deceived in this he fell, and by his fall involved Sicily in infinite grief. What therefore I advise you to do, after the present relation of these particulars, I have already nearly mentioned. But it appeared to me necessary to show on what account I came a second time to Sicily, through the absurdity and irrationality with which this circumstance seems to be attended. If, therefore, what has been now said shall appear to any one to be reasonable, and if he should think that I had a sufficient pretext for undertaking this voyage, the contents of this Epistle will also be sufficient.

EPISTLE VIII.

PLATO to the Kindred and Familiars of DION—Prosperity.

AS I perceive that affairs are in a very prosperous condition, I will endeavour, as far as I am able, to send you a true account of them. But I hope I shall not only, in the first place, give you salutary advice, but, in the second place, all those that are in Syracuse; and, in the third place, your enemies and adversaries, except some one of them shall have been guilty of an impious deed. For these things are incurable, and can never be expiated. But consider what I now say.

The tyranny being dissolved, all Sicily is at strife about these very things. And some wish to restore again the former government, but others to bring the tyranny entirely to an end, while in the mean time the several plans about things of this kind appear to the multitude to be right, so long as they tend to injure their enemies, and benefit their friends, in the highest degree. It is however by no means easy for him who inflicts many evils on others not to suffer many himself. Nor is it necessary, in order to see this clearly, to search for examples at a great distance, since the circumstances which have now taken place about Sicily are sufficient for this purpose: for some attempt to injure, and others to take vengeance on the injurers. But you are sufficiently acquainted with these particulars, to be able to teach them to others. In these things, therefore, there is nearly no difficulty. But what is advantageous to all enemies and friends, or what is the least noxious to both, this it is neither easy to perceive, nor, when seen, to accomplish. Indeed this consultation and inquiry appears to resemble prayer. Let it therefore be in every respect a certain prayer. For *it is requisite to begin every thing from the gods, both in speaking and understanding.* But when brought to a conclusion, it will signify to us the following discourse.

From the time that the war began to the end of it, one alliance nearly ruled over both you and your enemies; an alliance which your fathers once established,

established, in consequence of being involved in the greatest difficulties, at that time when the Sicily of the Greeks was exposed to the extreme danger of becoming the prey of Barbarians, through being entirely subverted by the Carthaginians. For then they chose Dionysius, as being a young man, and strenuous in such warlike affairs as were properly adapted to him. But they gave him as an adviser Hipparinus, who was his senior: and for the safety of Sicily, investing these two with absolute power, they denominated them, as they say, tyrants. And whether any one is willing to think that a divine fortune and a god, or the virtue of the governors, or both, together with the citizens of that time, were the cause of the safety of Sicily, let this be just as he pleases. Safety, however, to the men of that time, was thus obtained. As therefore they conducted themselves in this manner, it is just that those who were saved should return them thanks. But if the tyranny afterwards improperly used any gift of the city, for this it has partly been accused, and partly has suffered punishment. Certain punishments, therefore, have necessarily been properly inflicted on them for their conduct. For if you could either avoid them, without great danger and labour, or they could easily recover the antient government, we should not advise you to do such things as we shall persuade you to do hereafter. But now it is proper that both of you should understand and call to mind, how often you have been in hope of obtaining your desire, and have thought that but little was wanting to the accomplishment of all things according to your intention. However, this little that was wanting became every where the cause of great and infinite evils, and has not yet arrived at any end. But the antient evils always adhere together, and though the end presents itself to the view, yet a new beginning continually springs forth. The whole too of the tyrannic and popular genus appears to have perished under this circle. But if that which it seems reasonable to expect, though of an execrable nature, should take place, all Sicily nearly will become destitute of the Greek tongue, in consequence of being transferred to a certain Phœnician or Opic[†] dynasty and power. All the Greeks, therefore, with all possible diligence and earnestness, ought to bring a remedy for these things. If indeed any one can give better advice than that which I shall give, he may with the greatest rectitude be called a lover of Greece.

† The Opici were the antient inhabitants of Campania.

But I will now endeavour, with all possible freedom of speech, and making use of a certain common and just mode of discourse, to evince to you what appears to me to be the truth. I shall however for this purpose speak in the character of an arbitrator, and according to my antient custom give advice both to him who tyrannizes and him who is subject to tyranny. And now, in the first place, I advise every tyrant to fly from the appellation, and the thing itself, and change his tyranny, if possible, into a kingdom. But it is possible, as the wise and good Lycurgus evinced in reality: for he, when he saw that the race of his kindred in Argos and Messene had arrived from the power of kings to that of tyrants, and that they were destroying both themselves and the city,—he, I say, fearing both for his country and race, applied a remedy, by introducing the government of elderly men, and the division of the Ephori, as the means of preserving the royal government. And it is owing to this that it has been preserved for so many generations with glory; since here law became the proper king of men, and men did not tyrannize over the laws. To effect this indeed my present discourse persuades all men, exhorting those that aspire after tyranny to turn and fly, with an unwearied celerity, from the felicity of hungry and stupid men, and endeavour to transfer themselves to a royal form of government, become subservient to royal laws, and thus obtain the greatest honours with the consent both of men and the laws.

But I advise those that pursue free manners, and avoid a servile yoke as an evil, to be cautious lest, through an insatiable avidity of a certain unseasonable liberty, they fall into the disease of their ancestors, who, through an unmeasured love of freedom, suffered all the evils of extreme anarchy. For those that governed in Sicily before Dionysius and Hipparinus, lived as they thought happily, because they lived luxuriously, and governed even governors themselves. They likewise dissolved the authority of the twelve military chiefs prior to Dionysius, and judged no one according to law, that they might not be subject to any one who governed either with justice or law. But they were in every respect entirely free, and on this account they became subject to tyrannic governments. For both slavery and freedom when they are transcendent, are attended with every evil. But when they subsist according to measure, they are attended with every good. And the service of divinity is attended with measure, but that of men is without measure.

Divinity

Divinity too is the law to temperate men, but pleasure to the intemperate.

Since these things, therefore, naturally subsist in this manner, I exhort that the advice which I give to the friends of Dion be given to all the Syracusians, as the common advice of Dion and myself. But I will unfold what he while living and able said. Though perhaps some one may inquire what the advice of Dion has to do with the present affairs. Hear:—"O Syracusians, receive before all things such laws as appear to you to be neither conducive to gain, nor the gratification of your desires; but as there are three things, viz. soul, body, and riches, it is requisite that the care of the soul should rank in the first place; that of the body in the second place, situated under the care belonging to the soul; and, in the third place, the honour pertaining to riches, as in a state of servitude to both body and soul. The divine institution effecting these things, will be a law rightly established for you, and rendering those by whom it is used truly happy. But the discourse which calls the rich happy, is itself miserable and stupid, is the discourse of women and children, and renders those that are persuaded by it like itself. Indeed, that these things to which I exhort you are true, you will know in reality, if you have tasted of what has now been said by me respecting laws. But a most true examination appears to have taken place respecting all things. However, such laws being received, since Sicily is in danger, and you neither sufficiently vanquish, nor are remarkably vanquished, it will perhaps be just and advantageous to all of you to pursue the middle path, as well for those of you that avoid the severity of government, as for those of you that desire its restoration. For your ancestors formerly, which is a thing of the greatest consequence, preserved the Greeks from the Barbarians; so that it is now lawful to discourse concerning the present polity. For if at that time the Greeks had perished, we could neither have discoursed in any respect concerning them, nor would any hope whatever have remained. Now therefore to some let there be liberty in conjunction with a royal government; but to others in subjection to it; the laws at the same time having dominion not only over the other citizens, but over kings themselves, whenever they are found to act contrary to law. But in all these affairs, establish kings in conjunction with the gods, with a mind sound and free from guile.

And,

And, in the first place, establish my son¹ on a two-fold account, viz. for my sake, and for the sake of my father. For he at that time freed the city from the Barbarians: but I freed it twice from tyrants, as you yourselves can testify. But, in the second place, make him a king, who has the same name² with my father, I mean the son of Dionysius: and this do for the sake of the assistance which he now affords, and on account of his pious manners; for though he is the son of a tyrant, yet he has voluntarily liberated the city; and has thus procured for himself and his race ever-living honour, instead of the transient and unjust renown of a tyranny. In the third place, it is proper to invite willingly to the kingdom of the Syracusians, the city also being willing, Dionysius the son³ of Dionysius, who is now the general of the enemy's army, if he assents to the kingly form of government, fearing the changes of fortune, commiserating his country, and paying due reverence to temples and sepulchres; lest through a love of contention he should involve all things in ruin, and thus gratify the Barbarians by the destruction of his country.

These three kings, therefore, whether you give or deprive them of a Lacedæmonian power, you should by common consent establish after the manner which I have before mentioned to you, and which now again hear. If the offspring of Dionysius and Hipparinus are willing, for the safety of Sicily, that the present calamities should cease, and are thus desirous to procure honours for themselves and their race, both for the future and present time, on this condition, as I have before said, call them to the government, investing with the power of making a reconciliation, such ambassadors as they shall think fit for the purpose, whether they are chosen from among yourselves, or from other cities, or from both; and besides this, as many as they shall choose to allow.

These, in the first place, should establish laws and a polity, in which it will be requisite that the kings should be lords of the sacred, and such other concerns as ought to be entrusted to the benefactors of their country. Guardians of the laws too should be created, thirty-five in number, and

¹ Dion, who is here supposed to be speaking, means his son Hipparinus.

² Viz. Hipparinus, the son of Hipparinus.

³ Viz. the son of the second Dionysius.

these,

these, together with the people and senate, should be the governors of war and peace. There should likewise be different courts of justice: and the thirty-five guardians of the laws should be the judges of death and banishment. And besides these, judges should be chosen from those that acted last in the capacity of governors; so that one who appears to be the best and the most just should be chosen from each government. These too, on the following year, must judge such of the citizens as deserve death, or imprisonment, or exile. But the king shall not be permitted to be a judge of these decisions, as being a priest, and consequently purified from murder, bonds, and exile. While living, I conceived that these things should take place, and I think so at present. And then indeed, in conjunction with you, I should have vanquished my enemies, if foreigners and the furies had not prevented me from effecting what I intended to effect.

In the next place, if the event of things had answered my expectations, I should have caused the rest of Sicily to be inhabited, after having expelled the Barbarians from the places which they now occupy, such of them however being excepted as fought for the common liberty against the tyranny. I should likewise have restored the former inhabitants of Grecian places to their antient and paternal abodes. I therefore advise and call upon all of you to conceive and act in the very same manner at present: and let him who is unwilling to do so, be considered in common as an enemy. But neither are these things such as it is impossible to accomplish: for he who judges those things to be impossible, which subsist in the souls of two persons, and which from reasoning will readily be found to be the best of things, is by no means wise. But by the two, I mean the soul of Hipparinus the son of Dionysius, and the soul of my son. For I think if these two agree, the other Syracusians, and all those who are lovers of their country, will likewise be unanimous. But paying due honours, and praying to all the gods, and to those other natures whom it is proper to reverence in conjunction with the gods, and besides this persuading and inciting both your friends and enemies, benignantly, and in every possible way, do not desist, till by what we have now said, urging you in the same manner as divine dreams urge those that are awake, you obtain clear evidence and prosperous fortune in perfection."

EPISTLE IX.

PLATO to ARCHYTAS the Tarentine—Prosperity.

THE familiars of Archippus and Philonides came to us, bringing with them the letter which you gave them, and relating the state of your affairs. Such things therefore as pertain to the city, they accomplished without difficulty; for they were not in every respect laborious. But as to what relates to yourself, they said that you are indignant because you cannot be freed from an attention to public concerns. That it is indeed the most pleasant thing in life, for a man to attend to his own affairs, especially if he chooses to act in the same manner as you do, is nearly obvious to every one; but you ought also to consider this, that each of us is not born for himself alone; but that our country claims one part of our birth, our parents another part, and our friends the remaining part. Much too must be given to the occasions which occupy our life. As your country, therefore, calls upon you to attend to public affairs, it would perhaps be absurd not to obey its call: for at the same time too, it happens that a place is left for depraved men, who apply themselves to politics, not from the best motives. But of these things enough.

At present we take care of Echecrates¹, and shall do so in future; and this for your sake, and that of his father Phrynon, and for the sake of the young man himself.

¹ This is the person to whom the last discourse of Socrates was related by Phædo. See the Dialogue of that name.

EPISTLE X.

PLATO to ARISTODORUS—Prosperity.

I HEAR that you are now in the most eminent degree the associate of Dion, and that you are at all times most wise with respect to those manners that are subservient to philosophy. For I say that firmness, faith, and integrity, constitute true philosophy. But I think that other wisdom and skill, which tend to other things, when denominated elegant subtilties, will be rightly named. But now farewell ; and continue to abide in the manners in which you now abide.

EPISTLE XI.

PLATO to LAODAMAS—Prosperity.

WE have before written to you, that your coming to Athens is of great consequence with respect to all you say. But as you declare you cannot come, if either I should be able to come, or Socrates, as you mention in your letter, this will be the second plan to be adopted. Socrates however, at present, labours under the infirmity of the strangury; and it would be disgraceful for me to go thither, if the particulars, for the sake of which you incite me to make this journey, are not accomplished: but I have not much hope that they will be accomplished. However, to discuss every particular would require a long epistle. And at the same time my body, through age, is not able to bear the fatigue of wandering, and to encounter all those dangers with which the land and sea are surrounded; especially at the present time, when travelling is full of danger. But I give you as advice, that which Hesiod, through me as the relator, says, "that to opine is vile, but to understand is difficult." For if there are any who think that a city can be well established by the mere promulgation of laws, without some one endued with authority presiding in the city, and attending to the conduct of its inhabitants, in order that both slaves and the free born may be temperate and brave,—those who entertain this opinion do not think rightly.

But again, if there are men among you who deserve this authority, let them obtain it. But if there is occasion for some one to instruct them, I think that neither he who can teach, nor those who are capable of being instructed, are with you. All that remains, therefore, is to pray to the gods: for cities, prior to the present time, have been nearly constituted
in

in this manner. And after they have been well peopled, through the intervention of great concerns, which have taken place through war and other transactions, then at such like seasons an illustrious and good man has obtained a mighty power. But prior to this, it is proper and necessary to bestow great attention on these things. Consider what I say, and do not act imprudently, in consequence of thinking that something ought to be done with expedition. May prosperity attend you.

EPISTLE XII.

PLATO to ARCHYTAS the Tarentine—*Prosperity.*

IT is wonderful with what pleasure we received the commentaries which came from you, and how very much we were delighted with the genius of their author. To us indeed, he appeared to be a man worthy of his antient progenitors. For those men are said to have been ten thousand in number; and according to the fable, they were the best of all those Trojans that were excited by Laomedon.

With respect to the commentaries by me, about which you write, they are not yet finished. However, such as they are, I have sent them to you. With respect to guardianship, we both accord in our sentiments, so that in this particular there is no need of exhortation¹.

¹ There is another epistle after this which is ascribed to Plato, but which I have not translated, because it is obviously spurious. That it is so, will be at once evident to the intelligent reader from the following sentence in it, *της μιν γαρ σπουδαίας επιστολής θεός αρχήσιν, θεοί δε της ηττον, viz.* "The word *god* is the beginning of a serious epistle, the word *gods* of one that is not so." Very properly therefore in all the early editions of Plato is the reader admonished that this epistle is spurious by the word *οδευεται*; and it is singular that Fabricius should doubt whether it might not be genuine, because Diogenes Laertius enumerates thirteen epistles of Plato, and this with the preceding makes thirteen. For of the thirteen which are extant, two, as the reader will perceive, are written by Dion.

THE END OF THE EPISTLES.

ADDITIONAL

ADDITIONAL NOTES

ON

THE CRATYLUS,

EXTRACTED FROM THE MS. SCHOLIA OF PROCLUS ON
THAT DIALOGUE.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

ON

THE CRATYLUS.

THE scope of the Cratylus* is to exhibit in things last the prolific energy of souls, and the assimilative power, which, essentially receiving, they evince through the rectitude of names. But since the partial energy of souls frequently fails of its proper ends, just in the same manner as a partial nature, hence names indefinite, and which are casually circulated, naturally take place, and all of them are not the offspring of intellectual science, nor do they all regard an alliance with things themselves. Again, the Cratylus is logical and dialectical, not, however, according to the mere dialectic methods of the Peripatetics, but according to the scientific† dialectic of the great Plato, which is only adapted to those whose dianoëtic power is perfectly purified, who have been instructed from their youth in disciplines, have purified the juvenile condition of their manners through the virtues; and, in short, have genuinely philosophized. This dialectic also is the defensive enclosure of disciplines, leads us up to *the good*, the one

* The extracts with which the reader is here presented, comprehend nearly the whole of the Scholia of Proclus on the Cratylus. They may be justly called an incomparable treasury of theological information, since they are replete with the most mystic wisdom, and many of the most abstruse dogmas of antient theology are here most satisfactorily and perspicuously unfolded. To him also who is desirous of penetrating the depths of Grecian mythology, they will be inestimable; and genuine elucidations of many parts of Homer, of the Hymns of Orpheus, and of the Theogony of Hesiod, can alone be obtained from these Scholia. And in addition to all this, these Scholia are no less rare than valuable, since a copy of them is not to be found either in the university of Oxford or Cambridge, or in the British Museum, or in any of the universities of Scotland or Ireland; and it is seldom to be met with in the universities on the continent. My copy is a transcript of the manuscript now in the possession of Mr. Heber, of Brazen-nose college, Oxford.

† For an account of this dialectic, see the Parmenides, and particularly the introduction to it.

cause of all things, and was imparted to men through Prometheus, together with a most splendid fire* from the gods. For the analytics of the Peripatetics, and demonstration, which is the summit of this, may be comprehended by all who are not entirely involved in mental darkness, and who have not drank abundantly of the water of oblivion.

Again, intellect is the producer (*προσθετης*) of dialectic, from the whole of itself generating the whole of it; according to the progression of all things from *the one*, giving subsistence to the divisive method; but according to the collective comprehension of every thing in one idiom, to the definitive method; and according to the presence of forms with each other, though which each is what it is, and participates of other forms, the demonstrative method; and generating the analytic method, according to the conversion of all things to *the one*, and their proper principles.

Again, according to Aristotle, there is one rhetoric, and one dialectic, which are able to persuade or confute on both sides; but Plato says it is better to give a two-fold distribution to each. For one species of rhetoric is flattery, and without art, which he reprobates in the *Gorgias*; but the other is the science of things good and just, which he celebrates in the *Phædrus*. And again, he dismisses the dialectic of Aristotle as contentious, but embraces the dialectic, which surveys the principles of things, as a part of philosophy.

The present dialogue makes us to be scientifically knowing in the rectitude of names; and it is necessary that he who intends to be skilled in dialectic should begin from this theory.

As Plato, in the *Parmenides*, delivers the whole of dialectic, but not merely so, but together with the theory of beings, so now he delivers the rectitude of names, together with the science of things.

Plato now wishes to deliver the principles of things and of dialectic, since he delivers names in conjunction with the things of which they are names.

Why is it that Plato says, that by despising names we shall become, in old age, more rich in prudence, and yet now makes the investigation of them the leading object? May we not say, that he considers them, not so far as they are appellations, but so far as they are images of things? For the definitive art is triple; since either beginning from the highest genus, it proceeds through all the media, to the last differences, which the

* See the notes on the *Philebus*.

Elean guest does*, when defining a sophist and politician; or receiving the genus which is near and known, it proceeds through the following differences, such as in this instance, man is an animal pedestrian, biped, and the like; or it uses name alone, such as the becoming is beautiful, and soul is *ψυιςχη ανιω*, and the like. For if he who at first established names possessed science, he who uses an established name must necessarily fall upon definition. Hence Plato now makes the investigation about such like names his principal design, and through these as media is extended to things themselves. This inquiry also contributes to demonstration. Thus, in the Phædrus, Plato endeavours to show, that the divining art is better than that pertaining to augury, from the name. It likewise contributes to analysis. Thus, in the Phædrus, Plato calls the love which is participated by mortals *flying*, but that which is imparticipable and divine *winged*, through the essence and the energy of the god conspiring into one; and thus he appears to ascend and analyze. Frequently also, this is necessary to division. Thus Socrates shows, by division, that the pleasant is one thing, and the good another, because the names also are two.

That† the persons of the dialogue are Cratylus the Heraclitean, of whom Plato was an auditor, who said that all names are from nature, and that such as are not from nature are not names, just as we say, that he who falsely denominates things says nothing; and Hermogenes, the Socratic, who on the contrary said that there was no name from nature, but that all names are from position; and the third is Socrates, who distinguishing says, that some names are from nature, and others from position; such as are those which are casually made. For the names which belong to things perpetual, rather participate of a subsistence from nature, but those which belong to things corruptible, rather partake of the casual. For he who calls his son Athanasius‡, manifests the confusion of names about things of this kind.

Further still, since names have both form and matter, according to form they rather participate of a subsistence from nature, but according to matter of a subsistence from position. And Socrates indeed, addressing himself to Hermogenes, separates names firmly established in the gods, such as *μυρινη*, and the like, from those which subsist in

* In the Sophista and Politicus.

† Almost all the paragraphs of these Scholia begin with the word *αυτ*, that.

‡ That is, *Immortal*.

souls, such as *Ξατισσα*. But, addressing himself to Cratylus, he admits, indeed, the relation of names to things, but shews that there is much of the casual in names, and at the same time that all things are not moved.

That the heavens, which partake more of motion, have also permanency after a certain manner, as in the poles, and things of this kind. But the earth, which partakes more of permanency, has also motion through its internal change.

That names which subsist from nature partake also of a subsistence from position, and those which subsist from position partake of a subsistence from nature.

That Cratylus being scientific, and employing the greatest brevity of diction, which was the peculiarity of the Heraclitics, in consequence of enunciations not being able to keep pace with the flowing nature of things, appears to answer, through the whole of the dialogue, from the fewest syllables and words. Hence the most imitative Plato, in the very beginning, represents him as saying *βουλει*. But Hermogenes being doxastic, and venerating the opinions of the many, conformably to his doctrine, that names subsist from position, says, *εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ*, &c. For *δοκησις* frequently belongs to things ineligible, and also to such as are eligible, just as will is of things good alone.

That the whole Apolloniad series is suspended from the government of Jupiter.

That Pythagoras and Epicurus were of the opinion of Cratylus; but Democritus and Aristotle of Hermogenes. Pythagoras therefore being asked what was the wisest of things, said it was number; and being asked what was the next in wisdom said, he who gave names to things. But by number, he obscurely signified the intelligible order, which comprehends the multitude of intellectual forms: for there that which is the first and properly number* subsists after the superessential one. This likewise supplies the measures of essence to all beings, in which also true wisdom, and knowledge which is of itself, and which is converted to and perfects itself, subsist. And as there the intelligible, intellect, and intelligence are the same, so there also number and wisdom are the same. But by the founder of names, he obscurely signified the soul, which indeed subsists from intellect, and is not things themselves like the first intellect, but possesses the images, and essential transitive reasons of them, as statues of beings. Being therefore is imparted to all things from intellect, which knows itself and is replete with

* That is, number according to cause, which subsists at the extremity of the intelligible order. For number, according to hyparxis, subsists at the summit of the intelligible, and at the same time intellectual order.

wisdom; but that they are denominated is from foul, which imitates intellect. Pythagoras therefore said, that it was not the business of any casual person to fabricate names, but of one looking to intellect and the nature of things. Names therefore are from nature.

But Democritus, who said that names subsist from position, inferred this from four arguments: First, From sameness of appellation; for different things are called by the same name. Names therefore are not from nature. 2d, From the variety of names, for if different names are adapted to one and the same thing, they are also adapted to each other, which is impossible. 3d, From the change of names: for why was Aristotle called Plato, but Turtamus Theophrastus. 4th, If names are from nature, but yet from a defect of similars, why do we say φρασεν from φρασις, but from δικαιουση (ουκ εστι παρανομαζειν) we do not derive a word which alludes to this? Names therefore are casual and not from nature. But he calls the first argument πολυστημος, (i. e. *having a manifold signification*); the second, ισορροπος, (i. e. *equivalent, or equiponderant*); and the fourth, νωνυμος, (i. e. *nameless*). In answer to the first of these arguments, some say, that it is nothing wonderful, if one name shadows forth many things, as εως, *love*, both from ρωμη, *strength*, and from πτερον, *a wing*, manifests different things. In answer to the second, it is said, nothing hinders that different names, in a different respect, may manifest the same thing. Thus, for instance, in the words *merops* and *man*, the same thing may be called by the former of these words, according to the possession of a distributed life, and by the latter according to αναδρειν α οπωπεν, *considering what he has seen*. In answer to the third, it is said, that this very thing signifies that names are by nature, viz. that we transfer those that are not properly established, and which are contrary to nature, to a position according to nature. And in answer to the fourth, that it is nothing wonderful, if names which were established at first should fail through a great length of time.

That a subsistence according to nature is four-fold. For it is either as the essences of plants and animals, as well the wholes as the parts; or it is as the energies and powers of these, such as the levity and heat of fire; or it is as shadows and appearances in mirrors; or as artificial images are assimilated to their archetypes. Epicurus therefore thought that names had a subsistence from nature according to the first signification, as works predecaneous by nature, such as voice and sight. And as to see and to hear

hear are according to nature, so also to denominate; so that a name is from nature, as being the work of nature. But Cratylus was of this opinion according to the second signification; and hence he says that the peculiarity of every thing is a name, as being appropriately assigned by the founders of names, artificially and scientifically. For Epicurus said, that the founders of names did not establish them scientifically, but in effecting this were moved physically, like those that snore, howl, roar, and sigh. But Socrates said, that names are from nature, according to the fourth signification, as being the progeny of scientific conceptions, and not of physical appetite (*orexis*), but of the soul energizing according to imagination, and at the same time establishing names from the first, as much as possible, appropriately to things. He likewise said, that, according to form, all names are the same, have one power, and are from nature. For, according to form, they are similar to things, but differ from each other according to matter.

That the name Cratylus appears to have been assigned *παρὰ τῷ περιφρατῆσαι ἀραρίτως τῶν ἡρακλείτου δογμάτων*, from *firmly obtaining the dogmas of Heraclitus*, and that on this account he despised flowing things, as not properly having a subsistence. But the name Socrates is *παρὰ τῷ σωτήρα εἶναι τοῦ κρατοῦς τῆς Ψυχῆς*, from *being the saviour of the strength of his soul*, that is of his reason, and from not being drawn down under the senses.

That things eternal receive their denomination from powers or energies, but things generated from use and communion.

That he who wishes to imitate any thing, ought to be scientifically knowing in two things, viz. the archetype, and demiurgic art.

That the Heraclitics are accused as arrogant, as dissemblers, and as despisers, by Theodorus in the Theætetus, and now by Hermogenes. It must be observed, however, that these two are not philosophers; for the former was a geometrician, and the latter a youth. And a true philosopher has not leisure to consume his time in things of this kind.

That Socrates did not think that the speculation about the rectitude of names was to be despised, but according to the proverb he considered fine things to be difficult.

That investigation is imparted to souls from Maia the mother of Hermes; but invention is from the Hermaic series. For the more total genera of the gods energize prior to, together with, and posterior to, such as are more partial. Hence we see that investigation

is

is imperfect, and is as matter previously prepared, from the donation of more elevated causes to their participants, such as form supervening from things inferior.

That sophists rejoice in indicative assertions, but philosophers in such as are dialectic. And again, the sophists, as framers of images, assume the person of one skilled in dialectic; and thus their contentious molestation is produced.

That of the Hermaic gift, some things are intellectual and first goods; but others are secondary, and perfective of the dianoëtic power; and others rank in the third degree, purify the irrational nature, and in a particular manner measure the phantastic motions. Others again give subsistence to the reasons of nature; and others are the suppliers of externally proceeding powers, and of gain. For these are the last and the material gifts of the god, which, as astrologers say, the god imparts in ignoble dispositions (*αδελφοὺς διαθεσσειν*).

That it very little belongs to a philosopher, says Plato, to speak about particulars; for it is his business to ascend to the speculation of wholes, and things common.

The reasoning of Hermogenes is as follows: If there is a transposition of names, names are from position, and are the symbols of things. But the first is true, and therefore the second. But the reasoning of Proclus is this: If names are symbols of things, and are from position, we have no longer any occasion for the transposition of names. The first is true, and therefore the second. The followers of Hermogenes therefore speak erroneously; for they look to particulars only, and not also to things eternal. For the names of things eternal are divine and venerable, as being sacred to the gods, whose powers and energies they express. These Socrates, in the Philebus, venerates, and says, that his caution about them is attended with the greatest dread.

That the truth of an enunciative sentence (*του απφραντικου λογου*), means one thing with Aristotle, and another with Plato in the present place, in which he says, that names essentially predicated (*καθ αυτα λεγομενα*) are true. For that of Aristotle speaks of the composition and division of that which is predicated, and has for its subject both the false and the true. But the great Plato knew how to use the significant of truth and falsehood in a fourfold respect. For he uses it either according to the hyparxes themselves of things, as when he says that real beings truly are, but that unreal beings have a false subsistence. Or he uses it according to the passions which are consequent

to

to preceding motions, as when Socr  tes, in the *Philebus*, divides pleasure into the true and false. Or according to knowledge, as when he defines false opinions according to the true. Or according to the instruments of the gnostic life, as, for instance, assertions, names, and elements. For in these the true and the false are seen, according to their adaptation and symphony with things. Rhetoricians also have a certain form of diction which they call truth.

That Antisthenes said, that nothing could be contradicted; for according to him every assertion is true. For he who speaks says something. He who says something, speaks of that which has a being. And he who speaks of that which has a being, speaks the truth. In answer to this we must say, that there is also that which is false, and that nothing hinders but that the man who speaks of being may speak falsely. For he who speaks, speaks *about* something, and does not speak *something*.

That bad are more known by good men, than the virtue of good men is by the bad. For vice is blind; and in the first place is ignorant of itself, and in the next place of others.

That the dogma of Protagoras is different from that of Euthydemus. For the former says, that though the subject has no existence, yet it appears to beholders to possess a particular quality, through the commixture of the agent and patient. But the dogma of Euthydemus makes every thing to be all things, and asserts that all things are at the same time always true. As he that says, that a piece of wood is white and black, small and great, moist and dry, and likewise, that all the negations of these are true. Hence beginning from different principles, those sophists end in the same thing.

That the power of the first *infinity* imparts from itself progression to all things whatever which are capable of subsistence; but *bound*, limits and circumscribes every thing, and establishes it in its proper boundaries. Thus in numbers form pervades to all things from the monad and bound; but the never-failing according to progression from the prolific duad; so that every being has a certain nature, bound, idiom, and proper order, through the first bound. There is therefore contradiction in words, which definitely exhibits the false and the true.

That the word $\pi\rho\alpha\tau\iota\sigma\tau\iota\nu$, *to act*, is asserted of those only who energize according to the diano  tic power, but the word $\pi\omega\epsilon\iota\nu$, *to do*, is asserted of those who energize in a different

different manner from this. *Actions* therefore and *makings* have their proper boundaries, instruments, and times; nor does any casual thing do or act any casual thing.

That speech is under action, may be shown from the following division: Every energy of the soul is either effected without body, and this energy is phantasy, opinion, intelligence; or it is effected with body, and this is two-fold. For it is either unattended with free will, and this is sense and involuntary motion, or it is attended with free will, and this is action, under which is discourse.

That Plato coarranges Minerva, Vulcan, and Mars, through that which is common with respect to warlike concerns; through Minerva possessing a kindred art with each of the others; through each of the others being the lover of Venus; and because each was produced from Juno and Jupiter.

That the soul of the world imparts life to altermotive natures: for to these it is the fountain and principle of motion, as Plato says in the *Phædrus* and in the *Laws*. But the demiurgus imparts life simply to all things, life, divine, intellectual, psychical, and that which is divisible about bodies.

If names, according to Aristotle *, are from position, and are symbols of things and conceptions, it is necessary that the sentences composed from them, being enunciative from position, should not be said, from this very circumstance, to be assimilated to composite conceptions, nor that they are of themselves the recipients of truth or falsehood. But indeed enunciative sentences (*οι αποφαντικοι λογοι*), possessing essentially the speaking falsely or truly, do not possess this from position. Names therefore are not from position.

If every one who gives a name performs a certain action, but he who performs a certain action, performs it through an instrument; hence he who gives a name, since he gives it through an instrument, uses a name as an instrument. But of instruments some are from nature, as the hand and foot; others from position, as a bridle and a name. And of these artificial instruments, some effect something which is subservient to subsistence, as an ax; but others effect that which contributes to signifying and teaching. A name therefore is a thing of this kind: for it is an instrument which *teaches* and *unfolds into light* the essence of things; the teaching being assumed from him who uses the instrument, but the unfolding into light from the *paradigm*. But a

* See the Introduction to this Dialogue.

name requires, as an instrument, him who uses it, but as an image it requires a reference to its paradigm. So that it is evident from these things, that a name is not a symbol, nor the work of any casual position, but is allied to things, and adapted to them by nature. For every instrument is coordinated to a proper work, and cannot be adapted to any thing else than to that for which it was made. A name therefore, as being an instrument, has a certain connate power, and which coharmonizes with the things signified. As likewise, it is that which teaches, it possesses an order which unfolds conceptions into light; and as giving distinction to essence, it produces in us a knowledge of things.

Again, a name is not the effect of physical instruments: for every name, so far as a name, is significant of something; since *voice* is not the same with name. Physical instruments therefore, such as the tongue, the arteries, and the lungs, give perfection to voice; and though these cooperate in producing a name, through matter, yet the conception of the founder of names, especially gives completion to it, which conception coharmonizes, in a becoming manner, matter to form and paradigm. But he who discourses, uses a name when established: for every instrument has both one who uses it, and one who makes it. Every thing too which is used has a producing cause; and every thing having a producing cause, is ministrant to something with respect to energy.

A name is said to be from nature, both as an effect, and as an instrument; for it becomes by its formation an image of things, and announces them through conceptions as media. Very properly therefore is a name said to be a *doctrinal instrument*, *οργανον διδασκαλικον*; but shortly after it is called the *effect* of the legislator. And this is for the sake of him who discourses: for it is both an end and good to unfold things. Hence Socrates says, it is rather an instrument, considering it according to its more excellent subsistence. Hence too this instrument is a medium between the teacher and the learner.

That a shuttle and an augur are paradigms adapted to a name. For a name separates things from each other, and enters into the learner, through the depth of his conceptions.

That as Socrates, in the *Gorgias*, demonstrates to Callicles, who divides that which is just by law, oppositely to that which is just by nature, that law and nature in that which is just concur with each other, in like manner it is necessary to conceive that

names

names subsist both from law and nature; not however from casual law, but from that which is eternal, and which consists according to eternal reasons. A name therefore, through its producing cause, which is scientific, is both from law and position; but through its paradigmatic cause is from nature.

But if this be the case, how does Socrates afterwards show to Cratylus, that it is not only necessary to call that a name which is rightly framed, but that also which is erroneously established. In answer to this, we must say, that law is contemplative of that which is universal. Such names therefore as are given to things perpetual, are founded by law. But since there are also names of things corruptible, it is by no means wonderful if law, which regards universal, has not dominion over these, and that there should be much of the casual in them, as in the names *Ambrosius*, *Athanasius*, *Polychronius* *, and the like. But what the art is which produces names we will concisely relate; for not every thing in it is a species of the legislative art. That there is then in the soul an assimilative power is evident; for painting and things of this kind are suspended from this power, which assimilates subordinate to superior natures, and things which subsist in composition to such as are more simple. And again, according to the same power, the soul is able to assimilate herself to natures superior to her own essence, viz. to gods, angels, and dæmons. She also, through the same power, assimilates to herself things subordinate to her own nature; and also assimilates them to things superior to herself. Hence she fabricates statues of gods and dæmons. But wishing to give subsistence after a manner to immaterial similitudes of things, and which are alone the progeny of the rational essence, employing from herself the cooperation of phantasy adapted to speech (*λεκτική φαντασία*), she produces the essence of names. And as the telestic art, through certain symbols, and arcane signatures, assimilates statues of the gods, and makes them adapted to the reception of divine illuminations, so the legislative art, according to the same assimilative power, gives subsistence to names, the statues of things; through such and such sounds shadowing forth the nature of things, and having given subsistence to them, delivers them to the use of mankind. Hence the legislator is said to be the lord of the generation of names. And as it is not holy to behave in a disorderly manner towards the statues of the gods, so neither is it becoming to err

* The first and second of these words signify *immortal*; the third, *having an extended duration*.

about names. For a legislative intellect is the artificer of these, inserting in them images of paradigms; and it is proper to venerate them, through their alliance to the gods.

It also appears to me that Plato establishes the legislator analogous to the demiurgus of the universe: for he it is, according to the Timæus, who establishes the laws of fate, and who governs all things conformably to law. According to Plato too, he is the first fabricator of names: for as we learn from the Timæus, he denominated one of the circulations of the universe *same*, and the other *different*. If therefore the legislator is analogous to the demiurgus, must he not necessarily be the lord of the position of names? Hence in this Dialogue Plato calls the legislator, *demiurgus*, and the most rare of demiurgi. Thus also Socrates, in the Phædrus, says, that the name *μῆτις* was given by Jupiter. Of names therefore, some are the progeny of the gods, extending also as far as to the soul; but others are the offspring of partial souls, who are able to frame them through intellect and science; and others again subsist through the middle genera. For some meeting with dæmons and angels, have been taught by them names better adapted to things than such as men have established. It is requisite likewise to know the differences of names arising from their producing causes, and to refer all of them to the one demiurgus, a divinity of an intellectual characteristic. Whence also a name has two-fold powers, the one, that which teaches conceptions, and is the cause of communion; but the other, that which gives distinction to essence; since the demiurgus likewise possesses two-fold powers, the one productive of sameness, the other of difference.

That the assimilative energy of the demiurgic intellect is two-fold; the one, that according to which he gives subsistence to the whole world, looking to an intelligible paradigm; the other, that according to which he promulgates names adapted to things; concerning which Timæus briefly indicates, but theurgists teach more clearly, and oracles* from the gods themselves: "There is a venerable name with a sleepless revolution, leaping into the worlds through the rapid reproofs of the father." And another oracle says, "The paternal intellect disseminated symbols through the world." Thus therefore the legislator also, looking to the whole world, delivers the most excellent polity, and imposes names assimilated to things.

* See my collection of these Oracles in the third volume of the Monthly Magazine.

That

That of things artificial there are no definite causes and paradigms, because the effects of such causes and paradigms are essences, and proper measures, have a reference to the universe, and proceed through nature. But every thing artificial is unessential, and is all-variously changed in accommodation to our uses and circumstances, and is separated from things which have a natural subsistence. If, however, some one should call the producing and prolific powers of the gods, which proceed into the universe, demiurgic, intellectual, generative, and perfective arts, we shall not reject a nomination of this kind; since we also find theologists indicating through these divine productions. Hence they call the Cyclops the causes of all artificial production, who also taught Jupiter, Minerva, and Vulcan. But they celebrate Minerva as presiding over other arts, and particularly that of weaving, and Vulcan as the inspective guardian of another art. According to Orpheus, however, the weaving art originates from Minerva, but proceeds into the vivific series of Proserpine: for this goddess and all her choir, abiding on high, are said to weave the order of life, which is participated by all the mundane gods. For the one demiurgus excites all the junior demiurgi to weave together the mortal with the immortal form of life.* But the order of life thus woven ends in the gods who preside over generation, among whom is the Homeric Circe, who weaves all the life in the four elements, and at the same time with her song harmonizes the sublunary realms. Circe therefore is ranked by theologists among these weaving powers. Her shuttle too, as they say, is golden, by this indicating her essence to be intellectual and pure, immaterial and unmingled with generation, and that her employment consists in separating things stable from such as are in motion, according to divine diversity. If therefore, as I have said, so the one recurring to these analogies, calls the powers of the gods the causes of these arts, but their effects the illuminations of these powers pervading through the whole world, he will speak with rectitude. For it is necessary not only to suspend from Minerva the weaving art which is with us, but prior to this, that which energizes through nature, and connects generated with eternal, mortal with immortal, corporeal with incorporeal, and sensible with intellectual natures. In like manner we must survey the whole of the ætæonic, and each of the other arts, as first subsisting in nature. So that the shuttle will every where have an analogous subsistence, separating the genera which con-

* This is asserted in the *Timæus*.

stitute beings, that, together with the connection of them, division may remain, and genuinely preserve their hyparxis. Hence the artists that are with us act under presiding and inspecting gods. They do not however in consequence of this contemplate intelligibles; for they do not operate looking to these, but to the forms which are with themselves, and the reasons of things artificial which they contain; and this by either inventing these, or receiving them from others. For the first artificer of a shuttle conceived in his own mind what kind of a thing a shuttle ought to be, looking to its use, and being led by this, produced in himself that form of a shuttle according to which others are made. But others learning from him, have acquired a knowledge of the form, and conformably to it make the resemblance of the shuttle.

And here we may see how these things are imitations of the demiurgic art, and of intellectual forms: for these forms being always established according to invariable permanency, things corruptible in the world are preserved, and are again renovated through their stable famenefs. And the corruption indeed is derived from matter, but the stable famenefs from an eternal form. Just as in the shuttles which are here, the corruption is from the matter, but the regeneration from the reason or productive principle in the artist. What the shuttle, therefore, is to the artificer by whom it is made, that are names to the legislator, and all mundane natures to the demiurgus. Hence as forms have a three-fold subsistence, viz. intellectual, scientific, doxastic; all sensible natures are derived from intellectual, names from scientific, and shuttles from doxastic forms.

That the fabrication of the universe is two-fold: for the one gives subsistence to reasons which extend to all things, and to forms which have an invariable subsistence, and sustain no mutation; but the other inserts divisible differences in generated natures. Thus, for instance, the human form pervades supernally from the one and whole intellectual fabrication, through the stars as media. Hence this form has a perpetual subsistence, as originating from an immovable cause. But since men differ from each other in magnitude and colour, and things of this kind, these differences arise from the secondary fabrication of the junior gods, and are conversant with much mutability, through being the production of moveable causes. This however takes place, in order that the variety of things may subsist, and that the perpetual generation of particulars may be multiplied. For different celestial periods give completion to, and at different times generate different things,

things, and produce one connection from all things which contributes to the completion of the universe.

That the shuttle* is an image of the separating power of the gods, both of those that preside over wholes, and those that preside over parts; for its operation in woofs represents the energy of this power, and exhibits a symbol of the order of the separating gods. Hence when theologists speak of shuttles as belonging to these gods, they do not speak of the idea of a shuttle, but only symbolically use the name. For why do they rather speak of the shuttle, and not of something else? And is it not absurd that science should casually use names, and these when applied to the gods? But they appear to me to assume things of this kind according to analogy. For what a shuttle is in the weaving art, that separation is in the fabrication of forms. But analogy is not the habitude of idea to an image, nor is it from position alone. Thus Plato† calls certain powers of the soul horses; neither thus denominating them casually, nor meaning that these powers are the ideas of sensible horses, but merely employing analogy. *Hence initiators into the mysteries through an alliance of this kind, causing sensibles to sympathize with the gods, use these instruments as signatures of divine powers; the shuttle as a signature of separating, a cup of vivific, a sceptre of ruling, and a key of guardian power.* And thus they denominate other powers of the gods, using analogy in a similar manner.

That as things are to each other, so also are their names analogously to each other, according to honour and power. Hence the names of the gods are honourable and venerable, and worthy of the greatest fear to the wise. On this account they say it is not proper that the Greeks should use the Egyptian, Scythian, or Persian names of the gods, but such as are Grecian. For the gods who preside over climates rejoice when they are denominated in the dialects of their proper regions.

If he who uses an instrument is better than him who fabricates it as being more architectonic, how does a partial soul use the irrational nature, and the shelly body, which were fabricated by the junior gods? Or does not the soul also contribute to the fabrication of these? And do not the junior gods use these as instruments? And it is necessary to consider these with reference to each other; the whole fabrication, as they say, to the use of the whole, but the divisible to the divisible.

* See p. 495.

† See the Phædrus.

If he who is skilled in dialectic uses the work of the legislator as a more excellent character, but the judge as one subordinate, it appears to be absurd. May we not say that the one uses it as an instrument, the other as a principle? for a partial soul uses a dæmon as a governor and an inspective guardian, but the body as an instrument. For in the paradigms of these, the father of Jupiter is Saturn, but the daughter is Justice. Hence the legislator is analogous to the demiurgus Jupiter, inserting the laws of fate in souls, and promulgating names to the whole circulations. But he who is skilled in dialectic, is analogous to the Saturnian monad. For the mighty Saturn supernally imparted the principles of intelligence to the demiurgus, and presides over the whole fabrication of the universe. Whence also Jupiter in Orpheus calls him a dæmon:

Ορφου δ' ἡΜΕΤΕΡΟΥ ΓΕΓΕΝΗ ΑΡΙΔΕΙΚΕΤΕ ΔΑΙΜΟΝ.

i. e. O illustrious dæmon, direct our offspring.

And Saturn it seems possesses with himself the highest causes of things collected and separated; through the celestial sections* producing into parts the intellectual wholeness, and becoming the cause of generative progressions and multiplications, and, in short, being the leader of the Titanic race, from which the division of things originates. Through absorptions too, he again collects his own progeny, unites them to himself, and resolves them into his own uniform and impartible cause; since also the demiurgus Jupiter receives proximately from him the truth of things, and primarily understands the ideas which he contains: for Night also delivers oracles to Jupiter. But the father Saturn proximately imparts to him all the measures of the whole fabrication of things.

That with respect to intellect, the essential contains in itself the whole true knowledge of things at once in energy; but the intellect of the philosopher not being essential, but an illumination, and, in short, an image of intellect, understands divisibly, and sometimes only touches on the truth.

That there are five habits of men with respect to knowledge, viz. two-fold ignorance, simple ignorance, desire, investigation, invention.

* i. e. Through the sections of that order of gods which is denominated intelligible and at the same time intellectual.

That

That he who has a scientific knowledge of the methods of invention interprets to the learner, imitating the leading Hermes.

That Socrates is analogous to intellect; but Hermogenes to irrational opinion, aspiring after good; and Cratylus is analogous to the corporeal and material phantasy, on which account he is deceived by the sophists as a slave. But opinion and the phantasy are nearly sisters, as being neighbours (*αγχι Συνοί*).

Why does Plato eject from his Republic the poets about Homer, as imitators, but now* introduces them as divine leaders of the rectitude of names? May we not say, that there the variety of imitation is unadapted to simple and unperverted manners; but that here and every where he admires and embraces their divinely-inspired conceptions? Since however the present discourse is about divine names, it is necessary to speak a little concerning them. And in the first place, let us speak concerning the names which are occultly established in the gods themselves; since some of the ancients said that these originated from the more excellent genera†, but that the gods are established beyond a signification of this kind; but others admitted that names are in the gods themselves, and in those gods that are allotted the highest order.

The gods therefore possess an *hyparxis* uniform and ineffable, a power generative of wholes, and an intellect perfect and full of conceptions; and they give subsistence to all things according to this triad. Hence it is necessary that the participations of those divinities who are of a more elevated order, and who are arranged nearer to *the good*, should proceed triadically through all things to which they give subsistence. It is also necessary that among these, those participations should be more ineffable, which are defined according to the *hyparxes* of the first gods; but that those should be more apparent, and more divided, which are illuminated according to the *intellect* of exempt causes; and that those participations which are between these, should be such as are the effluxions of *prolific powers*. For the fathers of wholes giving subsistence to all things, have diffeminated in all things vestiges, and impressions, of their own triadic hypostasis; since nature also inserts in bodies an exciting principle (*ενουσμα*) derived from her proper idiom, through which she moves bodies, and governs them as by a rudder. And the demiurgus has established in the universe an image of his own monadic transcendency, through which

* See p. 500,

† Viz. angels, dæmons, and heroes.

he governs the world, holding a rudder, as Plato says, like a pilot. It is proper to think therefore, that these rudders, and this helm of the universe, in which the demiurgus being seated orderly disposes the world, are nothing else than a symbol of the whole fabrication of things, to us indeed difficult of comprehension, but to the gods themselves known and manifest. And why is it requisite to speak concerning these things, since, of the ineffable cause of all, who is beyond intelligibles, there is an impression in every being, and even as far as to the last of things, through which all things are suspended from him, some more remotely, and others more near, according to the clearness and obscurity of the impression which they contain? This it is which moves all things to the desire of good, and imparts to beings this inextinguishable love. And this impression is indeed unknown: for it pervades as far as to things which are incapable of knowledge. It is also more excellent than life; for it is present with things inanimate; and has not an intellectual power; since it lies in things destitute of intellectual energy. As nature therefore, the demiurgic monad, and the father himself who is exempt from all things, have disseminated in things posterior, impressions of their respective idioms, and through these convert all things to themselves, in like manner all the gods impart to their progeny symbols of their cause, and through these establish all things in themselves. The impressions therefore of the hyparxis of the higher order of gods, which are disseminated in secondary natures, are ineffable and unknown, and their efficacious and motive energy surpasses all intelligence. And of this kind are the characters of light, through which the gods unfold themselves to their progeny; these characters subsisting unically in the gods themselves, but shining forth to the view in the genera more excellent than man, and presenting themselves to us divinely, and accompanied with form. Hence the gods* exhort "To understand the forerunning form of light." For subsisting on high without form, it becomes invested with form through its progression; and there being established occultly and uniformly, it becomes apparent to us through motion, from the gods themselves; possessing indeed an efficacious energy, through a divine cause, but becoming figured, through the essence by which it is received.

Again, the impressions which are illuminated from powers, are in a certain respect

* Proclus here alludes to one of the Chaldean oracles.

media between things ineffable and effable, and pervade through all the middle genera. For it is not possible for the primary gifts of the gods to arrive to us, without the more excellent genera (i. e. angels, dæmons, and heroes,) previously participating the illuminations which thence proceed. But these illuminations subsisting appropriately in each of their participants, and coordinately in all things, unfold the powers that give them subsistence. Of this kind are the symbols of the gods, which are indeed uniform in the more elevated orders, but multiform in those that are subordinate; and which the theurgic art imitating exhibits through inarticulate evocations (*αδιαφύκτων εκφωνήσεων*).

The impressions which rank as the third in order, which pervade from intellectual essences to all idioms, and proceed as far as to us, are divine names, through which the gods are invoked, and by which they are celebrated, being unfolded into light by the gods themselves, and reverting to them, and producing to human knowledge as much of the gods as is apparent. For through these we are able to signify something to each other, and to converse with ourselves about the gods. Different nations however participate differently of these, as, for instance, the Egyptians, according to their native tongue, receiving names of this kind from the gods; but the Chaldæans and Indians in a different manner, according to their proper tongue; and in a similar manner the Greeks, according to their dialect. Though a certain divinity therefore may be called by the Greeks Briareus, but differently by the Chaldæans, we must nevertheless admit, that each of these names is the progeny of the gods, and that it signifies the same essence. But if some names are more and others less efficacious, it is not wonderful; since of things which are known to us, such as are dæmoniacal and angelic are more efficacious; and, in short, of things denominated, the names of such as are nearer are more perfect than the names of those that are more remote.

Not every genus of the gods however can be denominated: for Parmenides evinces that the god who is beyond all things is ineffable. "For," says he, "he can neither be denominated, nor spoken of." And of the intelligible gods, the first genera, which are conjoined with *the one itself*, and are called occult, have much of the unknown and ineffable. For that which is perfectly apparent and effable, cannot be conjoined with the perfectly ineffable, but it is requisite that the progression of intelligibles should be terminated* in this order; in which there is the first effable, and that which is called by

* The first effable subsists in the god Phanes, or the extremity of the intelligible order.

proper names. For the first forms are there, and the intellectual nature of intelligibles there shines forth to the view. But all the natures prior to this being silent and occult, are only known by intelligence *. Hence the whole of the theistic art energizing theurgically ascends as far as to this order. Orpheus also says, that this is first called by a name by the other gods: for the light proceeding from it is known to and denominated by the intellectual orders. But he thus speaks,

Μητιν σπέρμας φέροντα θεῶν κλυτον οὔτε φανήτα,
Πρωτογονον μακαρες καλεον κατα μακρον ολυμπον.

i. e. "Metis bearing the seed of the gods, whom the gods about lofty Olympus call the illustrious Phanes Protogonus." In the gods however nomination is united with intellectual conception, and both are present with them through the participation of the light which the mighty Phanes emits to all things. But in our soul these two are divided from each other; and intellectual conception is one thing, and name another: and the one has the order of an image, but the other of a paradigm. In the middle genera there is indeed a separation, but there is also a union of the intellective and onomastic energy. The transpositive name (διαποθμιον ονομα) of *Iynxes* † (ινγυνων), which is said to sustain all the fountains, appears to me to signify a thing of this kind. Such also is the appellation *teletarchic* (το τελεταρχικον), which some one of the gods ‡ says, "leaps into the worlds, through the rapid reproof of the father," κοσμοις ενθροωσκειν κραταιην δια πατρος επιτην. For all these things are occultly with the gods, but are unfolded according to second and third progressions, and to men that are allied to the gods.

There is therefore a certain abiding name in the gods, through which the subordinate invoke the superior, as Orpheus says of Phanes, or through which the superior denominate the subordinate, as Jupiter, in Plato, gives names to the unapparent periods of souls §. For fathers define the energies of their offspring, and the offspring know their

* See this explained in the notes on the Parmenides.

† The *Iynx*, *Synoches*, and *Teletarchæ* of the Chaldæans, compose that divine order, which is called by the Platonists *intelligible*, and at the same time *intellectual*. This order is celebrated by Plato in the *Phædrus* under the names of the *supercelestial place*, *Heaven*, and the *subcelestial arch*.

‡ This is one of the Chaldæan oracles.

§ See the *Timæus*.

producing causes, through the intellectual impressions which they bear. Such then are the first names which are unfolded from the gods, and which through the middle genera end in the rational essence.

There are however other names of a second and third rank; and these are such as partial souls have produced, at one time energizing enthusiastically about the gods, and at another time energizing according to science; either conjoining their own intelligence with divine light, and thence deriving perfection; or committing the fabrication of names to the rational power. For thus artists, such as geometricians, physicians, and rhetoricians, give names to the things the idioms of which they understand. Thus too poets inspired by Phœbus (*τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ φοῖβόληπτοι*) ascribe many names to the gods, and to human names give a division opposite to these; receiving the former from enthusiastic energy, and the latter from sense and opinion; concerning which Socrates now says Homer indicates, referring some names to the gods, and others to men.

That the names which are assigned to things by the gods are smooth, well-sounding, and of fewer syllables, than those which are assigned by men, as, for instance, Xanthus* than Scamander, Chalcis than Cymindis, and Myrine than Batieia. And it seems that the first of these names manifests how the gods comprehend and denominate according to a definite cause the whole of a flowing essence; but the second, how the gods bound in intellectual measures a life conversant with generation; and the third, how they divide and permit in a separate manner a life separate from generation. And with respect to Xanthus, Aristotle relates, that the skin of the cattle that drank out of it was yellower than before; and on this account perhaps the gods, who both produce and know the causes of all things, thus denominate it. But the apparent cause of its appellation perhaps was this, that its water passes through a drain made by the hand (*οτι διὰ τινος χειροποιήτου σκαφῆς διέρχεται το ὕδωρ αὐτοῦ*); and thus by men of superficial conceptions was called Scamander. Chalcis, perhaps, was so called from the shrill and canorous, like sharp sounding brass; for thus certainly the Chaldeans call it, having heard this name from the gods. But Cymindis is from the leaping of the bird (*παρα τὴν σκιρτήσιν τοῦ ὀρνέου*); and Myrine, from the soul allotted that place from the gods. Lastly, Batieia perhaps was thus called, through the plant which abounds in it. In these too, we have the three-fold differences of divine and human knowledge; the effi-

* See p. 500.

cacious and passive, in Xanthus and Scamander; the logical and physical, in Myrine and Bateia; and the enharmonic and unharmonic, in Chalcis and Cymindis.

That if the nature of the gods is unfigured, uncoloured, and unapparent, the dialectic work is not in them, but a thing of this kind is conversant with things that subsist in these inferior realms and about generation.

That of the gods, some are incorporeal, but others use bodies, and these such as are spherical: for the spherical figure is peculiarly adapted to things which are converted to themselves. But of dæmons some are good and divine, and have spheric vehicles; and others are material, and their vehicles are rectilinear.

With respect to our prayers, they are heard both by gods and dæmons, not externally; but both these comprehend in themselves causally our deliberative tendency to things in our power, and have a causal knowledge of our energies.

That there are Pans * with the feet of goats, such as was that which appeared to the courier Philippides, as he was passing over the mountain Parthenion; and also Minerva fawns using various forms, and proximately ruling above men; such as was the Minerva which appeared to Ulysses and Telemachus. But Panic and Minerva dæmons, and much more the gods themselves, are exempt from all such variety.

That it is not because dæmons are allotted certain forms, that the men who are under their guardian protection are allotted, both in common and peculiarly, different characteristic properties, as, for instance, the Scythians properties different from the Æthiopians, and one individual from another. But dæmons that preside over men comprehend all the variety of manners in simplicity, the mutation of figures in sameness, and the difference of motions in stable power.

That the names delivered by theologists by which the gods call things, are from the gods, and not from dæmons only. *For the things performed in the mysteries, are performed to the gods themselves, and not to the dæmons suspended from them.*

That the gods signify things to men, not requiring for this purpose corporeal organs, but fashioning the air according to their will: for the air being far more plastic than wax, receives the impressions of divine intelligence; which proceeds indeed from the gods with-

* After essential heroes, there is an order of souls who proximately govern the affairs of men, and are demouical *κατα σκετικῶν*, according to habitude, or alliance, but not essentially. Of this kind are the nymphs that sympathize with water, and the Pans now mentioned by Proclus.

out motion, but arrives to us through sound and mutation. For thus we say, that oracles are given by the gods, they not speaking, but using us as instruments, and filling the auditory sense with appropriate knowledge, without percussion and without contact. For they associate with each other through intellectual conceptions, and know what pertains to each other intellectually, but not sensibly.

That, as Homer says, the sun sees and hears all things, and the apparent gods have both a visive and auditory sense, but not externally : for they contain in themselves, prior to wholes, the roots and the causes of all things.

That knowledge does not descend from on high without a medium, but through certain media. For, as in Homer *, the knowledge of the conversation between Jupiter and the Sun, descended to Ulysses through the archangelic Hermes and Calypso as media, so Helenus the prophet perceived the will of Apollo and Minerva, not indeed of the divinities who stand at the head of the Apolloniacal and Minerval series, but of those powers of this series that were proximate to him, and of a dæmoniacal characteristic.

That with respect to the names Aftyanax† and Hector, the philosopher, looking to the form and the thing signified, calls them similar ; but grammarians, directing their attention to the matter and the syllables, will say that they are dissimilar.

That it is necessary the founder of names should establish names looking to the forms of the things denominated. But this will become evident to him who looks to the universe. For as there are many psychical descents to this terrestrial abode, and different souls are disseminated according to different allotments, and engaged in different lives, and since among these some choose lives corresponding to those of their presiding and leading gods ; hence souls of this kind especially appear to venerate the names of their leaders. My meaning is this : souls that proceed from the Minerval series, and preserve unchanged the form of life adapted to this order, at the same time exhibit themselves by an energy and appellation corresponding to the idiom of the goddesses. But souls that descend indeed from this order, and yet choose a life by no means adapted to it, employ likewise foreign and casual names. Hence, as it appears to me, Bacchuses, Esculapiuses, Mercuries, and Herculefes, having the same names with their presiding gods, have pro-

* See the twelfth book of the *Odyssey*.

† See p. 501.

ceeded into these terrestrial places, accompanied with the inspiring influence of the gods, neither changing the form of the life, nor the appellation of their proper leaders. They say then, that Hercules, who was called Alcides by his mortal parents, was called Hercules by the Pythian deity, through his alliance to the Herculean order and divinity. For deity gives an appropriate name to man, looking to his whole series and life, which he produces into energy.

That it is requisite to consider the names of things borne along in generation, either by looking to all causes, as well such as are total, as those that are partial, as well those that are remote, as those that are proximate to generated natures; as, for instance, horse considered as a whole, and that which is proximate and corruptible; or it is necessary to consider them looking only to more excellent and perfect natures, which possess invariable rectitude, and which entirely rule over matter; and of this kind are universals. For when an ox is generated from an horse, the partial nature is subdued, and on this account a horse is not generated; but whole nature vanquishes, and on this account an ox is generated. For whence is the form of the ox derived, unless nature simply considered subdues. Hence Plato does not now simply call things of this kind, τερατα, but as it were τιρατα, as not being entirely contrary to nature.

That he who intends to etymologize ought to know, in the first place, the differences of dialects; and, in the second place, the use of the poets. In the third place, he must distinguish simple from composite names. In the fourth place, he must unfold names in a manner accommodated to things themselves. In the fifth place, it is necessary that he should observe the different use of names. In the sixth place, he ought to know the properties of words, such as apocopies, syncopies, ellipses, pleonasm, and the like. In the seventh place, he ought to know the idioms of the elements; for from these, as extremes, the rectitude of names and their alliance to things is demonstrated. In the eighth place, it is necessary that he should distinguish ambiguities, and such names as are homonymous; for the truth of names is retained through these. Further still, it is necessary to know names which deviate from their origin. And such is the critical knowledge which he who etymologizes ought to possess.

That Socrates now appropriately introduces the words *θεοφύλον** and *μυησιθιον*, i. e. dear

* See p. 504.

to divinity, and mindful of divinity; for the alliance of souls to divinity is effected through the love of a divine nature, and the recollection of the hyparxis of deity; and to souls of this kind only does it belong to have paternal and intellectual names. But names, which are the offspring of generation, belong to those who embrace an indefinite and material life.

That names being two-fold, one kind belonging to things perpetual, which are established according to science, and another to things corruptible, and which are the subjects of doubt, it is not likely that fathers should have given their sons inauspicious names, such as Orestes, Atreus, Tantalus, nor is it probable that they foreknew what would be the life of their children in future: for the physiognomic art is attended with great obscurity, and especially when exercised on those that are just born. Of all these doubts, therefore, Socrates delivers to us most clear rules of solution: for men are unacquainted with the unapparent periods of souls, and the appetites (*ορεξεις*) which they possessed prior to generation, in which nearly the whole of actions is comprehended. Hence they are not judges of the rectitude of names coordinate to every form of life. Gods therefore and dæmons, who causally comprehend the powers and energies of souls, clearly know how to impose names adapted to the respective lives of souls. And as they distribute every other allotment to them according to their desert, so also their names. But since we every where consider fortune as the cause of the coordination of things which appear to be disordered, here also this is to be considered as the most proper principle. For fathers, looking to memory or hope, or something of this kind, give names to their children; but fortune gives them names after another manner, through a symphony with their lives. Agamemnon therefore called his son Orestes, not through rusticity of manners, but through impulse (*δια την ορμην*) and facility of motion (*ευκινησιν*), *παρα το ορουν* from *rushing*, or rather from *seeing* (*ορων*) in him such-like marks or tokens of nature; or from wishing that he might become a character of this kind. Fortune, however, after another manner, and more truly, allotted him this name: for it unfolds his whole life. Hence Socrates, from this cause, thinks fit to etymologize his name, but not from a mere human cause; for he saw that this accorded better with the thing. Much more therefore is fortune productive of the proximate cause of the rectitude of names; and when this proximate cause errs, nothing hinders the whole cause, which belongs to fortune, from acting rightly; since the same thing

takes place in nature. For when a partial nature acts rightly, whole nature much more acts with rectitude; but when a partial nature wanders from the mark, whole nature is nevertheless able to act with rectitude. Nor let any one think that this fortune is an irrational and indefinite cause: for its work looks to intellect. And a divine, or dæmoniacal power, leaves nothing destitute of its proper superintendence, but directs all, and the very last of our energies, to a good purpose, and to the order of the universe. For we are supernally moved from more excellent causes, who are able, from our essence, as if from the stern of a ship, to pilot all our concerns. Plato therefore introduces this as one cause of the right position of names; but he considers as another cause poets acting under the influence of divine inspiration, looking to the accidental actions of men, and through these as it were sagaciously analyzing and discovering their proper names. What then hinders but that poets, looking to the bold deed of Orestes towards his mother, may have called him Orestes, as *ορειον*, *mountainous*, and *savage* (*αγριον*), and without fruit (*ακαρπον*), as having cut off the principle of his proper generation; and that they should have delivered this name to the Greeks?

That Plato, in etymologizing, always first indicates by itself the thing signified; and afterwards that which is assimilated to the thing, and which subsists as a vestige of it in the syllables of the name. Thus in the name of Orestes* he first says, that it signifies *the savage and the rustic* (το θηριωδες, και το αγριον), and afterwards he adds, *το ορειον, the mountainous*, which subsists in the syllables. And in the name of Agamemnon, having first said that it signifies to labour and endure, he adds, he was therefore a good man, *δωα την επιμονην*. And this he does in all the other names.

That Plato, in his etymologies, despising the matter, but being especially attentive to the form of names, says that the name Agamemnon† was composed from the admirable (*παροι το αγαστον*), and not from the *too much* (*ου παροι το αγαν*). But grammarians, as paying attention mostly to the matter, and not seeing the form of life, very properly etymologize this name from the contrary.

That Plato indicates that our very being is in soul, and not in body, by looking to names from psychical idioms, and not from such as are corporeal.

That the divine Plato in what is here said assists us with respect to our morals, since

* See p. 504.

† See p. 505.

he delivers to us Orestes, Agamemnon, and Atreus, as men vehement, irascible, and avengers. But since the first of these sinned against his mother, and the last towards his children, hence they are very properly blamed. But Agamemnon is called by him admirable and praise-worthy, because he exerted his vehemence on the naturally hostile race of the Barbarians.

That the particulars respecting Pelops teach us, first, to despise appearances, and to look to the whole periods of souls; and to be remiss with respect to human affairs, but strenuous with respect to virtue and things divine. And, in the second place, they teach us that children partake of the punishment belonging to the crimes of their ancestors. For souls, through their coordination * with the unjust, become partakers of injustice; their bodies also consist from base feed; and their external concerns receive their beginning from crimes. Socrates in the Phædrus says, that the telestic art is able to purify these, liberating them from their present evils through the worship of divinity.

That the narration concerning Tantalus † obscurely signifies a soul elevated through contemplation to the intelligible (for the intelligible is the nutriment of the gods); but falling from the intelligible place to earth, and communicating his intellectual life which remains recently perfected (*νεοτελη*) with the multitude of the irrational nature. Hence he is said to be the son of Jupiter. For every recently-perfected soul falls from the court of Jupiter into generation; and on this account, Jupiter is the father of gods and men. Such a soul too, being enfolded with the evils which are here, and associating with images instead of realities, is said to suffer punishment in Hades; having much of the terrestrial, stony, and material suspended from its nature, through which its intellectual part is buried. It is likewise in want of all divine fruits, possessing the mere imaginations of them, and falling from the true and clear apprehension of them.

That the allotment of a certain name to a certain life is the work of the soul, but the general adoption of this name is from Fame. For Fame, according to Homer, is the angel of Jupiter.

That Socrates from divine names, which are statues of the gods, recurs analytically to

* The souls of such children, therefore, as are punished for the crimes of their parents, are, from their coordination, naturally allied to the disposition of their parents; and through this alliance become just objects of punishment.

† See p. 505.

the powers and energies of the gods: for he leaves their effences, as being ineffable and unknown, to be alone surveyed by the flower of intellect*.

That Jupiter is not *said to be*, but *is* the father of those who genuinely preserve the proper form of life, such as Hercules and the Dioscuri; but of those who are never at any time able to convert themselves to a divine nature, he never *is* nor is *said to be* the father. Such therefore as having been partakers of a certain energy above human nature, have again fallen into *the sea of dissimilitude*†, and for honour among men have embraced error towards the gods,—of these Jupiter is *said to be* the father.

That the paternal cause originates supernally from the intelligible and occult gods; for there the first fathers of wholes subsist; but it proceeds through all the intellectual gods into the demiurgic order. For Timæus celebrates this order, as at the same time *fabricative* and *paternal*; since he calls Jupiter the *demiurgus* and *father*. The fathers however who are superior to the one fabrication are called gods of gods, but the demiurgus is the father of gods and men. Further still, Jupiter is said to be *peculiarly* the father of some, as of Hercules, who immutably preserve a Jovian and ruling life during their converse with the realms of generation. Jupiter therefore is triply father, of gods, partial souls, and of souls that embrace an intellectual and Jovian life. The intellectual order of the gods, therefore, is supernally bounded by the king ‡ of the total divine genera, and who has a paternal transcendency with respect to all the intellectual gods. This king, according to Orpheus, is called by the blessed immortals that dwell on lofty Olympus, Phanes Protogonus. But this order proceeds through the three Nights, and the celestial orders into the Titanic or Saturnian series, where it first separates itself from the fathers, and changes the kingdom of the *Synoches*§, for a distributive government of wholes, and unfolds every demiurgic genus of the gods, from all the above-mentioned ruling and royal causes, but proximately from Saturn the leader of the Titanic orders. Prior however to other fabricators (*δημιουργοι*) it unfolds Jupiter, who is allotted the unical strength of the whole demiurgic series, and who produces and gives subsistence to

* That is, by the summit, or *one* of our nature, through which we become united with divinity.

† Plato, in the *Politicus*, thus calls the realms of generation, i. e. the whole of a visible nature.

‡ That is, intelligible intellect, the extremity of the intelligible order.

§ That is, the divinities who compose the middle of that order of gods, which is denominated intelligible and at the same time intellectual.

all unapparent and apparent natures. And he is indeed intellectual according to the order in which he ranks, but he produces the species and the genera of beings into the order of sensibles. He is likewise filled with the gods above himself, but imparts from himself a progression into being to all mundane natures. Hence Orpheus* represents him fabricating every celestial race, making the sun and moon, and the other starry gods, together with the sublunary elements, and diversifying the latter with forms, which before had a disordered subsistence. He likewise represents him presiding over the gods who are distributed about the whole world, and who are suspended from him; and in the character of a legislator assigning distributions of providence in the universe, according to desert, to all the mundane gods. Homer too, following Orpheus, celebrates him as the common father of gods and men, as leader and king, and as the supreme of rulers. He also says that all the multitude of mundane gods is collected about him, abides in and is perfected by him. For all the mundane gods are converted to Jupiter through Themis,

Ζεὺς δὲ θεμίστα κέλευσε θεούς, αἰγὸν δὲ καλεῖσθαι

—— ἐδ' αἶραι παντὶ

Φοιτῆσασα κέλευσε Διὸς πρὸς δαμα κεῖσθαι.

i. e. “But Jupiter orders Themis to call the gods to council; and she directing her course every where, commands them to go to the house of Jupiter†.” All of them therefore are excited according to the one will of Jupiter, and become *Διὸς εἶδον* ‡, *within Jupiter*, as the poet says. Jupiter too, again separates them within himself, according to two coordinations, and excites them to providential energies about secondary natures; he at the same time, as Timæus says, abiding after his accustomed manner,

Ὡς ἐφατο κρονίδης πολέμον δ' ἀλυσστον εἰρῆνιν §.

i. e. “Thus spoke Saturnian Jupiter, and excited inevitable war.” Jupiter however is

* As what is here said from Orpheus concerning Jupiter is very remarkable, and is no where else to be found, I give the original for the sake of the learned reader. Διὸ καὶ Ὀρφεὺς δημιουργοῦντα μὲν αὐτὸν τὴν οὐρανίαν πᾶσαν γένεαν παραδίδωσι, καὶ γλῶσιν ποιοῦντα καὶ σελήνην, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀστῆρας θεούς· δημιουργοῦντα δὲ τὰ ὑποσέληνν στοιχεῖα, καὶ διακρίνοντα τοῖς εἶδεσιν ἀτακτῶς ἔχοντα πρότερον· σείρας δ' ἐξισταντα θεῶν περὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον εἰς αὐτὸν ἀνέχτημενας, καὶ διαθεσμοθετοῦντα πᾶσι τοῖς ἐγκοσμίσι θεοῖς κατ' ἀξίαν ἐκνομίας τῆς ἐν τῷ παντὶ κρονίας.

† *Iliad*. xx. v. 4.

‡ See the 14th line.

§ *Ibid*. v. 32.

separate

separate and exempt from all mundane natures; whence also the most total and leading of the other gods, though they appear to have in a certain respect equal authority with Jupiter, through a progression from the same causes, yet call him father. For both Neptune and Juno celebrate him by this appellation. And though Juno speaks to him as one who is of the same order,

Και γὰρ ἐγὼ θεὸς εἰμὶ· γένος δὲ μοι ἐνθεν ὄθεν σοι

Καὶ με πρῶτατ' αὖτε τέκετο κρονὸς ἀγκυλομήτης*.

i. e. "For I also am a divinity, and Saturn of inflected council endowed me with the greatest dignity, when he begat me." And though Neptune says,

Τρεῖς γὰρ τ' ἐκ κρονου εἰμεν ἀδελφοί, οὗς τέκε Ρέη,

Ζεὺς καὶ ἐγώ, τρίτατος δ' Αἰδῶς ἐνεροισιν ἀνασσών†.

i. e. "For we are three brothers from Saturn, whom Rhea bore, Jupiter and I, and the third is Pluto, who governs the infernal realms." Yet Jupiter is called father by both these divinities; and this because he comprehends in himself the one and impartible cause of all fabrication; is prior to the Saturnian triad†; connectedly contains the three fathers; and comprehends on all sides the vivification of Juno. Hence, at the same time that this goddess gives animation to the universe, he also together with other gods gives subsistence to souls. Very properly therefore do we say that the demiurgus in the *Timæus* is the mighty Jupiter. For he it is who produces mundane intellects and souls, who adorns all bodies with figures and numbers, and inserts in them one union, and an indissoluble friendship and bond. For Night also in *Orpheus* advises Jupiter to employ things of this kind in the fabrication of the universe,

Αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶν δεσμον κρατερόν περὶ πασι τανύτης*

i. e. But when your power around the whole has spread

A strong coercive bond.——

The proximate bond indeed of mundane natures, is that which subsists through analogy;

* *Iliad*. iv. 58.

† *Iliad*. xv. v. 187.

‡ For the Saturnian triad belongs to that order of gods which is called supermundane, and which immediately subsists after the intellectual order; so that the Jupiter who ranks at the summit of this triad is different from and inferior to the demiurgus.

but

but the more perfect bond is derived from intellect and soul. Hence Timæus calls the communion of the elements through analogy, and the indissoluble union from life, a bond: for he says animals were generated bound with animated bonds. But a more venerable bond than these subsists from the demiurgic will. "For my will," says Jupiter in the Timæus, "is a greater and more principle bond," &c.

Firmly adhering, therefore, to this conception respecting the mighty Jupiter, viz. that he is the demiurgus and father of the universe, that he is an all-perfect imparticipable* intellect, and that he fills all things both with other goods, and with life, let us survey how from names Socrates unfolds the mystic truth concerning this divinity. Timæus then says that it is difficult to know the essence of the demiurgus, and Socrates now says, that it is not easy to understand his name, which manifests his power and energy.

That our soul knows partly, the impartible nature of the energy of the gods, and that which is characterized by unity in this energy, in a multiplied manner: and this especially takes place about the demiurgus, who expands intellectual forms, and calls forth intelligible causes, and evolves them to the fabrication of the universe. For Parmenides characterizes him by sameness and difference. According to Homer two tubs are placed near him; and the most mystic tradition, and the oracles of the gods, say that the duad is seated with him. For thus they speak: "He possesses both; containing intelligibles in intellect, but introducing sense to the worlds." These oracles likewise call him *twice beyond*, and *twice there* (δὲς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, καὶ δὲς ἐκεῖ), and, in short, they celebrate him through the duad. For the demiurgus comprehends in himself unitedly every thing *prolific* †, and which gives subsistence to mundane natures. Very properly therefore is his name two-fold, of which διὰ manifests *the cause through which*, and this is paternal goodness; but ζῆναι signifies *vivification*, the first causes of which in the universe the demiurgus unically comprehends. The former, too, is a symbol of the Saturnian and paternal series; but the latter of the vivific and maternal Rhea. So far likewise as Jupiter receives the whole of Saturn, he gives subsistence to a triple essence, the impartible, the partible, and that which subsists between these; but according to the Rhea which he contains in himself, he scatters, as from a fountain, intellectual, psychical, and corporeal life. But by his demiurgic powers and energies, he

* That is, he is not an intellect consubistent with soul.

† And the duad, considered as a divine form or idea, is the source of fecundity.

gives a formal subsistence to these and separates them from forms of a prior order, and from each other. He is also the ruler and king of all things; and is exempt from the three demiurgi. For they, as Socrates says in the *Gorgias*, divide the kingdom of their father; but Jupiter, the demiurgus, at once without division reigns over the three, and unically governs them.

He is therefore the cause of the paternal triad, and of all fabrication; but he connectedly contains the three demiurgi. And he is a *king* indeed, as being coordinated with the fathers; but a *ruler*, as being proximately established above the demiurgic triad, and comprehending the uniform cause of it. Plato, therefore, by considering his name in two ways, evinces that images receive partly the unical causes of paradigms, and that this is adapted to him who establishes the intellectual duad in himself. For he gives subsistence to two-fold orders, the celestial and the supercelestial; whence also the theologist Orpheus says, that his sceptre consists of four and twenty measures, as ruling over a two-fold twelve*.

That the soul of the world gives life to alternative natures; for to these it becomes the fountain and principle of motion, as Plato says in the *Phædrus* and *Laws*. But the demiurgus simply imparts to all things life divine, intellectual, psychical, and that which is divisible about bodies. No one however should think that the gods in their generations of secondary natures are diminished; or that they sustain a division of their proper essence in giving subsistence to things subordinate; or that they expose their progeny to the view, externally to themselves in the same manner as the causes of mortal offspring. Nor, in short, must we suppose that they generate with motion or mutation, but that, abiding in themselves, they produce by their very essence posterior natures, comprehend on all sides their progeny, and supernally perfect the productions and energies of their offspring. Nor again, when it is said that gods are the sons of more total gods, must it be supposed that they are disjoined from more ancient causes, and are cut off from a union with them; or that they receive the idiom of their hyparxis through motion, and an indefiniteness converting itself to bound. For there is nothing irrational and without

* The twelve gods who first subsist in the *liberated* or *supercelestial* order, and who are divided into four triads, are Jupiter, Neptune, Vulcan; Vesta, Minerva, Mars; Ceres, Juno, Diana; and Mercury, Venus, Apollo. The first of these triads is *fabricative*; the second, *defensive*; the third, *vivific*; and the fourth, *measuring*.

measure, in the natures superior to us. But we must conceive that their progressions are effected through similitude; and that there is one communion of essence, and an indivisible continuity of powers and energies between the sons of gods and their fathers; all those gods that rank in the second order being established in such as are more ancient; and the more ancient imparting much of perfection, vigour, and efficacious production to the subordinate. And after this manner we must understand that Jupiter is said to be the son of Saturn. For Jupiter being the demiurgic intellect, proceeds from another intellect, superior and more uniform, which increases indeed its proper intellects, but converts the multitude of them to union; and multiplies its intellectual powers, but elevates their all-various evolutions to impartible sameness. Jupiter, therefore, proximately establishing a communion with this divinity, and being filled from him with total intellectual good, is very properly said to be the son of Saturn, both in hymns and invocations, as unfolding into light that which is occult, expanding that which is contracted, and dividing that which is impartible in the Saturnian monad; and as emitting a second more partial kingdom, instead of that which is more total, a demiurgic instead of a paternal dominion, and an empire which proceeds every where instead of that which stably abides in itself.

Why does Socrates apprehend the name of king Saturn* to be *ὑβριστικόν*, *insolent*, and looking to what does he assert this? We reply, that according to the poets *Satiety* (*κορος*) is the cause of *insolence*; for they thus denominate immoderation and repletion; and they say that *Satiety* brought forth *Insolence* (*ὑβριν φασιν τικτεῖ κορος*). He, therefore, who looks without attention to the name of Saturn, will consider it as signifying *insolence*. For to him who suddenly hears it, it manifests satiety and repletion. Why, therefore, since a name of this kind is expressive of insolence, do we not pass it over in silence, as not being auspicious and adapted to the gods? May we not say that the royal series†

of

* See p. 506.

† This royal series consists of Phanes, Night, Heaven, Saturn, Jupiter, Bacchus. "Antient theologists," says Syrianus (in his Commentary on the 14th book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*), "assert that Night and Heaven reigned, and prior to these the mighty father of Night and Heaven, who distributed the world to gods and mortals, and who first possessed royal authority, the illustrious *Ericapæus* :

Τοιον ελων διενειμα θεοις, θνητοισι δε ποσμον
Ου πρωτος βασιλευε περικλυτος ηρικεπαιος.

of the gods, beginning from Phanes, and ending in Bacchus, and producing the same sceptre supernally, as far as to the last kingdom; Saturn being allotted the fourth royal order, appears, according to the fabulous pretext, differently from the other kings, to have received the sceptre insolently from Heaven, and to have given it to Jupiter? For Night receives the sceptre from Phanes; Heaven derives from Night the dominion over wholes; and Bacchus, who is the last king of the gods, receives the kingdom from Jupiter. For the father (Jupiter) establishes him in the royal throne, puts into his hand the sceptre, and makes him the king of all the mundane gods. "Hear me, ye gods, I place over you a king."

ΚΛΥΤΕ ΘΕΟΙ ΤΟΝ Δ' ΥΜΜΙΝ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙΑ ΤΙΘΗΜΙ

says Jupiter to the junior gods. But Saturn alone, perfectly deprives Heaven of the kingdom, and concedes dominion to Jupiter, cutting and being cut off as the fable says. Plato, therefore, seeing this succession, which in Saturn is called by theologists *insolent* (υβριστική), thought it worth while to mention the appearance of insolence in the name; that from this he might evince the name is adapted to the god, and that it bears an image of the insolence which is ascribed to him in fables. At the same time he teaches us to refer mythical devices to the truth concerning the gods, and the apparent absurdity which they contain, to scientific conceptions.

That *the great*, when ascribed to the gods, must not be considered as belonging to

Night succeeded Ericapaus, in the hands of whom she has a septre :

ΣΚΕΠΤΡΟΝ ΕΧΟΥΣ' ΕΝ ΧΕΡΣΙΝ ΕΡΙΚΕΠΑΙΟΥ.

To Night, Heaven succeeded, who first reigned over the gods after mother Night :

Ος ΠΡΩΤΟΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ ΘΕΩΝ ΜΕΤΑ ΜΗΤΕΡΑ ΝΥΚΤΑ.

Chaos transcends the habitude of sovereign dominion : and, with respect to Jupiter, the Oracles given to him by Night manifestly call him not the first, but the fifth immortal king of the gods :

ΑΘΑΝΑΤΩΝ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙΑ ΘΕΩΝ ΠΕΜΠΤΩΝ ΓΕΝΕΣΘΑΙ.

According to these theologists, therefore, that principle which is most eminently the first, is *the one* or *the good*, after which, according to Pythagoras, are those two principles Æther and Chaos, which are superior to the possession of sovereign dominion. In the next place succeed the first and occult genera of the gods, in which first shines forth the father and king of all wholes, and whom, on this account, they call *Phanes*."

interval,

interval, but as subsisting intellectually, and according to the power of cause, but not according to partible transcendence. But why does Plato now call Saturn *διανοία*, the dianoëtic part of the soul? May we not say, that it is because he looks to the multitude of intellectual conceptions in him, the orders of intelligibles, and the evolution of forms which he contains; since also in the *Timæus* he represents the demiurgic intellect as reasoning, and making the world, dianoëticallly energizing; and this in consequence of looking to his partible and divided intellects, according to which he fabricates not only wholes but parts? When Saturn however is called intellect, Jupiter has the order of the dianoëtic part: and when again, Saturn is called the dianoëtic part, we must say that he is so called according to analogy with reference to a certain other intellect of a higher order. Whether therefore you are willing to speak of intelligible and occult intellect, or of that which unfolds into light (*εκφαντορικος νους*), or of that which connectedly contains (*συνεκτικος νους*), or of that which imparts perfection* (*τελεστιουργος νους*), Saturn will be as the dianoëtic part to all these: for he produces united intellects into multitude, and fills himself wholly with excited intelligibles. Whence also he is said to be the leader of the Titanic race, and the source of all-various separation and diversifying power. And perhaps Plato here primarily delivers two-fold interpretations of the name of the Titans, which Jamblichus and Amelius afterwards adopted. For the one interprets this name from the Titans extending their powers to all things; but the other from *something infertile* (*παρὰ το τι ατομον*), because the division and separation of wholes into parts receives its beginning from the Titans. Socrates, therefore, now indicates both these interpretations, by asserting of the king of the Titans, that he is a *certain great dianoëtic power*. For the term *great* is a symbol of power pervading to all things; but the term *a certain*, of power proceeding to the most partial natures.

That the name Saturn is now triply analyzed, of which the first asserting this god to be the plenitude of intellectual good, and to be the satiety of a divine intellect, from its conveying an image of the satiety and repletion which are reprobated by the many, is ejected as insolent. The second also, which exhibits the imperfect and the puerile, is in

* Of these intellects, the first is Phanes, the second Heaven, the third Earth, and the fourth the Sub-celestial Arch, which is celebrated in the *Phædrus*, viz. *νους νοητος ο φανης, εκφαντορικος νους ο ουρανιος, συνεκτικος νους η γη, τελεστιουργος δε νους η υπ' ουρανιος αψις*.

like manner rejected. But the third, which celebrates this god as full of purity, and as the leader of undefiled intelligence, and an undeviating life, is approved. For king Saturn is intellect, and the supplier of all intellectual life; but he is an intellect exempt from coordination with sensibles, immaterial and separate, and converted to himself. He likewise converts his progeny, and after producing them into light, again embodies and firmly establishes them in himself. For the demiurgus of the universe, though he is a divine intellect, yet he orderly arranges sensibles, and provides for subordinate natures. But the mighty Saturn is essentialized in separate intellection, and which transcend wholes. "For the fire which is beyond the first," says the Oracle, "does not incline its power downwards." But the demiurgus is suspended and proceeds from Saturn, being himself an intellect subsisting about an immaterial intellect, energizing about it as the intelligible, and producing that which is occult in it, into the apparent. For the maker of the world is an intellect of intellect. And it appears to me, that as Saturn is the summit of those gods that are properly called intellectual, he is intellect as with reference to the intelligible genus of gods. For all the intellectual adhere to the intelligible genus of gods, and are conjoined with them through intellections. "Ye who understand the supermundane paternal profundity," says the Hymn to them. But Saturn is intelligible, with reference to all the intellectual gods. *Purity*, therefore, indicates this impartible and imparticipable transcendence of Saturn. For the not coming into contact with matter, the impartible, and an exemption from habitude, are signified by purity. Such indeed is the transcendence of this god with respect to all coordination with things subordinate, and such his undefiled union with the intelligible, that he does not require a Curetic guard, like Rhea, Jupiter, and Proserpine. For all these, through their progressions into secondary natures, require the immutable defence of the Curetes. But Saturn being firmly established in himself, and hastily withdrawing himself from all subordinate natures, is established above the guardianship of the Curetes. He contains however the cause of these uniformly in himself: for this purity, and the undefiled which he possesses, give subsistence to all the progressions of the Curetes. Hence, in the Oracles, he is said to comprehend the first fountain of the Amilioti, and to ride on all the others. "The intellect of the father riding on attenuated rulers, they become resplendent with the furrows of inflexible and implacable fire."

Νους πατρός αἰρείαις ἐποχουμένοις ἰδυτηρίσιν
 Ἀκναμπτοῦ ἀστραπτουσιν ἀμείλικτου πυρός ὀλκίαις.

He is therefore *pure intellect*, as giving subsistence to the undefiled order, and as being the leader of the whole intellectual series.

Αὐτοῦ γὰρ ἐκβρωσκανσιν ἀμείλικτοι τέ κερκῆνοι,
 Καὶ περὶ τῆς ὁδοῦ κολποὶ παμφεγγεὸς ἀλκῆς
 Πατρογενούς Ἑκάτης, καὶ ὑπεζῶκος πυρός ἀνθος,
 Ἡδὲ κραταῖον πνεῦμα πολλῶν πυρίων ἐπεκείνω.

i. e. "From him leap forth the implacable thunders, and the preter-capacious bosoms of the all-splendid strength of the father-begotten Hecate, together with the envired flower of fire, and the strong spirit which is beyond the fiery poles."

For he convolves all the hebdomad of the fountains*, and gives subsistence to it, from his unical and intelligible summit. For he is, as the Oracle says, *αμστυλλενος*, uncut into fragments, uniform, and undistributed, and connectedly contains all the fountains, converting and uniting all of them to himself, and being separate from all things with immaculate purity. Hence he is *κορονος*, as an immaterial and pure intellect, and as establishing himself in the paternal silence. He is also celebrated as the father of fathers. Saturn therefore is a father, and intelligible, as with reference to the intellectual gods.

That every intellect either abides, and is then intelligible, as being better than motion; or it is moved, and is then intellectual; or it is both, and is then intelligible, and at the same time intellectual. The first of these is Phanes; the second, which is alone moved, is Saturn; and the third, which is both moved and permanent, is Heaven.

That Saturn, from his impartible, unical, paternal, and beneficent subsistence in the intellectual orders, has been considered by some as the same with the one cause of all things. He is however only analogous to this cause, just as Orpheus calls the first cause *Time* (*χρονος*), nearly homonymously with Saturn (*χρονος*). But the oracles of the gods

* That is, of the whole intellectual order, which consists of Saturn, Rhea, Jupiter, the three Curetes, and the separating monad Ocean.

characterize

characterize this deity by the epithet of *the once* (τὴν ἁπαλάν); calling him *once beyond* (ἁπλᾶς ἐπέκεινα). For *the once* is allied to *the one*.

That *Heaven**, the father of Saturn, is an intellect, understanding himself indeed, but united to the first intelligibles; in which he is also firmly established; and connectedly contains all the intellectual orders, by abiding in intelligible union. This god too is *connective*, just as Saturn is of a *separating* idiom; and on this account he is *father*. For connecting precede separating causes; and the intelligible and at the same time intellectual, such as are intellectual only. Whence also *Heaven* being the *Synochus* (συνωχέυς) of wholes, according to one union, gives subsistence to the Titanic series, and prior to this, to other orders of the gods; some of which abide only in him, which he retains in himself, but others both abide and proceed, which he is said to have concealed, after they were unfolded into light. And after all these, he gives subsistence to those divine orders, which proceed into the universe, and are separated from their father. For he produces two-fold monads, and triads, and hebdomads, equal in number to the monads. These things however will be investigated more fully elsewhere. But this deity is denominated according to the similitude of the apparent Heaven. For each of them compresses and connects all the multitude which it contains, and causes the sympathy and connection of the whole world to be one. For connection is second to unifying power, and proceeds from it. In the *Phædrus* therefore Plato delivers to us the production of all secondary natures by Heaven, and shows us how this divinity leads upwards and convolves all things to the intelligible. He likewise teaches us what its summit is, what the profundity of its whole order, and what the boundary of the whole of its progression. Here therefore, investigating the truth of things from names, he declares its energy with respect to things more elevated and simple, and which are arranged nearer to *the one*. He also clearly appears here to consider the order of Heaven as intelligible, and at the same time intellectual. For if it sees things on high, it energizes intellectually, and there is prior to it the intelligible genus of gods, to which looking it is intellectual; just as it is intelligible to the natures which proceed from it. What then are the things on high which it beholds? Is it not evident that they are the supercelestial place, an essence without colour, without figure, and without

* See p. 507.

the touch, and all the intelligible extent? An extent comprehending, as Plato would say, intelligible animals, the one cause of all eternal natures, and the occult principles of these; but as the followers of Orpheus would say, bounded by Æther upwards, and by Phanes downward. For all between these two gives completion to the intelligible order. But Plato now calls this both singularly and plurally; since all things are there united, and at the same time each is separated peculiarly; and this according to the highest union and separation.

With respect to the term *μετεωρολογοι*, i. e. *those who discourse on sublime affairs**, we must now consider it in a manner adapted to those who choose an anagogic life, who live intellectually, and who do not gravitate to earth, but sublimely tend to a theoretic life. For that which is called Earth there, maternally gives subsistence to such things as Heaven, which is coordinate to that Earth, produces paternally. And he who energizes there, may be properly called *μετεωρολογος*, or, *one who discourses about things on high*. Heaven therefore being of a *connelive* nature, is expanded above the Saturnian orders, and all the intellectual series; and produces from himself all the Titannic race; and prior to this, the perfective and defensive orders; and, in short, is the leader of every good to the intellectual gods. Plato therefore having celebrated Saturn for his intelligence, which is without habitude to mundane natures, and for his life which is converted to his own exalted place of survey, now celebrates Heaven for another more perfect energy: for to be conjoined to more elevated natures, is a greater good than to be converted to oneself. Let no one, however, think that, on this account, the above-mentioned energies are distributed in the gods; as, for instance, that there is providence alone in Jupiter, a conversion alone to himself in Saturn, and an elevation alone to the intelligible in Heaven. For Jupiter no otherwise provides for mundane natures than by looking to the intelligible; since, as Plato says in the *Timæus*, intellect understanding ideas in animal itself, thought it requisite that as many, and such as it there perceived, should be contained in the universe; but, as Orpheus† says, with a divinely inspired mouth, “Jupiter swallows his progenitor Phanes, embofoms all his powers, and becomes

* See p. 507.

† Ως δ' Ὀρφεὺς εὐθεὶ στόματι λέγει, καὶ καταπίνει τὸν προγονὸν αὐτοῦ τὸν φάνητα, καὶ ἐγκολπίζεται πᾶσας αὐτοῦ τὰς δυνάμεις ὁ ζεὺς, καὶ γίνεται πάντα νοερώς, ὅσπερ ἡν ἐκεῖνος νοητῶς.

all things intellectually which Phœbus is intelligibly." Saturn also imparts to Jupiter the principles of fabrication, and of providential attention to sensibles, and understanding himself, he becomes united to first intelligibles, and is filled with the goods which are thence derived. Hence also the theologist (Orpheus) says, "that he was nursed by Night *." If therefore the intelligible is nutriment, Saturn is replete not only with the intelligibles coordinated with him, but also with the highest and occult intelligences. Heaven himself also fills all secondary natures with his proper goods, but guards all things by his own most vigorous powers; and the father supernally committed to him the connecting and guarding the causes of eternal animal. But he intellectually perceives himself, and is converted to the intelligibles which he contains; and this his intelligence, Plato, in the *Phædrus*, calls *circulation*. For as that which is moved in a circle is moved about its own centre, so Heaven energizes about its own intelligible, according to intellectual circulation. But all the gods subsisting in all, and each possessing all energizes, one transcends more in this, and another in a different energy, and each is particularly characterized according to that in which it transcends. Thus Jupiter is characterized by providence, and hence his name is now thus analyzed; but Saturn, by a conversion to himself, whence also he is *inflected counsel*, *αγκυλομητις*; and Heaven by habitude to things more excellent, from which also he receives his appellation. For his giving subsistence to a pure and the Saturnian intellect, represents his energy to the other part. But as there are many powers in Heaven, such as the connective, guardian, and convertive, you will find that this name is appropriately adapted to all these. For the connective is signified through bounding the intellectual gods; since the connective bounds the multitude which he contains. The power which guards wholes subsists through the termination and security of an intellectual essence. And the convertive power subsists through converting, seeing, and intellectually energizing natures, to things on high. But all these are adapted to Heaven. For there is no fear that the gods will be dissipated, and that on this account they require connective causes, or that they will sustain mutation, and that on this account they stand in need of the saving aid of guardian causes; but now Socrates at once manifests all the powers of Heaven, through convertive energy. For this is to behold things on high, to be con-

* Διο και τρεφεσθαι φησιν αυτον ο βιολογος υπο της νυκτος· "εκ παντων δε κρονον νυξ ετρεφεν ηδ' ατιταλ-
λει·"

verted to them, and through this to be connected and defended. And it appears to me that Heaven possesses this idiom according to analogy to the intelligible eternity, and the intelligible wholeness. For Timæus particularly characterizes eternity by this, viz. by abiding in the one prior to it, and by being established in the summit of intelligibles; and Socrates says, that Heaven surveys things on high, viz. the supercelestial place, and such things as are comprehended in the god-nourished silence of the fathers (*καὶ οὕτως ὁ Σοκράτης σιγῇ περιιληπταὶ τῶν πατέρων*). As therefore Parmenides signifies each of these orders through *wholeness*, the one through intelligible, and the other through intellectual wholeness; in like manner both Timæus and Socrates characterize them by a conversion to more excellent natures. But the conversion as well as the wholeness is different. For that of eternity is intelligible, on which account Timæus does not say that it looks to its intelligible, but only that it stably abides. But the conversion of Heaven is intellectual, and on this account Socrates says, that it sees things on high, and through this converts, guards, and connects all things posterior to itself. Whence also, in the Phædrus, it is said, by the circulation of itself, to lead all things to the supercelestial place, and the summit of the first intelligibles.

That there being three fathers and kings of which Socrates here makes mention, Saturn alone appears to have received the government from his father, and to have transmitted it to Jupiter by violence. Mythologists therefore celebrate the sections of Heaven and Saturn. But the cause of this is, that Heaven is of the connective, Saturn of the Titannic, and Jupiter of the demiurgic order. Again, the Titannic genus rejoices in separations and differences, progressions and multiplications of powers. Saturn therefore, as a dividing god, separates his kingdom from that of Heaven; but as a pure intellect, he is exempt from a fabricative energy proceeding into matter. Hence also the demiurgic genus is again separated from him. Section therefore is on both sides of him. For so far as he is a Titan, he is cut off from the connective causes, but so far as he does not give himself to material fabrication, he is cut off from the demiurgus Jupiter.

That with respect to the supercelestial place, to which Heaven extends his intellectual life, some characterize it by ineffable symbols; but others, after giving it a name, celebrate it as unknown, neither being able to speak of its form or figure. And proceed-

ing somewhat higher than this, they have been able to manifest the boundary * of the intelligible gods by name alone. But the natures which are beyond this, they signify through analogy alone, these natures being ineffable and incomprehensible. Since that god who closes the paternal order, is said by the wife to be the only deity among the intelligible gods, that is denominated: and theurgy ascends as far as to this order. Since therefore the natures prior to Heaven, are allotted such a transcendence of uniform subsistence, that some of them are said to be effable, and at the same time ineffable; known, and at the same time unknown, through their alliance to *the one*, Socrates very properly restrains the discourse about them, in consequence of names not being able to represent their hyparxes; and, in short, because it requires a certain wonderful employment, to separate the effable and ineffable, of their hyparxis and power. He accuses therefore his memory, not as disbelieving in the fables, which assert, that there are certain more ancient causes beyond Heaven, nor as not thinking it worth while to mention them. For in the Phædrus he himself celebrates the supercelestial place. But he says this, because the first of beings cannot become known by the exercise of memory, and through phantasy, or opinion, or the dianoëtic part. For we are alone naturally adapted to be conjoined to them, with the flower of intellect and the hyparxis of our essence; and through these we receive the sensation of their unknown nature. Socrates therefore says, that what in them is exempt, both from our gnostic and recollective life, is the cause of our inability to give them a name; for they are not naturally adapted to be known through names. Theologists likewise would not remotely signify them, and through the analogy of things apparent to them, if they could be named, and apprehended by knowledge.

That Homer † does not ascend beyond the Saturnian order, but evincing that Saturn is the proximate cause of the demiurgus, he calls Jupiter, who is the demiurgus, the son of Saturn. He also calls the divinities coordinate with him, Juno, Neptune, and Mars; and he denominates Jupiter the father of men and gods. But he does not in-

* That is Phanes, intelligible intellect, or in the language of Plato, *αυτογνω*, animal itself.

† Homer however appears to have ascended as far as to the goddess *Night*, or the summit of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual order. See the extracts from Damascius, in the additional notes to the Parmenides.

roduce Saturn, as either energizing, or saying any thing, but as truly *αγκυλωμενης*, in consequence of being converted to himself.

That Orpheus greatly availed himself of the license of fables, and manifests every thing prior to Heaven by names, as far as to the first cause. He also denominates the ineffable, who transcends the intelligible unities, *Time*; whether because *Time* preexists as the cause of all generation, or because, as delivering the generation of true beings, he thus denominates the ineffable, that he may indicate the order of true beings, and the transcendency of the more total to the more partial; that a subsistence according to Time may be the same with a subsistence according to cause; in the same manner as generation with an arranged progression. But Hesiod venerates many of the divine natures in silence, and does not, in short, name the first. For that what is posterior to the first proceeds from something else, is evident from the verse,

“Chaos of all things was the first produced,”

For it is perfectly impossible that it could be produced without a cause; but he does not say what that is which gave subsistence to Chaos. He is silent indeed with respect to both the fathers * of intelligibles, the exempt, and the coordinate; for they are perfectly ineffable. And with respect to the two coordinations, the natures which are coordinate with the one, he passes by in silence, but those alone which are coordinate with the indefinite duad, he unfolds through genealogy. And on this account Plato now thinks Hesiod deserves to be mentioned, for passing by the natures prior to Heaven, as being ineffable. For this also is indicated concerning them by the Oracles, which likewise add, “they possess mystic silence,” *σιγ' εχε μυστικα*. And Socrates himself, in the Phædrus, calls the intellectual perception of them, *μυησις* and *εποπτεια*, in which nearly the whole business is ineffable and unknown.

That, as a discourse concerning the gods is triple, viz. phantastic, like that of Euthyphro†, who irrationally imagined battles and stratagems among the gods; scientific, like that of Socrates; and doxastic, which subsists between these, and which, from the opinion of the founder of names, scientifically rises to the essence of the gods;—hence Socrates, perceiving that the conceptions of the multitude about the gods were equally

* That is to say, the first cause, and bound, which is called by Orpheus, *Æther*.

† For the character of Euthyphro, see the dialogue which bears his name. See also p. 507 of the Cratylus.

depraved with those of Euthyphro, descends from a scientific energy to inferior concerns, but at the same time elevates those who are detained by phantasy to a middle habit of apprehension concerning the gods. Hence, he ascribes the cause of this descent in speculation to Euthyphro; not considering him as the leader of this knowledge, but as one who, through the phantastically prodigious nature of his discourse, excites to the scientific investigation of truth.

That every where, the extremities of a prior, are conjoined with the summits of a secondary order. Thus, for instance, our master Hermes (ὁ δεσποτῆς ἡμῶν ἑρμῆς), being an archangelic monad, is celebrated as a god. But Plato calls the whole extent between gods and men, dæmons; and they indeed are dæmons by nature. Those dæmons however that are now* mentioned, together with the demigods heroes, are not dæmons and heroes by nature, for they do not always follow the gods; but they are only so from habitude, being souls who naturally deliver themselves to generation, such as was the great Hercules, and others of the like kind. But the peculiarity of heroic souls is magnitude of operation, the elevated and the magnificent; and such heroes it is necessary to honour, and to perform funeral rites to their memory, conformably to the exhortation of the Athenian guest. This heroic genus of souls therefore does not always follow the gods, but is undefiled and more intellectual than other souls. And it descends indeed for the benefit of the life of men, as partaking of a destiny inclining downwards; but it has much of an elevated nature, and which is properly liberated from matter. Hence souls of this kind are easily led back to the intelligible world, in which they live for many periods; while, on the contrary, the more irrational kind of souls are either never led back, or this is accomplished with great difficulty, or continues for a very inconsiderable period of time.

That each of the gods is perfectly exempt from secondary natures, and the first, and more total of dæmons are likewise established above a habitude of this kind. They employ however terrestrial and partial spirits† in the generations of some of the human race;

not

* See p. 508.

† Some of these spirits, according to Porphyry, are subject to the power of evil dæmons, as is evident from the following passage, preserved by Augustin:

“Sunt spiritus terreni minimi loco terreno quodam malorum dæmonum potestati subjecti. Ab his sapientes Hebræorum ——— * * (vid. August.) sicut audivisti divina Apollonis oracula quæ superius dicta

not physically mingling with mortals, but moving nature, perfecting its power, expanding the path of generation, and removing all impediments. Fables therefore, through the similitude of appellation, conceal the things themselves. For spirits of this kind are similarly denominated with the gods, the leading causes of their series. Hence they say, either that gods have connexion with women, or men with goddesses. But if they were willing to speak plainly and clearly, they would say that Venus, Mars, Thetis, and the other divinities, produce their respective series, beginning from on high, as far as to the last of things; each of which series comprehends in itself many essences differing from each other; such as the angelical, dæmoniacal, heroical, nymphical, and the like. The lowest powers therefore of these orders, have much communion with the human race:

dicta sunt. Ab his ergo *Hebræi* dæmonibus pessimis et minoribus spiritibus vetabant religiosos, et ipsis vacare prohibebant: venerari autem magis cælestes deos, amplius autem venerari deum patrem. Hoc autem et dii præcipiunt, et in superioribus ostendimus, quemadmodum animadvertere ad deum monent, et illum colere ubique imperant. Verum indocti et impiæ naturæ, quibus vere fatum non concessit a diis dona obtinere, neque habere Jovis immortalis notionem, non audientes deos et divinos viros; deos quidem omnes recusaverunt, prohibitos autem dæmones non solum nullis odiis insequi, sed etiam revereri delegerunt. Deum autem simulantes se colere, ea sola per quæ deus adoratur, non agunt. Nam deus quidem utpote omnium pater nullius indiget: sed nobis est bene, cum eum per justitiam et castitatem, aliasque virtutes adoramus, ipsam vitam precem ad ipsum facientes, per imitationem et inquisitionem de ipso. Inquisitio enim purgat, imitatio deificat affectionem ad ipsum operando." Porphy. ap. August. de Civit. Dei. lib. xix. cap. 23.

i. e. "There are terrene spirits of the lowest order, who in a certain terrene place are subject to the power of evil dæmons. From these were the wise men of the Hebrews — * * (see Augustin), as you have heard the divine oracles of Apollo above mentioned assert. From these worst of dæmons therefore and lesser spirits of the *Hebrew*, the Oracles forbid the religious, and prohibit from paying attention to them; but exhort them rather to venerate the celestial gods, and still more the father of the gods. And we have above shown how the gods admonish us to look to divinity, and every where command us to worship him. But the unlearned, and impious natures, to whom Fate has not granted truly to obtain gifts from the gods, and to have a knowledge of the immortal Jupiter,—these not attending to the gods and divine men, reject indeed all the gods, and are so far from hating prohibited dæmons, that they even choose to reverence them. But pretending that they worship god, they do not perform those things through which alone god is adored. For god indeed, as being the father of all things, is not in want of any thing; but it is well with us, when we adore him through justice and continence, and the other virtues, making our life a prayer to him, through the imitation and investigation of him. For investigation purifies, but imitation deifies the affection by energizing about divinity."

for

for the extremities of first, are connascent with the summits of secondary natures. And they contribute to our other natural operations, and to the production of our species. On this account, it frequently is seen that from the mixture of these powers with men heroes are generated, who appear to possess a certain prerogative above human nature. But not only a dæmoniack genus of this kind, physically sympathizes with men, but a different genus sympathizes with other animals, as Nymphs with trees, others with fountains, and others with stags, or serpents.

But how is it that at one time the gods are said to have connexion with mortal females, and at another time mortal females with the gods. We reply that the communion of gods with goddesses gives subsistence to gods, or dæmons eternally; but heroic souls having a two-fold form of life, viz. *doxastic* and *dianoëtic*, the former of which is called by Plato in the *Timæus* *the circle of difference*, and the latter, *the circle of sameness*, and which are characterized by the properties of *male* and *female*;—hence these souls at one time exhibit a deiform power, by energizing according to the masculine prerogative of their nature, or *the circle of sameness*, and at another time according to their feminine prerogative, or *the circle of difference*; yet so, as that according to both these energies they act with rectitude, and without merging themselves in the darkness of body. They likewise know the natures prior to their own, and exercise a providential care over inferior concerns, without at the same time having that propensity to such concerns which is found in the bulk of mankind. But the souls which act erroneously according to the energies of both these circles, or which, in other words, neither exhibit accurate specimens of practical or intellectual virtue—these differ in no respect from *gregarious* souls, or the herd of mankind, with whom the circle of sameness is fettered, and the circle of difference sustains all various fractures and distortions.

As it is impossible, therefore, that these heroic souls can act with equal vigour and perfection, according to both these circles at once, since this is the province of natures more divine than the human, it is necessary that they should sometimes descend and energize principally according to their doxastic part, and sometimes according to their more intellectual part. Hence, one of these circles must energize naturally, and the other be hindered from its proper energy. On this account heroes are called *demigods* (*ημιθεοι*), as having only one of their circles illuminated by the gods. Such of these therefore as have the circle of sameness unfettered, as are excited to an intellectual life,

and

and are moved about it according to a deific energy,—these are said to have a god for their father, and a mortal for their mother, through a defect with respect to the doxastic form of life. But such, on the contrary, as energize without impediment according to the circle of difference, who act with becoming rectitude in practical affairs, and at the same time *enthusiastically*, or, in other words, under the inspiring influence of divinity,—these are said to have a mortal for their father, and a goddess for their mother. In short, rectitude of energy in each of these circles is to be ascribed to a divine cause*. Hence, when the circle of sameness has dominion, the divine cause of illumination is said to be masculine and paternal; but when the circle of difference predominates, it is said to be maternal. Hence too, Achilles in Homer acts with rectitude in practical affairs, and at the same time exhibits specimens of magnificent, vehement, and divinely-inspired energy, as being the son of a goddess. And such is his attachment to practical virtue, that even, when in Hades, he desires a union with body, that he may assist his father. While, on the contrary, Minos and Rhadamanthus, who were heroes illuminated by Jupiter, raised themselves from generation to true being, and meddled with mortal concerns no further than absolute necessity required.

That heroes are very properly denominated from Love, since Love is a great dæmon†: and from the cooperation of dæmons, heroes are produced. To which we may add that Love originated from Plenty as the more excellent cause, and from Poverty as the recipient and the worse cause; and heroes are analogously produced from different genera.

That according to Plato το κομψον signifies both *the elegant and the appropriate* (τοτε κομψον και οκσιον); and again it signifies *the persuasive and the deceitful* (το πιθανον και απατηλον): but το κεκομψευμενον signifies *μεμπησανμενον*.

That as in the universe angels purify souls, freeing them from the stains produced by generation, and elevating them to the gods; and as certain material dæmons also purify by chastising souls looking to matter, tearing them on thorns, as in the Republic they are represented doing to Aridæus;—so indeed the ministers of sacred rites, angelically

* Let it however be carefully observed, that this divine cause illuminates, invigorates, and excites these circles in the most unrestrained and impassive manner, without destroying freedom of energy in the circles themselves, or causing any partial affection, sympathy or tendency in illuminating deity.

† See the speech of Diotima in the Banquet.

remove from us every thing which impedes our perception of more excellent nature; but sophists, through exercising us dæmoniacally by arguments on both sides, cut off the injury which we sustain from false opinion; not doing this that they may benefit through doubting those who are confused, but for the sake of a life phantastic, and conversant with the imitation of opinion. For sophists assume the character of those that are truly scientific and skilled in dialectic. And in like manner the last of dæmons afflict souls, not that they may make them lovers of real being, but because they are allotted a nature defensive of material and image-producing bosoms, but punishing the souls that fall into that place.

That many dæmons have thought fit to unfold the nature of the gods, and have also delivered names adapted to the gods. Thus*, too, the gods themselves not only unfolded the intelligible and intellectual orders to the theurgists under the reign of Marcus Antoninus, but also delivered names of the divine orders declarative of their characteristic properties, by which theurgists invoking the gods in the worship adapted to them, were favourably heard by the divinities. Many dæmons also, in appearing to men of a more fortunate destiny, have unfolded to them names connascent with things themselves, through which they have rendered the truth about beings more conspicuous.

That of names some belong to perpetual, and others to corruptible things. And of those which belong to things perpetual, some are devised by men, but others by more divine causes. And of those which are the production of more divine causes than men, some are established by the gods themselves, but others by dæmons. And of those which are devised by men, some are the offspring of science, but others are effected without science. Again, of names which belong to things corruptible, some are produced according to, but others without art; and of those produced without art, and the dianoëtic energy, some subsist according to an unknown divine cause, such for instance

* Οὕτω καὶ τοῖς ἐπὶ ΜΑΡΚΟΥ γενομένοις Θεουργοῖς, οἱ θεοὶ ὡς νοήτας καὶ νοεράς τάξεις ἐκφαίνοντες, ὀνόματα τῶν θείων διακοσμῶν ἐξαγγελτικὰ τῆς ιδιοτήτος αὐτῶν παραδεδωκάσιν, οἷς καλοῦντες ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς θεοὺς ἐν ταῖς προσήκουσαις θεραπειαῖς τῆς παρ' αὐτῶν ευηκείας ἐτυχάνον. This is a very remarkable passage, from which the antiquity of the greater part of the Chaldæan Oracles that are now extant may be ascertained. See my collection of those Oracles, in the Supplement to the 3d volume of the Monthly Magazine.

as the name *Orestes* ; but others without such a cause. And of those without a cause, some subsist according to hope, others according to memory, and others according to neither of these. But of those which are denominated according to art, some subsist according to things present, others according to things past, and others according to things future. Thus according to things present *Aristocles* was called *Plato* ; but according to things past *Antiochus* was denominated *Philopater*, through having encountered danger for the sake of his father. And names subsist according to things future, as when some one fore-knowing through skill in astrology that his son will become renowned, calls him *Pericles*. There is also a kind of names mixed from fortune and art, and which through this is two-fold. One division of this takes place, when some one knows the power of a name, but is ignorant of the nature of the thing of which it is the name. Thus *Xanthippus* knew that the name *Pericles* signifies *renown*, but he did not know that his son *Pericles* would be most renowned, and therefore did not in consequence of this knowledge thus name him. On the contrary, another division of this happens, when some one is ignorant of the power of the name, but knows the essence of the thing, as in the instance of him who denominated *Theseus*, *Hercules* : for he knew that *Theseus* resembled *Hercules*, but he was ignorant* that the name *Hercules* was alone adapted to *Hercules*, in consequence of *Juno* becoming the cause to him of so many labours, and of the renown which he afterwards acquired through those labours.

That with respect to the intellections of the soul, some abide in wholes, and comprehend these ; but others alone energize on more partial genera ; and others are busily employed about the divine conceptions of eternal individuals. Those who contemplate the Saturnian and defensive series are the paradigm of the first of these ; those whose conceptions are employed about supercelestial natures, and him† who there drives his winged chariot, are the paradigm of the second ; and those who diligently observe and judge of the effects proceeding into generation from the sun and moon, of the third.

That it is the peculiarity of the strange inhabitants of Greece of the present time,

* Ηγνείε δε το γρακλής ονομα, οτι επι μόνου χρησθε τοι γρακλέους, δια το τῆς γρᾶς αὐτῆς γενέσθαι αἰτίας τῶν ποσειδων ἀγωνῶν, καὶ τοῦ δια τῶν ἀγωνῶν ὑστέρου κλέους.

† Viz. Jupiter. See the *Phædrus*.

neither to confider the fun nor moon as gods*, nor to worship the other celestials, though they are our favours and guides, leading upwards immortal, and fabricating and giving subsistence to mortal souls. *I should say however that those who have the hardihood to entertain such an audacious and absurd opinion concerning the celestial gods, belong to souls who are hastening to Tartarus, and to that which is most dark and disordered in the universe†. Let these however remain where they are ranked by Justice.*

That the name GOD‡ is rationally ascribed not only to the apparent, but also to the supercelestial, intellectual, and intelligible causes. For Socrates in the Republic speaks of *swiftness* itself and *slowness* itself in intelligible numbers; on which account also the liberated rulers of wholes, who are supercelestial, are celebrated in the Phædrus as driving winged chariots. And theologists say that prior to these the intellectual gods ride in chariots of this kind; that Heaven itself, which connectedly comprehends the intellectual gods, possesses its intelligence in *circulation*; and that the intelligible causes prior to this, though these are ineffable, have a *rapid motion*, and unattended with time. For the Oracles § also call these *swift*, and say that "proceeding from the father they run to him." But Orpheus thus speaks about the occult order of the gods:

"Unwearied, in a boundless orb it moves."

This name may also be interpreted after another manner; since it manifests the producing and fabricative causes of all things: for *ῥεῖναι* and *ῥήσω* are assumed for *το ποιεῖν*.

* This also has been the peculiarity of what are called the *civilized* nations of the earth for upwards of a thousand years!

† Ψυχῶν ἂν ἐγὼγε φαῖναι εἰς αὐτὸν τὸν τάρταρον, καὶ τὸν ἀβέγγεστατον τοῦ παντός, καὶ ἀτακτοτάτον ἐπειγόμενων, τὴν τοιαύτην τολμᾶν, καὶ τὴν παραλογὸν ταύτην οἰσιν πρὸς τοὺς οὐρανίους ὑπερβαρυνόμενων ῥεούς; ἀλλ' οὗτοι μὲν ἐστῶσαν ὅπου περιτὰ χθίσαν ὑπὸ τῆς δίκης. Proclus in saying *this* will doubtless appear in the light of a most uncharitable bigot, to most readers. It must however be observed that the doctrine of eternal punishment has no place in the Pagan creed; and that, according to the same creed, divinity benevolently punishes the offending soul, in order to purify it from guilt.

‡ See page 508.

§ Θεῶς γὰρ αὐτὰς καὶ τὰ λόγια καλεῖ καὶ προΐστας ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ῥεῖν ἐπ' αὐτὸν. By the Oracles, Proclus means the Chalcæan.

That

That there is nothing debile, nothing inefficacious in the gods, but all things there are energies and lives, fervid, and eternally energizing. Of the genera, therefore, posterior to the gods, and which are indeed their perpetual attendants, but produce in conjunction with them mundane fabrications from on high, as far as to the last of things,—of these genera some unfold generation into light; others are transporters of union; others of power; and others call forth the knowledge of the gods and an intellectual essence. But of these, some are called angelic, by those that are skilled in divine concerns, in consequence of being established according to the hyparxis itself of the gods, and making that which is uniform in their nature commensurate with things of a secondary rank. Hence the angelic tribe is *boniform*, as unfolding into light the occult *goodness* of the gods. Others among these are called by theologists dæmoniacal, as binding the middle of all things, and as distributing divine power, and producing it as far as to the last of things: for δαίσασι is το μερισαι. But this genus possesses abundance of power, and is multifarious, as giving subsistence to those last dæmons who are material, who draw down souls, and proceed to the most partial and material form of energy. Others again are denominated by them heroic, who lead human souls on high through love, and who are the suppliers of an intellectual life, of magnitude of operation, and magnitude of wisdom. In short, they are allotted a converse order and providence, and an alliance to a divine intellect, to which they also convert secondary natures. Hence they are allotted this appellation as being able to *raise* and *extend* souls to the gods (ὡς αἰρῆιν καὶ ἀναστεινῆιν τὰς ψυχὰς ἐπὶ θεοὺς δυναμένους). These triple genera posterior to, are indeed always suspended from the gods, but they are divided from each other. And some of them are essentially intellectual; others are essentialized in rational souls; and others subsist in irrational and phantastic lives. It is also evident, that such of them as are intellectual, are allotted a prudence transcending that of human nature, and which is eternally conjoined with the objects of their intellection. But such of them as are rational, energize discursively according to prudence: and the irrational kind are destitute of prudence; for they dwell in matter, and the darkest parts of the universe. They also bind souls to shadow-producing forms (καὶ συνδῆι τὰς ψυχὰς τοῖς εἰδωλοποιῖς καλποῖς), and strangle such as are brought into that region, until they have suffered the punishment which is their due. These three genera, therefore, which are more excellent than us, Socrates now calls dæmons. But if he displeases the

material tribe of dæmons by this etymology, you must not wonder. For the etymology is transcendent, and perhaps το μερίζω is παραι το δαίω, as rejoicing in division.

That the hyparxis of the more excellent genera being triple, viz. intellectual, logical, phantastic, the golden* age is analogous to the intellectual genus. For gold, as theologists say is referred to the first of the worlds, the empyrean † and intellectual. But the silver age is analogous to the rational genus: for silver is referred to the middle and ethereal world. And the brazen age is analogous to the irrational and phantastic genus. For the phantasy is a figured, but not a pure intellect; just as brass appears to have the colour of gold, but possesses much of the terrestrial and resisting, and a great alliance with things solid and sensible. Hence this age is analogous to the solid and brazen heaven, or, in other words, to the sensible world, the proximate demiurgus‡ of which is represented as fabricating it from brass. But the fourth and heroic genus, is subordinate to some of those natures who belong to the above-mentioned three genera, but is superior to others. For the heroic genus touches upon action, and a providential attention to secondary natures, and is inferior to a life which is void of habitude. But it possesses magnitude of operation, and exhibits the magnificence of its proper virtue. And the fifth and very passive human age, is that which is assimilated to much-laboured and black iron, through the material and dark condition of its life. It also exhibits erroneous actions, and such as are distorted and irrational.

That Plato now speculates § about dæmons and heroes, not those which subsist according to habitude, but those which are beyond our essence. He recurs however, through analogy, from those which subsist according to habitude, to those of a more elevated order. But he passes by the material genus of dæmons.

That in the ancient tongue *dæmons* were called *damons*, is evident from *a* being then used instead of *αι* ||.

* See p. 510.

† According to the Chaldeans there are seven worlds, one empyrean and the first; after this three ethereal; and then three material worlds, which consist of the innerratic sphere, the seven planetary spheres, and the sublunary region. This last is called by them the *hater of life*, containing likewise in itself matter, which they call a profundity.

‡ Viz. Vulcan.

§ See p. 510.

|| Οτι το εν τη αρχή φωνη τους δαίμονας, δαμονας λεγέσθαι, δηλοι οτι τω α, αντι της αι εχρωστο.

That

That syllables and letters appear to have the relation of essence in names, but acute and grave accents are certain powers of names.

That the intellect in us is Dionysiacal, and is the true image of Bacchus. He therefore who acts erroneously with respect to it, and Titannically divulges its impartible nature through manifold falsehood, certainly sins against Bacchus himself, and more than those who sin against the external statues of the god, because intellect is more than any thing else allied to the gods.

That we are more able to understand the more total genera of the gods, than such as are more partial. For in the leading and ruling gods, we can obtain a clearer knowledge of that which is total in their subsistence, and extends to all things, than in the liberated order of gods. And we more easily learn that the mighty Jupiter is the supplier of life to all things, and that he is the demiurgus, than we learn the nature of that Jupiter who imparts life to things celestial alone. And that there is one whole demiurgus is evident to all; but that there are three demiurgi more partial than this, it is difficult to understand.

That each of the gods, so far as he knows himself, and all the other divine genera, and participates of all things, and is bounded according to his proper hyparxis, so far he gives subsistence to divine names which are to us unknown and ineffable; since all intellectual and divine natures subsist in us psychically. But if conceptions do not subsist in the soul coordinately to intellect, but after the manner of an image, and in subjection, much more must the soul become perfectly giddy in energizing intellectually about the gods. For it can only receive conceptions about the essence and the nomination of divinity, after the manner of an image (*εικονικως*).

That as he who supplies all mundane light from himself is called the sun, so the divinity who supplies truth from himself is called Apollo.

That according to the analogous of essences and knowledges in the gods, angels, daemons, and souls, the mutation also of divine names subsists. For the more subordinate natures of daemons, or heroes, or souls, do not call the gods and themselves in a superior and more intellectual manner, as angels do. "Youths celebrate Vesta as the oldest of the gods,"

Προΐστατην δὲ θεῶν ἐστὶν ἀνελδοῦσατε κοῦρον.

For in prayers they are called upon to celebrate Vesta * before the other gods.

* See p. 515.

That Saturn, in conjunction with Rhea, produced Vesta and Juno, who are coordinate to the demiurgic causes. For Vesta imparts from herself to the gods an uninclining permanency, and seat in themselves, and an indissoluble essence. But Juno imparts progression, and a multiplication into things secondary. She is also the vivifying fountain of wholes, and the mother of prolific powers; and on this account she is said to have proceeded together with Jupiter the demiurgus; and through this communion she generates maternally, such things as Jupiter generates paternally. But Vesta abides in herself, possessing an undefiled virginity, and being the cause of sameness to all things. Each of these divinities however, together with her own proper perfection, possesses, according to participation, the power of the other. Hence, some say that Vesta is denominated from essence (*απο της ουσίας*), looking to her proper hyparxis. But others looking to her vivific and motive power, which she derives from Juno, say that she is thus denominated, *ως ωσείως ουσίαν αἰτίας*, as being the cause of impulsion. For all divine natures are in all, and particularly such as are coordinate with each other, participate of, and subsist in each other. Each therefore of the demiurgic and vivific orders, participates the form by which it is characterized, from Vesta. The orbs of the planets likewise possess the sameness of their revolutions from her; and the poles and centres are always allotted from her their rest.

That Vesta does not manifest essence, but the abiding and firm establishment of essence in itself; and hence this goddess proceeds into light after the mighty Saturn. For the divinities prior to Saturn have not a subsistence in themselves and in another*, but this originates from Saturn. And a subsistence in *self* is the idiom of Vesta, but in *another* of Juno.

That the theology of Hesiod from the monad Rhea produces, according to things which are more excellent in the coordination, Vesta; but, according to those which are subordinate, Juno; and according to those which subsist between, Ceres. But according to Orpheus, Ceres is in a certain respect the same with the whole of vivification, and in a certain respect is not the same. For on high she is Rhea, but below, in conjunction with Jupiter, she is Ceres: for here the things begotten are similar to the begetters, and are nearly the same.

* See this explained in the notes on the Parmenides.

That we ought to receive with caution what is now * said concerning effluxions and motions. For Socrates does not descend to the material flowing of Heraclitus; for this is false†, and unworthy the dianoëtic conceptions of Plato. But since it is lawful to interpret things divine analogously, through appropriate images, Socrates very properly assimilates fontal and Saturnian deities to streams; in so doing jesting, and at the same time acting seriously, because good is always derived, as it were, in streams from on high, to things below. Hence, according to the image of rivers, after the fontal deities, who eternally devolve streams of good, the deities, who subsist as principles, are celebrated. For after the *fountain* of a river, the place where it *begins* to flow is surveyed.

That those divinities who are peculiarly denominated total intellectual gods, of whom the great Saturn is the father, are properly called fontal. For “from him leap forth the implacable thunders,” says the Oracle concerning Saturn. But concerning the vivific fountain Rhea, from which all life, divine, intellectual, psychical, and mundane, is generated, the Chaldaean Oracles thus speak :

Ρῆι τῶν νοερῶν μακαρῶν πηγὴ τε ροή.

Πάντων γὰρ πρώτη δυνάμεις κολποῖσιν ἀφραστοῖς

Δεξαμένη, γένεσιν ἐπὶ πᾶσι προχέει τροχῶσάν.

i. e. “Rhea § is the fountain and river of the blessed intellectual gods. For first receiving the powers of all things in her ineffable bosoms, she pours running generation into every thing.”

For this divinity gives subsistence to the infinite diffusion of all life, and to all never-failing powers. She likewise moves all things according to the measures of divine motions, and converts them to herself; establishing all things in herself, as being coordinate to Saturn. Rhea therefore is so called from causing a perpetual influx of good, and through being the cause of divine *facility*, since the life of the gods is attended with ease (Θεοὶ βεῖα ζῶντες).

* See p. 517.

† That is to say, it is false to assert of intellectual and divine natures, that they are in a perpetual flux; for they are eternally stable themselves, and are sources of stability to other things.

§ Gesner, misled by Patricius, has inserted these lines among the Orphic fragments, in his edition of the works of Orpheus.

That

That Ocean * is the cause to all the gods of acute and vigorous energy, and bounds the separations of the first, middle, and last orders; converting himself to himself, and to his proper principles, through swiftness of intellect, but moving all things from himself, to energies accommodated to their natures; perfecting their powers, and causing them to have a never-failing subsistence. But Tethys imparts permanency to the natures which are moved by Ocean, and stability to the beings which are excited by him to the generation of secondary natures. She is also the source of purity of essence to those beings who perpetually desire to produce all things: as sustaining every thing in the divine essences which, as it were, *leaps forth* and *percolates*. For each of first causes, though it imparts to secondary natures a participation of good, yet, at the same time, retains with itself that which is undefiled, unmingled, and pure from participation. Thus, for instance, intellect is filled with life, being, and intelligence, with which also it fills soul; but establishing in itself that which in each of these is genuine and exempt, it also illuminates from itself to beings of a subordinate rank, inferior measures of these goods. And vigour of energy indeed is present with more ancient natures, through Ocean; but the leaping forth and percolating through Tethys. For every thing which is imparted from superior to subordinate natures, whether it be essence, life, or intelligence, is *percolated*. And such of these as are primary, are established in themselves; but such as are more imperfect, are transferred to things of a subject order. Just as with respect to streams of water, such of them as are nearer their source are purer, but the more remote are more turbid. Both Ocean and Tethys therefore are fountal gods, according to their first subsistence. Hence Socrates now calls them the fathers of streams. But they also proceed into other orders of gods, exhibiting the same powers among the gods who rank as principles or rulers, among those of a liberated, and those of a celestial characteristic; and appropriately in each of these. Timæus however celebrates their sublunary orders, calling them fathers of Saturn and Rhea, but the progeny of Heaven and Earth. But their last processions are their divisible allotments about the earth; both those which are apparent on its surface, and those which, under the earth, separate the kingdom of Hades from the dominion of Neptune.

* See p. 517.

That Saturn is conjoined both to Rhea and Jupiter, but to the former as father to prolific power, and to the latter, as father to intelligible * intellect.

That Ocean is said to have married Tethys, and Jupiter Juno, and the like, as establishing a communion with her, conformably to the generation of subordinate natures. For an according coarrangement of the gods, and a connascent cooperation in their productions, is called by theologists *marriage*.

That Tethys is denominated from *leaping forth* and *straining* or *cleansing*, being as it were *Diatethys*, and by taking away the first two syllables, *Tethys* †.

That Saturn is the monad of the Titanic order of the gods, but Jupiter of the demiurgic. This last divinity however is two-fold, the one exempt and coordinated with Saturn, being a fontal god, and, in short, ranking with the intellectual fathers, and convolving the extremity of them; but the other being connumerated with the sons of Saturn, and allotted a Saturnian summit and dominion in this triad; concerning which also the Homeric Neptune says,

Τρεῖς γὰρ τ' ἐκ Κρονου εἰμεν ἀδελφοὶ οὓς τέκε Ρειή†.

As brother gods we three from Saturn came,
And Rhea bore us.

And the first Jupiter indeed, as being the demiurgus of wholes, is the king of things first, middle, and last, concerning whom Socrates also had just said, that he is the ruler and king of all things; and life and salvation are imparted to all things through him. But the ruling Jupiter, who ranks as a principle, and who is coordinate with the three sons of Saturn, governs the third part of the whole of things, according to that of Homer

Τριχθα δὲ πάντα δεδασται §.

A triple distribution all things own.

He is also the summit of the three, has the same name with the fontal Jupiter, is

* Proclus here means that there is the same analogy between Saturn, Rhea, and Jupiter, as in the intelligible triad, between father, power, and intellect.

† Οτι ὠνομασται ἡ Τηθύς παρὰ τὸ διαττομενον καὶ τήνυμενον, οἷον Διαττήδης, καὶ ἀφαιρήσει των πρώτων δυσσλλαζων Τηθύς.

‡ Iliad xv. ver. 187.

§ Ibid. 189.

VOL. V.

4 U

united

united to him, and is monadically called Jupiter. But the second is called, dyadically, marine Jupiter and Neptune. And the third is triadically denominated, terrestrial Jupiter, Pluto and Hades. The first of these also preserves, fabricates, and vivifies summits, but the second, things of a second rank, and the third those of a third order. Hence this last is said to have ravished Proserpine, that together with her he might animate the extremities of the universe.

That the Titanic order dividing itself from the connecting order of Heaven, but having also something in itself abiding, and connascent with that order, Saturn is the leader of the separation, and on this account he both arms others against his father, and receives the scythe * from his mother, through which he divides his own kingdom from that of Heaven. But Ocean is coordinated with those that abide † in the manners of the father, and guards the middle of the two orders; so far as a Titan being connumerated with the gods that subsist with Saturn; but so far as rejoicing in a coordination with Heaven conjoining himself with the Synoches. For it is fit that he who bounds the first and second orders, should be arranged in the middle of the natures that are bounded. But every where this god is allotted a power of this kind, and separates the genera of the gods, the Titanic from the connecting (των συνεχικων), and the vivific from the demiurgic. Whence also antient rumour calls Ocean the god who separates the apparent part of Heaven from the unapparent; and on this

* See the Theogony of Hesiod, v. 176, &c.

† Proclus here alludes to the following Orphic verses cited by him in his Commentary on the Timæus, lib. v. p. 296.

Βαθ' οὖν τ' ὠκεανὸς μὲν, ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν ἐμμένει
 Ὀφειλόντων ποτέρῳσε νόον τραποί, ἢ πατέρα
 Ὀν γυνῶν τε βίης, καὶ ἀτασθαλίᾳ δαΐσασαίτο
 Σὺν κρείνῃ, πρὸ' ἀλλοῖς ἀδελφοῖς, οἱ πεπιθόντο
 Μητρὶ φίλῃ, ἢ τοὺς γε λήπων, μένει ἐνδὸν ἐκλήδος
 Πλάττει δὲ πορφύρων, μέλει παῖδες ἐν μεγάροισι
 Σκυζόμενος τῇ μητρὶ, κασιγνήτοισι δὲ μάλλον.

i. e. "But Ocean remained within the ample house, considering how he should act, whether he should deprive his father of his strength, and basely injure him, together with Saturn and the rest of his brethren, who were obedient to their dear mother; or, whether leaving these, he should stay quietly at home. After much deliberation, he remained quietly at home, being angry with his mother, but more so with his brothers."

account

account poets say, that the sun and the other stars rise from the ocean. What is now said, therefore, by Plato, comprehends all the Titannic order through these two conjunctions; this order abiding and at the same time proceeding. And through the Saturnian order indeed, it comprehends every thing separated from the fathers; but through that of Ocean, every thing conjoined with the connecting gods. Or, if you had rather so speak, through the Saturnian order, he comprehends every maternal cause, but through the other, every thing subservient to the paternal cause. For the female is the cause of progression and separation, but the male of union and stable permanency.

That of the demiurgic triad* which divides the whole world, and distributes the indivisible, one, and whole fabrication of the first Jupiter, the summit, and which has the relation of father, is Jupiter, who through union with the whole demiurgic intellect, having the same appellation with it, is for this reason not mentioned here by Plato. But Neptune† is allotted the middle, and that which binds together both the extremes; being filled indeed from the essence of Jupiter, but filling Pluto. For of the whole of this triad, Jupiter indeed is the father, but Neptune the power, and Pluto the intellect. And all indeed are in all; but each receives a different character of subsistence. Thus Jupiter subsists according to *being*; but Neptune according to *power*, and Pluto according to *intellect*. And though all these divinities are the causes of the life of all things, yet one is so *essentially*, another *vitally*, and another *intellectually*. Whence also the theologist Orpheus says, that the extremes fabricate in conjunction with Proserpine things first and last; the middle being coarranged with generative cause from his own allotment, without Proserpine. Hence *violence* is said to have been offered to Proserpine by Jupiter; but she is said to have been *ravished* by Pluto (διο και φασι την κορην υπο μεν του διος βιαζεσθαι, υπο δε του πλουτωνος αρπαζεσθαι). But the middle is said to be the cause of motion to all things. Hence also, he is called *earth-shaker*, as being the origin of motion. And among those who are allotted the kingdom of Saturn, the middle allotment, and the agile sea (η ευκληνης θαλασσα) are assigned to him. According to every division, therefore, the summits are

* That is, of the first triad of the supermundane, which subsists immediately after the intellectual order.

† See p. 518.

Jovian, the middles belong to Neptune, and the extremes to Pluto. And, if you look to the centres, such as the east, that of mid-heaven, and the west; if also you divide the whole world, as for instance into the inerratic, planetary, and sublunary spheres; or again, if you divide that which is generated into the fiery, terrestrial, and that which subsists between; or the earth into its summits, middle and hollow, and subterranean parts, this triad every where distributes the first, middle, and last differences of things fabricated in demiurgic boundaries.

That the name Neptune is now triply analyzed. For Neptune is the trident-bearer, and the Tritons and Amphitrite are the familiars of this god. And the first analyzation of his name is from the allotment over which he presides, and from souls coming into generation, in whom the circle of fames is fettered; since the sea is analogous to generation. But the second is from communion with the first:

*Ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς πρότερος γέγονει, καὶ πλείων ᾔδει **.

But Jove was born the first, and more he knew.

For a Jupiter of this kind, is the proximate intelligible of Neptune. But the third analysis of his name, is from his energy in externals. For he is motive of nature, and vivific of things last. He is also the guardian of the earth, and excites it to generations.

That Neptune is an intellectual demiurgic god, who receives souls descending into generation; but Hades is an intellectual demiurgic god, who frees souls from generation. For as our whole period receives a triple division, into a life prior to generation, which is Jovian, into a life in generation which is Neptunian, and into a life posterior to generation which is Plutonian; Pluto, who is characterized by intellect, very properly converts ends to beginnings, effecting a circle without a beginning, and without an end, not only in souls, but also in every fabrication of bodies, and, in short, of all periods;—which circle also he perpetually convolves. Thus, for instance, he converts the ends to the beginnings of the souls of the stars, and the convolutions of souls about generation, and the like. And hence Jupiter is the guardian of the life of souls prior to generation.

* Hom. Iliad.

That some badly analyze the name of Pluto into wealth from the earth, through fruits and metals; but Hades into the invifible, dark, and dreadful. Thefe Socrates now reprobates*, bringing the two names to the fame fignification; referring the name of Pluto, as intellect, to the wealth of prudence, but that of Hades to an intellect knowing all things. For this god is a fophift, who purifying fouls after death, frees them from generation. For Hades is not, as fome improperly explain it, evil: for neither is death evil; though Hades to fome appears to be attended with peturbations (*εμπάως*); but it is invifible, and better than the apparent; fuch as is every thing intelligible. Intellect, therefore, in every triad of beings, convolves itfelf to being, and the paternal caufe, imitating in its energy the circle.

That men who are lovers of body, badly refer to themfelves the paffions of the animated nature, and on this account confider death to be dreadful, as being the caufe of corruption. The truth however is, that it is much better for man to die, and live in Hades a life according to nature, fince a life in conjunction with body is contrary to nature, and is an impediment to intellectual energy. Hence it is neceffary to divest ourfelves of the flefhy garments with which we are clothed, as Ulyffes did his ragged veftments, and no longer like a wretched mendicant, together with the indigence of body, put on our rags. For as the Chaldaean oracle fays, “ Things divine cannot be obtained by thofe whofe intellectual eye is directed to body; but thofe only can arrive at the poffeffion of them, who, ftript of their garments, haften to the fummit.”

That Plato contemplates defire †, according to each part of the foul. For the irafcible part afpires after honour or victory, and the rational after virtue. In like manner he wifhes to furvey confidence, good hope, pleafure, and the contraries of thefe, about each part of the foul.

That with the love and will of the gods, the neceffity which is with them concurs, againft which no god contends.

That the divine Plato knew that there are three kinds of Sirens ‡: the *celestial*, which is under the government of Jupiter; *that which is productive of generation* (*γενεσιουργον*), and is under the government of Neptune; and that which is *catbartic*, and is under the government of Pluto. It is common to all thefe, to incline all things through an

* See p. 518.

† Ibid. 519.

‡ Ibid. 520.

harmonic motion to their ruling gods. Hence, when the soul is in the Heavens, the Sirens are desirous of uniting it to the divine life which flourishes there. But it is proper that souls living in generation should sail beyond them, like the Homeric Ulysses, that they may not be allured by generation, of which the sea is an image. And when souls are in Hades, the Sirens are desirous of uniting them through intellectual conceptions to Pluto. So that Plato knew that in the kingdom of Hades there are gods, dæmons, and souls, who dance as it were round Pluto, allured by the Sirens that dwell there.

That Plato knew how to attribute the name *sophist** to a venerable thing: for he thus denominates him who is able to convert other things to himself, such as Jupiter, Hades, and Love.

That not all souls, after being liberated from the body, are thought worthy to associate with Pluto, but such only as are of superior worth: for those that are more corporeal are liberated from vice, by certain cathartic dæmons or angels, laboriously, and accompanied with pain.

That the demiurgic Jupiter, and who is also the ruler of all the demiurgi, wishing to suspend all the series of fabricators from the Titannic series, is very properly said to bind Saturn, as being converted to this divinity, and depending from him; and as surveying the length and breadth of the Saturnian place of survey (*πειρωπη*), and establishing in a Jovian manner Saturn in himself. Jupiter therefore binds Saturn in himself firmly and stably; and Jupiter is in a similar manner bound in Saturn.

That the ascent of the soul is two-fold †; the one according to an elevation to true being, and a purification from things connascent with generation, which the bonds of Pluto afford after death; but the other according to the soul having now arrived at the intelligible, through the purification of Hades, and revolving according to the life and transiſion of intelleſtions which are there, and which the bonds of Saturn effect through a conjunction with Jupiter. For the soul, placing as it were a vestige of her feet in the intelligible, passes through the extent of intelligibles which is there, and

* See p. 520.

† That is, the ascent of the soul may either be considered as taking place while she is ascending to true being, or as that superior energy which she exerts after she has ascended.

surveys those blessed spectacles, as Socrates teaches us in the *Phædrus*. And this is a posterior ascent, greater and more perfect than the former. Not only the bonds of Hades therefore are incapable of holding and elevating to the dominion of Jupiter, souls that are astonished about body, but neither can the bonds of Saturn effect this, though these as being of the father are evidently stronger.

That Neptune when compared with Jupiter is said to know *many* things; but Hades compared with souls to whom he imparts knowledge is said to know *all* things; though Neptune is more total than Hades.

That as it is necessary to analyze Pluto, not only into the obvious wealth from the earth, but also into the wealth of wisdom, so likewise Ceres must be analyzed not only into corporeal nutriment; but, beginning from the gods themselves, it is requisite to conceive her to be the supplier of aliment, first to the gods themselves, afterwards to the natures posterior to the gods; and, in the last place, that the series of this beneficent energy extends as far as to corporeal nutriment. For the characteristic of love shines forth first of all in the gods: and this is the case with the medicinal and prophetic powers of Apollo, and with those of every other divinity. But nutriment, when considered with reference to the gods, is the communication of intellectual plenitude from more exalted natures to those of an inferior rank. Gods therefore are nourished, when they view with the eye of intellect gods prior to themselves; and when they are perfected and view intelligible beauties, such as justice itself, temperance itself, and the like, as it is said in the *Phædrus*.

That the design of the great Plato, in the *Cratylus*, is not to celebrate the first, middle, and last orders of the gods, but only those idioms which are apparent in their names.

That, according to Orpheus, Ceres is the same with Rhea: for Orpheus says, that subsisting on high in unproceeding union with Saturn, she is *Rhea*, but that by emitting and generating Jupiter, she is *Ceres*. For thus he speaks,

Ρεινη το πριν εουσσαν, επει διος επλετο μητηρ
Γεγονε δημητηρ*.

i. e: The goddess who was *Rhea*, when she bore
Jove, became *Ceres*.

* This Orphic fragment is not to be found in Gesner's collection of the Orphic remains.

But

But Hesiod says that Ceres is the daughter of Rhea. It is however evident, that these theologists harmonize: for whether this goddess proceeds from union with Saturn to a secondary order, or whether she is the first progeny of Rhea, she is still the same. Ceres therefore thus subsisting, and receiving the most antient and ruling order from the whole vivific Rhea (της ολης ζωογονου ρεας), and comprehending the middle centres of whole vivification (της ολης ζωογονιας), she fills all supermundane natures with the rivers of all perfect life, pouring upon all things vitally, indivisibly, and uniformly.

Prior however to all this, she unfolds to us the demiurgic intellect (Jupiter), and imparts to him the power of vivifying wholes: for, as Saturn supplies her from on high with the cause of being; so Ceres from on high, and from her own prolific bosoms, pours forth vivification to the demiurgus. But possessing herself the middle of all vivific deity, she governs the whole fountains which she contains, and comprehends the one bond of the first and last powers of life. She stably convolves too, and contains all secondary fountains. But she leads forth the uniform causes of prior natures to the generation of others. This goddess too comprehends *Vesta* and *Juno*: in her right hand parts *Juno*, who pours forth the whole order of souls; but in her left hand parts *Vesta*, who leads forth all the light of virtue. Hence, Ceres is with great propriety called by Plato *, *mother*, and at the same time the *supplier of aliment*: for, so far as she comprehends in herself the cause of *Juno*, she is a mother; but as containing *Vesta* in her essence, she is the supplier of aliment. But the paradigm of this goddess is *Night*: for *immortal Night is called the nurse of the gods*. Night however is the cause of aliment intelligibly †: for that which is intelligible is, according to the Oracle ‡, the aliment of the intellectual orders of gods. But Ceres first of all separates the two kinds of aliment in the gods, as Orpheus says:

Μησατο γαρ προπαλους, και αμφιπελους, και επαδους*

Μησατο δ' αμβροσιην, και ερυθρου νεκταρος αλτρον

Μησατο δ' αγλαα εργα μελυσσωνι ερβομεων §.

* See page 521.

† Because Night subsists at the summit of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual order, and is wholly absorbed in the intelligible.

‡ That is, according to one of the Chaldaean Oracles.

§ These verses likewise are not in Gesner's collection.

- i. e. She cares for pow'rs ministrant, whether they
 Or gods *precede*, or *follow*, or *surround* :
Ambrosia, and *tenacious nectar red*,
 Are too the objects of her bounteous care.
 Laft to the bee her providence extends,
 Who gathers honey with refounding hum.

Ceres, therefore, our sovereign mistress (*δεσποινῶς*) not only generates life, but that which gives perfection to life; and this from supernal natures to such as are last: *for virtue is the perfection of souls*. Hence mothers, who are connected with the circulations of time, bring forth their offspring in imitation of this two-fold and eternal generation of Ceres. For, at the same time that they send forth their young into the light, they extend to them milk naturally produced as their food.

That the conjunction of the demiurgic intellect with the vivific causes is triple: for it is conjoined with the fountains prior to itself; is present with its kindred coordinate natures; and coenergizes with the orders posterior to itself. For it is present with the mother prior to itself, *convertively* (*ἐπιστρέπτικως*); with Proserpine posterior to itself, *providentially* (*προνοητικως*); and with Juno coordinate to itself with an *amatory energy* (*ἐρασμως*). Hence Jupiter is said to be enamoured of Juno,

Ὡς σὺ νῦν ἐράμαι *——

As now I love thee——

And this love indeed is legal, but the other two appear to be illegal. This goddess, therefore, produces from herself, in conjunction with the demiurgus and father, all the genera of souls, the supermundane and mundane, the celestial and sublunary, the divine, angelic, dæmoniacal, and partial. After a certain manner too, she is divided from the demiurgus, but in a certain respect she is united to him: for Jupiter is said, in the Philebus, to contain a royal intellect and a royal soul. For he contains uniformly the paternal and maternal cause of the world; and the fountain of souls is said to be in Jupiter; just as again the intelligence of Jupiter is said to be first participated by Juno. For no other divinity, says Jupiter in Homer, knows my mind prior to Juno. Through

* Iliad. xiv. ver. 328.

this ineffable union, therefore, of these divinities, the world participates of intellectual souls. They also give subsistence to intellects who are carried in souls, and who together with them give completion to the whole fabrication of things.

That the series of our sovereign mistress Juno* beginning from on high pervades to the last of things; and her allotment in the sublunary region is the air. For *air* is a symbol of *soul*, according to which also soul is called a *spirit* (πνευμα); just as *fire* is an image of *intellect*, but *water* of *nature*, by which the world is nourished (της κοσμοτροφου φύσεως); and through which all nutriment and increase are produced. But *earth* is the image of *body*, through its gross and material nature. Hence Homer, obscurely signifying this, represents Juno suspended with two anvils under her feet: for the air is allotted two heavy elements beneath itself. For

Ἥλην δ' ἀκαμπτα βωπις ποτνια ἤη
Πεμψεν ἐπ' ὀκεανοιο ποταῖς—†

i. e. "Fair-eyed venerable Juno sent the sun to the streams of the ocean,"—is from the same conception: for he calls the thick cloud produced by Juno, the setting of the sun. The assertion likewise that the end of this name will be conjoined with the beginning, if any one frequently repeats the name of the goddess, evinces the conversion of rational souls to her which proceed from her; and that voice is struck air. On this account also the voice of rational animals is especially dedicated to this goddess, who made the horse of Achilles to become vocal. But Socrates now delivers these three vivific monads in a consequent order; viz. Ceres, Juno, Proserpine; calling the first the mother, the second the sister, and the third the daughter of the demiurgus. All of them however are partakers of the whole of fabrication; the first in an exempt manner and intellectually; the second in a fontal manner and at the same time in a way adapted to a principle (αρχικως); and the third in a manner adapted to a principle and leader (αρχικως και ηγεμονικως).

Of these goddesses the last is allotted triple powers, and impartibly and uniformly comprehends three monads of gods. But she is called Core (καρη) through the purity of her essence, and her undefiled transcendence in her generations. She also possesses a first, middle, and last empire. And according to her summit indeed she is called Diana by

* See p. 521.

† Iliad. xviii. ver. 240.

Orpheus; but according to her middle, Proserpine; and according to the extremity of the order, Minerva. Likewise, according to an hyparxis transcending the other powers of this triple vivific order, the dominion of Hecate is established; but according to a middle power, and which is generative of wholes, that of Soul; and according to intellectual conversion, that of Virtue*. Core, therefore, subsisting on high, and among the supermundane gods, uniformly extends this triple order of divinities; and together with Jupiter generates Bacchus, who impartibly presides over partible fabrication. But beneath, in conjunction with Pluto, she is particularly beheld according to the middle idiom: for it is this which, proceeding every where, imparts vivification to the last of things. Hence she is called Proserpine, because she especially associates with Pluto, and together with him orderly distributes the extremities of the universe.^o And according to her extremities indeed she is said to be a virgin, and to remain undefiled; but according to her middle, to be conjoined with Hades, and to beget the Furies in the subterranean regions. She therefore is also called Core, but after another manner than the supermundane and ruling Core. For the one is the connective unity of the three vivific principles; but the other is the middle of them, in herself possessing the idioms of the extremes. Hence in the Proserpine conjoined with Pluto you will find the idioms of Hecate and Minerva; but these extremes subsist in her occultly, while the idiom of the middle shines forth, and that which is characteristic of ruling soul, which in the supermundane Core was of a *ruling*† nature, but here subsists according to a mundane idiom.

That a lover of piety to the gods ought earnestly to embrace the rectitude of divine names, lest, like those who err concerning Proserpine and Apollo, being ignorant of the analysis of names, he should be subject to the same reproof from Socrates.

That Proserpine is denominated either through judging of forms and separating them from each other, thus obscurely signifying the ablation of slaughter (*δια το κρῖναι τὰ εἶδη καὶ χωρίζειν ἀλλήλων, ὡς τοῦ φόνου τὴν ἀναίρεσιν ἀνιπτομένον*), or through separating souls perfectly from bodies, through a conversion to things on high, which is the most fortu-

* Proclus says this conformably to the theology of the Chaldeans: for he informs us in his 6th book on the Theology of Plato, p. 372, that, according to that theology, the first monad of the vivific triad is *Hecate*, the second *Soul*, and the third *Virtue*.

† That is, of a supermundane nature: for the *ruling* are the *supermundane* gods.

nate slaughter and death, to such as are worthy of it (η δια το χωριζειν τας ψυχας τελως εκ των σωμάτων δια της προς τα ανω επιστροφης, οπερ εστιν ευτυχιστατος φοβος και θανατος ταις αξιουμεναις ταιτου). But the name Φερεφαιττα, *Pherephatta*, according to a contact with generation, is adapted to Proserpine; but according to wisdom and counsel, to Minerva. At the same time however all the appellations by which she is distinguished are adapted to the perfection of soul. On this account also she is called Proserpine, and not by the names of the extremes; since that which was ravished by Pluto is this middle; the extremes at the same time being firmly established in themselves, according to which Core is said to remain a virgin.

That very rationally after Proserpine, Plato* now analyzes Apollo: for there is a great communion between the Coric and the Apolloniad series; since the former is the unity of the middle triad of rulers (i. e. of the supermundane gods), and emits from herself vivific powers; but the latter converts the solar principles to one union: and the solar principles are allotted a subsistence immediately after the vivific. Hence, according to Orpheus, when Ceres delivered up the government of Proserpine, she thus admonished her:

Αυταρ Απυλλωνος Σαλευρον λευχος εισαιεσα,
Τεξεται αγλαα τεκνα πυρρλεγεθοντα προσωποι†.

That is,

But next Apollo's florid bed ascend;
For thus the god fam'd offspring shall beget,
Refulgent with the beams of glowing fire.

But how could this be the case, unless there was a considerable degree of communion between these divinities?

It is necessary, however, to know thus much concerning Apollo, that, according to the first and most natural conception, his name signifies the cause of union, and that power which collects multitude into one; and this mode of speculation concerning his name harmonizes with all the orders of the god. But Socrates alone considers his more partial powers: for the multitude of the powers of Apollo are not to be

* See p. 522.

† These verses are not in Gesner's collection of the Orphic fragments.

comprehended, nor described by us. For when will man, who is merely rational, be able to comprehend not only all the idioms of Apollo, but all those of any other god? Theologists indeed deliver to us a great multitude of Apolloniæal idioms; but Socrates now only mentions four of them. For the world is as it were a decad, being filled from all productive principles, receiving all things into itself, and being converted to the proper principle of the decad, of which the tetrad proximately contains the cause, but in an exempt manner, the monad. And the former without separation and occultly, but the latter with separation; just as Apollo proximately unites the multitude of mundane natures, but the demiurgic intellect exemptly. Why then does Socrates use an order of this kind? For, beginning from the *medicinal* power of the god, and proceeding through his *prophetic* and *arrow-darting* powers, he ends in his *harmonic* power. We reply, that all the energies of this god are in all the orders of beings, beginning from on high and proceeding as far as to the last of things; but different energies appear to have more or less dominion in different orders. Thus, for instance, the *medicinal* power of Apollo is most apparent in the sublynnary region; for

There slaughter, rage, and countless ills beside,
Disease, decay, and rottenness reside*.

And as these are moved in an inordinate manner, they require to be restored from a condition contrary, into one agreeable to nature, and from incommensuration and manifold division, into symmetry and union.

But the *prophetic* energy of the god is most apparent in the heavens; for there his enunciative power shines forth, unfolding intelligible good to celestial natures, and on this account he revolves together with the sun, with whom he participates the same intellect in common; since the sun also illuminates whatever the heavens contain, and extends a unifying power to all their parts. But his *arrow-darting* energy mostly prevails among the *liberated* † gods; for there, ruling over the wholes which the universe

* These lines are from Empedocles, and in the original are as follow :

Εὐλα κτος τε φονος τε ηαι ἄλλων εὐνεια κηρην,
Αὐχμηραι τε ἰουσι, καὶ σφεις, ἐργα τε βρυστεα.

† For an account of this order of gods, see the notes on the Parmenides.

contains, he excites their motions by his rays, which are always assimilated to arrows, extirpates every thing inordinate, and fills all things with demiurgic gifts. And though he has a separate and exempt subsistence; he reaches all things by his energies.

Again, his *harmonic* power is more predominant in the *ruling supermundane order*; for it is this divinity who, harmonizing the universe, establishes about himself according to one union the choir of the Muses, and produces by this mean, as a certain theurgist says, “*the harmony of exulting light*.” Apollo therefore, as we have shown, is *harmonic*, and this is likewise the case with the other Apollos * which are contained in the earth and the other spheres; but this power appears in some places more, and in others less. These powers too subsist in the god himself in an united manner, and exempt from other natures, but in those attendants of the gods who are superior to us, divisibly, and according to participation; for there is a great multitude of medicinal, prophetic, harmonic, and arrow-darting angels, dæmons, and heroes, suspended from Apollo, who distribute in a partial manner the uniform powers of the god.

But it is necessary to consider each of these powers according to one definite characteristic; as, for instance, his *harmonic* power, according to its binding together separated multitude; his *prophetic* power, according to the enunciative; his *arrow-darting* power, according to its being subvertive of an inordinate nature; and his *medicinal* power, according to its perfective energy. We should likewise speculate these characteristics differently in gods, angels, dæmons, heroes, men, animals, and plants; for the powers of the gods extend from on high to the last of things, and at the same time appear in an accommodated manner in each; and the telestic (i. e. mystic) art endeavours through sympathy to conjoin these ultimate participants with the gods. But in all these orders we must carefully observe, that this god is the cause of union to multiplied natures: for his *medicinal* power, which takes away the *multiform* nature of disease, imparts *uniform* health; since health is symmetry and a subsistence according to nature, but that which is contrary to nature is multifarious. Thus too, his *prophetic* power, which unfolds the simplicity of truth, takes away the variety of that which is false; but his *arrow-darting* power, which exterminates every thing furious and wild, but prepares that which is or-

* See the Introduction to the *Timæus*.

derly and gentle to exercise dominion, vindicates to itself unity, and exterminates a disorderly nature tending to multitude; and his *musical* power, through rhythm and harmony, places a bond, friendship, and union in *wholes*, and subdues the contraries to these.

And all these powers indeed subsist primarily, in an exempt manner, and uniformly in Jupiter the demiurgus of wholes, but secondarily and separately in Apollo. Hence Apollo is not the same with the demiurgic intellect; for this comprehends these powers totally and paternally, but Apollo with subjection, imitating his father; since all the energies and powers of secondary gods are comprehended in the demiurgus according to cause. And the demiurgus fabricates and adorns the universe according to all these powers, and in a collected manner; but the other deities which proceed from him cooperate with their father according to different powers.

That purification being seen not only in the medicinal, but also in the prophetic art, evinces, that the cathartic power of Apollo comprehends the two powers: for it illustrates the world with the glittering splendors of light, and purifies all material immoderation by Pæonian energies; which physicians and prophets among us imitating, the former purify bodies, and the latter through sulphureous preparations render themselves and their associates pure. For, as Timæus says, the gods purify the universe, either by fire or water; and prophets also in this respect imitate the gods. In the most sacred of the mysteries too, purifications are employed prior to initiation into them, in order to take away every thing foreign from the proposed sacred mystery. We may likewise add, that the referring multiform purifications to the one cathartic power of the gods is adapted to him. For Apollo every where unites and elevates multitude to *the one*, and uniformly comprehends all the modes of purification, purifying all heaven, generation, and all mundane lives, and separating partial souls from the grossness of matter. Hence the theurgist, who is the leader of the mysteries of this god, begins from purifications and sprinklings:

Αὐτὸς δ' ἐν πρώτοις ἱερεὺς πυρὸς ἔργα κυβερνῶν,
 Κυματὶ ρινεσθῶ παγερῷ βαρυχέτες ἀλμύης.

i. e. "The priest in the first place governing the works of fire, must sprinkle with the cold water of the loud-sounding sea," as the Oracle says concerning him. But the assertion that the god presides over simplicity according to knowledge, and unfolds

truth

truth into light, presents him to our view as analogous to *the good*, which Socrates celebrates in the Republic; in which place he calls the sun the progeny of *the good*, and says that the former is analogous to the latter. Apollo therefore being the source of union, and this to the mundane gods, is arranged analogous to *the good*; and through *truth*, he unfolds to us his similitude to it, if it be lawful so to speak. For *the simple* is a manifestation of *the one*, and the truth which subsists according to knowledge is a luminous representation of superessential truth, which first proceeds from *the good*. But *the perpetually prevailing might of the god in the jaculation of arrows*, evinces his dominion, which vanquishes every thing in the world. For on high, from the supercelestial order, he scatters the rivers of Jupiter, and pours his rays on the whole world: for his arrows obscurely signify his rays. Again, the assertion that he presides over music, represents to us that this god is the cause of all harmony, both unapparent and apparent, through his ruling supermundane powers, according to which he generates, together with Mnemosyne and Jupiter, the Muses. But he orderly disposes every thing sensible by his *demiurgic powers*, which the sons of *theurgists* denominate *hands*; since the energy of the harmony of sounds is suspended from the motion of the hands. He likewise orderly disposes souls and bodies through harmonic reasons, using their different powers as if they were sounds; and he moves all things harmoniously and rhythmically by his demiurgic motions. The whole of this celestial order too, and motion, exhibit the harmonious work of the god; on which account also partial souls are no otherwise perfected than through an harmonic similitude to the universe, and abandoning the dissonance arising from generation; for then they obtain the most excellent life, which is proposed to them by the god.

From discoursing about king Apollo, Plato proceeds to the Muses*, and the name of music: for Apollo is celebrated as Musagetes; and he indeed is a monad with respect to the harmony in the world, but the choir of the Muses is the monad of all the number of the henriad (i. e. nine). From both likewise the whole world is bound in indissoluble bonds, and is one and all-perfect, through the communications of these divinities; possessing the former through the Apolloniacal monad, but its all-perfect subsistence through the number of the Muses. For the number nine, which is generated from the first perfect number (that is 3), is, through similitude and sameness, accom-

* See p. 527.

modated to the multiform causes of the mundane order and harmony; all these causes at the same time being collected into one summit for the purpose of producing one consummate perfection. For the Muses generate the variety of reasons with which the world is replete; but Apollo comprehends in union all the multitude of these. And the Muses give subsistence to the harmony of soul; but Apollo is the leader of intellectual and impartible harmony. The Muses distribute the phenomena according to harmonical reasons; but Apollo comprehends unapparent and separate harmony. And though both give subsistence to the same things, yet the Muses effect this according to number, but Apollo according to union. And the Muses indeed distribute the unity of Apollo; but Apollo unities harmonic multitude, which he also converts and comprehends. For the multitude of the Muses proceeds from the essence of *Musagetes*, which is both separate, and subsists according to the nature of *the one*; and their number evolves the one and primary cause of the harmony of the universe.

That such being the etymology of the name of the Muses, since Plato calls philosophy the greatest music, as causing our psychical powers to be moved harmoniously, in sympathy with real beings, and in conformity to the orderly motions of the celestial orbs; and since the investigation of our own essence and that of the universe leads us to this harmony, through a conversion to ourselves and more excellent natures,—hence also we denominate the Muses from investigation. For Musagetes himself unfolds truth to souls according to one intellectual simplicity; but the Muses perfect our various energies, elevating them to an intellectual unity. For investigations have the relation of matter, with reference to the end from invention; just as multitude with respect to *the one*, and variety with respect to simplicity. We know, therefore, that the Muses impart to souls the investigation of truth, to bodies the multitude of powers, and that they are everywhere the sources of the variety of harmonies.

That Latona* is a vivific fountain comprehended in Ceres: and hence, according to the Grecian rites, she is worshipped as the same with Ceres, these rites evincing by this the union of the goddesses. But this goddess emits the whole of vivific light, illuminating the intellectual essences of the gods, and the orders of souls: and lastly, she illuminates

* See p. 527.

the whole sensible heaven, generating mundane light, and establishing the cause of this light in her offspring, Apollo and Diana; and causes all things to glitter with intellectual and vivific light. She imparts likewise to souls the consummation of virtue, and an illumination which leads them back to the intellectual port of their father (Jupiter), hastily withdrawing them from the winding paths* of matter, the entanglements of vice, and the roughness of the passage over the sea of generation. It appears to me indeed that theologists, considering this, denominated her *Λητώ*, Latona, on account of her extending to souls *smoothness* of manners, a voluntary life, and divine gentleness and ease. For to such as raise themselves to her divinity, she imparts an ineffable energy, a blameless life, gentleness of manners, serenity, and intellectual tranquillity. Whether, therefore, she is called *Leto*, from a voluntary life; for *λω* signifies *το βουλομαι*, *I am willing*; or from *το λειον*, *the smooth*; her name will perfectly evince, through both these, the powers which she possesses. For the compelled energies of the soul take place through material roughness; and the obliquity of a life in generation diminishes the soul's voluntary life. But an ascent to the gods imparts a smooth and gentle, instead of a hard and rough, and a voluntary, instead of a compelled life.

Why then is it necessary to call, as some do, Latona matter, as capable of being easily turned, and subsisting as an express resemblance of all forms, like a mirror receiving the representations of all things; and to say that she is the cause of oblivion to those that look into her? Why is it necessary to call Apollo harmony, as subsisting from Latona and Jupiter? For thus the god would be inseparable from matter, and not the cause of the harmony in the universe. It is better, therefore, to say, that Latona is not the receptacle of Apollo, but that she is the mother and fountain of all vivific light, which preserves all things by heat: but that Apollo, who is a separate divinity, is the supplier of all harmonic life, and of all those mundane reasons by which the universe is indissolubly bound. But you may say that Socrates derives her name from *Lethe*, because she peculiarly causes in souls an oblivion of evils, and of the roughness and storms in generation; of which, while the soul retains the memory, she cannot possibly establish herself in intelligibles: for memory, says Plotinus, leads to the object of memory. And as Mnemosyne excites the memory of intelligibles, so Latona imparts an oblivion of material concerns.

* Of these winding paths the *Dedalean labyrinth* is an image.

That of our sovereign mistress Diana*, Plato delivers three idioms; the undefiled, the mundane, and the anagogic. And through the first of these indeed the goddess is said to be a lover of virginity; but through the second, according to which she is perfective of works (*τελεσιουργος*), she is said to be the inspective guardian of virtue; and through the third she is said to hate the impulses arising from generation. Of these three likewise, the first is especially adapted to the progression of the goddess, according to which she is allotted an *hyparxis* in the vivific triad of the supermundane gods; whether we call this deity Hecatic, as theurgists say, or Diana with Orpheus. For there being established, she is filled with undefiled powers from the gods called *Amiliati*†. But she looks to the fountain of virtue, and embraces its virginity. For the virginity which is there does not proceed forth, as the Oracle says, but abiding gives subsistence to Diana, and to supermundane virtue, and is exempt from all communion, conjunction, and progression, according to generation. Hence Core also, according to the Diana and Minerva which she contains, is said to remain a virgin; but according to the prolific power of Proserpine, she is said to proceed forth, and to be conjoined with the third demiurgus, and to bring forth, as Orpheus says, “nine azure-eyed, flower-producing daughters,”

Εἴνεα θυγατέρας γλαυκωπιδας ανθεσιουργους*

since the Diana and the Minerva which she contains preserve their virginity always the same. For the former of these is characterized according to her stability, but the latter according to her convertive energy. But that which is generative is allotted in her a middle order. They say too, that she aspires after virginity, since the form of her is comprehended in the vivific fountain, and she understands fontal virtue, gives subsistence to supermundane and anagogic virtue, and despises all material sexual connexion, though she inspects the fruits arising from it. She appears also to be averse to the generations and progressions of things, but to introduce perfections to them. And she gives perfection indeed to souls through a life according to virtue; but to mortal animals she imparts a restitution to form. But that there is a great union between Diana, the mundane Hecate, and Core, is evident to those that are in the least degree conversant with the writings of Orpheus; from

* See page 527.

† That is, the Corybantes.

which it appears that Latona is comprehended in Ceres, and together with Jupiter gives subsistence to Core, and the mundane Hecate. To which we may also add that Orpheus * calls Diana Hecate. So that it is nothing wonderful, if we should elsewhere call the Diana contained in Core, Hecate.

That Plato coarranges the mundane Bacchus † with the mundane Venus, in consequence of her love of Bacchus, and her fashioning, as an image of him, Adonis much honoured in Cilicia and Cyprus. And it is evident that a love of this kind in Venus, which is thus beneficent and providential, must be considered as exerted by a superior to an inferior divinity.

That the young man appears to inquire about our sovereign master Bacchus, as if it were about things of small importance, and on this account he is silenced ‡ by Socrates. And he does not indeed hear concerning the occult, but only the last and mundane progressions of the gods. These indeed the wise man venerates, though, as he says, they are sports, through these gods being lovers of sport. For, as he says of the terminations of the other gods, that they are terrible, and that they avenge and punish, and thus give perfection to souls; as, for instance, that Justice follows Jupiter, the avenger of the divine law, and that this divinity is benevolent to those whose manners are orderly, and who live according to intellect, but that she is baneful to those who mingle their life with insolence and ignorance, until she has entirely subverted them, their houses, and cities;—in like manner, he venerates the terminations of Bacchus and Venus, which produce *γλυκυθυμία*, *sweetness of sensation*; every where purifying our conceptions concerning the gods, and preparing us to understand that all things look to the best end, whatever it may be. For, because the terminations of these divinities strengthen the infirmity of the mortal nature, and recall corporeal molestation, on this account the gods, the causes of these things, are *φιλοπαιγμονες*, *lovers of sport*. Hence, of statues, they make some of them laughing and dancing, and exhibiting relaxation, but others austere, astonishing, and terrible to the view, analogously to the mundane allotments of the gods.

* Ηδ' ἀρ' ἐκὰς παιδὸς μέλη αὐτὴ λυπούσα
 Λήτους ἐπιλαχμαῖο κορὴ προσέειπ' αἰὲν ὀλίμπιον.

† See p. 527.

‡ This is implied by Socrates telling him that he inquires about *great* things.

That theologists frequently call Bacchus *wine*, from the last of his gifts, as, for instance, Orpheus,

Οἶνου πάντα μέλη κόσμῳ λαΐει, καὶ μοι ἐνεκεν.

i. e. "Take all the members of wine (that are distributed) in the world, and bring them to me."

But if the god is thus denominated, certainly his first and middle energies will be thus called, as well as his last; so that Socrates, now looking to this, calls the god *διδωνος*, beginning from wine, which, as we have said, manifests all the powers of the god. Thus also in the Phædrus, Socrates calls love in common *great*, both that which is divine, and that which is a lover of body. By this epithet *wine* therefore, we must understand that the idiom of a partial intellect is in common presented to our view. For the word *οἶνον*, *such as*, is nothing else than intellectual form separated from a total intellect, and in consequence of this becoming participated, *particular* and *alone*. For an all-perfect intellect is all things, and energizes according to all things with invariable sameness; but a partial and participated intellect is indeed all things, but this according to one form, such as a solar, lunar, or mercurial form. This therefore, the idiom of which is to be separated from the rest, wine indicates, signifying an intellect *such as*, and *particular* (*σημαινων του οἶνου και τινας νουν*). Since therefore every partial fabrication is suspended from the Dionysiacal monad, which distributes participated mundane intellects from total intellect*, many souls from one soul, and all sensible forms from their proper totalities; on this account theologists call both this god and all his fabrications *wine*: for all these are the progeny of intellect; and some things participate of the partial distribution of intellect in a more distant, but others in a nearer degree. *Wine* therefore energizes in things analogous to its subsistence in them: in body, indeed, after the manner of an image, according to a false opinion and imagination; but in intellectual natures, according to an intellectual energy and fabrication; since, in the laceration of Bacchus by the Titans, the *heart* of the god is said to have alone remained undistributed, i. e. *the indivisible essence of intellect*. Οτι τον δεσποτην ημων Διουσπον, οι θεολογοι πολλανεις,

* With respect to intellect, it is necessary to inform the reader, that one kind is imparticipable and total, such as all intellects unconnected with soul; but another participable indeed, but essentially so, such as the mundane intellect, and the intellects of all the mundane gods and beneficent dæmons; but a third is participable, and subsists as a *hulit*; and to this class our intellects belong.

και απο των τελευταίων αυτων δυνυν ονον καλουσιν.—Οστις ως ειρηται πασών εστι δηλωτικός των του Θεου δυναμεων. Ωσπερ και εν Φαιδρω τον μεγαν ερωτα κοινως λεγει, τον τε Ξειον, και τον Φιλοσωματον. Ο ουν ονος ουτος κοινως εξακουσμενος, την ιδιοτητα του μερικου νου παριστῃσιν ημιν. Το γαρ οιν, ουκ αλλο τι εστιν ἢ το διηκμενον απο του ολου, και μετεχμενον ηδη νοερον ειδος, και οιον, και μονον γενομενον. Ο μεν γαρ πατελης ιους παντοι' (*lege* πανται') εστι και ενεργει κατὰ πάντα ωσαυτως. Ο δε μερικος και μετεχμενος παντα μεν, αλλα καθ' εν ειδος, οιον το ηλιακον, η το σεληνιακον, ἢ το ερμιακον. Επειδη τειν η μεριστη δημιουργια πασα της δικυσιακης εξηρηται μοναδος, διαιρυστα τους μεν μεθεκτους εν τω κοσμῳ νοας απο του ολου νου, τας δε πλλας ψυχας, απο της μιας, τα δ' ειδη τα ακυθητα παντα απο των οικειων ολότητων, δια δι τούτο και αυτον τον Θεον οινον προσεηκασιν οι Ξεολογοι, αυτον τε, και παντα τα δημιουργηματα αυτου. Παντα γαρ εγγονα του νου. Και τα μεν παρρωτερον, τα δ' εγγυτερον μετεχει της μεριστης του νου διανομης. Αναλογως ουν εν τοις ουσιν ο οινος εγγινεμενος ενεργει. Εν μεν τῇ σωματι ειδωλικως, κατὰ ομῃσιν, και φαντασιαν ψευδη. Εν δε τοις νοεροις το κατὰ νουν ενεργειν, και δημιουργειν. Επει και εν τη διασπαρραξει των τιτανων μογη η καρδια αδιαμετος μιναι λεγεται· τρυτεστιν η αμερης του νου ουσια.

That from sportive conceptions about the gods it is possible for those to energize en-theastically, or according to a divinely inspired energy, who apply themselves to things in a more intellectual manner. Thus, for instance, according to the material conceptions of the multitude, Venus derives her origin from foam; and foam corresponds to feed. Hence according to them the pleasure arising from this in coition is Venus. Who, however, is so stupid *, as not to survey primary and eternal natures, prior to such as are last and corruptible? I will therefore unfold the divine conception respecting Venus.

They say then that the first Venus was produced from two-fold causes, the one as that *through which* †, cooperating with her progression, as calling forth the prolific power of the father, and imparting it to the intellectual orders; but Heaven as the maker and cause unfolding the goddess into light, from his own generative abundance. For whence could that which congregates different genera, according to one desire of beauty, receive

* A countless multitude we may say, O Proclus, of the present day are thus stupid; and few, very few indeed, have entertained a different opinion for upwards of a thousand years.

† This cause is Saturn, who according to the fable cut off the genital parts of Heaven. See the Theogony of Hesiod,

its subsistence except from the *synochical* power of Heaven? From the foam therefore of his own prolific parts thrown into the sea, Heaven produced this goddess, as Orpheus says. But the second Venus Jupiter produces from his own generative powers, in conjunction with Dione: and this goddess likewise proceeds from foam, after the same manner with the more ancient Venus, as Orpheus evinces. These goddesses therefore differ from each other, according to the causes of their production, their orders, and their powers. For she that proceeds from the genitals of Heaven is supermundane, leads upwards to intelligible beauty, is the supplier of an unpolled life, and separates from generation. But the Venus that proceeds from Dione governs all the coordinations in the celestial world and the earth, binds them to each other, and perfects their generative progressions, through a kindred conjunction. These divinities too are united with each other through a similitude of subsistence: for they both proceed from generative powers; one from that of the connectedly containing power of Heaven, and the other from Jupiter the demiurgus. But the sea signifies an expanded and circumscribed life; its profundity, the universally extended progression of such a life; and its foam, the greatest purity of nature, that which is full of prolific light and power, and that which swims upon all life, and is as it were its highest flower.

That theologists especially celebrate two powers of our sovereign mistress Minerva *, the *defensive* and the *perfective*, the former preserving the order of wholes undefiled, and unvanquished by matter, and the other filling all things with intellectual light, and converting them to their cause; on which account Plato also in the *Timæus* analogously celebrates Minerva as *philopolemic*, and *philosophic*. But three orders of this goddess are delivered by theologists; the one fontal and intellectual, according to which she establishes herself in her father Jupiter, and subsists in unproceeding union with him; but the second ranks among the supermundane gods, according to which she is present with Core, and bounds and converts all the progression of that goddess to herself. And the third is *liberated*, according to which she perfects and guards the whole world, and circularly invests it with her powers, as with a veil; binding together all the mundane summits, and giving subsistence to all the allotments in the Heavens, and to those which proceed into the sublunary region. Now therefore Socrates celebrates her *guardian* power, through the name of *Pallas*; but her *perfective* power through that of *Minerva*. She

* See p. 529.

is the cause therefore of orderly and measured motion, which she first imparts to the Curetic order, and afterwards to the other gods. For Minerva, according to this power, is the leader of the Curetes, as Orpheus says, whence also, as well as those divinities, she is adorned with empyrean arms, through which she represses all disorder, preserves the demiurgic series immovable, and unfolds dancing through rhythmical motion. She also guards reason as it proceeds from intellect; through this power vanquishing matter. For the visible region, says Timæus, is mingled from intellect and necessity, the latter being obedient to the former, and all material causes being in subjection to the will of the father. It is this goddess therefore who arranges necessity under the productions of intellect, raises the universe to the participation of Jupiter, excites and establishes it in the port of its father, and eternally guards and defends it. Hence, if the universe is said to be indissoluble, it is this goddess who supplies its permanency; and if it moves in measured motion, through the whole of time, according to one reason and order, she is the source of this supply. She watchfully surveys therefore all the fabrication of her father, and connects and converts it to him; and vanquishes all material indefiniteness. Hence she is called *Victory* and *Healer*; the former because she causes intellect to rule over necessity, and form over matter; and the latter, because she preserves the universe perpetually whole, perfect, exempt from age, and free from disease. It is the property therefore of this goddess to elevate and distribute, and through an intellectual dance, as it were, to connect, establish, and defend inferior natures in such as are more divine*.

* These admirable Scholia on the Cratylus end here; being unfortunately, like most both of the published and unpublished writings of Proclus, incomplete. These very Scholia too appear to be nothing more than extracts from a copious commentary of Proclus which is lost.

THE END.